¹ Williston, “Repudiation of Contracts” (1901) 14 Harv.L.Rev. 317; Ballantine, “Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of Contractual Duties” (1924) 22 Michigan L.Rev. 329; Limburg, “Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts” (1925) 10 Cornell L.Q. 135; Void, “The Tort Aspect of Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts” (1927) 41 Harv.L.Rev. 340; Stoljar, “Some Problems of Anticipatory Breach” (1974) 9 Melbourne Univ.L.Rev. 355; Davis, “Anticipatory Breach and Mitigation of Damages” (1963) 5 University of Western Australia L.R 576; Goodhart. “Measure of Damages when a Contract is Repudiated” (1962) 78 L.Q.R. 263; Nienaber, “The Effect of Anticipatory Repudiation: Principle and Policy” [1962] C.L.J. 213; Void, “Withdrawal of Repudiation after Anticipatory Breach of Contract” (1926) 5 Texas L.Rev. 9; McRae, “Repudiation of Contracts in Canadian Law” (1978) 56 Can. Bar Rev. 233; Gullota, “Anticipatory Breach—A Comparative Analysis” (1976) 50 Tulane L.Rev. 927.

² “There can be no fine-spun reasoning which will successfully make that a breach of promise which, in fact, is not a breach of promise. It should be sufficiently clear that a promise cannot possibly be broken before the time for its performance arrives”: Terry, C. T., “Book Review” (1921) 34 Harv.L.Rev. 891, 894.Google Scholar

³ “Conduct not in itself wrongful cannot be converted into wrongful conduct through the acquiescence of the very person whose injury is contemplated by such conduct”: Nienaber, “The Effect of Anticipatory Repudiation: Principle and Policy” [1962] C.L.J. 213, 221.

⁴ Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., Vol. 9, para. 556 citing Scarfe v. Jardine (1882) 7 App.Cas. 345, 361, per Lord Blackburn; Car and Universal Finance Co. Ltd. v. Caldwell [1965] 1 Q.B. 525, 535Google Scholar, per Upjohn L.J.

⁵ Holland v. Wiltshire (1953–54) 90 C.L.R. 409, 416Google Scholar, per Dixon J.; Car and Universal Finance Co. Ltd. v. Caldwell [1965] 1 Q.B. 525, 532Google Scholar, per Lord Denning M.R.; Smith v. Associated Dominions Assurance Society Proprietary Ltd. (in liquidation) (1955–56) 95 C.L.R. 381, 385Google Scholar, per Taylor J.; White v. Ross [1960] N.Z.L.R. 247, 249Google Scholar, per Clearly J.; American Red Cross v. Geddes Bros. (1920) 55 D.L.R. 194, 196Google Scholar, per Davies C.J.; Garrison v. Thomsen & Clarke Timber Co. Ltd. [1926] 2 D.L.R. 803, 805Google Scholar, per McDonald J.; McCowan v. McKay (1901) 13 Man L.R. 590, 596Google Scholar, per Killam C.J.M.; Kamlee Construction Ltd. v. Town of Oakville (1960) 26 D.L.R. (2d) 166, 182–183Google Scholar, per Ritchie J. In a number of cases there is no mention of any communicated election prior to the service of the writ, though logically the cause of action must be complete before the writ is issued: Canada Egg Products Ltd. v. Canadian Doughnut Co. Ltd. [1955] 3 D.L.R. 1, 4Google Scholar, per Kerwin C.J.C.; Martin v. Stout [1925] A.C. 359, 363Google Scholar, per Lord Atkinson; Hochster v. De la Tour (1853) 2 E. & B. 678; Frost v. Knight (1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 111; Roper v. Johnson (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 167, 175, per Keating J.; Reigate v. Union Manufacturing Co. (Ramsbottom) [1918] 1 K.B. 592, 607Google Scholar, per Scrutton L.J.; L. Roth & Co. v. Taysen, Townsend & Co. (1896) 12 T.L.R. 211, 212, per Lord Esher M.R. See in general McRae, Repudiation of Contracts in Canadian Law (1978) 56 Can. Bar Rev. 233, 244–249.Google Scholar There are also cases suggesting that mere acquiescence in the repudiation can amount to evidence of an abandonment or mutual rescission. These cases usually involve the repudiating party seeking to hold the other party (who has remained inactive as a result of the repudiation) to the contract: Morgan v. Bain (1874) L.R. 10 C.P. 15; American Red Cross v. Geddes Bros. (1920) 55 D.L.R. 194Google Scholar; Picturesque Atlas Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Harbottle (1891) 10 N.Z.L.R. 348; Summers v. The Commonwealth (1918) 25 C.L.R. 144Google Scholar; Ginter v. Chapman & Keen (1967) 60 W.W.R. 385Google Scholar; (1968) 64 W.W.R. 292; Olsen v. Capital Coaches Ltd. (1968) 112 S.J. 353.Google Scholar The principle of abandonment applied in some of the foregoing cases is in truth no more than a mutual rescission: Robinson v. Page (1826) 3 Russ. 114, 119; 38 E.R. 519, 521, per Copley M.R. and is well known: Pearl Mill Co. v. Ivy Tannery [1919] 1 K.B. 78Google Scholar; G. W. Fisher Ltd. v. Eastwoods Ltd. [1936] 1 All E.R. 421.Google Scholar

