Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-9q27g Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-20T02:21:01.391Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Meta-Strategic Lobbying: The 1998 Steel Imports Case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Douglas A. Brook
Douglas A. Brook*
Affiliation:
Naval Postgraduate School
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

In 1998, the domestic steel industry in the United States devised and executed a complex and sophisticated effort to achieve an effective non-market response to a sudden, persistent, and damaging surge of imported steel. This campaign lasted until 2002, when President George W. Bush invoked Section 201 of the U.S. trade laws to impose tariffs on imports of most steel products. This case of the steel industry's trade policy campaign provides an opportunity to examine selected models of protection-seeking industries and lobbying to ask why and how the steel coalition achieved this extraordinary governmental response. These questions are explored though a descriptive case of the steel industry's protection-seeking campaign followed by a comparative examination of previous models of protection-seeking firms, and lobbying to achieve protectionist policies. A comparison with selected models of the determinants of protection-seeking and factors affecting lobbying strategies show that most, almost all, were present in the steel case. In fact, a meta-strategic approach that transcends the customary understanding of lobbying is suggested in a complex policy environment. Such an environment can be characterized by: the need to influence multiple governmental entities – legislative, regulatory, executive; the desire for multiple outcomes with varying levels of specificity – laws or resolutions, administrative rulings, policy choices; interactions between different levels and branches of government; employment of coordinated interrelated lobbying techniques; and simultaneity of these factors.

Keywords

trade policylobbyingsteel
Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , April 2005 , pp. 1 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2005 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

References

Aggarwal, Vinod K., Keohane, Robert O. and Yoffie, David B. 1987. The Dynamics of Negotiated Protectionism. American Political Science Review 81(2): 345–366.Google Scholar
Baron, David P. Business and Its Environment; 2nd Edition. 1996. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Brook, Douglas A. 1998. Steel: Trade Policy in a Changed Environment. In Constituent Interests and U. S. Trade Policies. edited by Deardorff, A. and Stern, R., 133–144. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Brook, Douglas A. 2003. Trade Policy Strategies and Enforcement Choices: An Examination of the 1992 Steel Antidumping Cases. The International Trade Journal 42(1): 81–100.Google Scholar
Cherington, Paul W. and Gillen, Ralph L. 1962. The Business Representative in Washington: A Report on the Roundtable Discussion of Nineteen Washington Representatives on Their Job as They See It. Washington: Brookings.Google Scholar
Damania, Richard and Fredriksson, Per G. 2000. On the Formation of Lobbying Groups. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations 41: 315–335.Google Scholar
Deardorff, Alan V. and Stern, Robert M., eds. 1998. Constituent Interests and U.S. Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
De Figueiredo, John M. 2002. Lobbying and Information in Politics. Business and Politics 4(2): 125–129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finger, J. M. and Murray, T. 1990. Policing Unfair Imports: The United States Example. Journal of World Trade 24(4): 39–53.Google Scholar
Gale, Jeffrey and Buchholz, Rogene A. 1987. The Political Pursuit of Competitive Advantage: What Business Can Gain from Government. In Business Strategy and Public Policy: Perspectives from Industry and Academia. edited by Marcus, Alfred A., Kaufman, Allen M. and Beam, David R. New York: Quorum.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Thomas W. 2002. Money and Politics in the Current Contemporary Congress. Business and Politics 2(1): 5–7.Google Scholar
Grier, Kevin B., Munger, Michael C. and Roberts, Brian E. 1994. The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986. American Political Science Review 88(4): 911–926.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan. 1994. Protection for Sale. American Economic Review 94(4): 833–850.Google Scholar
Hart, David M. 2003. Political Representation in Concentrated Industries: Revising the “Olsonian Hypothesis.” Business and Politics 5(3): 261–286.Google Scholar
Heath, Robert L. and Nelson, Richard. 1986. Issues Management: Corporate Public Policymaking in an Information Society. Newberry Park, CA: Sage.Google Scholar
Hillman, Amy J. and Hitt, Michael A. 1999. Corporate Political Strategy Formulation: A Model of Approach, Participation, and Strategy Decisions. Academy of Management Review 24(4): 825–842.Google Scholar
Hillman, Ayre L. 1982. Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives. American Economic Review 72(5): 1180–1187.Google Scholar
Hogan, W. T. 1994. Steel in the 21st Century: Competition Forces a New World Order. New York: Lexington.Google Scholar
Hojnacki, Marie and Kimball, David C. 1999. The Who and How of Organizations’ Lobbying Strategies in Committee. The Journal of Politics 61(4): 999–1024.Google Scholar
Hojnacki, Marie and Kimball, David C. 1998. Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress. American Political Science Review 92(4): 775–791.Google Scholar
Howell, Thomas R., Noellert, William A., Kreier, Jesse G., and Wm. Wolff, Alan. 1988. Steel and the State. Boulder: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Keim, Gerald D. and Baysinger, Barry D. 1982. Corporate Political Strategies Examined; Constituency-Building May Be the Best. Public Affairs Review 3: 77–87.Google Scholar
Krueger, Anne O., ed. 1995. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lord, Michael D. 2000. Constituency-based Lobbying as Corporate Political Strategy: Testing an Agency Theory Perspective. Business and Politics 2(3): 287–308.Google Scholar
Milyo, Jeffrey. 2002. Bribes and Fruit Baskets: What Does the Link Between PAC Contributions and Lobbying Mean? Business and Politics 4(2): 157–159.Google Scholar
Milyo, Jeffrey, Primo, David and Groseclose, Timothy. 2000. Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective. Business and Politics 2(1): 75–88.Google Scholar
Moore, M. 1995. Steel Protection in the 1980s: The Waning Influence of Big Steel. In The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Edited by Krueger, A. O., 73–132. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Oberman, William D. 1993. Strategy and Tactic Choice in an Institutional Research Context. In Corporate Political Agency: The Construction of Competition in Public Affairs. edited by Melnick, Barry M. Newberry Park, CA: Sage.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Rodrik, Dani. 1995. Political Economy of Trade Policy. In Handbook of International Economics, Volume III. edited by Grossman, Gene and Rogoff, Kenneth. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V. Google Scholar
Salisbury, Robert H., Heinz, John P., Laumann, Edward O., and Nelson, Robert. 1987. Who Works With Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition. American Political Science Review 81(4): 1217–1234.Google Scholar
Schuler, Douglas A. 1996. Corporate Political Strategy and Foreign Competition: The Case of the Steel Industry. Academy of Management Journal. 39(3): 720–737.Google Scholar
Snyder, Jr., James, M. 1992. Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or Give Early, Give Often. Journal of Law and Economics 35: 15–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stand Up For Steel. 2003. The American Steel Industry: Current Trade Issues. Washington, DC.Google Scholar
Tripathi, Mickey, Ansolabehere, Stephen and Snyder, James. 2002. Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act. Business and Politics 4(2): 131–155.Google Scholar
Whitford, Andrew B. 2003. The Structure of Interest Coalitions: Evidence from Environmental Litigation. Business and Politics 5(1): 45–64.Google Scholar
Yoffie, David B. 1987. Corporate Strategies for Political Action: A Rational Model. In Business Strategy and Public Policy: Perspectives from Industry and Academia. edited by Marcus, Alfred A., Kaufman, Allen M. and Beam, David R. New York: Quorum.Google Scholar