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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 January 2009
Students interested in the concepts of cause and consideration must, surely, have been struck by two things. The first is the extraordinary tenacity which has enabled these concepts to survive the attacks of eloquent critics who have doubted their utility. The second is their equally remarkable ability to accommodate the most divergent comparative theories. For the study of the two notions has led some to argue that they are, in reality, the same; others to insist that they are totally different; while yet another school of thought could be taken to doubt whether there is “any point in comparing cause and consideration, even to contrast the two.”
The study of the legal systems of many countries—notably of the systems of West Germany, and Switzerland—reveals that there can be built a theory of contract which ignores the concepts of cause (as the French understand it) or consideration (as the Common lawyers have come to apply it over the years).
1 See, in particular, the 6th Interim Report of the Law Revision Committee, Cmnd. 5449 (1937)Google Scholar and the literature it gave rise to notably, Hamson, 54 L.Q.R. 233; Mason, 41 Col.L.Rev. 825; Chloros, 17 I.C.L.Q. 137. For a more recent discussion of the concept see, Atiyah, , Consideration in Contracts: A Fundamental Restatement (Canberra, 1971).Google Scholar For literature in the U.S. see, inter alia, Lorenzen, 28 Yale L.J. 621 (1919); Shiller, The Counterpart of Consideration in Foreign Legal Systems, N.Y. Law Revision Commission, 2nd Ann.Rep. 103 (1936); Glaser, 46 Dickinson L.R. 12–25 (1941).
In the francophone countries the attack against cause began in 1826 when the Belgian jurist Ernest published his pamphlet La cause est-elle une condition essentielle pour la validité des conventions' His view was subsequently developed by Laurent, in his Principes de droit civil français, Vol. 16, No. 111 and others then followed. But it was not until Planiol took on the attack in his Traité élémentaire de droit civil, Vol. II, No. 1037 that the concept looked as if it were to be abandoned. The counter-attack came with Capitant's, H.De la cause des obligations (1927)Google Scholar and though many of his views have been subsequently questioned, the utility of the concept has, on the whole, been accepted. Thus, see the Travaux of the Commission pour la revision du Code Civil, 1947–48, 277.Google Scholar The extensive francophone literature can be found in the Dalloz, Encyclopédie Juridique. Vol. I (1951 and supplements) under the word cause.
2 See, for example, the older case law of the Supreme Court of the former colony of Cape of Good Hope: Alexander v. Perry (1874) 4 Buch. 59; Tradesmen's Benefit Society v. Du Preez (1887) 5 Sup.Ct. 269; Mtembu v. Webster (1904) 23 Sup.Ct. 323.Google Scholar Earlier law, however, had gone the other way. See, Jacobson v. Norton (1841) 2 Menzies 221.
3 The case law quoted above, note 2, and the views of Lord de Villiers which had inspired these decisions came under severe attack by another South African judge, Sir John Kotze' in his Cause and Consideration in the Roman and Roman Dutch law of contract (1922).Google Scholar The view that cause and consideration are really different concepts has been accepted by most cases decided in former British possesions in which the Roman-Dutch law played an important part. See, for example, Rood v. Wallach (1904)Google Scholar T.S. 187 (Transvaal); Lipton v. Buchanan (1904) 8 New L.R. 49Google Scholar (Ceylon); Jayawickreme v. Amarasuriya (1918) P.C. 119 L.T. 499.Google Scholar In Quebec, article 984 of the Civil Code, reproducing article 1108 of the French C.C., states in finem that a valid contract requires “A lawful cause or consideration” but it is generally accepted that consideration here is not used in the technical sense understood by Common lawyers but as a mere alternative to the word cause. See, for example, Newman, H., “The Doctrine of Cause or Consideration in the Civil Law” in (1932) 30 Canadian Bar Review 662, 664.Google Scholar For Louisiana see J. H. Drake in 4 Michigan L.R. 19–41 (1905) but cf. Glaser in 46 Dickinson L.R. 12–25 (1941).
4 See Lawson, F. H., A Common Lawyer looks at the Civil Law (1953), p. 160.Google Scholar Yet it is doubtful whether too much should be read into this statement since the learned author has, himself, made some thought-provoking comparative observations in the 2nd edition of Buckland and McNair's Roman Law and Common Law: A Comparative Outline (1965), pp. 228–236. Equally important to the comparative lawyer are Professor David, R. remarks in “Cause et Consideration,” Mélanges Maury, pp. 111Google Scholar et seq.