⁶ Melanson v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. [1934] 2 D.L.R. 459Google Scholar; Pennicott v. Pennicott (1936) 30 Tasmania, L.R. 111Google Scholar; Mackenzie v. Rees (1941) 65 C.L.R. 1, 15Google Scholar, per Dixon J.; Wayne's Merthyr Steam Coal and Iron Co. v. Morewood (1877) 46 LJ.Q.B.(N.S.) 746; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1899), per Fuller C.J.; Restatement of Contracts, Vol. 1, Art. 318e, p. 477; and see Ballantine, “Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of Contractual Duties” (1924) 22 Michigan L.Rev. 329, 351; Limburg, “Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts” (1925) 10 Cornell L.Q. 135, 143–144; Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Western Pacific Ry., 244 Fed. 485, 501–502 (1917), per Learned Hand J.; Williston, , “A Treatise on the Law of Contracts” (Rev. ed., 1936), Vol. 5, para. 1328 et seq.Google Scholar; Corbin, , Contracts (1951), Vol. 4, para. 962 el seq.Google Scholar

⁷ Cf., Frost v. Knight (1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 111; Dalrymple v. Scott (1891) 19 Ont. A.R. 477; Monigatti v. Minchen [1937] N.Z.L.R. 49Google Scholar; Cohen & Co. v. Ockerby & Co. Ltd. (1917) 24 C.L.R. 288Google Scholar; Bowes v. Chaleyer (1923) 32 C.L.R. 159Google Scholar; Ripley v. M'Clure (1849) 4 Exch. 345; 154 E.R. 1245; Byrne v. Van Tienhoven (1880) L.R. 5 C.P. 344; Sinaison Teicher Inter American Grain Cpn. v. Oilcakes and Oilseeds Trading Co. [1954] 1 W.L.R. 935, 944Google Scholar, per Devlin J.; Moss Ltd. v. Colledge [1918] N.Z.L.R. 72Google Scholar; Brett v. Schneideman Bros. Ltd. [1923] N.Z.L.R. 938, 961–967Google Scholar, per Hosking J., 969–974, per Salmond J.; Peter Turnbull & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Mundus Trading Co. (Australasia) Pty. Ltd. (1953–54) 90 C.L.R. 235Google Scholar; Holland v. Wiltshire (1953–54) 90 C.L.R. 409, 422Google Scholar, per Kitto J. See generally M. G. Lloyd, “Ready and willing to perform: The problem of Prospective Inability in the Law of Contract” (1974) 37 M.L.R. 121.

