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Remoteness of Liability and Legal Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

R. W. M. Dias
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Extract

In the course of their stately opinion in the case of The Wagon Mound the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declared that “their Lordships have not found it necessary to consider the so-called rule of ‘strict liability’ exemplified in Rylands v. Fletcher and the cases that have followed or distinguished it. Nothing that they have said is intended to reflect on that rule.” The best excuse for the present addition to the controversial literature that is accumulating round this case is that, the courts having yet to pronounce on remoteness in cases of strict liability, there seems to be still some room for speculation, especially with reference to policy. It is therefore hoped that the fall, as it were, of yet another leaf in the forest will at least do no harm.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , July 1962 , pp. 178 - 199
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1962

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References

1 Sub nom. Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. [1961]Google Scholar A.C. 388, 426–427 (Viscount Simonds).

2 Goodhart, “Liability and compensation” (1960) 76 L.Q.R. 567; Williams, “Causation in the law” [1961] C.L.J. 62; “The risk principle” (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 179; Payne, “Foresight and remoteness of damage in negligence” (1962) 25 M.L.R. 1; James, “Polemis: the Serpent in Eden” [1961] J.B.L. 252; “Polemis: the scotch'd snake” [1962] J.B.L. 146; Fridman, “Negligence and remoteness” (1961) 111 L.J. 609, 624; B.G.C.W., “The sinking of Re Polemis” (1961) 105 S.J. 69; M.J.G., “Tiptoe through the twilight” (1962) 106 S.J. 460; anon. (1962) 233 L.T. 31; Walker, “Remoteness of damage and Re Polemis,” 1961 S.L.T. 37; anon. (1961) 95 I.L.T. 213, 219, 225; Fleming, “The passing of Polemis” (1961) 39 Can.B.R. 489; Morison, “The victory of reasonable foresight” (1960–61) 34 A.L.J. 317; Burke, Darval and Merkel, “Causation in the law: a comment on ‘The Wagon Mound’” (1961) 3 Melbourne Univ.L.R. 197; McKerron, “Foreseeability is all: a critical note on the Wagon Mound” (1961) 78 S.A.L.J. 282; Glos, “Directness or foreseeability to prevail in remoteness?” (1962) 79 S.A.L.J. 56; Weir, “Compensability of foreseeable damage resulting directly from negligent acts” (1961) 35 Tulane L.R. 619; Wilson, “Un arrèt important en matière de causalitè: le ‘Wagon Mound’” (1962) Rev.Int.de Droit Comparé 575; Staughton and Rokinson, “The Wagon Mound” Versicherungsrecht, Heft 36(s), Sept. 15, 1962; The Foresight Saga. A symposium on the Wagon Mound case (Haldane Society, 1962). Principal notes: A.L.G., (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 175; Honoré, (1961) 39 Can.B.R. 267; Dias, [1961] C.L.J. 23; Jolowiez, ibid. 30.

3 [1921] 3 K.B. 560.

4 Support for the foresight of damage to the plaintiff: e.g., Degg v. M. Ry. (1857) 1 H. & N. 773, 781; Ruck v. Williams (1858) 3 H. & N. 308, 318; Thomas v. Quartermaine (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 685, 694; Le Lievre v. Could [1893] 1 Q.B. 491, 497; Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932]Google Scholar A.C. 562, 580; Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1 K.B. 146, 152Google Scholar; Bourhill v. Young [1943]Google Scholar A.C. 92, 107, 108, 116–117; King v. Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, 433.Google Scholar Contrary opinions: dicta in Smith v. L. & S.W. Ry. (1870) L.R. 6 C.P. 14, 20, 21; and Re Polemis [1921] 3 K.B. 560, 574, 577Google Scholar; Prosser, Law of Torts, 2nd ed., 171; “Palsgraf revisited” (1953) 52 Mich.L.R. 1, 24, 32; Payne, “Negligence and interest: a comment” (1955) 18 M.L.R. 43; “Foresight and remoteness of damage in negligence” (1962) 25 M.L.R. 1Google Scholar; Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law, 235, 246.

