1 S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), 3, emphasis added.

2 In a European context, see e.g. Case C-517/99, Merz & Krell GmbH & Co. [2001] E.C.R. I-6959 (pointing out that “the essential function” of trademarks is to guarantee the origin of goods or services to consumers so as to enable them to be distinguished without a risk of confusion); Joined Cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others v Paranova A/S [1996] E.C.R. I-3457 (noting that a trademark “protects the interests of consumers by acting as a guarantee that all goods bearing the mark are of the same commercial origin”, which is “the essential function of the trade mark”); Case C-10/89, S.A. CNL-Sucal N.V. v Hag G.F. A.G. [1990] E.C.R. I-3711 (describing how trademarks “act as a guarantee, to the consumer, that all goods bearing a particular mark have been produced by, or under the control of, the same manufacturer and are therefore likely to be of similar quality”). In the UK, see e.g. L’Oréal S.A. v eBay International A.G. [2009] EWHC 1094, [2009] R.P.C. 21, 645 (Arnold J.); Scandecor Development AB v Scandecor Marketing AB [2001] UKHL 21, [2002] F.S.R. 7, 131–32 (Lord Nicholls); Wagamama Ltd. v City Centre Restaurants Plc [1995] F.S.R. 713, 729–32 (Ch.) (Laddie J.).

3 Similar shifts are occurring in the field of consumer protection more broadly understood: see L. Herrine, “What Is Consumer Protection For?” (2022) 34 Loyola Consumer Law Review 240.

4 See M.A. Lemley, “The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense” (1999) 108 Yale L.J. 1687.

5 See Trademark Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769 (1962) (deleting references to “origin” and “purchasers”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (rendering actionable confusion as to affiliation, endorsement, sponsorship or connection); A & H Sportswear, Inc. v Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (reverse confusion).

6 See Trademark Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769 (1962).

7 See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (post sale confusion); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (initial interest confusion pre-sale).

8 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1995); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).

9 See Trade Marks Act 1994, s. 10(2)(a); in the US, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a)(1).

10 See e.g. Directive (EU) No 2015/2436 (OJ 2015 L 336 p.1), art. 10(2)(c) (hereafter, Recast or 2015 EU Trade Mark Directive). The Recast EU Trade Mark Directive replaced Directive (EU) No 2008/95/EC (OJ 2008 L 299 p.25) (hereafter, 2008 Trade Mark Directive).

11 See e.g. Reed Executive Plc v Reed Business Information Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 159, [2004] R.P.C. 40, at [147] (Jacob L.J.) (Rix and Auld L.JJ. agreeing); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).

12 See Brookfield Communications v West Coast Entertainment, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enterprises v Netscape Communications, 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). The doctrine of initial interest confusion has its critics in the US, but it is arguably even less firmly embedded in EU or UK law. See generally I.S. Fhima, “Initial Interest Confusion” (2013) 8 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 311; L. Bently et al., Intellectual Property Law, 6th ed. (Oxford 2022), 1058.

13 See G.S. Lunney, Jr., “Trademark Monopolies” (1999) 48 Emory Law Journal 367, 371 (describing a property-based view of trademark law); Lemley, “Modern Lanham Act” (observing a trend towards “propertising” intellectual property).

14 Lunney, “Trademark Monopolies”, 372.

15 See M.P. McKenna, “The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law” (2007) 82 Notre Dame Law Review 1839; L. Bently, “The Making of Modern Trade Mark Law: The Construction of the Legal Concept of Trade Mark (1860–1880)” in L. Bently, J. Davis and J.C. Ginsburg (eds.), Trade Marks and Brands: An Interdisciplinary Critique (Cambridge 2008), 3.

16 For the pre-Lanham Act invocation of this metaphor, see International News Service v Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918) (describing the defendant’s conduct as “endeavoring to reap where it had not sown”); cf. Case C-487/07, L’Oréal S.A. v Bellure N.V. [2009] E.C.R. I-5185, at [49] (same language tied to unfair advantage claim under EU law).

17 S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), 3, emphasis added.

18 Boston Professional Hockey Association, Inc. v Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).

19 Ibid., at 1011. In the EU, these considerations arguably are reflected in the broader (and more easily available) dilution action, although the CJEU has held that the investment function is also protected by the double identity cause of action. See L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] E.C.R. I-5185, at [58].

20 See M. Grynberg, “Trademark Free Riders” (2024) 39 Berkeley Technology Law Journal (forthcoming). In the UK and the EU, the dilution claim explicitly encompasses free riding claims within the “unfair advantage” variant of the dilution cause of action: see 2015 Directive, art. 10(2)(c). In contrast, the 2006 reform of US dilution law exhaustively defined the dilution claim as covering only “blurring” and “tarnishment”: see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).