⁸ Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty. Ltd. v. Watson (1945–46) 72 C.L.R. 435, 450–451Google Scholar, per Latham C.J., 465–466, per Dixon J., 476, per Williams J.; Decro-Wall International S.A. v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 361, 369–370Google Scholar, per Salmon L.J., 375–376, per Sachs L.J.; Hill v. C. A. Parsons Ltd. [1972] Ch. 305;Google ScholarHaydon v. South Eastern District of the Workers' Education Association (1972) 7 I.T.R. 318Google Scholar; and see cases cited by Napier [1975] C.L.J. 36, 38–39. Cf., Denmark Productions Ltd. v. Boscobel Productions Ltd. [1969] 1 Q.B. 699Google Scholar; Marriott v. Oxford and District Co-operative Society (No. 2) [1970] 1 Q.B. 186Google Scholar; Sanders v. Ernest A. Neale Ltd. [1974] I.C.R. 565Google Scholar; G.K.N. (Cumbran) Ltd. v. T. I. Lloyd [1972] I.C.R. 214Google Scholar; Hare v. Murphy Bros. Ltd. [1973] I.C.R. 331Google Scholar; British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd. v. Dedman [1973] I.C.R. 82Google Scholar; [1974] I.C.R. 53. And see the valuable discussions in Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd. v. Guinle [1979] Ch. 227Google Scholar and Gunton v. London Borough of Richmond upon Thames [1980] 3 All E.R. 577.Google Scholar

⁹ White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor [1962] A.C. 413Google Scholar; Finelli v. Dee (1968) 67 D.L.R. (2d) 393Google Scholar; Attica Sea Carriers v. Ferrostaal Poseidon [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 250.Google Scholar See and cf., Davies, “Anticipatory Breach and Mitigation of Damages” (1963) 5 University of Western Australia L.R. 576; Goodhart, “Measure of Damages when a Contract is Repudiated” (1962) 78 L.Q.R. 263 and Stoljar, “Some Problems of Anticipatory Breach” (1974) 9 Melbourne Univ.L.Rev. 355.

¹⁰ Cf., Taylor v. Oakes, Roncoroni & Co. (1922) 127 L.T. 267Google Scholar; Continental Contractors Ltd. and Ors. v. Medway Oil and Storage Co. Ltd. (1925) 23 Ll.L.R. 124, 132–133Google Scholar, per Scrutton L.J., and Y.P. Barley Producers Ltd. v. E.C. Robertson Pty. Ltd. [1927] V.L.R. 194, 212–214Google Scholar, per McArthur J.; The Miholis Angelos [1971] 1 Q.B. 164.Google Scholar

¹¹ Roper v. Johnson (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 167; cf., Brown v. Mutter (1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 319, 323, per Martin B.

¹² See and cf., Cherry v. Thompson (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 573; Holland v. Bennett [1902] 1 K.B. 867Google Scholar; Martin v. Stout [1925] A.C. 359Google Scholar; Sefran v. Chant [1970] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 70Google Scholar; Cooper v. Knight (1901) 17 T.L.R. 299.Google Scholar

¹³ Horsler v. Zorro [1975] Ch. 302Google Scholar; Hayes v. Ross (No. 3) [1919] N.Z.L.R. 786Google Scholar; Slowey v. Lodder (1901) 20 N.Z.L.R. 321Google Scholar; [1904] A.C. 442; Goodman v. Pocock (1850) 15 Q.B. 576; De Bernardy v. Harding (1853) 8 Ex. 822. See generally Williston, “Repudiation of Contracts” (1901) 14 Harv.L.R.Rev. 317, 318 et seq. Dawson (1976) 39 M.L.R. 214; Albery (1975) 91 L.Q.R. 337. Cf., Johnson v. Agnew [1980] A.C. 367Google Scholar; White v. Ross [1960] N.Z.L.R. 247Google Scholar; Hunt v. Hyde [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 453.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Turner v. Bladin (1950–51) 82 C.L.R. 463Google Scholar; Kloepfer Wholesale Hardware & Automotive Co. v. Roy [1952] 3 D.L.R. 705Google Scholar; Hasham v. Zenab [1960] A.C. 316Google Scholar; Cf., Mohr v. Smith [1914] S.A.L.R. 92.Google Scholar

¹⁵ White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor [1962] A.C. 413, 438Google Scholar, per Lord Keith of Avonholm.

¹⁶ Sirangborough v. Warner (1588) 4 Leon 3; 74 E.R. 686; Gower v. Capper (1597) Cro.Eliz. 543; 78 E.R. 790; Wichels v. Johns (1599) Cro.Eliz. 703; 78 E.R. 938; Bettisworlh v. Campion (1608) Yelv. 133; 80 E.R. 90; Nichols v. Raynbred (1615) Hob. 88; 80 E.R. 238.