5 So found by the arbitrators and adopted by the Court of Appeal [1921] 3 K.B. 560, 563, 568, 575. Professor Goodhart, while conceding reluctantly that this is a possible interpretation of the ratio decidendi, dismisses it because of certain utterances in the judgments importing the wider formulation: (1960) 76 L.Q.R. at pp. 578–579; (1961) 77 L.Q.R. at p. 177. But no one maintains that every wide statement represents the ratio decidendi, least of all, one would suppose, Goodhart who preached that “the principle is not necessarily found in the rule set forth in the opinion,” but that “the principle of the case is found by taking account (a) of the facts treated by the judge as material, and (b) his decision based on them”: “Determining the ratio decidendi of a case,” Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law, 1, 25. The material fact found by the arbitrators, “by whose findings we are bound” as Scrutton L.J. put it (p. 575), was that some damage to the ship was foreseeable and the decision was that the defendants were liable for the full extent of the damage to the ship.

6 Bourhill v. Young [1943]Google Scholar A.C. 92; Glasgow Corporation v. Muir [1943]Google Scholar A.C. 443; Woods v. Duncan [1946]Google Scholar A.C. 406. The “wide” principle is inconsistent with these cases and it is obviously this which the Judicial Committee disapproved in The Wagon Mound [1961]Google Scholar A.C. 388, 421–422.

7 Pace Goodhart (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 175; cf. James, [1961] J.B.L. at p. 259, where he comments on Goodhart's reasoning as “devious logic.” The Lord Chief Justice in Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., Ltd. [1962] 2 W.L.R. 148, 156Google Scholar, said obiter that he would now be prepared to disregard Polemis without specifying to which of its two interpretations he was referring. Polemis may be overruled very shortly: Hughes v. Lord Advocate, 1961Google Scholar S.C. 310, now on appeal to the Lords.

8 e.g., Atkin, L.J. in Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. [1925] 1 K.B. 141, 156–157Google Scholar; Asquith, L.J. in Shearman v. Folland [1950] 2 K.B. 43, 49Google Scholar; Denning, L.J. in Roe v. M.O.H. [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 84–85.Google Scholar

9 See J., Manning in The Wagon Mound [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 697, 702Google Scholaret seq.; Williams (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 179.

10 [1921] 3 K.B. 560, 577.

11 Wright, Lord in Bourhill v. Young [1943]Google Scholar A.C. 92, 110; “Re Polemis” (1951) 14 M.L.R. 393, 398Google Scholar; Machin, “Negligence and interest” (1954) 17 M.L.R. 405. See also Paton, “Negligence” (1949) 23 A.L.J. 158, 163; Eldredge, Modern Tort Problems (1941), 17.

12 [1933] A.C. 449.

13 [1961] A.C. 388, 426.

14 Williams (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 179; [1961] C.L.J. 62 passim; Eldredge, Modern Tort Problems, 17; Denning, L.J. in Roe v. M.O.H. [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 86Google Scholar; Jones v. Livox Quarries, Ltd. [1952] 2 Q.B. 608, 616.Google Scholar

15 [1962] 2 W.L.R. 148.

16 i.e., cases of peculiar susceptibility: ibid. at p. 156.

17 1961 S.L.T. (Notes) 67.

18 1962 S.L.T. 168.

19 [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 497, now on appeal to the Court of Appeal.

20 If no initial injury is foreseeable there is, of course, no liability, e.g., Bourhill v. Young [1943]Google Scholar A.C. 92; Malcolm v. Dickson, 1951Google Scholar S.C. 542; Blaikie v. B.T.C., 1961Google Scholar S.L.T. 189.

21 1961 S.C. 310 (Inner House), 324. Whether Polemis will be formally overruled or not will depend on whether that case is part of Scots law, as to which see Walker, 1961 S.L.T. 37 (sed quaere).

