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Statuta Sunt Stricte Interpretanda? Statutes and the Common Law: A Continental Prespective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

Reinhard Zimmermann
Affiliation:
Professor of Private Law, Roman Law and Comparative Legal History, University of Regensburg. This is an amended and annotated version of a paper presented at the annual conference of the Society of Public Teachers of Law in Cambridge in September 1996. The theme of the conference was legislation. The present paper was preceded by a presentation by Neil MacCormick, focusing on theoretical aspects of statutory interpretation (for preliminary versions, see Argumentation and Interpretation in Law, (1995) 9 Argumentation 467 sqq.; Argumentation und Interpretation im Recht: “Rule Consequentialism” und rationale Rekonstruktion, in: Gunther Teubner (ed.), Enlscheidungsfolgen ahRechtsgriinde (1995), 39 sqq.).
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Extract

“All statutes contrary to the common law … are to be interpreted strictly and have to be accepted in the most exact manner as they stand, and speak”. “Statutes which repeal the [common] law, have to be interpreted most strictly, and cannot be extended to cases which are not expressed in them.” “Statutes … generally consist more in ‘thus I want and thus I command’ than in a regulation according to reason”; “they fade like the moon's shadows, and like the moon they wax and wane at the legislators' whim”. It may be thought that these four sentences refer to the approach traditionally adopted in England to the interpretation of statutes. But they do not. They encapsulate the attitude adopted by the learned lawyers of the older ius commune, particularly in 13th and 14th century Italy, and in 16th century Germany. An English colleague has suggested that “civilian lawyers regard our case law with admiration and our statute book with despair”.

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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1997

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References

1. Omnia statuta juri commune Romanorum adversa sunt strictae interpretationis, et ad unguem sicut iacent, et loquuntur, accipienda: Riccius, Zuverldssiger Entwurff von Stadt-Geselzen oder Statutis (1740), as quoted by Winfried Trusen, Römisches und partikulares Recht in der Rezeptionszeit, in: Rechtsbewahrung und Rechtsentwicklung, Festschrift für Heinrich Lange (1970), p. 110.

2. Statuta cum Juri Romano derogant esse strictissima interpretanda, et non extendi posse ad Casus in iisdem non expressos: Arthur Duck, De Usu et Authoritate Juris Civilis Romanorum in Dominiis Principum Christianorum Libri duo, 1648, Lib. II, Cap. 2, n. 17, as quoted by Norbert Horn, Romisches Recht als gemeineuropaisches Recht bei Arthur Duck, in: Walter, Wilhelm (ed.), Studien zur europaischen Rechtsgeschichte (1972), p. 177.Google Scholar

3. Statuta terrarum … maiori pane consistunt [in] sic volo sic iubeo quam in modulari ratione: Baldus de Ubaldis (1327–1400), Super usibus feudalibus, as quoted by Helmut Coing, Zur romanistischen Auslegung von Rezeptionsgesetzen: Fichards Noten zur Frankfurter Reformation von 1509, (1936) 56 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftungfur Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) 269.

4. [Sed iste leges municipales … sicut umbra lunatica evanescunt, quoniam ad similitudinem lunae crescunt et decrescunt secundum arbitrium conditorum: Boncompagno of Signa (d. 1235), as quoted by Manlio Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe 1000–1800 (1995), p. 85 (tr.: Lydia G. Cochrane).

5. Cf. generally, in particular, Woldemar, Engelmann, Die Wiedergeburt der Rechtskuhur in ltalien durch die wissenschaftliche Lehre (1938), pp. 139Google Scholar sqq., 145 sqq.; Mario, Sbriccoli, L'interpretazione dello statuto (1969),Google Scholar passim.

6. For a general account, now available in English, see Franz, Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe, translated by Tony, Weir (1995);Google Scholar cf. also the work by Bellomo, as quoted above, n. 4.

7. A point particularly emphasised by Berman, Harold J., Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983)Google Scholar (“Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Western legal tradition is the coexistence and competition within the same community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems”: p. 10).