¹⁷ If the innocent party desired to withhold his performance, he could consent to a mutual rescission of the contract (in consideration that your obligation to perform is extinguished, my obligation to perform is extinguished). See Coniers v. Holland (1588) 2 Leon. 214; 74 E.R. 488; Langden v. Stokes (1634) Cro.Car. 383, 79 E.R. 935; Cook v. Newcomb (1662) T.Raym. 42; 83 E.R. 24; Edwards v. Weekes (1677) 1 Freem K.B. 230; 89 E.R. 164; May v. King (1701) 12 Mod. 537; 88 E.R. 1502; King v. Gillelt (1840) 7 M. & W. 55; 151 E.R. 676; but in that event, there could be no claim for damages in breach of contract: see Hochster v. De la Tour (1853) 2 E. & B. 678, 686, 688; 118 E.R. 922.

¹⁸ On conditions, see Corbin, “Conditions in the Law of Contract” (1919) 28 Yale L.J. 739; Stoljar, “The Contractual Conception of Condition” (1953) 69 L.Q.R. 485.

¹⁹ See e.g., Brocus' case (1588) 2 Leon. 211; 74 E.R. 486.

²⁰ On prevention excusing compliance with condition precedent, see Jones v. Berkley (1781) 2 Doug. 685, 686–688; 99 E.R. 434, 435–436; Holham v. East India Co. (1787) 1 Term Rep. 638; 99 E.R. 1295.

²¹ (1773) 2 Doug. 689; 99 E.R. 436. There is evidence of a tendency towards construing executory bilateral contracts as involving mutually dependent promises much earlier: see Callonel v. Briggs (1703) 1 Salk. 112; 91 E.R. 104; Thorpe v. Thorpe (1701) 1 Salk. 171; 91 E.R. 157. See generally Stoljar, “Dependent and Independent Promises” (1955–57) 2 Sydney L.R. 217, 234 et seq. But Kingston v. Preston was the first “strong authority”: Glazebrook v. Woodrow (1799) 8 T.R. 366; 101 E.R. 1436; 371, 1439, per Grose J., 374, 1441, per Le Blanc J.

²² (1773) 2 Doug. 689, 691; 99 E.R. 436, 438.

²³ See, e.g., Goodison v. Nunn (1792) 4 T.R. 761; 100 E.R. 1288; Morton v. Lamb (1797) 7 T.R. 125; 101 E.R. 890; Glazebrook v. Woodrow (1799) 8 T.R. 366; 101 E.R. 1436; Rawson v. Johnson (1801) 1 East 203; 102 E.R. 79; and see United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Burnley Borough Council [1978] A.C. 904, 927GGoogle Scholar, per Lord Diplock.

²⁴ Williston, , A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (Rev. ed., 1936), Vol. 3, paras. 812 et seq.Google Scholar

²⁵ Glazebrook v. Woodrow (1799) 8 T.R. 366, 374; 101 E.R. 1436, 1439.

²⁶ See, e.g., Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. [1942] A.C. 356, 361Google Scholar, per Viscount Simon: “But repudiation by one party standing alone does not terminate the contract. It takes two to end it, by repudiation on the one side and acceptance of the repudiation on the other”; Howard v. Pickford Tool Co. Ltd. [1951] 1 K.B. 417, 421Google Scholar, per Asquith L.J.: “An unaccepted repudiation is a thing writ in water” and see and cf., Brien v. Dwyer (1978) 22 A.L.R. 485Google Scholar; Car and Universal Finance Co. Ltd. v. Caldwell [1965] 1 Q.B. 525, 535Google Scholar, per Upjohn L.J.

