¹ See, for example, Dicey, and Morris, , The Conflict of Laws, 11th ed. (1987), p. 958, Rules 123, 124Google Scholar; Westlake, , A Treatise on Private International Law, 7th ed. (1925), ss.150, 152Google Scholar; Cheshire, and North, , Private International Law, 11th ed. (1987), pp. 804–805Google Scholar.

² Day, J. in Lee v. Abdy (1886) 17 Q.B.D. 309 at 312Google Scholar noted “the subject matter of the assignment is a chose in action which has no locality”.

³ The ecclesiastical officer with power to grant probate and administer intestacies: A.-G. v. Bouwens (1838) 4 M. & W. 171 at 191–192Google Scholar.

⁴ A.-G. v. Dimond (1831) 1 Cr. & J. 356Google Scholar; A.-G. v. Bouwens (1838) 4 M. & W. 171Google Scholar.

⁵ [1891] A.C. 476 at 481.

⁶ R. v. Lovitt [1912] A.C. 212 at 219–220Google Scholar.

⁷ Leaving aside the fact that the application of a test of residence is in itself not entirely straightforward.

⁸ [1924] 2 Ch. 101.

⁹ The moneys payable under an insurance policy do not strictly constitute a debt of the insurance company and they are a sum which is certain and owed by the company and therefore analogous to a debt.

¹⁰ [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1035.

¹¹ Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws, op. cit., at p. 907.

¹² Residence is one of the internationally recognised bases of competent jurisdiction in foreign courts. The English courts will generally recognise a judgment of a court at the residence of the debtor. See, for example, Emanuel v. Symon [1908] 1 K.B. 302 at 309Google Scholar.

¹³ R. v. Lovitt [1912] A.C. 212Google Scholar; Re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade [1933] 1 Ch. 745Google Scholar.

¹⁴ New York Life Insurance Co. v. Public Trustee [1924] 2 Ch. 101Google Scholar; F. & K. Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property [1954] 1 W.L.R. 139Google Scholar; Rossano v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. [1963] 2 Q.B. 352Google Scholar.

¹⁵ [1958] 2 Q.B. 59 at 73–74.

¹⁶ Alloway v. Phillips [1980] 1 W.L.R. 888 at 893Google Scholar; SCF Finance Co. v. Masri (No. 3) [1987] Q.B. 1028 at 1044Google Scholar; see also Dicey & Morris, op. cit., Rule 115.

¹⁷ He said: “As has been pointed out a chose in action has not in strictness any locality. But where, as in the present case, a simple contract debt has to be treated as having some locality, it is deemed by English law to be situated at the place where the debtor resides. The reason for assigning this locality to a simple contract debt was that the place where the debtor resides was in nearly every case the place where it was recoverable. Even in earlier times, it might, of course, occasionally have happened that judgment could be obtained against a debtor in a country where he did not reside. But it was probably thought desirable for the sake of uniformity to adopt in all cases the test of residence rather than the test of recoverability. … I know of no authority for the proposition that a simple contract debt is situate in this country at a time when the debtor is not resident here. … The fact that a simple contract debt can be recoverable here from a debtor out of the jurisdiction does not establish an English locality for the debt.” Deutsche Bank und Disconto Gesellschaft v. Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Court of Appeal judgment delivered 14th December, 1931) cited in Re Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesky) (No. 2) [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1108 at 1115–1116Google Scholar.

¹⁸ [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1037.

¹⁹ [1891] A.C. 476.

²⁰ See also R. v. Williams [1942] A.C. 541 at 555–556Google Scholar.

²¹ There may be no real justification for the separate treatment of debts and specialties.

²² Other than to avoid any question of lack of consideration.

²³ (1838) 4 M. & W. 171.

²⁴ See below, text accompanying notes 27 to 31.

²⁵ [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1233.

²⁶ Where, for example, a court has attached the letter of credit or government has purported to appropriate it. See text accompanying note 32 et seq. below.

