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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 January 2009
In the first part of this article, published in April, the avowed intent was to demarcate and emphasise the difference between the two kindred but separate defences of claim of right and dispute of title. The subsequent publication of the eighth report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee on Theft has shown that the defence of claim of right is to be left untouched by the sweeping proposals contained in the report, and that consequently the subject of this article will not become a mere academic exercise, but will remain a matter of practical importance even if the recommendations are adopted.
The earlier part of this article was primarily devoted to an attempt to isolate the meaning of title, the type of dispute that will lead to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of justices. It was noted that this procedural defence of dispute of title springs from a rule of statutory interpretation that it is always open to the legislature to exclude or modify. Passing reference has already been made to two famous modifications of the defence, in statutes providing for summary trial of assault and battery and malicious damage respectively. These enactments will now be examined in detail. Their special relevance for the object of this article is that the two cases on assault and battery show in the first place that, leaving aside the difficult question whether dispute of title should be extended to disputes as to title to personalty, even within the acknowledged prohibited sphere of disputes as to title to real property, criminal courts can be singularly slow to appreciate that a title to real property of an incorporeal kind is at stake.
10 Cmnd. 2977, para. 39. Substantive claim of right is defined in the draft bill in s. 2 (1) (a) as follows: “the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it…”
11 Note 25, p. 93, supra.
12 pp. 99–101, supra.
13 Notes 38, 39, 42, 43, p. 95, supra.
14 (1880) 44 J.P. 618.
15 Notes 78–80, p. 101, supra.
16 Notes 76, 77, pp. 100, 101, supra.
17 Also per Reading L.C.J. in Lucan v. Barrett (1915)Google Scholar 79 J.P. 463; Turner in Russell, op. cit., p. 1576, Appendix 2, n. 10; Jones, Rouse, Magistrates' Courts (1953), p. 31.Google Scholar S. 46 clearly confines the exclusion of jurisdiction to disputes of title to real property, but the question is whether the section is merely repeating the general rule as Coleridge L.C.J. thought (see note 44, p. 95, supra) or is modifying it.
18 Note 69, p. 99, supra.
19 Note 83, p. 102, supra, and notes 1–16, pp. 228–231, infra.
20 Notes 28–91, pp. 233–243, infra.
21 Note 3, p. 229, infra; Butler v. Lord.
22 In this respect, the case resembles R. v. Critchlow (1878) 26 W.R. 681, per Cockburn C.J. See notes 83, 84, p. 102, supra.
23 Notes 95–11, pp. 243–245, infra.
24 (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 237. This is one of the rare cases where the title in dispute was ownership.
25 The only clear report of the facts is in (1856) 26 L.T.(o.s.) 257, here relied on. According to 20 J.P. 68, P. claimed a right to drive poultry across E.'s field, which E. asserted his right to prevent. P. was driving his poultry across E.'s field, and threw his own duck over the fence. It seems unlikely that an owner would treat a nervous creature like this. It is here P. that is claiming a profit.
In 4 W.R. 257, P.'s allegation is that he was driving his poultry out of a field, where they had strayed. E.'s counsel replied that his affidavits entirely contradicted those of the other side: E. claimed a profit à prendre. That it was E. who claimed the profit is confirmed by 26 L.T.(o.s.) 257, but the factual situation is, as counsel observes, contradictory.
26 In Smith v. Gates [1952]Google Scholar C.P.L. 814, the C.A. accepted such a profit for chickens.
27 (1856) 4 W.R. 257, 258.
28 Ibid. at p. 257; 20 J.P. 68, 69.
29 (1863) 11 W.R. 434, 435; see notes 3 and 13, pp. 229, 230, infra.
30 Note 10, p. 230, infra.
31 Notes 11–13, p. 230, infra.
32 See P. M. North in (1966) 29 M.L.R. 16, 21.
33 Notes 95–11, pp. 243–245, infra.
34 Note 24, p. 219, supra.
35 Note 2, p. 244, infra.
36 Notes 40, 46, pp. 95–96, supra.
37 24 and 25 Vict. c. 97.
38 4 and 5 Geo. 5, c. 58. The 1914 Act was amended by extending the pecuniary limits in the Malicious Damage Act, 1964, 12 and 13 Eliz, 2, c. 76.
39 Op. cit., p. 315.
40 Note 32, p. 94, supra.
41 Note 31, p. 94, supra.
42 (1840) 11 Ad. & E. 483, 488.
43 Smith and Hogan, op. cit., p. 492.
44 Notes 28–91, pp. 233–243, infra.
45 9 A.d. & E. 704.
