¹ Many writers have tended to understate or ignore the activity and creativity of civilians in government, acting independently of corporate links, in pressing for ties between military and industrial sectors. David Horowitz, in his introduction to Horowitz, , ed., Corporations and the Cold War (New York, 1969) argued (p. 14)Google Scholar that the backgrounds of government officials demonstrate that: “In the postwar period, the strategic agencies of foreign policy — the State Department, the CIA, the Pentagon, and the Treasury, as well as the key Ambassadorial posts — have all been dominated by representatives and rulers of America's principal corporate financial empires.” Horowitz further suggested (p. 15) that corporate ideology dominates national policy “by the very fact that the dominant reality of the society is corporate.” Although this latter observation may well be correct, it offers no way of delineating the specific control of American policy. To say that national ideology is corporate does not automatically mean that it was an invention of businessmen. To postulate that corporations control national policy because the national ideology is corporate is to evade the real issue. In a free-wheeling effort, Cook, Fred J. asserted in The Warfare State (New York, 1962)Google Scholar that wartime Washington was divided between “the rapidly vanishing breed of New Dealers and even some of the dollar-a-year men who actually believed in democracy” and on the other side “the Military and the vast majority of Big Business.” This latter force was set in opposition to “the philosophy that government belonged to the people and should be operated for the welfare of the people.” The “Military” ran its domestic war, supposedly, by use of “stupendous power generated by virtually unlimited billions of war contracts, practically the total economic resources of the nation” (p. 55). Such arguments fail to recognize that President Franklin Roosevelt, his advisers, and the Congress (as well as the American public, theoretically, through their representatives) also had something to do with letting contracts. They also fail to note that watch-dog groups such as the Truman Committee filed quite favorable reports on war contracting. Even more significant is the unjustified assumption that the pursuit of “democracy” and the “welfare of the people” is inconsistent with the pursuit of a corporate ideology. Whether or not democracy and the corporate state are inconsistent, it must be remembered that Harry Truman and others gave no evidence of believing that they were. For a recent work that accepts the thesis of control by a corporate elite but rejects the notion of military control over national policy, see Kolko, Gabriel, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston, 1969)Google Scholar.

² On the general framework of the thinking inside the Truman Administration concerning defense mobilization, see Mrozek, Donald J., “Peace Through Strength: Strategic Air Power and the Mobilization of the United States for the Pursuit of Foreign Policy, 1945–1955” (Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1972)Google Scholar. The call for industrial mobilization and for integration of industrial and military planning became more urgent with the rapid development of air power and the acceptance of air power theories by government planners. Clark Clifford and George Elsey were leading White House advisers in outlining postwar defense policy and in delineating the relationship between military problems and the organization of the national economy. Clifford and Elsey drafted memoranda which served as the basis for presidential speeches, policy statements, and guidelines for legislation. It was common for them to make extensive annotations on their drafts, including many attributions of specific ideas to individual staff members. See, for example, Clark Clifford and George Elsey, “Outline of Message on Universal Military Training,” August 25, 1945, in the Papers of George Elsey (Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.), Universal Military Training folder #1 [henceforth cited as Elsey Papers, HSTL]; Memorandum from Clark Clifford to Samuel I. Rosenman, December 13, 1945, Elsey Papers, HSTL, Postwar Military Organization: Primary memoranda folder; George Elsey, draft manuscript and notes for Presidential press conference, May 1946, Elsey Papers, HSTL, Labor Legislation (May 1946) folder; and George Elsey, memorandum for the record, August 23, 1950, Elsey, Papers, HSTL, University Military Training folder #3. Truman himself appears to have surprised some of his aides and department heads, which suggests that the President was not merely dominated by his advisers. This impression is further supported by diary entries in the papers of Harold D. Smith (original at Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), and by memoranda in the Papers of James E. Webb (Harry S. Truman Library) suggesting that Truman sought to use the federal budget to influence policy and legislation in ways which these Budget Directors gave little indication of anticipating. Although a vast number of documents in the files of the Administration are unsigned and at first suggest “policy by accident” or by default to the bureaucracy, there is much to indicate that on critical matters there were often specific patterns of high-level influence in the development of proposals and in the advocacy of legislation to enact those proposals.

³ Although some have suggested that the search for government subsidy is the conventional and traditional pattern for aviation industrialists, it should be recognized that the economic circumstances of the postwar period were unconventional. Aviation leaders were behaving differently after the war because they had overestimated postwar demand for their products. Although that behavior deviated from prewar patterns, it resembled in many ways that of the automobile manufacturers, who were quite willing to return to domestic non-military markets because they envisioned strong civilian demand. In this respect, the postwar efforts of the U.S. Army to develop a satisfactory tank through the Chrysler Corporation were revealing in that Chrysler was by then willing to tell the Army to go elsewhere if the military's demands interfered with the firm's ability to supply a booming civilian market.