21 See e.g. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy J., dissenting) (post sale confusion); see also Moseley v V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) (“Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are … not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers”).

22 In registration-based systems, such as the UK or EU, the endeavour is inevitably more normative because lack of use may preclude a descriptive analysis.

23 The language of law and economics has not been deployed as frequently in UK or EU judicial decisions in trademark law (or law generally), though it is discussed (with less centrality than in the US) in the scholarly literature. See e.g. A. Griffiths, “A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Trade Marks” in Bently, Davis and Ginsburg (eds.), Trademarks and Brands, 241.

24 McKenna, “Normative Foundations”, 1848.

25 In the UK and EU, a trademark claim can seek to protect a far broader range of functions. See L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] E.C.R. I-5185, at [58] (“These functions include not only the essential function of the trade mark, which is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services, but also its other functions, in particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services in question and those of communication, investment or advertising”). But the source or origin function is the primary or essential function of the mark.

26 See Thompson Medical Co., Inc. v Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1985).

27 Namely, whether the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to confuse “an average consumer who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect”: Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V. [1999] E.C.R. I-3819; see also Case C-251/95, Sabel B.V. v Puma A.G. [1997] E.C.R. I-6191, at [23] (referring to “the average consumer of the type of goods or services in question”); see generally G.B. Dinwoodie and D.S. Gangjee, “The Image of the Consumer in EU Trade Mark Law” in D. Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill (eds.), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (Oxford 2015), 339.

28 Some of the factors that are considered in performing this inquiry do, however, have a normative component. This is neither surprising nor a problem. But courts only rarely present their analysis in such terms. See G.B. Dinwoodie, “Trade Mark Law as a Normative Project” (2023) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 305.

29 See generally B. Beebe, “An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement” (2006) 94 California Law Review 1581. For a more sceptical approach in the UK and elsewhere, see Marks & Spencer Plc v Interflora Inc. [2012] EWCA Civ 1501, [2013] 2 All E.R. 663; Masterpiece Inc. v Alavida Lifestyles Inc., 2011 S.C.C. 27, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 387 (Supreme Court of Canada); Australian Postal Corporation v Digital Post Australia Pty Ltd. [2013] FCAFC 153, (2013) 308 A.L.R. 1 (Federal Court of Australia). See generally K. Weatherall, “The Consumer as the Empirical Measure of Trade Mark Law” (2017) 80 M.L.R. 57; Dinwoodie and Gangjee, “Image of the Consumer”.

30 Anheuser–Busch, Inc. v Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).

31 Although the US Supreme Court has not broadly expressed concern over surveys, in two very different cases Justice Sotomayor has recently voiced doubts in terms that sometimes bring the Anheuser–Busch case to mind. In a concurring opinion in United States Patent and Trademark Office v Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2309 (2020), she expressed some scepticism about placing undue weight on consumer surveys, noting that she did “not read the Court’s opinion to suggest that surveys are the be-all and end-all”. Likewise, in Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v VIP Products L.L.C., 143 S. Ct. 1578, 1593–94 (2023), Justice Sotomayor noted that “courts should … be attentive to ways in which surveys may artificially prompt … confusion about the law or fail to sufficiently control for it”.

32 See e.g. National Football League v Governor of the State of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Del. 1977) (finding confusion where only 19 per cent of surveyed consumers believed in a connection or association with the defendant).

33 Libman Co. v Vining Industries, Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 1363 (7th Cir. 1995).

34 Société Technique de Pulverisation Step v Emson Europe Ltd. [1993] R.P.C. 513, 519 (C.A.) (Hoffmann L.J.) (commenting that s. 32(1)(f) of the Patents Act 1949 (UK) must be construed “in accordance with the general policy of [that Act]”).

35 L’Oréal S.A. v Bellure N.V. [2007] EWCA Civ 968, [2008] E.T.M.R. 1, at [63].

36 See notes 70–72 below.

37 W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, MA 2003), 168.

38 See e.g. Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (remarking that trademark law operates to “reduce the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions” by providing guarantees about the common origin of similar products).

39 Ty Inc. v Ruth Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner J.); see also Tiffany & Co. v Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964) (finding infringement by restaurant styling itself “Tiffany’s”); R. Tushnet, “Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science” (2008) 86 Texas Law Review 507 (critiquing cognitive studies on which the argument is to some extent based); G.W. Austin, “Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination” (2004) 69 Brooklyn Law Review 827 (critical of approach in general).

40 S.L. Dogan and M.A. Lemley, “A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law” in G.B. Dinwoodie and M.D. Janis (eds.), Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Cheltenham 2008), 65.

