Discussions of the ethics of advertising have been based on a general distinction between informative and persuasive advertising without looking at specific techniques of persuasion. Self-identity image ads persuade by presenting an image of an idealized person-type such as a “beautiful” woman (Chanel) or a sexy teen (Calvin Klein). The product becomes a symbol of the ideal, and target consumers are invited to use the product to project the self-image to themselves and others. This paper argues that image ads are not false or misleading, and that whether or not they advocate false values is a matter for subjective reflection. Image ads can undermine a consumer’s self-esteem by collectively omitting images authentic for that sort of person (such as large women), and by combining impossible images with implied gaze. Image ads generally do not undermine autonomy of choice, internal autonomy, or social autonomy. It is concluded that image advertising is a basically ethical technique, but several recommendations are given on how use of image advertising can avoid specific harms.

In addressing the theme of this special issue of Business Ethics Quarterly on business ethics in the new millennium, I want to focus not on business ethics as an academic field of study but rather on ethics in business. By ethics in business I mean the standards for ethical conduct that are generally recognized in business and the ways in which these standards are established. Ethics in business in this sense is, at least in part, what the field of business ethics studies.

The traditional model of ethical decision making in business suggests applying an initial set of principles to a concrete problem and if they conflict the decision maker may attempt to balance them intuitively. The centrality of the ethical conflict in the accepted notion of “ethical problem” has diverted the attention of moral decision modelers from other ethical problems that real-world managers must face—e.g., compliance problems, moral laxity, and systemic problems resulting from the structures and practices of the business organization. The present article proposes a new model for ethical decision making in business—the Phase-model—designed to meet the full spectrum of business-related ethical problems. Drawing on the dominant moral theories in business literature, the model offers additional strategies for tackling ethical issues beyond the traditional cognitive operations of deductive application of principles to specific cases and the balancing of ethical considerations. Its response to the problems of moral pluralism in the context of decision making lies in its structural features. The model distinguishes between three phases of the decision-making process, each having a different task and a different theoretical basis. After an introductory stage in which the ethical problem is defined, the first phase focuses on a principle-based evaluation of a course of action; the second phase provides a virtue-based perspective of the situation and strategies for handling unsettled conflicts and compliance problems; and the third phase adapts the decision to empirical accepted norms. An illustrative case demonstrates the applicability of the model to business real life.

Managers have the primary role responsibility to protect and promote the economic viability of their organizations. Utilizing a formula that demonstrates the inherently unstable nature of economic systems, I argue that managers are sometimes morally required to make adjustments that result in harming people who work for them in order to reestablish the equilibrium necessary to remain viable. The question of who is going to be harmed and how this harm is morally justified is the focal point of this paper. I argue that utilizing traditional methods associated with our common morality cannot solve the issue of who is going to be harmed, and that the traditional methods for reestablishing equilibrium promote a distribution of harm that cannot be justified from a rationally defensible moral point of view. Utilizing the constraint of impartiality and the concept of the health of the organization, I argue that an equal distribution of harm among everyone affected by the decision is the only one that is rationally defensible.

Although BEQ is celebrating its tenth anniversary, business ethics is considerably older than that. Business ethics has been a staple of Catholic thinking on business for most of this century at least. For most philosophers, however, business ethics is about twenty-five years old. Philosophers became active in the field in the mid-1970s. I have chosen as my topic for this essay the role that the discipline of philosophy could play in the future.

This paper carries forward the conceptual clarification of normative theories of business ethics ably begun by Hasnas in the January 1998 issue of BEQ. This paper proposes a normatively neutral framework for discussing and assessing such normative theories. Every normative theory needs to address these seven issues: it needs to specify a moral principle that identifies (1) recommended values and (2) the grounds for accepting those values. It also must specify (3) a decision principle that business people who accept the theory can use. It must determine (4) who the normative theory applies to and (5) whose interests need to be considered. It must also outline (6) in what contexts it applies, and (7) what legal and regulatory structures it assumes. Once clarified, this paper applies the framework to the normative versions of stockholder theory, stakeholder theory, and ISCT. It is concluded that ISCT is the most promising normative theory currently under discussion, but that there are some major issues that ISCT has not dealt with yet.

