British, Dutch, French, and American oil companies set up a multinational consortium in 1928 with a view to dominating petroleum production in the Middle East. Development of the consortium's first oilfield in northern Iraq depended on the construction of a pipeline to the Mediterranean sea-board, but rival great-power ambitions in the region blocked selection of a suitable route. Walter Teagle, president of Standard Oil of New Jersey, devised a compromise that he successfully pressed on both the French government and the chairman of the consortium, Sir John Cadman. Using company records and state papers now available in France, this article explains how Teagle's intervention arose and why it was crucial to the resolution of the Anglo-French pipeline conflict.

Recent events in Europe have given rise to renewed speculation about the possible economic threat of a resurgent united Germany. This article examines six leading German firms in the electrical and chemical industries over the course of the twentieth century in an attempt to understand the historical realities of the foreign market strategies of Germany's largest firms. The author concludes that the changed configuration of international markets, the post-Second World War “Americanization” of German management, and the growing perception of a “European home market” have combined to remove the threat implicit in “the German question.”

In its early years, the disk drive industry was led by a group of large-scale, integrated firms of the sort that Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., observed in his studies of several of the world's largest industries. The purpose of this history is to explore why it was so difficult for the leading disk drive manufacturers to replicate their success when technology and the structure of markets changed. The most successful firms aggressively developed the new component technologies required to address their leading customers’ needs, but this attention caused leading drive makers to ignore a sequence of emerging market segments, where innovative disk drive technologies were deployed by new entrants. As the performance of these new-architecture products improved at a rapid pace, the new firms were eventually able to conquer established markets as well. As a consequence, most of the integrated firms that established the disk drive industry were driven from it, displaced by networks of tightly focused, less integrated independent companies.

Punched-card tabulating equipment, an important commercial predecessor of the computer, was used for processing large amounts of data in many business firms during die first half of the twentieth century. Life insurance was an information-intensive business dependent on firms' abilities to manage large quantities of data. This article examines both the role that tabulating machinery played in shaping insurance firms' business processes and the simultaneous role that Ufe insurance as a user industry played in shaping the development of tabulating technology between 1890 and 1950. The ongoing interaction between the Ufe insurance and tabulating industries shaped both in significant ways, setting the stage for continued interaction between the two industries during the transition to computers beginning at mid-century.

Small firms that operate in manufacturing sectors amenable to economies of scale are faced with particularly challenging strategic problems. This article on the Seiberling Rubber Company, a family–owned minor player in the U.S. tire industry, takes as its starting point the intersection between Michael Porter's typology of competitive strategies and the entrepreneurial theorists' views on the importance of the human factor. Against a detailed analysis of the changing structure of the tire industry over four decades, it examines closely the strategic decisions of one firm and its senior managers.

Punched-card tabulating equipment, an important commercial predecessor of the computer, was used for processing large amounts of data in many business firms during the first half of the twentieth century. Life insurance was an information-intensive business dependent on firms' abilities to manage large quantities of data. This article examines both the role that tabulating machinery played in shaping insurance firms' business processes and the simultaneous role that life insurance as a user industry played in shaping the development of tabulating technology between 1890 and 1950. The ongoing interaction between the life insurance and tabulating industries shaped both in significant ways, setting the stage for continued interaction between the two industries during the transition to computers beginning at mid-century.

John Herbert Orr (1911-84) was an Alabama entrepreneur who formed Orradio Industries, Inc., a pioneering hightechnology firm that made magnetic recording tape. In 1945, Orr was among the U.S. Army Intelligence officials who investigated this technology, which was originally developed in Germany during the 1930s. Orr's early knowledge allowed him to establish Orradio in 1949 on a shoestring budget and to make it competitive with larger firms. When, after some uncertainty, tape became the standard medium for magnetic recorders, and as other uses such as data storage and videotape appeared, Orradio's sales expanded rapidly in the late 1950s. The company was purchased by a larger competitor, the Ampex Corporation, in 1959. The history of Orradio illustrates some of the technological, organizational, and locational problems associated with the establishment of a small high-technology firm in a new industry.

This article examines some major aspects of the history of the state-owned, privately operated German National Railway Company under the reparations regime of 1924 to 1932. It explores the dispute that erupted between the Reichsbahn and the government concerning whether the DRG should be used primarily to serve national economic and social ends or to earn a surplus to pay reparations. The controversies that erupted concerning tariffs, motor vehicle competition, and wages are examined against the background of the Reichsbahn's financial performance. The article argues that the political and cultural clashes caused by the introduction of Western management priorities and practices were more significant than the financial burdens that reparations imposed on the Reichsbahn.

The editor of the Business History Review has asked me, as the oldest “new” economic historian, to make a comment on the 1993 Nobel Prize award in Economics—a comment directed to “real” historians—which I am not—and especially to business historians, of whose product I have been an often satisfied—though occasionally restless—consumer. Needless to say, I find this to be an assignment difficult to fulfill. Praise will be put down to “trendy” insincerity and criticism to jealousy. Nor will Historians miss the irony in all the excitement generated by the award within a sub-tribe whose main charge has been to minimize the biographical, the “human” element in historical explanation. The self-styled “new” economic history movement, christened half-jokingly as early as 1968 by an ingenious neologism, “Cliometrics,” was now, twenty-five years later, awarded what is formally known as the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Science in Honor of Alfred Nobel, in the persons of two of its very keen and most prolific, best-known, energetic, and indomitable practitioners, Douglass C. North of Washington University (St. Louis, Mo.) and Robert W. Fogel of the University of Chicago (Chicago, Ill.). Surely there is some lesson in marketing in all this to make business and entrepreneurial historians sit up and take notice.

Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR) played the lead role in pursuing large-scale leveraged buyouts in the U.S. market for corporate control in the 1980s by taking advantage of investment opportunities created by three decades of public policies regarding antitrust, pensions, corporate governance, and banking. KKR's innovations were its ability to overcome investors' collective action and monitoring problems by arranging takeovers through limited partnerships and by managing acquired firms through shared equity ownership with management. These organizational innovations, when combined with the financial changes of the 1980s, allowed KKR and its investor-controlled associations to challenge managerially controlled firms.

Although the U.S. steel industry's concentrated market structure and well-established production technology curbed active research by most steel firms, between 1880 and 1910 vertical research arrangements between steel producers and steel consumers, notably the Pennsylvania Railroad, became a key factor in promoting both increased innovation in basic steel products and increased innovative effort by steel producers, albeit slowly and gradually. Thus, research into steel was initiated not by steel producers but by steel consumers, who established in-house industrial research laboratories and interfirm cooperative research arrangements as a means to solve their technical problems with steel products. They also began to work toward creating an institution—the American Society for Testing Materials—that would allow for effective interaction with other consuming firms and, eventually, with producing firms to exchange information and build consensus.