41 S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), 3.

42 See J. Gibson, “Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law” (2007) 116 Yale L.J. 882.

43 Of course, courts could also reverse themselves and re-examine the normative basis of the line of case law. But that is rare. For a recent effort, see Pennsylvania State University v Vintage Brand, L.L.C., 614 F. Supp. 3d 101, 114 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (“The modern collegiate trademark- and licensing-regime has grown into a multi-billion-dollar industry. But that a house is large is of little matter if it’s been built on sand”).

44 See Conopco, Inc. v May Department Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In the UK and the EU, causes of action grounded in unfair advantage have arguably afforded brands greater control: see L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] E.C.R. I-5185, at [49]; cf. Intellectual Property Office, The Impact of Lookalikes: Similar Packaging and Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (Newport 2013).

45 See e.g. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal S.A. v eBay International A.G. [2011] E.C.R. I-6011 (action against online marketplace operator alleging secondary infringement by permitting sale of counterfeit products by third parties); Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France S.A.R.L. v Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. [2010] E.C.R. I-2417 (finding search engine not liable for sale of keyword advertising containing registered trademarks).

46 See e.g. Electronic Frontier Foundation, available at http://www.eff.org/ (last accessed 1 May 2023); Lumen Database, available at http://chillingeffects.org/ (last accessed 9 December 2023).

47 See N. Vigdor, “Company Will Offer Refunds to Buyers of ‘Satan Shoes’ to Settle Lawsuit by Nike”, New York Times, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/08/style/satan-shoe-settlement-nike.html (last accessed 9 December 2023).

48 E. Lee, “Warming Up to User-Generated Content” (2008) University of Illinois Law Review 1459, 1463–64.

49 See e.g. F.I. Schechter, “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection” (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813; L.D. Taggart, “Trade-Marks: Monopoly or Competition?” (1945) 43 Michigan Law Review 659; B. Diggins, “Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade” (1944) 32 Georgetown Law Journal 113; Lunney, “Trademark Monopolies”.

50 See Whirlpool Corp. v Kenwood Ltd. [2009] EWCA Civ 753, [2010] E.T.M.R. 7 (describing the policy underlying this proscription as being to prevent manufacturers from monopolising a market by claiming protection for shapes that are essential to their products’ nature or operation).

51 See C. Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business Is Selling Less of More (New York 2006).

52 Ibid., at 36–38, 223; see also C. Anderson, Free: The Future of a Radical Price (New York 2009).

53 See e.g. Case C-228/03, Gillette Co. v LA-Laboratories Ltd. Oy [2005] E.C.R. I-2337.

54 See E. Goldman, “Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law” (2005) 54 Emory Law Journal 507.

55 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 537–40 (1987) (dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

56 International Olympic Committee v San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 789 F.2d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir. 1986).

57 Matal v Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Iancu v Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).

58 In re Elster, 26 F.4th 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2022), petition for certiorari granted sub nom. Vidal v Elster, 2023 WL 3800017 (U.S. 5 June 2023).

59 Jack Daniel’s, 143 S. Ct. 1578, 1590–91 (2023) (Kagan J.) (“when ‘another’s trademark (or a confusingly similar mark) is used without permission’ as a means of ‘source identification’ … (except, potentially, in rare situations), the likelihood-of-confusion inquiry does enough work to account for the interest in free expression”).

60 See generally R. Tushnet, “The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration and Free Speech” (2016) 92 Notre Dame Law Review 381; L.P. Ramsey, “Free Speech Challenges to Trademark Law After Matal v. Tam” (2018) 56 Houston Law Review 401.

61 Cf. Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (because “parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as artistically”, the role of the courts is to distinguish between “[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement[, which] usurps it” (citations omitted).

62 See e.g. M.A. Lemley and M.P. McKenna, “Irrelevant Confusion” (2010) 62 Stanford Law Review 413; R. Tushnet, “Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law” (2011) 159 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1305.

63 Lunney, “Trademark Monopolies”, 483; see also S.L. Dogan and M.A. Lemley, “The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?” (2005) 54 Emory Law Journal 461.

64 Cf. Article 16(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) (1994) (in force since 2015), which obliges Members to confer, inter alios, the right to prevent use of a trademark “where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion”. While Article 17 permits Members to create “limited exceptions” to the rights mentioned in Article 16(1), those exceptions must take account of the trademark owner’s “legitimate interests” and those of third parties.

65 M. Grynberg, “Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict” (2008) 83 New York University Law Review 60, 63, 116–17.

66 See McKenna, “Normative Foundations”, 1887–96; M.P. McKenna, “Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm” (2009) 95 Iowa Law Review 63, 75–79.

67 Despite the difficulties, the US Supreme Court arguably has opened the door to these types of arguments via decisions reached on questions of standing in non-trademark cases. See Dinwoodie, “Normative Project” (discussing the Lexmark International, Inc. v Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) and TransUnion L.L.C. v Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) cases).

