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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
When the Asquith Coalition Government took office in May, 1915, the new First Lord of the Admiralty was Mr. Arthur James Balfour. His appointment to that particular position at that time was due to a number of influences, among which political exigency was by no means the least important. In the Cabinet reconstruction, Asquith had insisted that Grey at the Foreign Office and Kitchener at the War Office were not to be changed, and these reservations materially lessened the higher Cabinet posts which were available for prominent Conservatives. As a result of this delicate weighing of leaders and offices, Balfour became the most obvious choice for the Admiralty, a position for which he was well qualified on at least two other grounds. He not only held a seat in the Commons, but his experience as an unofficial consultant and member of the War Council during the previous seven months had given him a more comprehensive knowledge of the problems of the fighting services than any of his Conservative colleagues. The suitability of his appointment, moreover, was endorsed by his predecessor, Mr. Churchill, who suggested that inasmuch as Balfour had recently been in unusually close touch with events at the Admiralty, he could take over its duties with very little break in the continuity of the administration.
This article continues the history of the First Lords of the Admiralty which was begun by “The Cabinet Minister and Administration: Winston S. Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911-15” in the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. VI, Aug., 1940, pp. 325-58.
2 Spender, J. A. and Asquith, C., Life of Lord Oxford and, Asquith (London, 1932), vol. II, p. 170.Google Scholar
3 Lord Kitchener, head of the other “war” portfolio, was in the House of Lords.
4 Balfour had occupied a curious position on the War Council as an opposition representative. See Dugdale, Blanche E. C., Arthur James Balfour (London, 1936), vol. II, pp. 125, 131–3, 141.Google Scholar
5 Churchill, Winston S., The World Crisis (Toronto, 1923), vol. II, p. 381.Google Scholar
6 The Committee was composed of all those whom the Prime Minister chose to summon for consultation, chiefly naval and military officers and Cabinet Ministers. The meetings not only secured greater co-operation between the fighting forces but also “bridged the dangerous gap between expert knowledge and ministerial responsibility,” and the Prime Minister was thereby expressly charged with the duty of coordinating all measures for defence. See Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. I, pp. 365–70Google Scholar; SirMaurice, F., Haldane (London, 1937), vol. I, pp. 273–5.Google Scholar
7 George, D. Lloyd, War Memoirs (London, 1933), vol. I, p. 172.Google Scholar Cf. pp. 171–7.
8 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 180-8; Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, pp. 134–5.Google Scholar
9 “His was a trained mind of the finest quality, of the ripest experience, of the greatest penetration, piercing and dissecting problems and laying them bare before his colleagues for their examination and judgment” ( George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, p. 1016).Google Scholar Cf. Fisher, H. A. L., Pages from the Past (Oxford, 1939), pp. 174–6Google Scholar; Riddell, Lord, More Pages from My Diary (London, 1934), p. 68 Google Scholar; Sir.Kempe, J. A., Reminiscences of an Old Civil Servant (London, 1928), p. 139.Google Scholar
10 It should be borne in mind, however, that Mr. Lloyd George's admiration at this time was probably not nearly so fervent as it later became and as it finds expression in his writings; for Balfour's support in December, 1916, and his subsequent association with Mr. Lloyd George raised him greatly in the latter's esteem.
11 Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, pp. 139–41.Google Scholar
12 Ibid., vol. II, p. 141.
13 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 142-3.
14 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 1014–15.Google Scholar “Mr. Balfour's handicap was that of a grocer who attempts to weigh his cheese with the scales and weights of a chemist. Politics is a rough business, and the judgment needed for it is a rule-of-thumb judgment. Something closely approaching accuracy is necessary, but it is better to be a little out than too finicking; in the attempt to measure to a millimetre and weigh to a grain one is pretty certain to miss the essence of the calculation” ( Raymond, E. T., A Life of Arthur James Balfour (Boston, 1920), p. 245).Google Scholar
15 Balfour, A. J., Chapters of Autobiography (London, 1930), p. xii.Google Scholar
16 Cf. Fisher, , Pages from the Past, p. 175.Google Scholar
17 Seely, J. E. B., Adventure (London, 1930), p. 86.Google Scholar
18 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 1014–17Google Scholar; Spender, J. A., Life, Journalism and Politics (London, 1927), vol. II, p. 97.Google Scholar
19 Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, pp. 142–7Google Scholar; SirBrownrigg, D. E. R., Indiscretions of the Naval Censor (New York, 1920), pp. 50–1.Google Scholar
20 Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, p. 143.Google Scholar
21 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 143-5; Churchill, , The World Crisis (Toronto, 1923), vol. I, pp. 85–6Google Scholar; vol. II, pp. 379-80, 391-2.
