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Sincere Cooperation between EU and Member States in the Field of Readmission: The More the Merrier?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 December 2021

Caterina MOLINARI
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Abstract

Cooperation with third countries on readmission has occupied an increasingly prominent place in the EU's migration management strategy. The EU and its Member States have progressively concluded an extensive set of bilateral and multilateral, binding and non-binding, cooperation instruments on readmission. This proliferation questions the field's coherence with the principle of sincere cooperation, governing the interplay between the Union's and Member States’ action. By taking this principle as a benchmark, the article highlights the ineffective nature of the current ‘unprincipled’ pursuit of readmission goals. It also demonstrates that sincere cooperation—if read together with subsidiarity—does not necessarily favour the Union's international action, to the detriment of the Member States’. Rather, it requires a good faith effort to identify, and stand by, the most effective level of action.

Keywords

EU Readmission Policysincere cooperationexternal relationsshared external competencessoft deals
Type
Research Article
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 23 , December 2021 , pp. 269 - 289
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge

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Footnotes

*

Research Student, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven/Doctoral fellow Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).

References

1 Art 4(3) Treaty on the European Union (‘TEU’).

2 Opinion 1/94, EU:C:1994:384, para 108. See also Commission v Germany (OTIF II), C-620/16, EU:C:2019:256, para 45; Commission v Sweden (PFOS), C-246/97, EU:C:2010:203, para 73; Commission v Germany (Inland Waterways), C-433/03, EU:C:2005:462, para 66.

3 Eg Commission v Finland (BIT), C-118/07, EU:C:2009:715, para 37; Opinion 1/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2303, para 74.

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15 Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention), EU:C:1993:106, para 25.

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17 Eckes, note 8 above) pp 21–22.

18 Commission v Luxemburg, C-266/03, EU:C:2005:341, paras 60–61.

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21 Ibid, paras 68–69.

22 Commission v Germany (OTIF II), EU:C:2019:256.

23 Commission v Sweden (PFOS), C-246/07, EU:C:2010:203.

24 Commission v Council (ERTA), EU:C:1971:32, para 17.

25 Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community [2016], OJ C203/1.

26 Ruling 1/78, EU:C:1978:202, para 33.

27 Article 20(1) TEU indicates that Member States willing to ‘establish enhanced cooperation between themselves within the framework of the Union's non-exclusive competences may make use of its institutions’, which implies that they are not obliged to do so (M Kellerbauer, ‘Art. 20 TEU: A Commentary’ in M Kellerbauer, M Klamert, and J Tomkin (eds), The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2019), pp 192–96).

28 Pringle, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, paras 64–65

29 G De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp 62–63, 289–93.

30 Articles 209(2) and 214(4) TFEU, respectively.

31 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts [1997] OJ C340/1.

32 Art 63(3)(b) Treaty establishing the European Community [1997], OJ C340/173.

33 For an overview, see https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy/return-readmission_en.

34 COM(2002) 564 final, Community Return Policy on Illegal Residents.

35 On which, see B Hulme, ‘Analysis of the United Kingdom's Proposal for a UK-EU Readmission Agreement’ (EU Law Analysis, 21 August 2020), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/08/analysis-of-united-kingdoms-proposal.html.

36 Molinari, C, ‘The EU and Its Perilous Journey through the Migration Crisis: Informalisation of the EU Return Policy and Rule of Law Concerns’ (2019) 44 (6) European Law Review 824Google Scholar, pp 831–32.

37 COM(2007) 248 final, Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and Third Countries.

38 For an analysis of the funded projects and their relationship with the commitments listed in the main text of a Mobility Partnership, see Hertog, L den, ‘Funding the EU–Morocco “Mobility Partnership”: of Implementation and Competences’ (2016) 18(3) European Journal of Migration and Law 275Google Scholar.

39 COM(2011) 743 final, Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.

40 European Council and Council Press Release 144/16: EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016.

41 Doubts on the link between the deal and the curbing of migration flows are raised by T Spijkerboer, ‘Fact Check: Did the EU-Turkey Deal Bring Down the Number of Migrants and of Border Deaths?’ (Border Criminologies, 28 September 2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/09/fact-check-did-eu.