5 Para. 145 B.G.B. Both concepts are also unknown to the Scandinavian legal systems.
6 Art. 17, Federal Code of Obligations.
7 Was it not Voltaire who said: “Si Dieu n'existait pas il faudrait l'inventer”
8 That this is so can be seen in Professor von Mehren's work “Civil–Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis,” 72 Harv.L.Rev. 1009 et seq. (1959). In this article we shall concentrate only on comparative aspects of the two doctrines which have not been discussed in Professor von Mehren's learned article.
9 Art. 1131 C.C. “L'obligation sans cause, ou sur une fausse cause, ou sur une cause illicite, ne peut avoir aucun effet.” In this section we shall discuss the absence of cause and in the next we shall focus on illicit cause. Fausse cause can be omitted for it is either a cause erronée which is tantamount to no cause; or it is a cause simulée which is valid if the underlying, real, cause is licit. See, Paris, 16 octobre 1956, D. 1957, Somm. 17 and cf. Req. 9 novembre 1891, D.P. 92, 1, 151.
10 History and Sources of the Common Law. Tort and Contract (1949), p. 399.Google Scholar
11 (1842) 2 Q.B. 851, 859.
12 In England this was firmly established by the end of the sixtcenth century. Thus, it was said in Sturlyn v. Albany, Croke, Eliz. 67 that “When a thing is to be done by the plaintiff, be it never so small, this is a sufficient consideration to ground an action” and in Knight v. Rushworth, Croke, Eliz. 469 Anderson C.J. agreed that “the smallness of a consideration is not material.” By contract the old French law, influenced by the canonist ideas of a iustum contrapassum, had adopted a generalised theory of lesio enormis which was progressively eroded and finally reduced to relative insignificance.
13 Apart from article 118 C.C. and 1674 C.C. the other cases of lésion recognised by the Code are of a secondary importance. See, for example, articles 887, 2 C.C; 1854 C.C. By contrast the legislator has not been inactive and, during periods of monetary instability, has intervened in a number of specific instances.
14 Lord Denning M. R. has consistently refused to accept such a rule. In Ward v. Byham [1956] 1 W.L.R. 496Google Scholar at 498, he said that “a promise to perform an existing duty, or the performance of it, should be regarded as good consideration, because it is a benefit to the person to whom it is given.” And in Williams v. Williams[1957] 1 W.L.R. 148, 151Google Scholar he qualified this by adding: “so long as there is nothing in the transaction which is contrary to the public interest.” Attractive as this idea is, however, it is not easy to reconcile it with some of the authorities. That “an agreement to do an act which the promisor is under an existing obligation to a third party to do, may …amount to valid consideration” is no longer seriously in dispute. See, N.Z. Shipping Co. v. Satterthwaitt [1975] A.C. 154, at 168.Google Scholar
15 Oeuvres de Pothier (ed. Bugnet) Vol. II, No. 46.
16 (1831) 1 B. & Ad. 950. See, also, Glasbrook Brothers Ltd. v. Glamorgan County Council [1925] A.C. 270.Google Scholar
17 (1809) 2 Camp. 317.
18 “Exacted” is the word used by W. D. Evans in his translation of Pothier's “Treatise” published in London in 1806.
19 H. Newman, op. cit., p. 670.
20 As Domat Seems to suggest. See Lawson's, F. H. comments in Roman Law and Common Law, 233.Google Scholar
21 See, also, civ. 22 novembre 1909 D.P. 1910. 1. 407.
22 (1852) 8 Exch. 40; reversed (1853) 9 Exch. 102; reversal affirmed (1856) 5 H.L.Cas. 673.
23 See, in particular, Professor Atiyah's views in 73 L.Q.R. 340; 24 M.L.R. 421 and 2 Ottawa L.R. 337.
24 (1852) 7 Exch. 208, Scott v. Coulson [1903] 2 Ch. 249.Google Scholar
25 Art. 1971 C.C. “La rente viagére peut étre constituée, soil sur la téle de celui quien fournit le prix, soit sur la tête d'un tiers, qui n'a aucun droit d'en jouir.”