22 An excellent illustration of this is given in Spender, , Life, Journalism and Politics, vol. II, p. 50.Google Scholar
23 Balfour, Lady Frances, Ne Obliviscaris (London, n.d.), vol. II, pp. 377–8Google Scholar; George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, p. 643.Google Scholar
24 Balfour's original plan proposed a joint research organization for the army and navy; but the War Office would not participate. The Admiralty then created its own body, and a short time later the Ministry of Munitions set up a similar organization (ibid., vol. II, p. 618).
25 Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, pp. 147–8Google Scholar; infra., pp. 27-8.
26 Sir J. J. Thompson, Sir Charles Parsons, Sir George Beilby, and many other associates of similar achievements.
27 The three First Lords were Mr. Balfour, Sir Edward Carson, and Sir Eric Geddes.
28 Fisher, Lord, Records (London, 1919), pp. 65–8.Google Scholar This astonishing accusation is confirmed elsewhere, cf. SirThomson, J. J., Recollections and Reflections (Toronto, 1937), pp. 209–22Google Scholar; Langton, H. H., Sir John Cunningham McLennan (Toronto, 1939), p. 46 Google Scholar; British House of Commons Debates, 02 26, 1917, pp. 1717–19Google Scholar; May 9, 1917, pp. 1112-13.
29 Langton, , Sir John Cunningham McLennan, p. 46.Google Scholar The lack of co-operation was due in part, at least, to anti-Fisher elements in the navy—the residue of an old feud between the supporters of Lord Charles Beresford and Lord Fisher.
30 The third, Sir Eric Geddes, did not show the same general lack of aggressiveness, whatever he may have failed to do in this particular matter.
31 British House of Commons Debates, 03 7, 1916, pp. 1410–14.Google Scholar
32 Balfour called it “the most amazing proposition that has ever been laid before the House of Commons” (ibid., March 8, 1916, pp. 1558-9).
33 Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, p. 142 Google Scholar; Raymond, , A Life of Arthur James Balfour, p. 226.Google Scholar
34 Ibid., pp. 22-3.
35 Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, p. 159 Google Scholar; cf. Ronaldshay, Lord, The Life of Lord Curzon (London, 1928), vol. III, pp. 141–7Google Scholar; George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 976–7.Google Scholar
36 The communiqué on the battle of Jutland ran as follows: “On the afternoon of Wednesday May 31st a naval engagement took place off the coast of Jutland. The British ships on which the brunt of the fighting fell were the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and some cruisers and light cruisers supported by four fast battleships. Among those the losses were heavy. The German Battle Fleet, aided by low visibility, avoided prolonged action with our main forces, and soon after these appeared on the scene, the enemy returned to port, though not before receiving severe damage from our battleships. The Battle Cruisers, Queen Mary, Indefatigable, Invincible, and the Cruisers Defence and Black Prince were sunk. The Warrior was disabled, and after being towed for some time had to be abandoned by her crew. It is also known that the destroyers Tipperary, Turbulent, Fortune, Sparrowhawk and Ardent were lost, and six others are not yet accounted for. No British battleships or light cruisers were sunk. The enemy's losses were serious. At least one battle cruiser was destroyed, and one severely damaged; one battleship reported sunk by our destroyers during a night attack, two light cruisers were disabled and probably sunk. The exact number of enemy destroyers disposed of during the action cannot be ascertained with any certainty, but it must have been large” ( Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, pp. 160–1).Google Scholar
37 Brownrigg, , Indiscretions of the Naval Censor, p. 64.Google Scholar Cf. Newbolt, H., Official History of the War, Naval Operations, vol. IV (1928), pp. 3–13.Google Scholar (This will be referred to henceforth by the shorter title, Newbolt, Naval Operations.)
38 Churchill, Winston S., Great Contemporaries (London, 1937), p. 251.Google Scholar “For a long time,” Churchill writes, “this was accounted to him as a virtue. But the newspapers won in the end. … At length he was scolded for not keeping in touch with public opinion; in the end he had to read the newspapers; but he read them as little as he could.”