²⁷ See now R.S.C., Ord. 17, r. 4. Before the reforms introduced into the practice rules by the Common Law Procedure Act 1852, s. 57, a plaintiff at common law had to allege and prove the performance of all conditions precedent to the defendant's duty to perform. This was a serious burden on a plaintiff because any error on his part rendered his pleadings defective. He had to determine at his peril what acts were conditions, and no distinction was drawn for these purposes between express and implied (or constructive) conditions. The object of s. 57 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 was to lift this burden from a plain-tiff's shoulders. At first a general allegation of the performance or happening of all conditions was made sufficient: now in most jurisdictions, this general allegation is implied into all statements of claim. It is for a defendant to state what if any breaches of condition he relies upon, though no substantive change in the law has been made because the ultimate burden of proof has remained with the plaintiff: Jefferson v. Paskell [1916] 1 K.B. 58.Google Scholar These changes have nevertheless greatly obscured the true basis of discharge for breach because the result of the pleading rules has been to shift the focus of attention away from the question whether the plaintiff had complied with conditions precedent to his right to put the contract into suit towards the question whether there had been a breach of condition precedent entitling the defendant to treat himself as discharged. See generally Williston, “Fashions in Law” (1942) 21 Texas L.R. 117. 128–129.

²⁸ Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., Vol. 9, para. 556; Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Transgrains S.A. [1958] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 562.Google Scholar

²⁹ Haynes v. Hirst (1927) 27 S.R.(N.S.W.) 480, 486Google Scholar, per Long Innes J.

³⁰ Williston, “Repudiation of Contracts” (1901) 14 Harv.L.Rev. 421, 426, n. 2.

^30a See note 27, supra.

³¹ See Dawson, “Waiver of Conditions Precedent on a Repudiation” [1980] 96 L.Q.R. 239. And see Jones v. Barkley (1781) 2 Doug. 684, 694; 99 E.R. 434, 439–440, per Lord Mansfield; Ripley v. M'Clure (1849) 4 Exch. 345; 154 E.R. 1245, esp. at 353, 1248 (4th question); Cort and Gee v. The Ambergale, etc., Rly. Co. (1851) 17 Q.B. 127; 117 E.R. 1229.

³² Jones v. Barkley (1781) 2 Doug. 684; 99 E.R. 434; Goodison v. Nunn (1792) 4 T.R. 761; 100 E.R. 1288; Hawkins v. Kemp (1803) 3 East 410; 102 E.R. 655; Gandell v. Pomigny (1816) 4 Camp. 375; 171 E.R. 119 (servant recovering wages due on the basis of notional performance).

³³ Laird v. Pim (1841) 7 M. & W. 474; 151 E.R. 852; and see the pleadings in Ripley v. M'Clure (1849) 4 Exch. 345; 154 E.R. 1245; and Cort and Gee v. The Ambergale, etc., Railway Co. (1851) 17 Q.B. 127; 117 E.R. 1229.

³⁴ (1781) 2 Doug. 684, 694; 99 E.R. 434, 440

³⁵ See the amount recovered in Jones v. Barkley (1781) 2 Doug. 684; 99 E.R. 434; Hawkins v. Kemp (1803) 3 East 410; 102 E.R. 655; in Alva v. Plummer, 4 Greenleaf 258 (U.S.) it was held that where the vendor of lands tendered a deed which the vendee refused to receive, the measure of damages in an action against the latter for the breach of the contract of sale was the amount of the purchase money, with interest, leaving the purchaser to his right of action should the vendor after a demand subsequently made refuse to execute a proper conveyance. In such cases the vendor assigned as his breach the purchaser's failure to pay the agreed price on the due date, and would aver the performance or grounds excusing the performance of any conditions. Because the vendor had notionally complied with all conditions, a prevention of performance being equal to performance, the purchaser's promises became unconditional and on their non-performance the innocent party was entitled to sue for the loss caused by the non-performance, i.e., the price.

³⁶ (1841) 7 M. & W. 474; 151 E.R. 852.

³⁷ Ibid., 478. 854.

³⁸ Ibid., 484, 855–857, per Lord Abinger C.B., 485, 857, per Parke B.

³⁹ Ibid., 485, 857.