22 At pp. 322–323.

23 The Lord President (Clyde) at pp. 328–329; Lord Sorn at p. 333; Lord Guthrie at pp. 339–340. Lord Carmont dissented.

24 Ibid. at pp. 328, 333, 340.

25 [1962] N.Z.L.R. 552.

26 Ibid. at p. 560.

26a The writer has suggested elsewhere that the conditions of liability in tort broadly require that the categories of damage, the manner of infliction and the persons involved must be recognised by law: “The duty problem in negligence” [1955] C.L.J. 198, 204; Clerk & Lindsell On Torts, 12th ed., §§ 698–703. It would seem now that the conditions of liability in negligence can also be stated in a way that is roughly parallel—within the general sphere of legal recognition there has to be foresight of the specific kind of damage sustained, the specific manner of its incidence and the specific party injured. For Continental law, see Mehren, Von, The Civil Law System (1957)Google Scholar, Bk. III.

27 e.g., Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1 K.B. 145Google Scholar; Wells v. Metropolitan Water Board [1937] 4 All E.R. 639Google Scholar; Hale v. Jennings [1938] 1 All E.R. 579Google Scholar; Stansbie v. Troman [1948] 2 K.B. 48Google Scholar; Davies v. Liverpool Corporation [1949] 2 All E.R. 175.Google Scholar

28 [1943] P. 32.

29 e.g., SS. Singleton Abbey v. SS. Paludina [1927]Google Scholar A.C. 16; The Genua [1936] 2 All E.R. 789, 801–803Google Scholar; The Guildford [1956] P. 364Google Scholar; Schneider v. Eisovitch [1960] 2 Q.B. 430.Google Scholar Arguable applications: Philco Radio and Television Corporation of G.B., Ltd. v. J. Spurling, Ltd. [1949] 2 All E.R. 882Google Scholar; Pigney v. Pointers Transport Services, Ltd. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1121.Google Scholar Intervening agency unreasonable: The Flying Fish (1865) L.J.P. 113; Cutler v. United Dairies (London), Ltd. [1933] 2 K.B. 297Google Scholar; Hogan v. Bentinck West Hartley Collieries (Owners), Ltd. [1949] 1 All E.R. 588Google Scholar; Rushton v. Turner Bros. Asbestos Co. Ltd. [1960] 1 W.L.R. 96Google Scholar; The Pacific Concord [1961] 1 All E.R. 106.Google Scholar

30 An instance of a court proceeding on an estimate of reasonableness even where there was foreseeability is Russell v. McCabe [1962] N.Z.L.R. 392, especially at pp. 404–405.Google Scholar

31 This statement does not accord with Professor Goodhart's view, “The third man or novus actus interveniens” (1951) 4 Current Legal Problems, 177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32 Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 679Google Scholar; Owens v. Liverpool Corporation [1939] 1 K.R. 394, 400–401Google Scholar; Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., Ltd. [1962] 2 W.L.R. 148, 156.Google Scholar

33 Bourhill v. Young [1943]Google Scholar A.C. 92, 109–110; Bidwell v. Briant, The Times, May 9, 1956.Google Scholar

34 (1960) 76 L.Q.R. at p. 581; (1962) 78 L.Q.R. at pp. 161–162.

35 Bourhill v. Young [1943]Google Scholar A.C. 92, 110, 117; Paton, “Negligence” (1949) 23 A.L.J. 158, 161; Williams (1961) 77 L.Q.R. at p. 195. See generally, Fardon v. Harcourt-Rivington (1932) 146 L.T. 391, 392Google Scholar; Bolton v. Stone [1951]Google Scholar A.C. 850, 858, 866–869.

36 The Wagon Mound [1961] A.C. 388, 417, 425.

37 (1961) 77 L.Q.R. at pp. 193–197. Note that in Smith v. Leach Brain & Co., Ltd. [1962] 2 W.L.R. 148, 155–156Google Scholar, The Wagon Mound was distinguished on the ground that the Judicial Committee had not adverted to the thin skull type of case.