²⁷ Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s.6(1).

²⁸ Smelting Co. of Australia Ltd. v. I.R.C. [1897] 1 Q.B. 175Google Scholar; Danubian Sugar Factories v. I.R.C. [1901] 1 Q.B. 245Google Scholar; I.R.C. v. Muller & Co.'s Margarine [1901] A.C. 217Google Scholar.

²⁹ Stamp Act 1891, s.59(1).

³⁰ [1932] A.C. 238.

³¹ [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1035.

³² Dicey & Morris, op. cit., Rule 124; Kaye, [1989] J.B.L. 449Google Scholar.

³³ [1927] P. 228.

³⁴ See, for example, Balcombe, L.J.'s judgment in Interpool Ltd. v. Galani [1988] Q.B. 738 at 741Google Scholar.

³⁵ [1987] Q.B. 1028.

³⁶ [1927] P. 228.

³⁷ [1988] Q.B. 738.

³⁸ One of the group of orders (Ords. 45–52) dealing with enforcement of judgments, it is relevant as part of the general context in which Ord. 49 is to be construed. Ord. 48 allows a judgment creditor to require the judgment debtor to attend an oral examination to disclose debts owing to him and property that may be used to satisfy the judgment.

³⁹ [1988] Q.B. 738 at 741.

⁴⁰ In terms of its own internal jurisdiction, i.e., the court is acting properly under the terms of the order which grants it the power to garnish debts.

⁴¹ See Interpool Ltd. v. Galani [1987] 2 All E.R. 981 at 983–984Google Scholar.

⁴² See Martin v. Nadel [1906] 2 K.B. 26Google Scholar; cf. Swiss Bank Corporation v. Boehmische Industrial Bank [1923] 1 K.B. 673Google Scholar and D.S.T. v. Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1990] A.C. 295Google Scholar.

⁴³ RSC 1965, Ord. 45, r.l.

⁴⁴ The application of the doctrine means that the courts of the second country would generally recognise the title of the new owner (granted by the law of the country where the goods were seized) and the overriding of the judgment debtor's interest in the property. See generally Lalive, , The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws (1955)Google Scholar; Zaphiriou, , The Transfer of Chattels in Private International Law (1956)Google Scholar; Dicey and Morris, op. cit., Rules 119, 120; Cheshire and North, op. cit., pp. 790–803.

⁴⁵ Or even an express analogy, as in Re Maudslay, Sons & Field [1990] 1 Ch. 602 where Cozens-Hardy, J. cited (at 609)Google Scholar and followed authorities relating to tangible property.

⁴⁶ [1990] A.C. 295.

⁴⁷ Ibid, at 343.

⁴⁸ Dicey and Morris, op. cit., Rule 124.

⁴⁹ [1891] 1 Ch. 536 at 545.

⁵⁰ [1900] 1 Ch. 602 at 609. See also Rossano v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. [1963] 2 Q.B. 352Google Scholar; Power Curber v. National Bank of Kuwait [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1233Google Scholar.

⁵¹ [1990] A.C. 295.

⁵² Whether the Ras Al Khaimah court's judgment would be a sufficient discharge of the debt is another question. As that court had ordered Shell International to pay its original creditor it is unlikely that any court would order it to pay that creditor again. The issue would arise more directly if instead of paying the original creditor, the debtor had been forced to pay another judgment creditor of the original creditor.

⁵³ For example, Libyan Arab Bank [1989] Q.B. 728Google Scholar, [1989] 1 LI.L.R. 608; Re Helbert Wagg & Co. [1956] Ch. 323.