⁴ Indeed, in the years after 1945, the defense establishment saw constant change — exemplified in the so-called unification controversy, in the National Security Act of 1947, in executive modifications of the military establishment in 1948, in the National Security Act of 1949, in the bitter debate ostensibly over the merits of the B–36 bomber but actually over executive direction of the defense establishment, in the dislocations of the Korean War, and in efforts to smooth out defense burdens and budgets.

⁵ Opinion was strong among White House staff members Elsey and Clifford that military reorganization was impossible and pointless except as part of a general reorganization which would also affect civilian agencies and offices dealing with national security. Such a view also was held by important defense officials such as James Forrestal, who was influential in keeping the drive toward military unification stalled long enough to permit the development of support for the integration of civilian agencies into a common security program. See, for example, Memorandum from George Elsey to Samuel I. Rosenman concerning unification of the armed forces, December 15, 1945 [copy undated, notation added], Elsey Papers, HSTL, Postwar Military Organization: Primary memoranda folder. Forrestal urged organizing “the whole complex of our national, economic, military, and political power.” Memorandum from James Forrestal to Clark Clifford, September 7, 1946, Papers of Clark M. Clifford (Harry S. Truman Library), Unification Correspondence: General folder [henceforth Clifford Papers, HSTL]. For a contrary view, suggesting that the President was uninterested in the civil-military organization to be effected under the National Security Council, see Sander, Alfred D., “Truman and the National Security Council: 1945–1947,” Journal of American History, LIX (September, 1972), 369–388CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ The word “administration,” as indicated above, here refers primarily to Truman and his close advisers such as Clark Clifford, George Elsey, and Samuel Rosenman. Certain important figures such as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, as the President's agent in the creation of the budget and as his watchdog in its use as an instrument of executive policy, also qualify for inclusion within the inner circle according to this definition. The term does not include all cabinet members or officials of the executive branch indiscriminately, however, nor all high-ranking military men. In this respect, for present purposes, Louis Denfield, Chief of Naval Operations until 1949, does not qualify for inclusion within the administration because he had little influence on overall policy. Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley, Army Chiefs of Staff, can, however, be considered within the “administration” because of their close cooperation with the White House during their tenures and because of the proximity of their views to those of the President and his close advisers on defense. It is significant, for example, that Eisenhower stayed on as a leading, formal adviser on military matters after his retirement from command of the Army and his assumption of the presidency of Columbia University. Eisenhower's views remained valuable to Truman because the President was predisposed to expect congenial advice from the general. The cases of Truman's dealings with Admiral Denfield, Henry Wallace, and Douglas MacArthur suggest counter-examples of high-ranking experts whose advice carried no weight in setting administration policy because it deviated from Truman's expectations and preferences.

⁷ James Forrestal, speech to Navy Industrial Association of New York, September 11, 1944; Papers of James Forrestal (Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey), Miscellaneous Files, “Navy Industrial Association of N.Y.” folder [henceforth Forrestal Papers, PUL].

⁸ Ira C. Eaker, circular letter to A. A. F. commanding officers, January 23, 1946, Records of the President's Air Policy Commission (Harry S. Truman Library), Betts folder [henceforth Finletter Commission, HSTL].

⁹ Budget Bureau staff memorandum (“Misconceptions Arising Out of Mobilization Experience in the Last War”), undated, Papers of James E. Webb (Harry S. Truman Library), Mobilization folder [henceforth Webb Papers, HSTL].

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Memorandum (“Organization of the National Security Resources Board”), undated, Webb Papers, HSTL, Mobilization folder #2.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Memorandum (“Proposal for Establishment of a Permanent National Security Resources Board”), undated, Clifford Papers, HSTL, National Military Establishment, Security Resources folder.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Testimony of George P. Saunders, sent to Air Policy Commission, undated, Finletter Commission, HSTL, Saunders folder. As Edward M. Coffman suggested to the author, there is some official testimony to support the argument that the armed services were slow to anticipate a new war after 1945. As late as 1949, for example, the U.S. Army had made little effort to develop lines of supply and communication across France. Huston, James A., The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775–1953 (Washington, D.C., 1966)Google Scholar attributes the first moves toward logistical preparedness to shock over the Berlin blockade and asserts that they were intensified in response to the outbreak of the Korean War (see pp. 597–98). Similarly, Smith, Perry McCoy, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1945 (Baltimore, 1970), argues (p. 15)Google Scholar that Air Force planners were concerned primarily with autonomy for their service and only secondarily with military problems and threats to national security. Davis, Vincent, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943–1946 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1966)Google Scholar suggests that battles within the Navy were as significant as the service's battles with representatives of other military services, and that the issue of weapons development within the Navy was a bureaucratic as well as a military problem. All these studies strongly imply that the services were deeply involved in defensive campaigns to maintain what budgets and influence they could and that they were not in a position to win domination over the civilian economy.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Harry S. Truman to Thomas K. Finletter, July 18, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman (Harry S. Truman Library), OF 249 C., Air Policy Commission folder #1 [henceforth Truman Papers, HSTL]. Characteristically, Truman knew the results he intended his special commissions to report even before they began operations. A good example was his appointment of the Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, generally known as the Fahy Committee, only after he had issued Executive Order 9981 delineating his policy of equal opportunity. See Dalfiume, Richard M., “The Fahy Committee and Desegregation of the Armed Forces,” The Historian, XXXI (November, 1968), 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ John P. Gaty to Harry S. Truman, October 17, 1941, Truman Papers, HSTL, Senatorial and Vice-Presidential Files, National Defense — Aviation Production folder.