46 Op. cit., p. 11.
47 R. v. Cridland (1857) 7 E. & B. 853, 868, see note 35, p. 95, supra, but G. L. Williams treats it as a case of substantive claim of right, op. cit., p. 316, n. 30.
48 (1858) 6 W.R. 594.
49 (1859) 23 J.P. 323.
50 Crompton J. in Williams v. Adams (1862) 2 B. & S. 312, 316, equates the proviso to s. 24 with the proviso to s. 58, County Court Act, 1846, 9 and 10 Vict, c. 95.
51 G. L. Williams, however, again treats it as a case of claim of right: op. cit., p. 316, n. 30.
52 Note 54, p. 97, supra.
53 (1859) 23 J.P. 724. For G. L. W., claim of right: op. cit., p. 315, n. 24.
54 Notes 45, 46, pp. 95, 96, supra.
55 (1860) 24 J.P. 422.
56 Excessive damage prevents reliance on the proviso to s. 24, as there must be “a fair and reasonable supposition of right.” On whether excess always destroys a plea of ouster, see notes 95–11, pp. 243–245, infra. For G. L. W., a case on claim of right: op. cit., p. 316, n. 30.
57 (1861) 30 L.J.M.C. 207, 208.
58 (1862) 3 B. & S. 206, 213.
59 See notes 28–91, pp. 233–243, infra.
60 See Brooks v. Hamlyn, notes 82–92, pp. 226, 227, infra.
61 S. 73, 5 and 6 Will 4, c. 50. See note 30, p. 94, supra.
62 (1862) 2 B. & S. 312, 315.
63 Note 36, p. 221, supra.
64 Note 37, p. 221, supra.
65 The s. 23 case is Heaven v. Crutehley (note 95, p. 243, infra). See G. L. W., op. cit., p. 312, n. 18. The s. 52 cases are Usher v. Luxmore (note 79, p. 226, infra) and Brooks v. Hamlyn (notes 82–92, pp. 226, 227, infra). See G. L. W., op. cit., p. 316, nn. 30, 31.
66 (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 353.
67 Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 18th ed. (1962), para. 189. G. L. Williams is to the same effect: p. 315.
68 In Russell, op. cit., p. 1319. On whether legal impossibility destroys a plea of dispute of title, see notes 28–91, pp. 233–243, infra.
69 Per Quain J.: 26 L.T. 611, 616.
70 Ibid, at p. 615.
71 36 J.P. 436.
72 Note 98, p. 244, infra. See also Race v. Ward (1855) 4 E. & B. 702. Such a body of persons cannot claim a profit, as it will lead to destruction of the subject-matter: see note 37, p. 234, infra.
73 (1857) 1 H. & N. 784, 795.
74 (1868) 32 J.P. 613.
75 Note 49, p. 222, supra.
76 (1873) 37 J.P. 133.
77 Note 72, supra. See also Fitch v. Rawling, notes 98, 99, p. 244, infra.
78 (1888) 16 Cox 437. Croydon R.D.C. v. Crowley (1909)Google Scholar 100 L.T. 441 is another case, where it was held that justices should have exercised jurisdiction on the same ground.
79 (1890) 54 J.P. 405. R. v. Fane (1885) 49 J.P. 329 is a similar case.
80 Op. cit., p. 316, n. 30.
81 The right to go over every part of the way does exist in law: Halsbury, op. cit., Vol. 19, p. 271, n. (f).
82 Op. cit., p. 316, n. 31.
83 Notes 28–91, pp. 233–243, infra.
84 Notes 17, 18, p. 231, infra.
85 (1899) 63 J.P. 215. In 79 L.T. 734, 736, the questions of law arising are said to be: (a) whether the claim… was impossible in law; (b) whether the justices were estopped from inquiring into the merits; (c) whether the jurisdiction of the justices was ousted.
86 63 J.P. at p. 216.
87 Notes 28–91, pp. 233–243, infra.
88 63 J.P. at p. 217. See Kilgour v. Gaddes [1904]Google Scholar 1 K.B. 457 (C.A.), in fact a case on easements and s. 2, Prescription Act, 1832, but s. 1 on profits is similarly worded.
89 44 and 45 Vict. c. 41.
90 s. 6 (4), ibid.
91 [1922] 1 K.B. 727 (C.A.).
92 International Tea Stores v. Hobbs [1903]Google Scholar 2 Ch. 165. See also Wright v. Macadam [1949]Google Scholar 2 K.B. 744; Goldberg v. Edwards [1950]Google Scholar Ch. 247 on s. 62, Law of Property Act, 1925, which re-enacts s. 6 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, verbatim. These two cases confirm that B. 62 applies to leases.