8. Wolfgang, Wiegand, Die privatrechtlichen Rechtsquellen des Usus modernus, in: Dieter, Simon (ed.), Aklen des 26. Deutschen Rechtshistorikertages (1987), p. 239.Google Scholar

9. Analysed, by way of example, most recently by Petra, Koch, Die Statutengesetzgebung der Kommune Vercelli im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert (1995);Google ScholarWesthues, Peter Lütke, Die Kommunalstatuten von Verona im 13. Jahrhundert (1995).Google Scholar Generally on the topic of Medieval statute law, see Helmut, Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht, vol. I (1985), pp. 105Google Scholar sqq.; Reiner, Schulze, Statutarrecht, in: Handwärterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. IV (1990),Google Scholar cols. 1922 sqq. For a survey of the most important city statutes of Northern Italy, see Armin, Wolff, Die Gesetzgebung der entstehenden Territorialstaaten, in: Helmut, Coing (ed), Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europaäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, vol. I (1973), pp. 573Google Scholar sqq.

10. Max, Gutzwiller, Geschichte des Internationalprivatrechts (1977), pp. 7Google Scholar sqq.; Coing (n. 9 above) pp. 137 sqq.; Christian von Bar, Internationales Privatrecht, vol. I (1987), pp. 360Google Scholar sqq.; Gerhard, Kegel, Internationales Privatrechl, 7th ed. (1995), pp. 129 sqq.Google Scholar

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12. Cf. Detlef, Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter, 5th ed. (1991), p. 111.Google Scholar

13. Cf. Pap. D. 50, 17, 80; Paul. D. 32, 99, 5.

14. Cf., e.g., Trusen (n. 1 above) p. 111.

15. For the details, see Wolfgang, Wiegand, Studien zur Rechtsanwendungslehre der Rezeptionszeit (1977), pp. 126 sqq.Google Scholar, 161; Klaus Luig, Universales Recht und partikulares Recht in den “Meditationes ad Pandeetas” von Augustin, Leyser, in: Diriito commune e diritii locali nella storia dell'Europa, Atti del Convegno di Varenna (1980), pp. 27 sqq.Google Scholar

16. For all details, see Engelmann (n. 5 above) pp. 139 sqq., 145 sqq., 153 sqq. Cf. also Willem, Zwalve, Interpretatieproblemen vóór de codificatie, in: Liber memorialis François Laurent (1989), pp. 447 sqq.Google Scholar

17. For an example, see Hermann Lange, Ius commune und Statutarrecht in Christoph Besolds Consilia Tubigensia, in: Festschrift für Max Kaser (1976), pp. 638 sqq. But see also, concerning the 16th century practice of the Reichskammergericht, the remarks by Bernhard Diestelkamp, Das Reichskammergericht im Rechtsleben des 16. Jahrhunderts, in: Rechlsgeschichie als Kulturgeschichte: Festschrift für Adalbert Erler (1976), pp. 469 sq.; and, concerning the territorial courts, Luig (n. 15 above) pp. 35 sqq., pp. 40 sqq.

18. Wieacker (n. 6 above) p. 106.

19. Wieacker (n. 6 above) p. 35.

20. Coing (n. 3 above) p. 269, p. 276 (from where the metaphor is taken); Sbriccoli (n. 5 above) p. 410; Trusen (n. 1 above) p. 98.

21. Engelmann (n. 5 above) p. 146; Sbriccoli (n. 5 above) p. 406. Many statutes contained specific rules enjoining judges not to interpret the provisions of the statute freely or even to interpret them at all; cf. Engelmann (n. 5 above) pp. 145 sqq. The latter type of clause was usually taken by the learned jurists to prohibit a “frivolous” interpretation (Nam per dicta verba solum frivola interpretatio videtur remota, in the words of Bartolus; cf. Engelmann (n. 5 above) p. 150).

22. For details concerning what was called, oddly, “Syndikatsprozess” (“sindicatus”), see Engelmann (n. 5 above) pp. 467 sqq., pp. 514 sqq.; Erler, A., Syndikatsklage, in: Handowrterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 33. Lieferung (1991),Google Scholar cols. 100 sq.

23. Sbriccoli (n. 5 above) p. 407.

24. The parallels have also been pointed out by Zwalve (n. 16 above) pp. 462 sqq.

25. Harbert's Case, (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 13 b, as quoted by Jack Beatson, Has the Common Law a Future? [1997] C.L.J. 291, at pp. 299 sqq.

