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An Overlooked Type of Inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 December 2009

Arnold Kunst
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A Detailed analysis of single statements corroborates more and more our conviction that the elements of Hindu mentality (viz. philosophy, religion, and fine arts) are subject to certain fixed and common rules of thinking. If we acknowledge any one analytical method—of course the most general possible—as sufficient and adequate, we can presume that whatever may at any time be the object of our analysis must follow the method adopted. If we accept as a principle for the veracity of all judgments that they must be subjected to the rule of sapakṣe sattva and vipakṣe asattva, then the analysis will show that in reality all statements are measurable under the aspect of those two criteria. The only breach in this principle was made by a Jaina logical school which, while anticipating the principles of our “implication”, admits the syllogism fulfilling the anyathānupapannatva condition, i.e. it accepts as true conditional sentences of which the protasis does not reach beyond the sphere of the predicated subject (pakṣa). In other words: the argument, when predicating a fact, forms a true sentence, even if it does not predicate the class to which the fact belongs. Whilst the Buddhist syllogism oscillates between class inference and sentence calculus (sapakṣa and vipakṣa being the necessary conditions), the Jaina syllogism advances exclusively the sentence calculus, and the validity of the predication is confined merely to the implication in question.

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Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies , Volume 10 , Issue 4 , February 1942 , pp. 976 - 991
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Copyright © School of Oriental and African Studies 1942

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References

page 976 note 1 Sapakṣe sattva (lit. the presence in the homogeneous class of subjects) is one of the marks of a valid argument (hetu). A judgment in which the rule of the sapakṣe sattva is fulfilled is a sentence where the subject of the proposition (sādhyadharmin) as a variable can be replaced by another subject predicated by the same predicate (sādhyadharma) and proved by the same argument (hetu or hetudharma). AH subjects to which the same sādhyadharma and the same hetudharma can be applied belong to the sapakṣa of the sādhyadharmin.

page 976 note 2 Vipakṣe asattva (lit. the absence in the heterogeneous class of subjects) is also one of the marks of the valid hetu. It is the negative formulation of the sapakṣe sattva. A judgment in which the rule of the vipakṣe asattva is fulfilled is a sentence where the sādhyadharmin as a variable cannot be replaced by another subject predicated by the same sādhyadharma and at the same time denied by tbe hetudharma. All subjects which are thus contradictory to the sādhyadharmin are its vipakṣa. There would be a subtle difference in both the above definitions if we started from, the predicates and not from the subjects. Then we should consider the subjects as statical values and the predicates as variable ones. That, however, would be important only for the deduction of the vipakṣa definition from the sapakṣa definition.

page 976 note 3 Cf. Tattvasaṅgraha, 1365 ff.

page 977 note 1 Cf. my Problems der Buddhistischen Logik Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Cracow, 1939, pp. 12 ff.Google Scholar

page 978 note 1 Cf. Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa, 10, 25.

page 978 note 2 Cf. Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa, 10, 35

page 982 note 1 Tattvasaṅgraha, 1435.

page 983 note 1 Johnston, E. H., The Saundarananda of Aśvaghosa, critically edited with notes by…, Panjab University Oriental Publications, Oxford University Press, London, 1928Google Scholar. Johnston, E. H., The Saundarananda or Nanda the Fair, translated from the original Sanskrit of AśVaghosa by…, Panjab University Publications No. 14, Oxford University Press, London, 1932Google Scholar. Johnston, E. H., The Buddhacarita: Or, Acts of Buddha. Part I— Sanskrit text edited by…, Panjab University Oriental Publications No. 31, Calcutta, 1935Google Scholar. Johnston, E. H., The Buddhacarita: Or, Acts of the Buddha. Part II— Cantos I to XIV translated from the original Sanskrit supplemented by the Tibetan version, together with an Introduction and Notes, by…, Panjab University Oriental Publications No. 32, Calcutta, 1936Google Scholar. Besides the verses quoted prāg eva occurs also in Buddhacarita, iv, 10; xi, 7, and in Saundarananda, ii, 24. Kuta eva occurs in Bhagavadgītā, Ṥakuntalā, Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, etc.

page 984 note 1 Cf. Heimann, Betty, Studien zur Eigenart indischen Denkens, p. 208Google Scholar: Auch die indische Logik und Erkenntnistheorie ist durchaus ursprungs- und zweckbestimmt durch die Gesamtweltanschaimng.