²⁰ Clyde Vandeburg to board of directors of the Aircraft War Production Council, East Coast, Inc., December 31, 1943, Records of the National Aircraft War Production Council (Harry S. Truman Library), East Coast Board Meetings folder [henceforth NAWPC, HSTL].

²¹ Julius Krug served as chairman of the War Production Board.

²² Richard Palmer to William F. Peters, March 31, 1945, NAWPC, HSTL, Memoranda - William F. Peters folder.

²³ Testimony of Oliver Echols, October 14, 1947 (revised version), Finletter Commission, HSTL, Aircraft Industries Association folder.

²⁴ Ibid. As Robin Higham has suggested in “Quantity vs. Quality: The Impact of Changing Demand on the British Aircraft Industry, 1900–1960,” Business History Review, XLI (Winter, 1968), 443–466Google Scholar, the problem was largely one of disposing of surplus World War II aircraft and not one of disinterest in commercial aviation. But this fact did not lessen the shock of the industry's postwar readjustment.

²⁵ Testimony of William C. Foster, September 8, 1947 (revised version), Finletter Commission, HSTL, Foster folder.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Testimony of W. Averell Harriman, September 8, 1947 (revised version), Finletter Commission, HSTL, Harriman folder.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ W. Stuart Symington to Thomas K. Finletter, October 28, 1947, Finletter Commission, HSTL, Symington folder.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Arthur Whiteside, comment in testimony of J. Weldon Jones et al., October 10, 1947, Finletter Commission, HSTL, Jones folder.

³² Ralph J. Burton, comment included in testimony of J. Weldon Jones et al., October 10, 1947, Finletter Commission, HSTL, Jones folder.

³³ Frederick B. Rentschler to Thomas K. Finletter, December 9, 1947, Finletter Commission, FSTL, United Aircraft Corporation folder.

³⁴ Testimony of John Nicholas Brown, September 9, 1947 (revised version), Finletter Commission, HSTL, Brown folder.

³⁵ Testimony of Kenneth C. Royall, December 2, 1947 (revised version), Finletter Commission, HSTL, Royall folder.

³⁶ A comparatively small number of companies specializing in the production of small private aircraft remained rather hesitant about tying their futures to military controls and contracts. Their subsequent development was relatively free of the boom-bust cycle problems that the major companies faced. The cases of Beech and Cessna are instructive in this regard.

³⁷ Harold L. Ickes to Harry S. Truman, August 6, 1941, Truman Papers, HSTL, Senatorial and Vice-Presidential Files, National Defense — Contract Investigation folder.

³⁸ Louis B. Heller to Harry S. Truman, October 1, 1949, Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 (March-September, 1950).

³⁹ Louis B. Heller to Harry S. Truman, July 11, 1950, Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 (March-September, 1950).

⁴⁰ Mike Mansfield to Harry S. Truman, June 26, 1952 (memorandum and letter), Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 D (Air Force, 1950–1953). When warning of possible ill effects of failing to increase defense spending in Montana, Mansfield was referring, of course, to the November 1952 elections.

⁴¹ Thomas K. Finletter to Harry S. Truman, July 19, 1952, Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 D (Air Force, 1950–1953).

⁴² Harry S. Truman to Thomas K. Finletter, July 24, 1952, Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 D (Air Force, 1950–1953).

⁴³ C. G. Wallace to Lew Wallace, undated, Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 D (Miscellaneous, October 1951–February 1952).

⁴⁴ C. G. Wallace to Matthew Connelly, August 13, 1951, Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 D (Miscellaneous, October 1951–February 1952).

⁴⁵ Robert B. Landry to C. G. Wallace, October 1, 1951, Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 W (Miscellaneous, October 1951–February 1952).

⁴⁶ C. G. Wallace to Matthew Connelly, October 5, 1951, Truman Papers, OF 1285 D (Miscellaneous, October 1951–February 1952).

⁴⁷ Charles E. Wilson, the head of General Electric.

⁴⁸ C. G. Wallace to Matthew Connelly, October 5, 1951, Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 D (Miscellaneous, October 1951–February 1952).

⁴⁹ Sid McMath to Harry S. Truman, June 29, 1951, Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 D (Miscellaneous, May–September 1952).

⁵⁰ An interesting example was the effort of Boeing (Seattle) to win contracts away from Boeing (Wichita), illustrated in correspondence between Stuart Symington and Jack Underwood of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce. W. Stuart Symington to Jack Underwood, September 1, 1949, Truman Papers, HSTL, OF 1285 D (Miscellaneous, May-September 1951).

⁵¹ For a general survey of the efforts to organize the armed services and of the conflicts among the services and branches, see Hammond, Paul Y., Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J., 1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.