38 Clippens Oil Co., Ltd. v. Edinburgh & District Water Trustees [1907]Google Scholar A.C. 291, 303; The Arpad [1934] P. 189, 202–203.Google Scholar

39 Goodhart (1962) 78 L.Q.R. at p. 162; Williams (1961) 77 L.Q.R. at p. 197.

40 Weld-Blundell v. Stephens [1920]Google Scholar A.C. 956, 984.

41 [1961] A.C. 388, 417, 425. The criticism was probably directed at the implied support which the dictum gives to the Polemis principle that foresight of some damage is sufficient to ground liability for more extensive damage of a “different kind.”

42 [1962] 2 W.L.R. 148, 156.

43 See generally Cock v. Wortham (1736) 2 Selw.N.P., 10th ed., 1104; Huxley v. Berg (1815) 1 Stark. 98; Horton v. Colwyn Bay and Colwyn U.D.C. [1908] 1 K.B. 327, 341Google Scholar; Lampert v. Eastern National Omnibus Co., Ltd. [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1047Google Scholar; Cutler v. McPhail [1962] 2 W.L.R. 1135.Google Scholar

44 [1961] A.C. 388, 422. It is to be noted that justice is only spoken of with reference to the defendant.

45 Williams (1961) 77 L.Q.R. at p. 180; but the argument was anticipated by Goodhart, “Liability for the consequences of a ‘negligent act,’” Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law, 110; “The Palsgraf Case,” ibid. 129.

46 Goodhart, op. cit., pp. 120, 130, adopted in The Wagon Mound [1961]Google Scholar A.C. 388, 425; and see also n. 4, ante, for the use of a similar expression in some of the authorities there cited.

47 Dr. Williams seems to appreciate this very distinction elsewhere when he argued that breach of a statutory provision is in itself “statutory negligence,” a failure to conform to a statutory standard: “The effect of penal legislation in the law of tort” (1960) 23 M.L.R. 233 passim.

48 For an appreciation, see Williams (1961) 77 L.Q.R. at pp. 180, 181; James [1961] J.B.L. at pp. 256, 259.

49 (1961) 77 L.Q.R. at pp. 179, 196. For abandonment of logic, see, e.g., Falmouth Boat Construction Co., Ltd. v. Howell [1950] 2 K.B. 16, 23.Google Scholar

50 e.g., regulation of feuds; for the Lex talionis in the Leges Henrici Primi, 90.7, see Holdsworth, H.E.L. ii, 47; contra, Pollock and Maitland, H.E.L. i, 46.

51 Winfield, “The myth of absolute liability” (1926) 42 L.Q.R. 37.

52 Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 2nd ed., 314.

53 Laws of Hlothere and Eadric in Thorpe, Ancient Laws, I, 27–29; Laws of Alfred, ibid. 49–51; Laws of Ine, ibid. 149.

54 Holdsworth, H.E.L. iii, 375 et seq.; Holmes, The Common Law, 92.

55 See, e.g., trespass to the person: Bazeley v. Clarkson (1681) 3 Lev. 337; Leame v. Bray (1803) 3 East 593; Holmes v. Mather (1875) 10 Exch. 261 (cf. 33 L.T. 361); Stanley v. Powell [1891] 1 Q.R. 86; Fowler v. Lanning [1959] 1 Q.B. 426Google Scholar; cf. Walmesley v. Humenick [1954] 2 D.L.R. 232Google Scholar (Can.); Beals v. Hayward [1960]Google Scholar N.Z.L.R. 131. Trespass to goods: N.C.B. v. Evans [1951] 2 K.B. 861.Google Scholar

56 Symons v. Darknoll (1628) Palmer 523; Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 909; Elsee v. Gatward (1793) 5 T.R. 143; Wilkinson v. Coverdale (1793) 1 Esp. 75; Govett v. Radnidge (1802) 3 East 62.