26. Sir Edward, Coke, Le Quart Part des Reporles (1604),Google Scholar as quoted by Baker, J.H., An Introduction to English Legal History, 3rd ed. (1990), p. 223.Google Scholar

27. Lord, Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, (1972) 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 28,Google Scholar as quoted by Roderick, Munday, The Common Lawyer's Philosophy of Legislation, in: (1983)Google Scholar 14 Rechtstheorie 193.

28. Cf. the reference in the previous note.

29. Sir John, Davis, Le Primer Report des Cases en Ireland (1615)Google Scholar (Baker (n. 26 above) p. 223).

30. Zenon, Bankowski & MacCormick, D. Neil, Statutory Interpretation in the United Kingdom, in: MacCormick, D. Neil & Summers, Robert S. (eds.), Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (1991), p. 361.Google Scholar

31. Harbert's Case (n. 25 above).

32. Bankowski & MacCormick (n. 30 above) p. 396. Cf. also Sir William, Jones, as quoted by Munday, (1983)Google Scholar 14 Rechtstheorie 201: “ … the unwritten law is eminently favourable, and written law generally hostile, to the absolute rights of persons”.

33. For a statement of the traditional English doctrine on statute interpretation, in the light of comparative law, see Wolfgang, Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts in vergleichender Darstellung, vol. II (1975), pp. 111 sqq.Google Scholar For a comprehensive “code” drawn up by a professional English legislative draftsman, see Bennion, F.A.R., Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed. (1992).Google Scholar

34. Their validity is undermined, inter alia, by the fact that in areas governed by statute law gapfilling by way of analogy is widely regarded as admissible (cf., e.g., Bankowski & MacCormick (n. 30 above) p. 384; Sir Rupert, Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed.Google Scholar by John Bell & Sir George Engle (1995), pp. 44 sqq.

35. Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., [1978] ICR 347 (354).

36. Cf, e.g., the brief discussion and t h e references in (1993) 1 Zeilschrift für Europüisches Privatrecht 6 sq.

37. Concerning England cf., e.g., Beatson (n. 25 above) pp. 299 sqq.

38. Cf. Lord, Esher M.R., R.v. Judge of the City of London Court, [1892] 1 Q.D. 273 (290).Google Scholar

39. In continental Europe, this was indeed the ideal espoused by 18th century enlightened authoritarianism: the law was to be made accessible (by means of a comprehensive codification), so that all subjects would know about their rights, their duties, and their position within society. On the rule of error iuris nocet see, in the present context, Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990, paperback edition 1996), pp. 604 sqq., 868 sqq.

40. Cf. the analysis by Peter Birks, Konkurrierende Strategien und Interessen: Das Irrtumserfordernis im Bereicherungsrecht des common law, (1993) 1 Zeilschrift fur Europaisches Privatrecht 554 sqq.Google Scholar

41. Cross (n. 34 above) p. 10.

42. [1993] A.C. 593.

43. Reservations have recently been expressed, on essentially pragmatic grounds, about Pepper v. Hart, insofar as this decision accepts that judges may refer to the Parliamentary debates in order to ascertain the meaning of an act of legislation, by Walker, Neil C., The Crumbling Pillars of Statutory Interpretation, in: MacQueen, Hector L. (ed.), Scots Law into the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of W. A. Wilson (1996), pp. 126 sqq.Google Scholar The arguments advanced (e.g. that ministers might feel inhibited to speak frankly to their legislative brief in Parliament) do not strike a continental observer as particularly convincing.

44. Beatson (n. 25 above) p. 301, pp. 309 sqq.

45. It has been reinforced, traditionally, by the so-called “mischief-rule”; for its classic statement, see Cross (n. 34 above) pp. 11 sq.