26 Art. 1974 C.C. “Tout contrat de rente viagére créé sur la léte d'une personne qui etait morte au jour du contrat, ne produit aucum effet.” Art. 1975 C.C. “II en est de méme du contract par lequel la rente a été crééé sur la téte d'une personne atteinte de la maladie dont elle est déc´dée dans les vingt jours de la date du contrat.” On these see Capitant, op. cit., pp. 215 et seq.
27 (1914) 30 T.L.R. 531.
28 Michel c. Ronet, Req. 30 juillet 1873 D.P. 1873. 1. 330.
29 Not always welcomed by academics. See, for example, , H. L. and Mazeaud, J., Leçons de droit civil, Vol. 11Google Scholar, A, No. 266.
30 Conjoints Ceccaldi c. Albertini, Civ. 14 avril 1891, D.P. 1891. 1. 329.
30a A recent attempt (by Francis Dawson, 91 L.Q.R. 380) to utilise the concepts of dependent and independent promises to explain the operation of exception clauses has been convincingly criticised (by Brian Coote, 40 M.L.R. 31 at 41), but it has, nevertheless, helped to re–emphasize their usefulness in understanding discharge for breach. It is submitted that the French approach illustrates this point most clearly.
31 (1863) 3 B. & S. 826.
32 For example, Harbutt's “Plasticine” Ltd. v. Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd. [1970] 1 Q.B. 447.Google Scholar On this unfortunate case see J. A. Weir's pithy remarks in [1970] C.L.J. 189 and, for a more detailed critique, Brian Coote in [1970] C.L.J.221.
33 (1863) 3 B. & S. 826.
34 s. 7. “Where there is an agreement to sell specific goods, and subsequently the goods, without any fault on the part of the seller or buyer, perish before the risk passes to the buyer, the agreement is thereby avoided.” For the doubts as to the meaning of the word “specific” see Chalmers, Sale of Goods, 17th ed., by M. Mark, p. 100.
35 s. 20. “Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk until the property therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the property therein is transferred to the buyer, the goods are at the buyer's risk whether delivery has been made or not.”
36 (1863) 3 B. & S. 826.
37 For example, art. 1788 C.C. “si, dans le cas oú l'ouvrier fournit la mattère, la chose vient à péerir, de queique manière que ce soil, avant d'être livrée, la perte en est pour l'ouvrier, à moins que le maitre ne fût en demeure de reçevoir la chose.” See, also, articles 1790 C.C. and 1867 C.C.
Para. 323 B.G.B. states ”If the performance due from one party under a mutual contract becomes impossible because of a circumstance for which neither he nor the other party is responsible, he loses the claim to counter performance; in case of partial impossibility the counter–performance is diminished in accordance with paras. 472, 473 B.G.B. It will be noticed that this solution is analogous to though more rigid than that accepted by the French law.
38 Droit Civil. Les obligations (1975), No. 498.Google Scholar
39 Article 1138. “L'obligation de livrer la chose est parfaite par le seul consentement des parties contractantes.
Elle rend le créancier proprietaire et met la chose á ses risques dés l'instant oú elle a dú étre livrée, encore que la tradition n'en ait point été faite, á moins que le débiteur ne soil en demeure de la livrer; auquel cas la chose reste auxrisques de ce dernier.”
40 Quoted in note 35, above.
41 (1863) 3 B. & S. 826.
42 [1896] 1 Q.B. 123.
43 [1903] 2 K.B. 683.
44 McElroy, R. G. and Williams, G., “The Coronation Cases” (1941) 4 M.L.R. 241Google Scholar; (1941) 5 M.L.R. 1.
45 Art. 1722 C.C. “Si, pendant la durée du bail, la chose louée est détruite en totalité par cas fortuit, le bail est résilié de plein droit; si elle n'est detruite qu'en partie, le preneur peut, suivant les circonstances, demander ou une diminution du prix, ou la résiliation méme du bail. Dans l'un et l'autre et Vautre cas, il n'y a lieu à aucun dédommagement.”
