ACCOUNTABILITY, transparency, and freedom of information are essential to democracy. These values are not absolute; hence the law is used to demarcate how much transparency, access, and freedom are allowed. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) provides a mechanism for accessing information held by public authorities. It has been heavily criticised for not providing sufficient access due to its wide exemptions and section 53 veto power. Nevertheless, it was thought that, where citizens seek information, they should use FOIA. In Kennedy v The Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20, [2014] 2 W.L.R. 808, the Supreme Court found that this may not always be the appropriate method. The Supreme Court held, by a majority of 5:2, that Kennedy should not have pursued his claim under FOIA; instead he should have sought disclosure via the Charities Act 1993 (“Charities Act”) and judicial review. The majority took this opportunity to criticise the overuse of human rights, and to emphasise the significance of the common law and its role in ensuring accountability and transparency.

AT an airfield in Dorset, a vintage aircraft took to the air and then – as too often seems to happen – fell out of it. The fatal consequences led to Rogers v Hoyle [2014] EWCA Civ 257, [2014] 3 W.L.R. 145 – proceedings brought on behalf of the dependants of the deceased passenger, Orlando Rogers, against the pilot, Scott Hoyle, whose negligence they claimed had caused the crash. As required by law, the accident had been officially investigated by the Department of Transport's Air Accident Investigation Department (the AAID). Its report contained findings about the cause of the accident which were helpful to the claimants' case, so they sought to adduce it as evidence. To this the defendant objected and sought to persuade the courts to exclude it. That he failed in his attempt is unsurprising because, as Leggatt J. put it at first instance, “If any non lawyer was told that the law does not permit a court to have regard to the AAIB report when deciding how the accident was caused, I am sure that he or she would express astonishment at the suggestion”. But if the sensible outcome was so obvious, why were lengthy judgments at two levels, with over 70 authorities cited and discussed, needed to produce it?

THE finality of proceedings, resource constraints, a presumption of guilt, and the existence of the Criminal Cases Review Commission (“CCRC”) all combine to outweigh the principle of fairness for a convicted individual. Such was the stark conclusion of the Supreme Court in dismissing Kevin Nunn's application to force prosecution authorities to grant access to material which he believed would help him get his conviction quashed: R. (Nunn) v Chief Constable of Suffolk Constabulary [2014] UKSC 37, [2014] 3 W.L.R. 77.

FREEDOM of contract is a fundamental principle of English law, but it is of course qualified by numerous protective regimes, some common law, most statutory nowadays, which protect vulnerable parties from untrammelled, unequal free bargaining. It is, quite rightly, exceptional for an experienced commercial party, negotiating at arm's length and with the benefit of specialist professional advice, to succeed in invoking such a regime to escape being bound by what he freely agreed. Yet, in Cavendish Square Holdings BV v Makdessi [2013] EWCA Civ 1539, this was precisely the controversial result.

DOES wrongdoing by a squatter prevent him from acquiring title to another person's land via the law of adverse possession? The answer is plainly “no” where the squatter is a civil, tortious wrongdoer: the law not only condones, but positively requires a successful adverse possession claimant to have committed the tort of trespass over the true owner's land (this condition is inherent in the requirement that the squatter's possession be “adverse”). But what happens where the tortious acts that establish the squatter's adverse possession also constitute a criminal offence? This was the tricky question facing the court in Best v The Chief Land Registrar [2014] EWHC (Admin) 1370.

THE “tripartite” test for the prescriptive acquisition of rights over land, derived from the Roman law of servitudes, has long been a source of confusion. The crucial distinction that underlies it is between use of land that is “as [if] of right” – nec vi, nec clam, nec precario (without force, stealth, or licence) – and use that is “by right” – that is, with a licence. This distinction has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in R. (Barkas) v North Yorkshire County Council & Another [2014] UKSC 31. The court held that use of land pursuant to a statutory entitlement is necessarily use “by right”, and so was not “as of right”.

FHR bought a long lease for €211.5 million. Cedar Capital conducted the negotiations on FHR's behalf, but also received a €10 million commission from the vendor. On becoming aware of this commission, FHR sought to recover it from Cedar Capital. As its negotiating agent, Cedar Capital owed fiduciary duties to FHR, and had not obtained FHR's fully informed consent to the commission. Cedar Capital therefore had to account to FHR for the commission. However, applying the Court of Appeal's decision in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [2012] Ch. 453, Simon J. held that the remedy was purely personal; FHR could not assert a proprietary constructive trust over the €10 million: FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2011] EWHC 2999 (Ch). The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal as to remedy, distinguishing the facts from those in Sinclair v Versailles, but also casting some doubt on the correctness of that decision: [2013] EWCA Civ 17, [2014] Ch. 1. The Supreme Court was thus required to pass judgment on the voluminous debate as to whether English law should follow Lister & Co. v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch.D. 1, or Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 A.C. 324.