46. Munday, (1983) 14 Rechtstheorie 197.

47. Friedrich, Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, vol. I (1840), pp. 206 sqq.Google ScholarSavingy's lectures on legal methodology have recently been edited by Aldo, Mazzacane, Vorlesungen über juristische Methodologie 1802–1842 (1993).Google Scholar

48. For an authoritative statement, cf. Karl, Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 6th ed. (1991), pp. 320 sqq.;Google Scholar cf. also Wolfgang, Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts in vergleichender Darslellung, vol. III (1976), pp.668 sqq.;Google ScholarWolfgang, Seiler, Hüchstrichterliche Entscheidungsbegrundungen und Methode im Zivlrecht (1992), pp. 30Google Scholar sqq. and passim; Robert, Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, 3rd ed. (1996), pp. 289 sqq.;Google ScholarKarl, Larenz & Claus-Wilhelm, Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 3rd ed. (1995), pp. 141 sqq.;Google ScholarPeter, Raisch, Jurislische Methoden: Vom antiken Rom bis zur Gegenwan (1995), pp. 138 sqq.Google Scholar In English: Robert, Alexy & Ralf, Dreier, Statutory Interpretation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: MacCormick, D. Neil & Summers, Robert S. (eds), Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (1991), pp. 73 sqq.Google Scholar

49. On both of them, see Alexy (n. 48 above) p. 294; Alexy & Dreier (n. 48 above) pp. 87 sq. On the ius commune preceding the enactment of the BGB as a point of reference for understanding, interpreting, and developing the law, see Reinhard, Zimmermann, Civil Code and Civil Law, (1994/1995) 1 Columbia Journal of European Law 89 sqq.Google Scholar

50. See Walter, Odersky (the then President of the German Federal Supreme Court), Harmonisierende Auslegung und europaische Rechtskultur, (1994)Google Scholar 2 Zeitschrift fur Europaisches Privalrecht 1 sqq.

51. See Larenz (n. 48 above) pp. 339 sqq.; Alexy & Dreier (n. 48 above) pp. 110 sqq.; Klaus, Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. I, 2nd ed. (1984), pp. 135 sqq.;Google Scholar vol. HI/2 (1994), pp. 1147 sqq.

52. For details, see Larenz (n. 48 above) pp. 366 sqq. The history of the device of statutory analogy has recently been traced by Baade, Hans W., The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, (1994) 20 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 45 sqq.Google Scholar

53. Raisch (n. 48 above) pp. 139 sqq., pp. 151 sqq., pp. 162 sqq.

54. Larenz (n. 48 above) pp. 366 sqq.

55. On the role, and significance, of case law under the German Civil Code, see Reinhard, Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in: Werner, Ebke & Finkin, Matthew W. (eds.), Introduction to German Law (1996), pp. 16 sqq.Google Scholar

56. It does, occasionally, occur but is usually very skilfully covered up. One of the most notorious examples is the one briefly mentioned in Zimmermann (n. 55 above) pp. 18 sq., p. 20 and discussed in (1994/95) 1 Columbia Journal of European Law 103 sq.

57. Cf, e.g., Fritz, Ossenbühl, Gesetz und Recht—Die Rechtsquellen im demokratischen Rechtsstaat, in: Josef, Isensee & Paul, Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. III (1988),Google Scholar § 61, nn. 35 sqq. (pp. 298 sqq.).

58. Concerning other countries, see the reports in MacCormick, D. Neil & Summers, Robert S. (eds.), Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (1991).Google Scholar The European Court of Justice in Luxemburg, by and large, follows the classical four approaches (wording, history, system, purpose) mentioned above: see Marcus, Lutter, Die Auslegung angeglichenen Rechts, (1992) Juristenzeitung 598Google Scholar sqq. National legal norms that have been enacted as a result of an EU-directive have to be interpreted in conformity with this directive; for details see, most recently, Winfried Brechmann, Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung (1994); Stefan Grundmann, Richtlinienkonforme Auslegung im Bereich des Privatrecht-s-insbesondere: der Kanon der nationalen Auslegungsmethoden als Grenze?, (1996) 4 Zeilschrift für Europüisches Privatrecht 399 sqq. Generally on the impact of EU-directives on and their relationship to the national methods of interpretation, see Marek Schmidt, Privatrechtsangleichende EU-Richtlinien und nationale Auslegungsmethoden, (1995) RahelsZ 569 sqq.