page 984 note 2 Cf. also the Pāli-English Dictionary s.v.

page 984 note 3 Introduction to the Translation of the Buddhatarita, p. lxviii.

page 985 note 1 Cf. Glasenapp, H. v., “Zur Geschichte der buddh. Dharma-Theorie,” ZDMG., 1938, p. 385Google Scholar.

page 986 note 1 Schwarz, Adolf, Der Hermeneutische Syllogismus in der talmudischen Litteratur. Ein Beitrag zu der Geschichte der Logik im Morgenland. Karlsruhe, 1921Google Scholar.

page 986 note 8 Strack, Hermann L., Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, Philadelphia, 1931, p. 94Google Scholar, and Mielziner, M., Introduction to the Talmud, New York, 1925, pp. 130 ffGoogle Scholar.

page 986 note 3 Bacher, Wilhelm, Die exegetische Terminologie der jüdischen Traditions-literatur. I. Teil: Die Bibelexegetische Terminologie der Tannaiten, Leipzig, 1899Google Scholar.

page 986 note 4 Cf. M. Mielziner, op. cit.

page 987 note 1 Midrash Rabbah on Genesis, 27, 22. Transl. by DrFreedman, H., 1939, vol. ii, p. 597 (Toledoth, lxv, 20)Google Scholar.

page 987 note 2 Kiṃpunar and qal waḥomer inferences are formulated as interrogative sentences the difference being that kiṃpunar puts the question in the apodosis, and qal waḥomer the first sentence. The first sentence formulated as an interrogation does not serve merely to address the common people with a rhetorical question. It is a formulation which rests the veracity of the assertion upon common sense as an epistemological base. We should call it in India pramāṇa. In the passages quoted below the interrogative form has unfortunately not been respected by some of the translators.

page 988 note 1 Cf. Lukasiewicz, J., The Principles of Mathematical Logic (in Polish), Warsaw, 1929Google Scholar.

page 988 note 2 Bergsträsser, G., Anfänge und Charakter des juristischen Denkens im Islam, Islam, xiv, 1924, pp. 76 ffGoogle Scholar.

page 988 note 3 Graf, L. I., Al-Shāfi‘ī’s Verhandeling over de “Wortelen” van den Fiḳh, Paris- Amsterdam, 1934, p. 73Google Scholar.

page 989 note 1 Translation of Muhammad, MaulviAli, The Holy Qur-án, Lahore, 1920Google Scholar. There is another example quoted by Santillana, D. in his Istituzioni di diritto Musulmano malichita (Roma, 1926)Google Scholar. The example is that a judge should not judge in a state of anger; all the more should he refrain from judging in a state of physical or mental disease. But on the whole the book does not contribute much to our problem, and even the quoted example is dealt with in connection with another question.

page 989 note 2 Cf. Juynboll, Th. W., Handbuch des Islamischen Gesetzes naeh der Lehre der Schāfi‘itischen Schule, Leiden-Leipzig, 1910, pp. 50 ff.Google Scholar

page 990 note 1 Bhagavadgītā, 9, 32–3. Transl. by Thomas, E. J., Wisdom of the East, London, 1931Google Scholar.

page 990 note 2 Proverbs, xi, 31.

page 990 note 3 Exodus, vi, 12.

page 990 note 4 Meghadüta 17, Transl. by King, Ch., Wisdom of the East, London, 1930Google Scholar.

page 990 note 5 Deuteronomy, xxxii, 27.

page 990 note 6 Varāhamihira's Brhatsaṃhitā; cf. Whish, C. M., Über den Ursprung und das Alter des indischen Tierkreises (translated from the Transactions of the Lit. Soc. Of Madras), ZDKM., 4, Bonn, 1842, pp. 302–328Google Scholar.

page 990 note 7 See above.

page 990 note 8 RāmāSyaṇa, 3.3.3/4; the translation of the author.

page 991 note 1 For instance: Rāmāyaṇa, 2.23.11/12; 4.7.3; 4.28.21/22 (ed. Gorresio); Pañcatantra, 45.5 (ed. Kosegarten). In Hertel's edition this aphorism has been omitted. Meghadūta, 3; etc., etc. Genesis, xlvi, 8; Job, iv, 18; ix, 13–14; xvi, 15–16; Psalms, lxxviii, 19–20. Pesiqta, , ed. S. Buber, Lyck, 1868, 10a; 124a; 126b; etc., etcGoogle Scholar.