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Dangerous Work, Intention, and the Ethics of Hazard Pay

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2020

Adam D. Bailey
Adam D. Bailey*
Affiliation:
Black Hills State University
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Abstract

Is offering hazard pay ethically permissible when the pay premium is the only reason that a dangerous job is accepted? Robert C. Hughes argues that it is not. Central to his argument is the claim that in such cases, workers intend the foreseeable risks of harm as a means to the pay premium. Herein I question the plausibility of this claim and then develop a conception of the concept of means sufficient to make it plausible. By so doing, I provide support for Hughes’s stringent position.

Keywords

double effectdangerous workhazard payintentionmeansrisk
Type
Commentary
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , October 2020 , pp. 591 - 602
Copyright
© 2020 Business Ethics Quarterly

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