59. For details, see Reinhard, Zimmermann, Codification: History and Present Significance of an Idea, (1995) 3 European Review of Private Law 95 sqq.Google Scholar

60. Jan, Lokin, Tekst en Uitleg, Opstellen over codificatie en interpretalie naar aanleiding van de invoering van het nieuwe Burgerlijk Welboek (1994), pp. 143 sqq.Google Scholar, however, points out specific problems of transition in early 19th century Dutch law.

61. Baker (n. 26 above) p. 240.

62. The statement continues: “…the letter of the law is the body of the law, but the sense and reason of the law is its soul … and often when you know the letter you do not know the sense, for sometimes this sense is not as large as the letter and sometimes it is larger”.

63. Cf. generally Loyd, W.H.The Equity of a Statute, (1909) 58 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 76 sqq.; and see Thome, Samuel E. (ed.),Google Scholar A Discourse upon the Exposicion and Understandinge of Statutes (1942), as well as the recent discussion by Baade, (1994) 20 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 65 sqq., 74 sqq.Google Scholar

64. Baker (n. 26 above) pp. 239 sq. Cf. also Devenish, G.E., Interpretation of Statutes (1992), pp. 18 sqq.Google Scholar I would suspect, however, that it has even survived until far into the 18th century. The narrowly literalist approach could then be seen as an emanation of the positivism culminating in the 19th century. The tightening up of the doctrine of stare decisis also dates from this period. Cf. also Baade, (1994) 20 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 83 sqq. (who argues that the equitable approach towards the interpretation of statutes was abandoned “in the wake of the Glorious Revolution but almost a century thereafter”).

65. Regulae generales de interpretatione etiam ad statuta hodierna extendi debent: Johannes, Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, vol. I, Halae (1776),Google Scholar Lib. I, Tit. Ill, 24. The same view had been adopted by his father Paulus Voet in his influential treatise De statutis.

66. [Dubium non est, quin] statuta aeque, ac ipsae leges Romanae extensiva, ut aiunt, interpretatione non possint modo, sed et debeant porrigi libere ad casus similes, in quibus eadem ratio est: Jacobus, Voorda, Tractatus de Statutis, edited and translated by Hewett, M.L. & van Warmelo, P. (1985),Google Scholar Cap. II, § 8 (p. 37). Cf. also, e.g., Johannes van der Linden, Regtsgeleerd, Practicaal, en Koopmans Handboek, Amsteldam (1806), I. Boek, 1. Afdeeling, §§ VI sqq.; Dionysius Godefridus van der Keessel, Praelectiones luris Hodierni ad Hugonis Grotii Introduclionem ad Iurisprudentiam Hollandicam, ed. by van Warmelo, P., Coertze, L.I., Gonin, H.L. & Pont, D., Amsterdam/Cape Town (1961), I, 1,Google Scholar 33 and 47. For further details, see Zwalve (n. 16 above) pp. 453 sqq., pp. 457 sqq. He shows that the modern view was inspired by French doctrine, particularly Charles DuMoulin. France, of course, had not experienced a reception of Roman law “in complexu”. Earlier Dutch authors like Groenewegen and Grotius had still espoused Bartolist doctrine.

67. Gluck, Christian Friedrich, Ausführliche Erläuterung der Pandekten, vol. I (1797), p. 393.Google Scholar

68. D. 1, 3, 17. For a discussion, and further references, see Law of Obligations (n. 39 above) pp. 702 sqq.; cf. also 622 sqq. (on the related issue of contract interpretation); and see, most recently, Baade, (1994) 20 Syracuse Journal of International Law and CommerceGoogle Scholar 46 sqq.; Peter Stein, Interpretation and Legal Reasoning in Roman Law, (1995) 70 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1539 sqq.

69. Trans. MacCormick, D.N., in: Alan, Watson (ed.), The Digest of Justinian, English Translation (1985),Google Scholar D. 1, 3, 17.