93 (1842) C. & M. 501.
94 Russell (1865), 4th ed., Vol. II, p. 457, n. (p).
95 Russell (1964), 12th ed., Appendix 2, p. 1577, n. 21.
96 (1862) 32 L.J.M.C. 6, 9.
97 Note 38, p. 235, infra.
98 Russell, op. cit., p. 1577.
99 Kenny, op. cit., para. 188, p. 231, n. 4.
1 Birnie v. Marshall (1876) 35 L.T.(n.s.) 373; Philpot v. Bugler (1890) 54 J.P. 646.
2 R. v. Snape (1863) 11 W.R. 434, 435, per Crompton J.
3 Ibid. Crompton J. had already taken this view on the question whether an assault was made in assertion of title in Edwards (1856) 20 J.P. 68, see note 28, p. 219, supra. If the justices have acquitted, weight is regarded as a question for them: see Butter v. Lord (1860) 24 J.P. 390, note 95, p. 104, supra.
4 (1863) 11 W.R. 780.
5 (1864) 28 J.P. 133. This case and R. v. Derbyshire Justices are erroneously treated as separate cases in 25 The English and Empire Digest (1962), p. 391, paras. 185 and 187.
6 (1862) 32 L.J.M.C. 208, 210.
7 (1869) 83 J.P. 694, 695.
8 (1878) 26 W.R. 681.
9 (1874) 80 L.T.(N.S.) 792, 794. Obiter as they held that there was no evidence of mala fides: see notes 14, 15, pp. 230–231, infra.
10 (1885) 2 T.L.R. 161. See note 99, p. 105, supra.
11 (1864) 28 J.P. 133, 135.
12 Ibid.
13 (1868) 11 W.R. 434, 435.
14 See note 97, p. 104, supra.
15 (1874) 30 L.T.(N.S.) 792, 795, per Grove J.
16 See Brigstocke v. Rayner, note 71, p. 99, supra, and Brooks v. Hamlyn, notes 82–92, pp. 226–227, supra.
17 (1869) 11 Cox 549. The burden of proof is on the prosecution. The accused does not have to prove he had the honest intention suggested. The proper direction to the jury is that they must acquit if they think he honestly thought or may have honestly thought that he was entitled to the umbrella, and to take it out of the owner's possession: R. v. King-Jones & Gladdy [1966]Google Scholar 1 W.L.R. 1077. See also note 2, p. 90, supra.
18 [1938] 2 K.B. 264.
19 [1948] 1 K.B. 234.
20 Ibid. at p. 239.
21 Notes 17, 18, p. 231, supra.
22 Note 91, p. 103, supra.
23 Note 95, p. 243, infra.
24 [1964] 2 Q.B. 447.
25 Ibid. 451. See note 73, p. 240, infra.
26 Ibid. 454.
27 4 B. & S. 585, 592. See note 9, p. 91, supra.
28 Ibid. 591.
29 (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 582, 586.
30 L.R. 10 C.P. 662.
31 4 T.R. 681.
32 5 T.R. 19.
33 25 J.P. 263, 264, per Williams J.
34 7 C.B.(N.S.) 641, 651.
35 29 L.J.M.C. 213, 216, per Williams J.
36 (1861) 30 L.J.M.C. 207, 208.
37 Norfolk Estuary Co. v. Flanders (1903)Google Scholar 47 S.J. 749 (profit to shoot on the seabanks and outmarshes of the Wash could not be claimed by custom); Bland v. Lipscombe (1854) 4 E. & B. 713n. (custom to angle in a river, pleaded by inhabitants of a parish, held bad).
38 (1862) 32 L.J.M.C. 6.
39 Ibid. at p. 8.
40 9 Jnr.(n.s.) 540, 541.
41 3 B. & S. 206, 217.
42 6 M. & W. 536, 543, per Parke B.
43 (1865) 19 C.B.(N.S.) 687, 709.
44 2 and 3 Will. 4, c. 71.
45 (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 527, 532.
46 3 B. & S. 206, 212.
47 Ibid. at pp. 214–215.
48 Ibid. at p. 213.
49 Thompson v. Ward [1953] 2 Q.B. 153, 158–159Google Scholar, per Evershed M.R.
50 (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 662, 665.
51 Ibid. at p. 664.
52 (1875) L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154, 163–164.