In this paper I explore the topic of moral compromise in institutional settings and highlight how moral compromise may affirm, rather than undermine, personal integrity. Central to this relationship between moral compromise and integrity is a view of the self that is responsive to multiple commitments and grounded in an ethic of responsibility. I elaborate a number of virtues that are related to this notion of the self and highlight how these virtues may support the development of individuals who are responsive and reasonable in moral discourse and discerning in establishing moral limits on compromise. I look at how moral regret is closely connected to moral compromise and emphasize its significance for reinforcing personal integrity. The paper closes with a discussion of the relevance of these topics to the field of business ethics.

The empirical-normative split in business ethics is another manifestation of the fact-value problem that has existed between science and philosophy for several centuries. This paper explores classical American pragmatism’s understanding of the fact-value distinction, showing how it offers a different way of understanding the empirical business ethics–normative business ethics issue. Unfolding the pragmatic perspective on this issue involves a focus on its understanding of both the nature of empirical inquiry and the nature of normative inquiry.

One so-called paradox of blackmail concerns the fact that “two legal whites together make a black.” That is, it is licit to threaten to reveal a person’s secret, and it is separately lawful to ask him for money; but when both are undertaken at once, together, this act is called blackmail and is prohibited. A second so-called paradox is that if the blackmailer initiates the act, this is seen by jurists as blackmail and illicit, while if the blackmailee (the person blackmailed) originates the contract, this is commonly interpreted as bribery and is not illicit.

But these are paradoxes only for legal theorists innocent of libertarian theory. The authors use that perspective to reject the claim that blackmail should be unlawful. If this act were legalized, then both paradoxes would disappear, precisely their contention.

This study tests the usefulness of a person-situation interactionist framework in examining the willingness of a salesperson to lie to get an order. Using a survey of 389 salespersons, our results demonstrate that organizational relationships influence willingness to lie. Specifically, salespersons are less willing to lie to their own company than to their customer, than to a channel partner, and finally, than to a competitor firm. Furthermore, respondents from firms with a clear and positive ethical climate are less willing to lie. Finally, our study finds that interactions between personality factors, such as high Machiavellianism and high self-monitoring, and situational factors have an impact on willingness to lie. Our results suggest that firms can take steps to influence employee ethical behavior.

Business ethics serves the important social function of integrating business and society, by promoting the legitimacy of business operations, through critical reflection. Although the social function of business ethics is implicit in leading business ethics foundation theories, it has never been presented in a systematic way. This article sets out to fill this theoretical lacuna, and to explore the theoretical potentials of a functional approach to business ethics. Key concepts from Parsonian functionalistic sociology are applied to establish the social integrative function of business ethics. This produces a theoretical framework for business ethics that provides strong theoretical arguments against often-heard criticisms of business ethics. Many of these criticisms are ideological in nature, in that they systematically play down the importance of integrative functions in the business-society relationship, on the grounds of unrealistic assumptions about the performance of economic and bureaucratic institutions. However, business ethics itself can also become ideological, if it forgets that the conditions for the application of ethics to business are not always ideal as well.

One of the most important and challenging issues of business ethics—or indeed of ethics more generally—is that of “moral responsibility.” And though this problem has been with us from the outset of reflection on ethics and business, the following developments in the late twentieth century have exacerbated its difficulty: the increased mobility among people, the development of increasingly complex technologies with ever more significant consequences, the extension of the distance between people’s actions and the effects of their actions, the extended distance between the manufacturers of products and the consequences of those products, the expanded possibilities for anonymous actions, and the collapse of many customary forms of restraints between both individuals and organizations. As a consequence, I believe, we are in the midst of rethinking and developing new and creative ways of extending our notion of responsibility.

Since the Enlightenment our attachment to the past has been greatly weakened, in some areas of social life it has almost ceased to exist. This characteristic of the modern mind is seen as an overreaction. The modern mind has lost the capacity to appreciate the positive contribution the maintenance of the past in the present achieves in social life, especially in the sphere of moral conduct.

