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The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 January 2009
Extract
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea is one of the best-known maxims of our Common Law. It is regarded at the present day as a statement in general terms which indicates the essentials of liability to criminal punishment. The maxim sharply contrasts the conduct of the wrongdoer, i.e. his physical acts or omissions, with the state of his mind at the time, i.e. what he was thinking when he so acted.
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References
1 In the offence of ‘Attempt to commit crime’ the actus may or may not be in itself forbidden by law. See C. L. J. Vol. V, No. 2, p. 235.
2 R. v. Senior [1899] 1 Q. B. 283; R. v. Smith (1826) 2 C. & P. 449; R. v. Edwards (1838) 8 C. & P. 611; R. v. Barrett (1846), 2 Car. & K. 343.
3 1 Hale P. C. 497.
4 1 Hale P. C. 486.
5 R. v. Hussey (1924) 18 Cr. App. R. 160; Hinchcliffe's Case (1829) 1 Lew. 161.
6 Stephen, Dig. C. L. p. 207, art. 288.
7 In which the law allows the participants to consent to receive, or run the risks of, a certain amount of physical harm. R. v. Donovan [1934] 2 K. B. 498; R. v. Coney (1882) 15 Cox 46; R. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cox 83.
8 See note (1), ante.
9 See Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (ed. 1933), p. 46.
10 The latter topic is dealt with by Mr. R. M. Jackson elsewhere in this issue, and I. beg leave to state that I am in complete agreement with his views.
11 For the case of ‘abnormal’ persons, e.g. infants, lunatics, see p. 48, below.
12 Fitz. Abr. Corone, pl. 163, 303; or contributed to it in a substantial degree. This may sometimes be difficult to prove, e.g. R. v. Macdaniel (1754) 1 Leach 44; R. v. Holland (1841) 2 Moody & Rob. 351; R. v. Sawyer (1887) 106 Sess. Pap. 301.
13 See C. L. J. Vol. V, No. 1 at p. 65.
14 Y.B. 17 Edw. IV, f. 2 (Pasch. pl. 2).
15 See Colvile v. Parker (1608) Cro. Jac. 158.
16 (1935) 25 Cr. App. R. 72.
17 [1891] 2 Ch. 449 at p. 471.
18 Holdsworth, H. E. L. IlI, 374.
19 E.g. Kenny, op. cit. pp. 41 et seq.; Stroud, Mens Rea, pp. 29—50; and almost any passage in which R. v. Prince (1875) L. R. 2 C. C. R. 154 is discussed by anv author.
20 P. & M. II, 470 et seq.: Holdsworth, H. E. L. II, 50 et seq.; but cf. Winfield in L. Q. R. Vol. XLII, 37.
21 ‘When crude retaliation appears in a medieval code, the influence of the Bible may always be suspected’: P. & M. II, 489, n. 2.
22 Holdsworth, H. E. L. II, 259.
23 P. & M. II, 479; Holdsworth, H. E. L. III, 313.
24 Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 9.
25 Kenny, op. cit. 123, ‘wicked negligence’: R. v. Prince (1875) L. R. 2 C. C. R. 154, judgment of Bramwell B. at pp. 175–7; R. v. Spencer (1867) 10 Cox 525 at p. 527, ‘an evil mind’; R. v. Bateman (1925) 94 L. J. K. B. 791, at p. 794, ‘conduct deserving of punishment’; R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox 306 at p. 309, ‘ought to be published’; Stephen, H. C. L. Vol. III, p. 16, ‘a most wicked action’.
26 Page 48.
27 P. & M. II, 488; Holdsworth, H. E. L. III, 314.
28 It is not certain that this last defence is valid in every case event at the present day, though it is submitted that it ought to be admitted: see pp. 53 et seq. below.
29 1 Plow. 253 at p. 259.
30 1 Hale, P. C. 42.
31 Fost. 265.
32 For what, it is submitted, is the true view of the latter, see Mr. R. M. Jackson's article in this issue.
33 1 Hale 433.
34 Kenny, op. cit. 58.
35 1 Hawk. c. 29, ss. 2 and 3: 1 Hale 472.
36 R. v. Hay (1911) 22 Cox 268; R. v. Fryer (1915) 24 Cox 403.
37 E.g. if two of three mountaineers, having fallen, are dangling over a precipice and are dragging the third over also, then if he cuts himself clear, he does not cause their death, for they are doomed and he cannot save them—he merely saves his own life by preventing them from pulling him over. See also R. v. Pocock (1851) 17 Q. B. 34; R. v. Dalloway (1847) 2 Cox 273.