In the discussion that follows in the text the term bail is, faute de mieux, translated as lease. Technically speaking, however, the word lease is in this context misleading since in English law (and unlike French law) a lease is more than a mere contract: it creates an interest in land. Hence the view that whatever happens to the premises “the lease would remain. The estate in the land would still be vested in the tenant.” Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd. v. Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd. [1945] A.C. 221, 234.Google Scholar This is not true in French law. The term “hire” should also be avoided since, strictly speaking, it refers to a type of bailment in which the bailee receives the possession of a chattel and the right to use it in consideration for a price that has to be paid to the bailor, and here we are dealing with immovables. It would also necessitate the use of the words “hire” and “lettet” which, to the present writer, sound rather awkward, particularly the latter. So, “lessor” and “lessee” have been used and, in order to stress that they are not used in their technical sense, they are printed in inverted commas.
46 A number of cases decided during the Franco–Prussian War of 1870 decided this and the litigation that followed the two Great Wars has confirmed the solution stated in the text beyond doubt. See, for example, Paris, 23 décembre 1871, S. 1873. 2. 36; D. 71. 2. 225; Poitiers, 12 juillet 1915, G.P. 1916, 172; Nancy, 22 juin 1916, G.P. 1916, 160; Paris, 21 Janvier 1916, G.P. 1916, 254; Paris, 3 mars 1917, Gaz.Trib., 6 juin 1918, etc. etc.
47 But the plaintiff is obliged to pay rent for the part of the building which she uses as her residence.
48 G.P. 1916, 255.
49 From the terms of the “lease” quoted in the judgment at first instance it is clear that the plaintiff and the defendant had clearly negotiated the hiring of a music hall which was to be used as a music hall (p. 255). The Court of Appeal, confirming in part the award made by the lower court, laconically asserted that the defendant “avait loué à la dame Rasimi (the plaintiff) un établissement à usage de théátre” and that“ les prescriptions administratives n'ont affecté queles modalités de l'exploitation théâtrale, sans atteindre tout ou partie de la chose louée.” It was otherwise, however, from the moment when the interference of the authorities became less stringent even though the exploitation of the theatre continued to be financially very onerous for the plaintiff.
50 [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
51 Ibid. On this see, McElroy and Williams, “The Coronation Cases I” (1941) 4 M.L.R. 241, 254.
52 Ibid. See, also, R. G. McElroy and G. Williams, Impossibility of Performance (1941), pp. 88. et seq.
53 For a brief discussion see Treitel, The Law of Contract (1975), pp. 573 et seq.
54 Treitel, op. cit., pp. 549, 589–590.
55 Howell v. Coupland (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 258. Re–confirmed in H. R. and S. Sainsbury Ltd. v. Street [1972] 1 W.L.R. 834.Google Scholar But, in the absence of any contrary agreement, the seller remains liable for the part of the crop he has in fact produced.
56 Taylor v. Laird (1856) 25 L.J.Ex. 329.
57 Cutter v. Powell (1795) 6 T.R. 320.
58 Sumpter v. Hedges [1898] 1 Q.B. 673.
59 Op. cit., p. 319 quoting the relevant case-law.
60 “Partial Performance of Entire Contracts” (1941) 57 L.Q.R. 373, 490.
61 “Contracts may be so made; but they require plain words to shew that such a bargain (i.e., an entire contract) was really intended,” Button v. Thompson (1869) L.R. 4 C.P. 330, 342.
62 The role of cause in the case of gifts is not discussed in this article, partly because gifts are not considered as contracts by the Common law (though they are by the civil law) but largely because the significance of cause in the case of gifts is minimal.
63 Chitty on Contracts, 24th ed., Vol. II, No. 2213.
64 Ibid., No. 2279.
65 Req. 17 avril 1923, D.P. 1923. 1. 172.
66 Weill, op. cit. No. 257.
67 See, generally, M. J. P. Walton's remarks in (1919) Rev.Trim.dr.Civ. 469 et seq.
68 Cheshiare and Fifoot, op. cit., 625.
69 Cf. para. 138 B.G.B. “(1) A legal transaction which is against public policy is void. (2) A legal transaction is also void whereby a person exploiting the need, carelessness or inexperience of another, causes to be promised or granted to himself or to a third party in exchange for a performance, pecuniary advantages which exceed the value of the performance to such an extent that under the circumstances, the pecuniary advantages are in obvious disproportion to the performance.”