In the field of organization theory, nowhere is the past as explicitly distrusted as in critical organization theory. The maintenance of the past in the present is seen as a potential carrier of oppressive and unjust social relationships. Perpetual critique is advocated as a means to uncover these oppressive and unjust relations and prevent any new undemocratic relations from becoming established.

I present an historical and cultural analysis of the modern attitude toward the past and develop a concept of moral tradition to analyze critical organization theory’s ethical assumptions and implications. In so doing, an effort is made to rectify the exaggerated confidence critical organization theory places in rationalism and individualism and to recognize the ineluctable role traditions play not only in organizational life, but also in the way we theorize about organizations.

In much of the written work on Christian or religious business ethics, a holistic framework is assumed but not argued for practically or supported philosophically. In this article I 1) outline a position of ethical holism, explaining its logic, motives, and consequences; 2) attack the ethical dualism of Carr, Friedman, and French; and 3) defend my theory against five possible objections. My basic thesis is that if a corporation wishes to hire employees who will act in compliance with ethical codes of the corporation, employees who both have a deeply rooted personal ethic that parallels that of the corporation and who see their business practices to be an extension of their personal ethic will be better suited candidates simply because they are more likely to be compliant. In other words, personal convictions and values are relevant to hiring practices, and a view that holds personal and business ethics to be separate affairs (Carr, Friedman, French) is misguided.

As we transition to the 21st century, it is useful to think about some of the most important challenges business and other organizations will face as the new millennium begins. What will constitute “business as usual” in the business ethics arena as we start and move into the new century? My overall thought is that we will pulsate into the future on our current trajectory and that the new century will not cause cataclysmic changes, at least not immediately. Rather, the problems and challenges we face now we will face then. Undoubtedly, new issues will arise but they will more likely be extensions of the present than discontinuities with the past.

Moral imagination is a reasoning process thought to counter the organizational factors that corrupt ethical judgment. We describe the psychology of moral imagination as composed of the four decision processes identified by Rest (1986), i.e., moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior. We examine each process in depth, distilling extant psychological research and indicating organizational implications. The conclusion offers suggestions for future research.

This article presents moral jurisprudence theory as a systematic approach to business ethics that analogizes core problems of the field to related problems in law. Adapting theoretical approaches from contemporary philosophy of law, the article develops a decision-making method for business ethics.

In this paper I will help provide some suggestions for a “postmodern” business ethic. I will do this by criticizing some recent work done in the field, and then put forth some basic themes in postmodern thinking that might be applied to business ethics. I will here criticize both Green’s and Walton’s articles on the possibility of postmodern business ethics. I will criticize Green on the grounds that his characterization of the definitive elements of postmodern thought are not definitive of postmodern thought. I will criticize Walton on the grounds that his portrayal of postmodern philosophy as inherently nihilistic and relativistic is mistaken. Finally, I will try to provide a few minimal principles (or tendencies) of a postmodern business ethic. Ultimately, what postmodernism has to offer business is not rules, but questions that raise issues of responsibility.

The detrimental impact of fraud on organisations, the economy, and society makes the fight against it imperative. The objective of this article is to show that a proper understanding of the phenomenon of fraud is required in order to be able to undermine it. Such an understanding required firstly a sufficient definition of fraud that can distinguish it clearly from the related phenomenon of corruption. Secondly, a theoretical framework for understanding and explaining fraud is needed. After providing both such a definition and a theoretical framework, the latter is then used in the analysis of interviews conducted with persons who were convicted on charges of fraud in South Africa. The findings of this analysis are thenused to suggest various avenues for fighting fraud. Among these suggestions are proposals indicating the role that ethical values can play in undermining fraud.

The extraordinarily rapid growth of global communications, information technology, and investments have energized hundreds of millions of business people and opened up immense opportunities in most of the countries of the world. Yet this apparently inevitable global business growth also has parallel dangers for people. In two areas the weaknesses of the global economy are evident: (1) Global business and financial operations with little accountability for long-term human needs; and (2) Goals and values of business managers that are not sufficient for business or for life.