70. Deoratore 1, LV-236; Pro Murena oratio, X-23 sqq.; De officiis. 1, X 33.

71. See Law of Obligations (n. 39 above) pp. 148 sqq., p. 705.

72. Iul. D. 14, 6, 14. For other cases, see Law of Obligations (n. 39 above) pp. 179 sqq., p. 705.

73. Cf, e.g., Iul. D. 1,3, 12 (Non possunt omnes articuli singillatim aut legibus aut senatus consultis comprehendi: sed cum in aliqua causa sententia eorum manifesta est, is qui iurisdictioni praeest ad similia procedere atque ita ius dicere debet); C. 1, 14, 12 (Omnes omnino iudices sciant, hoc esse legem non solum illi causae, pro qua producta est, sed at omnibus similibus).

74. For a detailed account of the development, see Raisch (n. 48 above) pp. 24 sqq., pp. 41 sqq., pp. 70 sqq.; Baade, , (1994) 20 Syracuse Journal of International Law and CommerceGoogle Scholar 53 sqq. These maxims of the ius commune also appear to have informed the equitable approach to statutory interpretation in early modern England and may thus have inspired authors like Coke and Plowden (cf. nn. 62 sqq. above); cf, e.g., the observations by Loyd, , (1909) 58 University of Pennsylvania Law ReviewGoogle Scholar 77 and Baade, , (1994) 20 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 66 sqq.Google Scholar

75. Concerning Roman-Dutch law, see the contributions in Robert, Feenstra & Reinhard, Zimmermann, Das romisch-holldndische Recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (1992)Google Scholar (cf, by way of example, the discussion by J.P. van Niekerk on the development of Roman- Dutch insurance law, ibid. pp. 305 sqq., which occurred “by way of a complex and constantly changing interaction between a variety of agencies generating its specific rules”); and the contribution in (1992) 66 Tulane Law Review 1685 sqq. The point is also emphasised by Bellomo (n. 4 above) passim; he refers to the “quintessential relationship” that existed between the ius proprium and the ius commune, “a relationship that was implicit, unexpressed, but nonetheless evident and sure” (p. 156). On the theories concerning the validity of Roman law in the 18th century, see, in the present context, Klaus Luig, Der Geltungsgrund des romischen Rechts im 18. Jahrhundert in Italien, Frankreich und Deutschland, in: La formazione storica del diritto moderno in Europa (1977), pp. 819 sqq.

76. Beatson (n. 25 above) p. 313, quoting Chief Justice Stone.

77. Teleological interpretation of statutes like the senatus consullum Vellaeanum or Macedonianum within a system that was built up through the discussion and decision of cases. On the similarities between classical Roman law and English common law, see Peter G. Stein, Roman Law, Common Law. and Civil Law. (1992) 66 Tulane Law Review 1591 sqq.

78. For details, see Rudolf von, Jhering, Geist des römischen Rechls aufden verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, vol. II, 2, 5th ed. (1898), pp. 441 sqq.;Google ScholarFranz, Wieacker, Vom römischen Recht: Zehn Versuche, 2nd ed. (1961), pp. 45 sqq.;Google ScholarHeinrich, Honsell, Das Gesetzesverstandnis in der römischen Antike, in: Europaisches Rechtsdenken in Geschichle und Gegenwart, Festschrift für Helmut Coing, vol. I (1982), pp. 129 sqq.Google Scholar

79. Cf. Honsell, Festschrift Coing, p. 140.

80. Cf. Jan, Schröder, Das Verhaltnis von Rechtdogmatik und Gesetzgebung in der neuzeitlichen Privatrechtsgeschichte (am Beispiel des Privatrechts), in: Okko, Behrends & Wolfram, Henckel (eds.), Gesetzgebung und Dogmatik, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, vol. 178 (1989), pp. 43 sqq.Google Scholar

81. § 55 I 2 PrALR.

82. §§ 99 sq. I 2 PrALR.

83. § 68 II 2 PrALR.