42 COM(2016) 385 final, Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration.

43 Joint Way Forward on Migration Issues between Afghanistan and the EU, 4 October 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_migration_issues.pdf.

44 Annex I to Decision C(2017) 6137 final on the Signature of the EU-Bangladesh Standard Operating Procedures for the Identification and Return of Persons without an Authorisation to Stay.

45 Annex to Item Note 15762/17: Admission procedures for the return of Ethiopians from European Union Member States.

46 C Molinari, EU Institutions in Denial: Non-Agreements, Non-Signatories, and (Non-)Effective Judicial Protection in the EU Return Policy (Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper), 2019/2, p 15.

47 See, for example, J Santos Vara, ‘Soft International Agreements on Migration Cooperation with Third Countries: A Challenge to Democratic and Judicial Controls in the EU’ in S Carrera, J Santos Vara, and T Strik (eds), Constitutionalising the External Dimensions of EU Migration Policies in Times of Crisis: Legality, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Reconsidered (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp 29–38.

48 Agreement on the circulation of persons and readmission between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, signed on 11 July 2006 and entered into force on 27 March 2007.

49 UK-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Provision of Assurances in Respect of Persons Subject to Deportation, 12 December 2008.

50 UK-Morocco Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Persons Subject to Deportation for Reasons of Involvement in Terrorism, 24 September 2011.

51 Memorandum d'intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto all'immigrazione illegale, al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere tra lo Stato della Libia e la Repubblica Italiana, 3 February 2017.

52 Commission Press Release IP/17/2187 : EU Trust Fund for Africa Adopts €46 Million Programme to Support Integrated Migration and Border Management in Libya.

53 See, for example, the Explanatory Memorandum included in COM(2018) 634 final, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals (Recast) (2018).

54 J P Cassarino, ‘Readmission Policy in the European Union’ (Study for the European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2010), p 17.

55 This is due to the fact that readmission is not framed by Article 79 TFEU as a parallel competence. Thus, its exercise by the Union is capable of pre-empting future Member States action.

56 European Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2008/115 [2008] OJ L348/98.

57 Billet, C, ‘EC Readmission Agreements: A Prime Instrument of the External Dimension of the EU's Fight against Irregular Immigration. An Assessment after Ten Years of Practice’ (2010) 12(1) European Journal of Migration and Law 45CrossRefGoogle Scholar, pp 62–63.

58 S Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), p 589.

59 So much so that it resembles a regulation more than a directive in terms of regulatory technique, see, E Muir and C Molinari, ‘Targeted Impact Assessment Study on the Proposed Return Directive (Recast) - Legal Aspects’, The Proposed Return Directive (Recast): Substitute Impact Assessment (European Parliament, Ex-ante Impact Assessment Unit, EPRS 2019), p 57.

60 Klamert, M, ‘Dark Matter: Competence, Jurisdiction and “the Area Largely Covered by EU Law” - Comment on Lesoochranarske’ (2012) 37(3) European Law Review 340, p 348Google Scholar.

61 As would its proposed recast (COM(2018) 634 final, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals (Recast) (2018)), if adopted.

62 García Andrade, note 13 above, p 170; B Van Vooren, ‘The Principle of Pre-Emption after Opinion 1/2003 and Coherence in EU Readmission Policy’ in M Cremona, J Monar, and S Poli (eds), The External Dimension of the European Union's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Peter Lang, 2011) pp 185–89. For a different view see Billet, note 57 above, pp 62–63.

63 J Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, ‘The External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: An Essential Part of the European Union's External Action’ in P Eeckhout and M López-Escudero (eds), The European Union's External Action in Times of Crisis (Hart Publishing, 2016), p 520.

64 N Coleman, European Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2009), p 83; Cassarino, note 54 above, p 18. Institutional involvement in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Treaties is the reason why collective negotiation by the Member States outside the Union's framework is prohibited as well in areas where the Union has acquired exclusivity.