57 Compare, e.g., Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co., Ltd. [1957]Google Scholar A.C. 555, and Davie v. New Merton Board Mills, Ltd. [1959]Google Scholar A.C. 604, with pre 1945 cases, such as Smith v. Baker [1891] A.C. 325; Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co., Ltd. v. English [1938]Google Scholar A.C. 57; Riddell v. Reid [1943]Google Scholar A.C. 1, 24; Summers v. Salford Corporation [1943]Google Scholar A.C. 283, 293.

58 This has been stated: Latimer v. A.E.C., Ltd. [1953]Google Scholar A.C. 643, 658; Davie v. New Merton Board Mills, Ltd. [1959]Google Scholar A.C. 604. 626–627.

59 Denning, L.J., in White v. White [1949] P. 39, 59Google Scholar; Mint v. Good [1951] 1 Q.B. 517, 527Google Scholar; Road to Justice, 113; see also Tattersall v. Drysdale [1935] 2 K.B. 174, 181Google Scholar; Monk v. Warbey [1935] 1 K.B. 75Google Scholar; Pound, “The end of law as developed in legal rules and doctrines” (1913–14) 27 Harv.L.R. 195, 233; Fleming, “The passing of Polemis” (1961) 39 Can.B.R. 489, 505–508; Ehrenzweig, Negligence without fault (1951).

60 Dr. Williams's assumption does not appear to be adequate: “It would probably be beneficial to the law of tort if the social security aspects could be wholly sloughed off, because tort could then be left to do its proper job of dramatising society's reaction to wrongdoing through the medium of the courts”: (1961) 77 L.Q.R. at pp. 180–181. One is moved to inquire why this should not be the primary function of criminal law and perhaps only a subordinate function of tort, the main concern of which is with the victim and compensation. That his point of view is important is seen in the stirrings of an idea to provide compensation to all victims of violent crime: Margery Fry, “Justice for victims,” the Observer, July 7, 1957; White Paper, “Penal practice in a changing society. Aspect of future development” Cmnd. 645; Criminal Injuries (Compensation) Bill, 1960; Schafer, Restitution to victims of crime (1960), Pt. 3; Lucas-Tooth, Victims of Violence (1962).

61 See also Williams (1961) 77 L.Q.R. at pp. 210–212.

62 (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.

63 See, e.g., Dr. Williams's doubt as to whether a trickle of water seeping out of a reservoir, which freezes over and on which the plaintiff slips, is an “escape” within the meaning of the rule: (1961) 77 L.Q.R. at p. 210. Cf. Read v. J. Lyons & Co., Ltd. [1947]Google Scholar A.C. 156.

64 Miles v. Forest Rock Granite Co. (Leicestershire), Ltd. (1918) 34 T.L.R. 500Google Scholar; Shiffman v. Order of St. John [1936] 1 All E.R. 557Google Scholar; Hale v. Jennings [1938] 1 All E.R. 579Google Scholar; Perry v. Kendricks Transport, Ltd. [1956] 1 W.L.R. 85.Google Scholar The doubt is raised by dicta in Read v. J. Lyons & Co., Ltd. [1947]Google Scholar A.C. 156, 169, 173, 178, as to which see Salmond on Torts, 13th ed., 577–578.

65 [1961] A.C. 388, 426–427.

66 No liability without a trespass: Cox v. Burbidge (1863) 13 C.B.n.s.) 430; Tillett v. Ward (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 17; Bradley v. Wallaces, Ltd. [1913] 3 K.B. 629Google Scholar; Manton v. Brocklebank [1923] 2 K.B. 212Google Scholar; cf. Wellaway v. Courtier [1918] 1 K.B. 200.Google Scholar

67 Lee v. Riley (1865) 18 C.B.(n.s.) 722, expressly on this ground; Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co. (1874) L.R. 10 C.P. 10; Holgate v. Bleazard [1917] 1 K.B. 443.Google Scholar

68 Theyer v. Purnell [1918] 2 K.B. 333.Google Scholar

69 Cooper v. Railway Executive [1953] 1 W.L.R. 223Google Scholar (counterclaim).

70 Wormald v. Cole [1954] 1 Q.B. 614.Google Scholar

71 Cox v. Burbidge (1863) 13 C.B.(n.s.) 430, 437, 439; Glanville v. Sutton [1928] 1 K.B. 571.Google Scholar If the tendency to attack human beings were known, the proper remedy would be a scienter action.