⁵⁴ The courts have followed the well-known cases on tangible property: Luther v. Sagor [1921] 3 K.B. 532Google Scholar and Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz [1929] 1 K.B. 718Google Scholar; Re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade [1933] 1 Ch. 745; Cheshire v. Huth (1929) reported at (1946) 79 LI.L.R. 263 at 266Google Scholar; Novella v. Hinrichsen Edition [1951] Ch. 595 at 604; Re Banque des Marchands de Moscou cases [1952] 1 All E.R. 1269 at 1272–1273Google Scholar, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1108 at 1113; Adams v. National Bank of Greece [1958] 2 Q.B. 59 at 73–74Google Scholar reversed on grounds not affecting this point, [1960] 1 Q.B. 64, Court of Appeal, reversed [1961] A.C. 255; Bank Saderat Iran v. Sayed Hossain Farshneshani [1982] Comm. L.R. 111 at 111Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ [1947] Ch. 629.

⁵⁶ This was doubtless per incuriam given the nature of the decree. Compare Oppenheimer v. Cattermole [1976] A.C. 249Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ [1947] Ch. 629 at 644.

⁵⁸ The usual exceptions to recognition of a foreign rule (on the grounds of discrimination contrary to human rights, for example) will operate.

⁵⁹ [1954] 1 W.L.R. 139.

⁶⁰ The insurance company was incorporated in England where it was sued on the policy. The company admitted liability and the action was heard on an interpleader summons. The plaintiffs claimed as insured and the defendant claimed as being entitled to the proceeds of the insurance policy by virtue of Israeli legislation which operated to pass title to the property to him.

⁶¹ Following the English case of A.S. Tallinna Laevauhisus v. Estonian State Steamship Line (1947) 80 LI.L.R. 99Google Scholar as the parties had agreed that the English rules of construction were to be applied to the legislation.

⁶² Indeed, in a sense all “property” is intangible as it is the rights (necessarily intangible) over the thing that constitute the property. This is, however an unnecessary distraction as it is the thing, the subject of the property rights, which is important in this context.

⁶³ See Lalive, , The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws (1955), ch. 5Google Scholar.; Zaphiriou, , The Transfer of Chattels in Private International Law (1956), ch. 6Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Within the EC domicil is the main ground for jurisdiction, not mere residence (Brussels Convention 1968, art. 52). For the interrelationship between the situs rules and defendants domiciled in the EC contracting states see Kaye, [1989] J.B.L. 449Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ The American courts in deciding cases concerned with the escheat of debts have already recognised this point, see Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania 82 S.Ct. 199 (1961)Google Scholar; Texas v. New Jersey 85 S.Ct. 626 (1965)Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ For example Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods [1980] Ch. 496.

⁶⁷ Williams, (1895) 11 L.Q.R. 223 at p. 226 (his emphasis, footnotes omitted)Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ See, for example, New York Life Insurance Co. v. Public Trustee [1924] 2 Ch. 101; Rossano v. Manufacturers Life [1963] 2 Q.B. 352Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ For a fairly startling example of the courts coming to different conclusions on similar facts compare F. & K. Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property [1954] 1 W.L.R. 139Google Scholar and Rossano v. Manufacturers Life [1963] 2 Q.B. 352Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ As in Libyan Arab Bank v. Bankers Trust [1989] Q.B. 728Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Residence is itself not a straightforward test. Even leaving aside the situation when the debtor has two or more residences, determining a person's or company's residence can involve a long enquiry into any number of factors. See, for example, the use of residence for tax purposes in Levene v. IRC. [1928] A.C. 217Google Scholar and IRC. v. Lysaght [1928] A.C. 234Google Scholar.

⁷² [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1035.

⁷³ Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s.32.

⁷⁴ [1990] A.C. 295.

⁷⁵ Ibid., at 354.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ (1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 228.

⁷⁸ See, Richardson v. Richardson [1928] P. 228Google Scholar, which is an example of the rare case when a debtor is subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts but the debt was not situated here.

⁷⁹ As, for example, when the express choice of the proper law is not connected in any way with the debtor's residence.

⁸⁰ Luther v. Sagor [1921] 3 K.B. 532Google Scholar and in respect of intangible property, see note 54.