70 For example: Civ. 15 décembre 1873, D.P. 1874. 1. 222: S. 1874. I. 241; Req. 17 juillet 1905, D.P. 1906. 1. 72; 1 octobre 1940, G.P. 1940, 2. 146; Trib. Seine, 25 novembre 1936, D.H. 1937. 142, etc.
71 Thus in Comp. d'assurance Le Monde c. Havard, S. 1904. 1. 509, the court refused to avoid a contract of insurance of a brothel on the grounds that “les prestations (réciproques des parties) étaient licites en elle-mêmes; qu'elles ne différaient en rien des prestations stipulées dans tous les contrats de cette nature, et qu'elles n'ont pu devenir illicites, par cela seul que les risques assurés dependaient d'une maison de tolérance; qu'elles ne sauraient être considérées comment ayant eu en vue la création, le maintien ou l'exploitation d'un établissement de cette nature; qu'elles n'impliquent par suite aucune immoralité susceptible d'entrainer l'annulation de la convention.” A summary of this case can also be found in D.P. 1906, 5, 33. There are other cases which also adopt this marked distinction between cause proper and ulterior motives but in view of what is said in the text, above, they do not represent the current view on the matter.
72 (1866) L.R. 1 Exch. 213.
73 Op. cit., 240.
74 Trib.civ. Tarbes, 14 mars 1899. D.P. 1904. 2. 201; S. 1900. 2. 219.
75 Paris, 12 mai 1949, G.P. 1949, 2. 48.
76 Civ. 4 décembre 1956, Sem.Jur. 1957, 10008 and obs. J. Mazeaud, G.P. 1957, 1, 183; Rev.trim.dr.civ. 1957, 329.
77 Leases of buildings to be used as brothels: Paris 30 novembre 1839, S. 40. 2. 121; Lyons 11 juillet 1862, S. 63. 2. 165: Paris, 26 décembre 1899, G.P. 1. 132; Civ. 27 décembre 1945, G.P. 1946. 1. 88. Sales of buildings to be used as brothels: Civ. 15 décembre 1873, D.P. 1874. 1. 222; Req. 17 juillet 1905, D.P. 1906. 1. 72; Trib. Seine, 25 novembre 1936, D.H. 1937. 142. Loans to purchase brothels: Paris 26 janvier 1894 and Req. 1 avril 1895, S. 96. 1. 289, D.P. 95. 1. 263, Trib.civ. Bruxelles, 5 déc. 1894, Pas belge, 95. 3. 98. Supplies to brothels: Trib.comm. Seine, 1 mai 1888, G.P. 1888. 1. 797; Trib. Liège, 14 novembre 1896, Pas. belge, 97. 3. 75, Trib.civ. Nice, 18 novembre 1909, Rec.G.Trib. 1910. 1. 119.
78 Civ. 17 janvier 1944. D. 1945, somm p. 2.
79 Civ. 26 mars 1860, D.P. 1860, 1, 255; Civ. 8 octobre 1957, D. 1958, 317 (and note Esmein). But it is otherwise if the money is paid or the gift is made to mark the end of the extra-marital connection. Civ. 11 mars 1918, S. 1918, 1, 170; Civ. 6 octobre 1959, D. 1960, 515 and note Malaurie, Sem.Jur. 1959, II, 11305 (note Esmein); Civ. 16 octobre 1967, Sem.Jur. 1967, II, 15287, Rev.trim.dr.civ. 1968, 178 obs. Savatier. See, also, R. Rodière, “Le menage de fait devant la loi” in Travaux de l'Association Henri Capitant, 1957.Google Scholar A distinction between a concubinage simple and adultérin has also been taken, the law taking a harsher view in the case of the latter. See, Amiens, 30 novembre 1961, D. 1962, Somm. 61; Civ. 16 octobre 1956, G.P. 14–16, Rev.trim.dr.civ. 1957, 157, obs. Savatier; Paris 14 juin 1955, D. 1956, Somm. 38; J.C.P. 1956, II, 9303. For English law see, Benyon v. Nettlefold (1850) 3 Mac. & G. 94; Ayerst v. Jenkins (1873) L.R. 16 Exch. 275 though it is said that these cases lay down the rule only with regard to future cohabitation. Payment made to recompense past cohabitation or to mark the end of cohabitation would not be enforceable in this country since it would be treated as a case of past consideration. It is otherwise, however, if it is made under seal: Nye v. Moseley (1826) 6 B. & C. 133.