⁴⁰ At the present day the orthodox view appears to be that a wrongful repudiation at the time of performance is an actual failure to perform one's main promise. The purchaser in Laird v. Pim, for example, breaks his promise to pay the price when he fails to complete on the agreed date. The reasoning in support of this conclusion appears to be as follows—what follows is my understanding of the analysis to be found in the American Restatement of Contracts, ss. 251, 294, 306: In an ordinary bilateral contract for sale, the parties' promises are concurrent conditions precedent, and the innocent party complies with the condition if he is ready and willing to perform and has done everything he can to perform. A wrongful repudiation excuses actual performance and the condition may be treated as having been complied with. But the fact that the innocent party has notionally complied with the condition does not mean that he is entitled to receive the value of the counter-performance. This is because conditions may be divided into two classes. In the first the condition is all or part of the exchanged performance agreed upon for the performance promised by the other party. The second class comprises conditions which in themselves have no value to the promisor whose undertaking is qualified by the requirement of the existence of the condition. Where that class of condition is excused, the duty of the promisor is the same as if the promise was unconditional. Where a condition of the first class is excused, a breach by the promisor generally subjects him only to duty to pay damages based on the difference in value between the performance which he has promised and the value of the performance which constitutes the condition. This reasoning is, with respect, open to the same sort of objection as Parke B.'s reasoning is— viz., how can one be obliged to pay the price and not be obliged to pay it at one and the same time?

⁴¹ See, e.g., Ruddenklau v. Charlesworth [1925] N.Z.L.R. 161, 164Google Scholar, per Salmond J.; Automatic Fire Sprinklers Ply. Ltd. v. Watson (1945–46) 72 C.L.R. 435, 463–466Google Scholar, per Dixon J. and the cases collected in the English and Empire Digest, Vol. 40 (1958 ed.), p. 282, para. 2350.

⁴² See, e.g., Colley v. Overseas Exporter [1921] 3 K.B. 302.Google Scholar In practical terms this was the real change that was brought about by Laird v. Pim. Yet in strict theory it is difficult to see why a seller ought not to be entitled to the contract price if he relies on the buyer's prevention as establishing constructive performance of all conditions precedent (see Jones v. Barkley (1781) 2 Doug. 684; 99 E.R. 434). Many American jurisdictions allowed such a remedy prior to the passing of codifying legislation on sales. See Williston, Sales (Rev. ed.), Vol. 3. paras. 502 et seq. And perhaps this is the true explanation of Mackay v. Dick (1881) 6 App.Cas 251 where it is unclear that the property had passed to the defendant.

⁴³ See Halsbury's, Laws of England, 4th ed., Vol. 9, paras. 359, 518; Chitty, The Law of Contracts, 24th ed. (1977), Vol. 1, paras. 788, 1491 (and cases cited thereat). Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (Rev. ed.), para. 1293A.

⁴⁴ See n. 27 (supra); and see the Common Law Procedure Act 1852, ss. 50, 51, 57.

⁴⁵ (1853) 2 E. & B. 678; 118 E.R. 922.

⁴⁶ (1851) 17 Q.B. 127; 117 E.R. 1229.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 145–148, 1236–1237.

⁴⁸ Morion v. Lamb (1797) 7 T.R. 125; 101 E.R. 890.

⁴⁹ Con and Gee v. The Ambergate, etc., Rly. Co. (1851) 17 Q.B. 127; 117 E.R. 1229 and cases at n. 31, supra.

⁵⁰ (1853) 2 E. & B. 678; 118 E.R. 922.

⁵¹ (1901) 14 Harv.L.Rev. 421.

⁵² See supra, n. 6.

⁵³ (1941) 65 C.L.R. 1.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 15. And see Wigan v. Edwards (1973) 47 A.L.T.R. 586, 589.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Restatement, Contracts, Vol. 1, Art. 318e, p. 477.

⁵⁶ [1934] 2D.L.R. 459.

⁵⁷ (1936) 30 Tasmania L.R. 111.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 115.

⁵⁹ [1934] 2 D.L.R. 459, 463.

⁶⁰ Société Générale de Paris v. Milders (1883) 49 L.T. 55; Johnstone v. Milling (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 460; Rhymney Rail Co. v. Brecon & Merthyr Tydfil Rail Co. (1900) 83 L.T. 111.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Nienaber, “The Effect of Anticipatory Repudiation: Principle and Policy” [1962] C.L.J. 213, 221.