84. Kunkel, (1954) 71 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichle (Romanistische Abteilung) 534.

85. And, of course, by a desire to keep the citizen in the tutelage of the state.

86. Cf. also Heinz, Hübner odifikation und Enlscheidungsfreiheit in der Geschichte des Privatrechts (1980), pp. 30 sqq.;Google ScholarKonrad, Zweigert & Hein, Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, trans. Tony, Weir, 2nd ed. (1987, reprint 1993), pp. 143 sq.Google Scholar For recent evaluations of the Prussian Code, see Klaus Luig, Das Privatrecht im ‘Allgemeinen Landrecht fü die preussischen Staaten' von 1794, (1994) 194 Archiv fur die civilistische Praxis 521 sqq.; Gerhard Dilcher, Die januskopfige Kodifikation—Das preussische Allgemeine Landrecht (1794) und die europaische Rechtsgeschichte, (1994) 2 Zeitschrift fur Europaisches Privatrecht 446 sqq. and, specifically on the Introduction, Andreas, Schwennicke, Die Entstehung der Einleitung des Preussischen Allgemeinen Landrechts von 1974 (1993).Google Scholar

87. See, generally, Hans-Jiirgen, Becker, Kommentier- und Auslegungsverbot, in: Handworterbuch zur deulschen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. II (1978),Google Scholar cols. 963 sqq.; Hübner (n. 86 above) passim.

88. Sterilia tamquam mulae: Engelmann (n. 5 above) p. 156; Sbriccoli (n. 5 above) p. 411. In England, Lord Evershed described the task of the courts in intepreting statutes as “spiritually sterilising”; cf. Beatson (n. 25 above) p. 299.

89. See the title of van, R.C. Caenegem's well-known book Judges, Legislators and Professors (1987);Google Scholar cf. also idem. An Historical Introduction to Private Law (1988), pp. 170 sqq.

90. In England, the idea of the courts and the law schools working in a partnership has been gaining ground; see Peter Birks, Adjudication and interpretation in the common law: a century of change, (1994) 14 Legal Studies 166, referring, in particular, to Lord GofTs Maccabean Lecture of 1983 entitled “In Search of Principle”.

91. Okko Behrends, Das Biindnis zwischen Gesetz und Dogmatik und die Frage der dogmatischen Rangstufen, in: Behrends & Henckel (n. 80 above) pp. 9 sqq. and the remarks in Zimmermann (n. 55 above) pp. 14 sq.

92. On their significance, see Reinhard Zimmermann, Unjustified Enrichment: The Modern Civilian Approach, (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 406 sqq.

93. They are discussed, over a span of more than 100 pages, in Dieter, Reuter & Michael, Martinek, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung (1983), pp. 387 sqq.Google Scholar, and more than 100 marginal notes by Manfred Lieb, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol. III, 2nd ed. (1986),Google Scholar nn. 30 sqq. For an overview, see (1994) 2 Restitution Law Review 31 sqq.

94. See, e.g., Karl-Heinz, Schramm, Münchener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol. I, 3rd ed. (1993),Google Scholar § 181, nn. 15 sqq. (restriction), 21 sqq. (extension).

95. The style of legislative drafting in England corresponds to the narrow techniques of statutory interpretation; for criticism see, for instance, Tony, Honore, The Quest for Security: Employees, Tenants, Wives (1982), pp. 118 sqq.;Google ScholarAtiyah, P.S., Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (1987), p. 31Google Scholar and Atiyah, P.S. & Summers, R., Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (1987), p. 323.Google Scholar Even today, the approach to legislative drafting is very different from the one adopted in Germany. This does not only apply to technical fields like tax (for which see John Avery Jones, Tax Law: Rules or Principles? (1996) 17 Fiscal Studies 63 sqq.) but also to central areas of private law. Thus, at the SPTL conference the Law Commission presented its Draft Bill relating to contracts for the benefit of third parties (“An Act to make provision for the enforcement of a contract in certain circumstances by a person who is not a party to the contract; and for connected purposes”). This Draft Bill regards it as necessary, for instance, to provide that the court may dispense with the consent of the third party to the cancellation or variation of a contract if he is mentally incapable of giving his consent (clause 2(4)(b)).

96. Art. 1 III GG.

97. For a brief summary in English on the “constitutionalisation” of private law, see Basil, Markesinis, A Comparative Introduction to the German Law of Torts, 3rd ed. (1994), pp. 27Google Scholar sqq. And see, recently, Johannes Hager, Grundrechte im Privatrecht, 1994 Juristenzeitung 373 sqq.; Uwe Diederichsen, Die Selbstbehauptung des Privatrechts gegeniiber dem Grundgesetz, 1997 Jura 57 sqq.

98. Cf. n. 51 above.