38 R. v. Smith (1869) 11 Cox 210.
39 Holdsworth, H. E. L. II, 452.
40 H. C. L. II, 95.
41 R. v. Tolson (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 168, at p. 185.
42 Kenny, op. cit. 122; Stroud, op. cit. 127; R. v. Handley (1874), 13 Cox. 79, at p. 81.
43 R. v. Markuss (1864) 4 F. & F. 356, at p. 359.
44 R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox 306, at p. 309.
45 R. v. Noakes (1866) 4 F. & F. 920, at p. 921.
46 R. v. Macleod (1874) 12 Cox 534, at p. 539.
47 R. v. Elliott (1889) 16 Cox 710, at p. 714.
48 Austin, Jurisprudence (4th ed.), Vol. 1, pp. 431—442.
49 Austin, loc. cit., and see Hudston v. Viney [1921] 1 Ch. 98, at p. 104, ‘an attitude of mental indifference to obvious risks’. See also Stephen, H. C. L. III, pp. 55, 56.
50 See C. L. J. (1933), V, No. 1, pp. 62—65.
51 Excluding, as has been pointed out, the case of public nuisance, in which offence a mental element is irrelevant to the question of liability, although it may affect the amount of punishment.
52 See Holdsworth, H. E. L. II, 452.
53 Such of these as are now incorporated in statutes were originally crimes at common law.
54 Although animus furandi was not always required in the earliest period. Holdsworth, H. E. L. II, 359.
55 R. v. Smith (1826) 2 C. & P. 449, at p. 457; in R. v. Jones (1870) 11 Cox 544 ‘neglect’ is used in place of ‘negligence’.
56 R. v. Haines (1847) 2 C. & K. 368, at p. 371.
57 (1866) 4 F. & F. 920, at p. 921.
58 Stephen, H. C. L. Vol. III, p. 11.
59 R. v. Spencer (1867) 10 Cox 525.
60 R. v. Bateman (1925) 94 L. J. K. B. 791.
61 R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox 306.
62 P. & M. II, 471, 474.
63 P. & M. II, 484.
64 See, e.g. the judge's insistence on the strict rule in benefit of clergy mentioned in Kelynge 51.
65 See pp. 53 et seq. below.
66 Kelynge 41.
67 C. C. & C. L. pp. 264–5.
68 1 P. C. 40.
69 St. Malefactores in parcis, 21 Edw. 1.
70 See Mr. Jackson's article, below.
71 C. C. & C. L. p. 257.
72 Ibid. p. 264.
73 Ibid. p. 256.
74 Stephen, H. C. L. III, 110.
75 3rd Inst. p. 56: ‘if he had shot … at any tame fowl of another man's, and the arrow by mischance had killed a man, this had been murder for the act was unlawful.’
76 Foster p. 258.
77 H. C. L. III, 57.
78 H. C. L, III, 75. Stephen might have reflected, however, that manslaughter was a ‘clergyable’ felony, punishable, until 1822, marely with burning in the hand and imprisonment for not more than one year.
79 See, e.g. his direction to the jury, R. v. Serné (1887) 16 Cox 311, at pp. 312, 313, and in R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox 306, at pp. 307—310; also H. C. L. III, pp. 57, 75, 83, 84.
80 See, e.g. H. C. L. II, pp. 91–2; III, p. 57, n. 3, pp. 89, 84.
81 Arts. 314, 315 and Note VII (7th ed. PP. 225, 461).
82 H. C. L. III, p. 16.
83 See the reasons for this statement in C. L. J. Vol. V, No. 1, at pp. 69, 70.
84 E.g. Archbold, 28th ed. 894; Kenny, op. cit. p. 120; Stephen, Dig. C. L. 7th ed. p. 210.
85 H. C. L. II, p. 113.
86 See H. C. L. II, pp. 113 note, 123; R. v. Tolson (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 168, at p. 185 ‘forgetting to notice a signal’.
87 R. v. Elliott (1884) 16 Cox 710; R. v. Trainer (1864) 4 F. & F. 105.
88 H. C. L. pp. 122–3; Gen. View of C. L. pp. 76, 126.
89 See Gen. View of C. L. p. 128; and H. C. L. III, p. 11: ‘There must be more, but no one can say how much more, carelessness than is required in order to create civil liability.’
90 Stephen, H. C. L. III, 16, note 1.
91 R. v. Finney (1874) 12 Cox 625, per Lush J. at p. 626.
92 R. v. Spencer (1867) 10 Cox 525, per Willes J. at p. 527.
93 R. v. Elliott (1889) 16 Cox 710, per O'Brien J. at p. 714.
94 Cashill v. Wright (1856) 6 E. & B. 899, per Erle J. at p. 899.
95 E.g. R. v. Markuss (1864) 4 F. & F. 356; R. v. Noakes (1866) 4 F. & F. 920; R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox 306; R. v. Jones (1870) 11 Cox 544; R. v. Chainey (1913) 23 Cox 620, at p. 623. See also Stephen, H. C. L. III, p. 76.
96 12 Cox 628.
97 At p. 629.
98 Supra.
99 Op. cit. p. 897; see also Halsbury, Vol. IX, p. 445, note (t).
1 (1875) L. R. 2 C. C. R. 154.
2 At pp. 170—173.
3 At pp. 173—177.
4 At p. 171.
5 At p. 179.
6 E.g. Kenny, op. cit. pp. 41—43; Stroud, op. cit. pp. 15, 34—39.
7 Kenny, op. cit. 41.
8 A is of course guilty of ‘attempt to murder’.
9 P. 53.
10 Ante, p. 35.
11 Hale, P. C. I, pp. 30—32.
12 (1843) 10 CI. & F. 200.