⁶² The cases are hopelessly divided on this issue: see n. 4 and n. 5, supra. For an excellent illustration of the problem, see American Red Cross v. Geddes Bros. (1920) 55 D.L.R. 194.Google Scholar

⁶³ For cases on mutual rescission, see n. 17, supra, and Morris v. Baron [1918] A.C. 1.Google Scholar Part of the confusion on this question is attributable to the confusion as to the true theoretical basis of wrongful repudiation: cf., e.g., Lord Wrenbury's offer to rescind theory in Bradley v. Newsom [1919] A.C. 16, 52Google Scholar, which is convincingly answered by Nienaber [1962] C.L.J. 213, 220–221.

⁶⁴ Cf., Void, “Withdrawal of Repudiation after Anticipatory Breach of Contract” (1926) 5 Texas L.Rev. 9.

⁶⁵ (1953–54) 90 C.L.R. 409.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 416 per Dixon J.

⁶⁷ [1905] 2 K.B. 543.

⁶⁸ (1922) 127 L.T. 267.

⁶⁹ Benjamin, Sale of Goods (1974), para. 1604.

⁷⁰ Dawson, “Waiver of Conditions Precedent on a Wrongful Repudiation” (1980) 96 L.Q.R. 239.

⁷¹ The Mihalis Angelas [1971] 1 Q.B. 164Google Scholar; Schilling v. Kidd Garrett Ltd. [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 243.Google Scholar

⁷² Taylor v. Oakes, Roncoroni & Co. (1922) 127 L.T. 267, 271Google Scholar, per Bankes L.J.; and see Braithwaite v. Foreign Hardwood Co. [1905] 2 K.B. 543, 552Google Scholar, per Collins M.R.

⁷³ See Williston, “Repudiation of Contracts” (1901) 14 Harv.L.Rev. 317; Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (Rev. ed.), Vol. 5, paras. 1454 et seq. And see Corbin, , Contracts (1952) Vol. 4, para. 1102 et seq.;Google Scholar Dawson (1976) 39 M.L.R. 214.

⁷⁴ See for recent illustrations Capital and Suburban Properties Ltd. v. Swycher [1976] 1 Ch. 319Google Scholar; Johnson v. Agnew [1978] 1 Ch. 176Google Scholar; Buckland v. Farmer & Moody [1979] 1 W.L.R. 221Google Scholar; Johnson v. Agnew [1979] 1 All E.R. 883, 891Google Scholar, per Lord Wilberforce. See generally Albery, “Mr. Cyprian Williams' Great Heresy” (1975) 91 L.Q.R. 337.

⁷⁵ Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty. Ltd. v. Watson (1945–46) 72 C.L.R. 435, 465Google Scholar, per Dixon J.

⁷⁶ Decro-Wall International S.A. v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 361, 375Google Scholar, per Sachs L.J.; Hill v. C. A. Parsons Ltd. [1972] Ch. 305, 319Google Scholar, per Sachs L.J.

⁷⁷ See, e.g., Colliery. Sunday Referee Publishing Co. Ltd. [1940] 2 K.B. 647Google Scholar; Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty. Ltd. v. Watson (1945–46) 72 C.L.R. 435, 450–451Google Scholar, per Latham C.J.; 465–466, per Dixon J., 476, per Williams J.

⁷⁸ [1962] A.C. 413. See Goodhart, “Measure of Damages when a Contract is Repudiated” (1962) 78 L.Q.R. 263; Stoljar, “Some Problems of Anticipatory Breach” (1979) 9 Melbourne Univ.L.Rev. 355; and cf. Davies, “Anticipatory Breach an d Mitigation of Damages” (1963) 5 University of Western Australia L.R. 576.

⁷⁹ Cf., Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Den. 317 (1845) on which Professor Goodhart placed some reliance in his criticism of White and Carter (78 L.Q.R. 263, 268). In that case a plaintiff who had refused to accept the defendant's repudiation sued to recover the price agreed on for cleaning and repairing certain paintings. The Supreme Court of New York held the plaintiff limited to damages: “to persist in accumulating a larger demand is not consistent with good faith towards the employer.”

⁸⁰ [1962] A.C. 413, 431.

⁸¹ (1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 111.