65 2184th Council Meeting - Justice and Home Affairs - Conclusions, Brussels, 27/28 May 1999.

66 See N.F. v European Council, T-192/16, ECLI:EU:T:2017:128.

67 Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation [2014] OJ L134/3–27.

68 Council Decision (EU) 2016/551 [2016] OJ L95/11. The decision of the Joint Readmission Committee is dated 1 April 2016 (see COM(2016) 231 final, First Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement).

69 F Erlbacher, Recent Case Law on External Competences of the European Union: How Member States Can Embrace Their Own Treaty (T.M.C. Asser Institute for International & European Law), CLEER Paper Series 2017-02, p 21.

70 Cassarino, note 54 above, p 19.

71 Eg, Article 20 Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on readmission [2007] OJ L129/40.

72 Cassarino, note 54 above, pp 19–20.

73 Eg Article 18(3) EU-Russia Readmission Agreement, note 70 above; Article 18(7) EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, note 66 above.

74 On the constitutional distortions caused by these clauses, see García Andrade, note 13 above, pp 171–72, who sees these clauses as expression of ‘the preference … given to fast and effective returns at any price’.

75 Commission v Sweden (PFOS), EU:C:2010:203, para 75. See also Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:2005:341, para 60; Commission v Germany, C-433/03, EU:C:2005:462, para 66.

76 ‘2184th Council Meeting - Justice and Home Affairs (Re-Admission Agreements - Consequences of the Entry into Force of the Amsterdam Treaty)’, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-99-168_en.htm. See also the slightly more cautious stance taken by Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, note 63 above, p 521.

77 Commission v Sweden (PFOS), EU:C:2010:203, para 74. See also Commission v Luxembourg, EU:C:2005:341, para 59; Commission v Germany, EU:C:2005:462, para 65; Commission v UK, C-804/79, EU:C:1981:93, para 28. See, on this G De Baere, ‘“O, Where Is Faith? O, Where Is Loyalty?” Some Thoughts on the Duty of Loyal Co-Operation and the Union's External Environmental Competences in the Light of the PFOS Case’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 405, p 414.

78 This view is shared by part of the literature. See Coleman, note 64 above, p 84; Panizzon, M, ‘Readmission Agreements of EU Member States: A Case for EU Subsidiarity or Dualism?’ (2012) 31 Refugee Survey Quarterly 101, p 27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schieffer, M, ‘Community Readmission Agreements with Third Countries: Objectives, Substance and Current State of Negotiations’ (2003) 5 European Journal of Migration and Law 343, p 350CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Rosas, A, ‘The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU Member States European Union Law Issue Dedicated to Jean-Claude Piris: Essay’ (2010) 34(5) Fordham International Law Journal 1304, p 1319Google Scholar. As discussed above, according to the Court, action by all Member States outside the Treaty framework is, instead, possible whenever the Union itself would not be competent to undertake it, ie in areas that are still within the realm of national competence (Pringle v Ireland, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, para 105).

79 Cassarino, note 54 above, pp 18–23.

80 Décret No 2009-905 du 24 juillet 2009 portant publication de l'accord-cadre relatif à la gestion concertée des migrations et au développement solidaire, du protocole relatif à la gestion concertée des migrations et du protocole en matière de développement solidaire entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République tunisienne, JORF No 0171 du 26 juillet 2009, Texte No 4.

81 Accordo Tra Il Governo Della Repubblica Italiana e Il Governo Della Repubblica Algerina Democratica e Popolare, Firmato Il 24 Febbraio 2000 Ed Entrato in Vigore Il 18 Ottobre 2006.

82 Andrade, P García, ‘The Legal Feasibility of the EU's External Action on Legal Migration: The Internal and the External Intertwined’ (2013) 15 European Journal of Migration and Law 263, p 273CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

83 Coleman, note 64 above, p 36.

84 Article 4(3) TEU makes no distinction as to the type of measures in question when codifying the principle of sincere cooperation.