68 See ibid. The range of values that might inform trademark law will inevitably evolve over time. For example, sustainability concerns might counsel in favour of doctrine that more robustly facilitates the capacity of consumers to repair products using spare parts. See A. Kur, “‘As Good as New’ – Sale of Repaired or Refurbished Goods: Commendable Practice or Trade Mark Infringement?” (2021) 70 GRUR International 228. The effect of trademark law on the availability of spare parts from a range of suppliers has thus far been debated largely in terms of competition considerations. But legislative activity in a number of spheres has sought to further sustainability values on their own terms, and these might in time be invoked to support competition-grounded arguments for doctrinal evolution. Cf. A. Tischner and K. Stasiuk, “Spare Parts, Repairs, Trade Marks and Consumer Understanding” (2023) 54 IIC – International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 26, 40–54 (buttressing the normative arguments with an empirical study of consumer understanding regarding spare parts).

69 2015 Trade Mark Directive, art. 4(1)(e); Trade Marks Act 1994, s. 3(2).

70 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).

71 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542, 547–48 (2004).

72 See the Opinion of Advocate General Colomer in Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club Plc v Matthew Reed [2002] E.C.R. I-10273: “the function of a trade mark being to distinguish the goods and services of various undertakings with the purpose of guaranteeing to the user or the consumer the identity of their respective origins … is no more than a staging post on the road to the final objective, which is to ensure a system of genuine competition in the internal market.” See also ibid., at footnote 30: “in order to ensure free competition in the market [a trademark] is a right which constitutes an exception to the general rule of competition, by according to its proprietor the right to appropriate exclusively certain signs and indications.”

73 [1995] F.S.R. 713, 729 (Ch.). See also C. Buccafusco, J.S. Masur and M.P. McKenna, “Competition and Congestion in Trademark Law” (2023) 102 Texas Law Review (forthcoming) (“Trademark law should be attuned to these competition concerns. Indeed, these are the principal concerns to which trademark law should be attuned. Trademark law exists to promote fair competition, which ultimately benefits consumers” (emphasis in original)).

74 O2 Holdings Ltd. v Hutchison 3G Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1656, [2007] R.P.C. 16, 412.

75 See L’Oréal v Bellure [2007] EWCA Civ 968, at [139] (Jacob L.J.) (“The rejected complaint shows just how anti-competitive a law of unfair competition would or might be. What one man calls ‘unfair’ another calls ‘fair’. The market involves the interests of traders, their competitors and consumers. They all have different perspectives”).

76 S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), 3.

77 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 5 September 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (1970), Article 10bis; see generally C. Wadlow, “The Emergent European Law of Unfair Competition and its Consumer Law Origins” [2012] Intellectual Property Quarterly 1.

78 See A. Ohly, “Unfair Competition (Basic Principles)” in J. Basedow and others (eds.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, vol. 2 (Oxford 2012), 1712.

79 Compare International News Service v Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) with Kellogg Co. v National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); see generally G.B. Dinwoodie, “The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis” in J.C. Ginsburg and R.C. Dreyfuss (eds.), Intellectual Property Stories (New York 2005), 220.

80 See G.B. Dinwoodie, “Dilution as Unfair Competition: European Echoes” in R.C. Dreyfuss and J.C. Ginsburg (eds.), Intellectual Property at the Edge: The Contested Contours of IP (Cambridge 2014), 81.

81 See e.g. O2 Holdings v Hutchison 3G [2006] EWCA Civ 1656, 419–27 (Jacob L.J.) (comparative advertising); cf. United Biscuits (U.K.) Ltd. v Asda Stores Ltd. [1997] R.P.C. 513, 531–36 (Ch.) (Robert Walker J.).

82 See M.P. McKenna, “Property and Equity in Trademark Law” (2019) 23 Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 117, 123 (“Trademark and unfair competition … claims were meaningfully different in that unfair competition claimants faced more onerous proof requirements and their remedies were more limited”); cf. J. Drysdale and M. Silverleaf, Passing Off: Law and Practice (London 1986) (discussion of passing off remedies).

83 See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).

84 The outbreak of ahistorical textualism on the current US Supreme Court might at some point test the strength of this proposition. See M. Grynberg, “Things Are Worse than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a ‘Formalist’ Age” (2009) 24 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 897.

85 P.N. Leval, “Trademark: Champion of Free Speech” (2004) 27 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 187, 198.

86 Irvine v Talksport Ltd. [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2355, 2360–61 (Laddie J.).

87 Ibid., at 2368 (Laddie J.).

88 [1979] A.C. 731, 743 (H.L.).

89 [1998] E.T.M.R. 124, 140–41 (Ch.).

90 Directive 2006/114/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising (codified version) (OJ 2006 L 376 p.22).