72 Unless the cases referred to in note 67, supra, are overruled.

73 Wormald v. Cole [1954] 1 Q.B. 614, 625.Google Scholar

74 Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus, Ltd. [1957] 2 Q.B. 1, 17–18Google Scholar; Read v. Edwards (1864) 17 C.B.(n.s.) 245; Glanville v. Sutton [1928] 1 K.B. 571.Google Scholar

75 In Brook v. Cook and Cook (1961) 105 S.J. 684Google Scholar, Lord Evershed M.R., suggests that liability for shock caused by the sudden appearance of a grass monkey, 12 inches high, should be determined by foreseeability of shock. The full text of the judgment, which was made available to me through the courtesy of Dr. Ellis Lewis, shows that the remark was obiter. In any case, the comment of Scriven in (1961) 105 S.J. 1094, 1095, that the foreseeability test was accepted as “applicable to strict liability cases” appears to be unduly sweeping.

76 Discussed by Williams, “The effect of penal legislation in the law of tort” (1960) 23 M.L.R. 233.

77 Galashiels Gas Co., Ltd. v. Millar [1949]Google Scholar A.C. 275; J. Summers & Sons, Ltd. v. Frost [1955]Google Scholar A.C. 740; cf. Monk v. Warbey [1935] 1 K.B. 75Google Scholar, where perhaps the court interpreted the prohibited result too extensively.

78 Gorris v. Scott (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 125; Carroll v. Andrew Barclay & Sons, Ltd. [1948]Google Scholar A.C. 477; Nieholls v. F. Austin (Leyton), Ltd. [1946]Google Scholar A.C. 493; Bailey v. Ayr Engineering Co., Ltd. [1959] 1 Q.B. 183Google Scholar; cf. Grant v. N.C.B. [1956]Google Scholar A.C. 649; Gatehouse v. J. Summers & Co., Ltd. [1953] 1 W.L.R. 743.Google Scholar

79 Groves v. Wimborne [1898] 2 Q.B. 402; Knapp v. Railway Executive [1949] 2 All E.R. 508Google Scholar; Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium, Ltd. [1949]Google Scholar A.C. 398; Canadian Pacific Steamships, Ltd. v. Bryers [1958]Google Scholar A.C. 485; cf. Atkin, L.J. in Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co., Ltd. [1923] 2 K.B. 832, 841.Google Scholar

80 Close v. Steel Co. of Wales, Ltd. [1962]Google Scholar A.C. 367 (whether a piece of machinery is “dangerous” was determined by the foreseeability of injury).

81 Forcefully argued by Williams (1960) 23 M.L.R. 233.

82 Especially with activities with serious repercussions: Lloyds Bank, Ltd. v. Savory [1933]Google Scholar A.C. 201; Manchester Corporation v. Markland [1936]Google Scholar A.C. 360; Daly v. Liverpool Corporation [1939] 2 All E.R. 142Google Scholar; Paris v. Stepney B.C. [1951]Google Scholar A.C. 367; Cavanagh v. Ulster Weaving Co., Ltd. [1960]Google Scholar A.C. 145.

83 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932]Google Scholar A.C. 560; Lang v. London Transport Executive [1959] 1 W.L.R. 1168Google Scholar; Godsmark v. Knight Bros. (Brighton), The Times, May 12, 1960.Google Scholar

84 For this argument, see Payne (1952) 5 Current Legal Problems, 189; (1962) 25 M.L.R. 1.

85 Lord, Wright, “Re Polemis” (1951) 14 M.L.R. 393, 410.Google Scholar