13 R. v. Codere (1916) 12 Cr. App. R. 21, at p. 27, per Reading L.C.J.; in the case of R. v. Hicklin (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, although the defence of insanity was not raised, the point is the same: the Court decided, on their own moral standard, that the moral standard of the defendant was irrelevant.
14 See Hale, P. C. 26—29.
15 P. 41.
16 Foster, C. C. & C. L. 255.
17 See Foster, op. cit. pp. 290—302.
18 Foster, op. cit. p. 291.
19 R. v. Alexander (1913) 23 Cox 604; R. v. Lesbini, 24 Cox 516; but see R. v. Hopper (1915) 11 Cr. App. R. 136.
20 C. L. J. Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 68 et seq.
21 Hall, Theft, Law and Society, p. 67.
22 C. L. J. Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 71 et seq.
23 [1933] 1 K. B. 704.
24 The C. C. A. in the case of Stringer held that the proper procedure was to prefer two indictments, one for manslaughter and the other for dangerous driving. The Court gave no reason for this, but in any case it does not affect the point under discussion: see C. L. J. Vol. I, p. 74 (iii).
25 The maximum term of imprisonment for ‘dangerous driving’ is now two years: R. T. Act, 1934, s. 4.
26 ‘It would, however, be on all accounts far better to substitute, as the Draft Code does, a definite enumeration of the states of mind intended to be taken as constituent elements of murder for a phrase which is never used except to mislead or to be explained away’: Stephen, H. C. L. III, 83.
27 Kenny, op. cit. pp. 116 et seq. used the expressions ‘Voluntary’ and ‘Involuntary’ manslaughter in a meaning different from that in which they are employed by other writers. His view, peculiar to himself, is not borne out by the cases he cited, and cannot be supported. See C. L. J. Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 67—68.
28 See Foster, C. C. & C. L. pp. 305–6.
29 H. C. L. II, p. 89.
30 Stephen, Dig. Cr. Law, Art. 315, III. 11.
31 Kenny, op. cit. p. 141.
32 [1925] 2 Ch. I. R. 9.
33 At p. 22.
34 See e.g. his Digest of Cr. Law, Note VII; H. C. L. III, pp. 60–68.
35 See Stephen, H. C. L. III, 64.
36 See Woolmington's Case (1935) 25 Cr. App. R. 72, at pp. 87—96.
37 See Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill, 1879, clause 175.
38 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard [1920] A. C. 479, per Lord Birkenhead L.C. at p. 493.
39 Ante, p. 42; Stephen, H. C. L. III, 75.
40 H. C. L. III, pp. 57, 75.
41 R. v. Lad, 1 Leach 96.
42 R. v. Greenwood (1857) 7 Cox 404.
43 (1861) 2 F. & F. 580.
44 At p. 582.
45 (1862) 3 F. & F. 287.
46 At p. 288.
47 (1862) 3 F. & F. 483.
48 Note (b) at p. 491.
49 (1866) 4 F. & F. 931.
50 At p. 936.
51 (1862) 3 F. & F. 520.
52 At p. 522.
53 At p. 522, note (c).
54 H. C. L. III, 57 and n. 3.
55 H. C. L. III, 83, 84.
56 Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill, 1879, clauses 174, 175.
57 H. C. L. III, p. 51.
58 (1887) 16 Cox 311, at pp. 312, 313.
59 General View of C. L. p. 141, note 1.
60 Except in the case of R. v. Skeet; but here the reference to ‘deadly weapons’ makes it plain that the judge was basing liability on foresight of the chance of killing.
61 R. v. Whitmarsh, 62 J. P. 711.
62 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 58.
63 At p. 712.
64 R. v. Bottomley and Earnshaw (1903) L. J. Vol. 38, p. 311.
65 R. v. Lumley, 22 Cox 635.
66 Outlines of Criminal Law, 1st ed. p. 137.
67 See ante, p. 33.
68 14 Cr. App. R. 110.
69 Under Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, s. 1 (6).
70 14 Cr. App. R. at p. 184.
71 14 Cr. App. R. at pp. 114 and 116.
72 [1909] 1 K. B. 895.
73 14 Cr. App. R. at pp. 110, 112.
74 On the authority of R. v. Hopper (1915) 11 Cr. App. R. 136.
75 14 Cr. App. R. at p. 115.
76 14 Cr. App. R. at p. 116.
77 14 Cr. App. R. at p. 187.
78 [1909] 1 K. B. 895.
79 Per Darling J. at p. 899.
80 Per Lord Birkenhead L.C. at pp. 197 and 199.
81 4 & 5 Vict. c. 38.
82 (1913) 23 Cox 455.
83 C. C. & C. L. Appendix, p. 420.
84 R. v. Manley (1933) 24 Cr. App. R. 25; R. v. Woolmington (1935) 25 Cr. App. R. 72; Duncan v. Jones (1935) 52 T. L. R. 26.
85 Ante, p. 57.
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