53 L.R. 10 C.P. 662, 666.
54 Ibid.
55 Note 33, p. 234, supra.
56 L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154, 169–170.
57 [1895] 1 Q.B. 918, 922.
58 Note 9, p. 91, supra; notes 26, 27, pp. 232–233, supra.
59 Avory J. made this point arguendo (see 30 T.L.R. 496), and also in his judgment: (1914) 78 J.P. 326, 327. Williams, G. L. observes that this case throws doubt on Morden v. PorterGoogle Scholar : op. cit., p. 238.
60 Note 33, p. 234, supra.
61 The Ground Game Act, 1880, s. 1. See notes 1, 2, p. 105, supra.
62 Notes 17, 18, p. 231, supra.
63 (1901) 17 T.L.R. 569.
64 Note 84, p. 241, infra.
65 The dictum is attributed to Coleridge L.C.J. in 44 L.J.M.C. 164, 168; 39 J.P. 808, 809; and 24 W.R. 164.
66 Op. cit., Vol. 25, p. 183.
67 In Russell, op. cit., p. 1577, he treats impossibility in law as invariable excluding the defence of ouster.
68 24 and 25 Vict. c. 96.
69 (1863) 33 L.J.M.C. 65. The accused also pleaded substantive claim of right. The defence failed, as mens rea is not an ingredient in the offence: see note 9, p. 91, supra, and note 27, p. 233, supra.
70 Murphy v. Ryan (1868) I.R. 2 C.L. 143.
71 (1869) 34 J.P. 53. See also note 65, p. 98, supra.
72 (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 582.
73 (1876) 35 L.T. 486. There are many subsequent Divisional Court decisions that a member of the public cannot in law claim a right to fish in a navigable river above the flow of the tide: Reece v. Miller (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 626; Pearce v. Scotcher (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 162; Wells v. Hardy [1964]Google Scholar 2 Q.B. 447, cited note 24, p. 232, supra. There is a decision of North J. in a case of civil trespass: Smith v. Andrews [1891] 2 Ch. 678, and a dictum of Bowen L.J. in the Court of Appeal in Blount v. Layard [1891] 2 Ch. 681n., 689–690n.
74 (1914) 84 L.J.K.B. 959, 967.
75 Kenny, op. cit., p. 45; Edwards, Mens Rea in Statutory Offences (1955), p. 249.
76 Notes 82–92, p. 226–227, supra.
77 (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 353, 359. See note 66, p. 224, supra.
78 (1903) 68 J.P. 53.
79 White v. Feast (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 353, 359, per Blackburn J.
80 Turner thinks the right was possible in law: see notes 96–99, p. 244, infra.
81 Notes 82–92, pp. 226–227, supra.
82 Notes 38–43, p. 235, supra.
83 (1914) 84 L.J.K.B. 959, 965.
84 (1878) 38 L.T. 525, 527, per Mellor J.
85 [1911] 2 K.B. 314, 324, per Hamilton J.
86 (1895) 64 L.J.M.C. 200, 202.
87 Robertson v. Hartopp (1889) 43 Ch.D. 484.
88 Note 70, p. 240, supra, and note 65, p. 98, supra.
89 See notes 72, 73, p. 240, supra, for the four Divisional Court rulings to that effect.
90 Notes 82–92, pp. 226–227, supra.
91 [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234, July 26, 1966.
92 24 and 25 Vict. c. 97.
93 [1898] 1 Q.B. 556.
94 (1864) 4 F. & F. 50.
95 (1903) 68 J.P. 53, see note 78, p. 240, supra.
96 In Russell, op. cit., p. 1326.
97 (1666) 1 Lev. 176.
98 (1795) 2. H.B1. 393.
99 [1896] 1 Ch. 308.
1 (1797) 2 Esp. 543.
2 In Russell, op. cit., p. 1326.
3 (1868) 32 J.P. 691. Williams, G. L. treats Evison v. MarshallGoogle Scholar as a case on claim of right: op. cit., p. 309, n. 12.
4 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97.
5 No counsel appeared for M.
6 (1862) 3 B. and 8. 206, 216.
7 Ibid, at p. 211. See note 38, p. 235, supra.
8 R. v. Williams (1836) 7 C. & P. 354, see note 8, p. 105, supra; R. v. Williams [1962]Google Scholar Cr.L.Rev. 111.
9 Note 24, p. 219, supra.
10 Note 34, p. 220, supra, but misnaming the case as Richards.
11 Fitch v. F., note 1, p. 244, supra; Todrick v. Western National Omnibus Co. [1934]Google Scholar Ch. 561.