85 Germany v Council (OIV), C-399/12, EU:C:2014:2258, paras 63–64, see also Erlbacher, note 69 above.

86 Ibid, paras 63–64.

87 Commission v Sweden (PFOS), EU:C:2010:203, para 101.

88 Ibid, para 104. In this case of course, the duty to abstain would be the consequence of the obligation of close cooperation following from sincere cooperation in the absence of exclusivity. In fact, a duty to abstain from taking a certain action can be a consequence not only of the exclusivity of the Union's action, but also (directly) of the duty of cooperation. See De Baere, note 77 above, pp 417–18.

89 Commission v Sweden (PFOS), EU:C:2010:203, para 76.

90 This does not correspond to my position, but has been argued by part of the literature. S Peers, ‘The Draft EU/Turkey Deal on Migration and Refugees: Is It Legal?’ (EU Law Analysis, 16 March 2016), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/03/the-draft-euturkey-deal-on-migration.html; K Babická, ‘EU-Turkey Deal Seems to Be Schizophrenic’ (Migration Online, 22 March 2016), https://migrationonline.cz/en/eu-turkey-deal-seems-to-be-schizophrenic; for a view to the contrary see M den Heijer and T Spijkerboer, ‘Is the EU-Turkey Refugee and Migration Deal a Treaty?’ (EU Law Analysis, 7 April 2016) http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/04/is-eu-turkey-refugee-and-migration-deal.html.

91 On the relationship between the Statement and EU asylum law see, for example, M J Alpes, S Tunaboylu, and I van Liempt, Human Rights Violations by Design: EU-Turkey Statement Prioritises Returns from Greece Over Access to Asylum (European University Institute), Policy Brief 2017/29; as well as S Peers and E Roman, ‘The EU, Turkey and the Refugee Crisis: What Could Possibly Go Wrong?’ (EU Law Analysis, 5 February 2016) http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/02/the-eu-turkey-and-refugee-crisis-what.html.

92 As described also by the General Court C in N.F. v European Council, ECLI:EU:T:2017:128.

93 COM(2011) 743 final, Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.

94 Panizzon, note 78 above, p 132.

95 See, for example, the negotiations on readmission between Tunisia and Spain, which are pursued bilaterally notwithstanding the signing of the EU-Tunisia mobility partnership in 2014 (Déclaration Conjointe Pour Le Partenariat de Mobilité Entre La Tunisie, l'Union Européenne et Ses Etats Membres Participants https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/international-affairs/general/docs/declaration_conjointe_tunisia_eu_mobility_fr.pdf). To track the web of multilateral and bilateral readmission negotiations, consult the dataset made available by J P Cassarino at https://www.jeanpierrecassarino.com.

96 See, for example, the Union's support (Commission, Press Release IP/17/2187, note 25 above) for the soft readmission deal between Italy and Libya (note 51 above).

97 See M Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford University Press 2014), p 20, according to whom ‘loyalty expresses the gravitational force of European Union law’, and Eckes, note 7 above, p 86, who affirms it ‘triggers integrative dynamics’.

98 See Eckes, note 7 above, pp 91–94.

99 Art 4(3) TEU. See P Van Elsuwege, ‘The Duty of Sincere Cooperation and Its Implications for Autonomous Member State Action in the Field of External Relations’ in M Varju (ed), Between Compliance and Particularism: Member State Interests and European Union Law (Springer International Publishing, 2019), p 285; Neframi, E, ‘The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field of EU External Relations’ (2010) 47(2) Common Market Law Review 323, p 325CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

100 Among others, Lenaerts, K, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism’ (1993) 17(4) Fordham International Law Journal 846, p 894Google Scholar.

101 Article 4(3) TEU.

102 Eckes, note 7 above, p 88. when revisiting J Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (Macmillan, 1908). See also T Roes, note 31 above, p 262: ‘[e]very application of loyalty requires a Union interest [ie objective or task identified in the Treaties] that loyalty seeks to safeguard’.

103 Efficiency will have to be assessed aaccording to the normative framework constituted by the EU Treaties themselves.

104 Eckes, note 7 above, pp 86, 105.

105 Klamert, note 97 above, p 20.