80 For footnote, see p. 71.
80 Pau 16 octobre 1956, D. 1957, 17. Cf. Miller v. Karlinski (1945) 62 T.L.R. 85Google Scholar; Napier v. National Business Agency Ltd. [1951] 2 All E.R. 264.Google Scholar
81 Req. 15 mars 1911, D. 1911, 1. 382; Civ. 3 avril 1912, S. 1912, 1, 382; Civ. 23 avril 1898, D. 1898, 1, 415. Cf. Garforth v. Fearon (1787) 1 Hy.Bl. 328; Parkinson v. College of Ambulance Ltd., and Harrison [1925] 2 K.B. 1Google Scholar and now Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925, etc.
82 Paris 30 avril 1963, Rec. G.P. 1963. 1. 405 (contract of employment prohibiting air hostess from marrying).
83 In French law the various types of nullities and their effects are, invariably, discussed under a separate heading or chapter in a manner which a Common lawyer can only describe as admirable as it is systematic. For a discussion, at times critical, of the Common law approach, see Honoré, 75 S.A.L.J. 32 et seq.; Turpin, 72 S.A.L.J. 58 et seq.
84 See Carbonnier, Droit civil (1975), Vol. I, No. 29 and Vol. IV, p. 164.
85 In this sense, Colin—la Morandière, No. 105; Ripert—Boulanger, Traité de droit civil (1957), Vol. II, Nos. 762, 763. Aix, 28 mars 1945, J.C.P. 46, 2, 3063 and cf. Civ. 20 juillet 1844, S. 1844, I, 582; Civ. 13 juillet 1885, S. 1886, I. 205; Req. 24 octobre 1928, G.P. 1928 s. 747. Older case law can be found in Capitant's work. For a new monograph see: Le Tourneau, P., La règle “Nemo auditur…,” Paris, 1970.Google Scholar
86 [1960] A.C. 167.
87 [1971] 1 Q.B. 210.
88 [1960] A.C. 167 at p. 176.
89 See, for example, Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract, 9th ed. by M. P. Furmston, at pp. 348–349.
90 Though, subject to what has been said above, this does not mean that the things transferred can be recovered. The nemo auditur rule, which Lord Denning appeared to quote in Singh v. Ali [1960]Google Scholar A.C. 167, 176, ensures this.
91 (1893) Nouv.Rev.Hist. 555.
92 See, for example, Markesinis, B. S., “The not so dissimilar tort and delict” (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 78–123.Google Scholar
93 BGHZ 41, 123; NJW 1964, 720; OLG.Karlsruhe, NJW 1975, 221; BGH, NJW 1976, 1740 and cf. S.C.M. (U.K.) Ltd. v. W. J. Whittall and Son, Ltd. [1971] 1 Q.B. 337Google Scholar; Spartan Steel and Alloys, Ltd. v. Martin and Co. (Contractors) Ltd. [1973] 1 Q.B. 27.Google Scholar
94 Rechtswidrigkeit, Sozialadäquanz, Fahrlässigkeit and Schuld im Zivilrecht, in 1957 NJW 1777. See, also, von Caemmerer, , “Wandlungen des Deliktsrecht” in (1960) II 100 Jahre Deutsches Rechtsleben 49Google Scholaret seq.
95 (1863) 3 B. & S. 826.
96 These are two of the five benefits which codification, apparently, entails according to Scarman, Lord, Codification and Judge-made Law—off-printGoogle Scholar of a lecture delivered on 20 October 1966 to the Law Faculty of the University of Birmingham, p. 19.
97 French Law. Its Structure, Sources, and Methodology. English translation by Kindred, M. (1972), p. 77.Google Scholar
98 But, of course, examples from other parts of the law of contract can be quoted. Thus, in the area of offer and acceptance, see Req. 21 mars 1932, D. 1933, 1. 65 and Professor Carbonnier's comments, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 68.
99 As Dr. Bernard Rudden has pertinently remarked (“Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia,” 48 Tulane Law Rev., 1010 at 1022): “The very act of decision implies a choice; but the French grammatical technique enables the judge to conceal it.”