39 Spender, and Asquith, , Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith, vol. II, p. 236.Google Scholar
40 Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, p. 160.Google Scholar
41 Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. II, pp. 285–306.Google Scholar
42 Ibid., vol. III (London, 1927), pp. 216-23; vol. IV (London, 1927), pp. 349-60; Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, pp. 229–75, 323–85.Google Scholar Cf. infra, pp. 15-22.
43 Fayle, C. E., Official History of the War, Seaborne Trade (referred to henceforth as Fayle, Seaborne Trade), vol. III, p. 465.Google Scholar
44 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 964–72Google Scholar; Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, pp. 323–5.Google Scholar
45 Jellicoe, Viscount, The Crisis of the Naval War (Toronto, 1920), p. 4.Google Scholar
46 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, p. 324.Google Scholar
47 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III (London, 1934), pp. 1130–1.Google Scholar
48 Ibid., vol. II, p. 1017.
49 Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, p. 163.Google Scholar
50 Ibid., vol. II, p. 164.
51 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 980–1.Google Scholar
52 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 497-513, 519; vol. II, pp. 980-3, 1017-21. Mr. Lloyd George has stated that he intended to place Sir Edward Carson in the War Cabinet, but Conservative opposition induced him to drop it for the time (ibid., vol. III, p. 1077).
53 Ibid., vol. II, p. 1020.
54 Colvin, I., The Life of Lord Carson (New York, 1937), vol. III, p. 217.Google Scholar
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., vol. III, pp. 218-21; Jellicoe, , The Crisis of the Naval War, p. 7.Google Scholar
57 Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. III, p. 247.Google Scholar
58 Ibid., vol. III, pp. 243-4.
59 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1138.Google Scholar
60 The desire to maintain the prestige of the Admiralty and, to a somewhat lesser degree, that of the political leaders concerned make the various accounts of this struggle not entirely unbiased. The versions given by Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Lloyd George, however, seem to be substantially correct. They are almost identical; and while Mr. Lloyd George is clearly pleading his own case, the same accusation cannot be brought against Mr. Churchill who for some time sided with the Admiralty on the convoy question [cf. The World Crisis, vol. IV, p. 365].Google Scholar These accounts are also confirmed in many vital respects by other authorities. Lord Jellicoe's interpretation is not likely to win many converts; for the evidence is overwhelmingly against him, and his attempt in The Submarine Peril (London, 1934)Google Scholar to fill the awkward gaps which appeared in an earlier account is unconvincing and still leaves many facts unnoticed and unexplained. The three-volume biography of Lord Carson is not an impressive work on any count, save size, and its obvious hero-worship does not give the best approach to controversial material. The Official History of the War (Naval Operations) despite its caution, poor presentation, and tendency to give the Admiralty and Earl Jellicoe the benefit of many doubts, tells a revealing story, which substantiates virtually everything stated by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill. The latter, who knows his Admiralty and the way of a department with an official historian, comments; “The book is not an inspiring book … it is the composite work of different hands. The able historian has evidently had to submit his chapters to authorities and departments; and important personages in the story have clearly applied their pruning knives and ink-erasers with no timid hand. The result is a sort of official amalgam which seems to be neither a plain, fearless narrative nor a fair and searching analytical examination of the great disputes. … No part of the Official History is written with more circumspection than the account of the conflict between the War Cabinet and the Admiralty upon the adoption of the convoy system. A layman might read these pages attentively and remain quite unconscious of its intensity, or indeed of what actually happened. All the main essential facts are stated, but they are stated with such a studied absence of emphasis, and often in so inverted a sequence, that the conclusion to which they remorselessly point is hidden. It is only when we decipher the cryptogram by the key of chronology that the truth—to many the unwelcome truth—emerges” ( Thoughts and Adventures, London, 1932, pp. 123, 132–3).Google Scholar
61 Fayle, , Seaborne Trade, vol. III, p. 465.Google Scholar
62 Jellicoe, , The Crisis of the Naval War, pp. 6–14.Google Scholar
63 Churchill, , Thoughts and Adventures, p. 129.Google Scholar
64 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, pp. 1138–40Google Scholar; Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. V, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar
65 Ibid., vol. V, p. 5.
66 Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 325-33.
67 Twenty-five German submarines, mostly of the small type, were destroyed within the year from all causes (ibid., vol. IV, p. 351 n.).
68 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, pp. 1133–4Google Scholar; Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, p. 337.Google Scholar
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 343-4; vol. V, pp. 5-6.
71 SirSalter, J. Arthur, Allied Shipping Control (Oxford, 1921), p. 122.Google Scholar
72 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. V, pp. 5–9 Google Scholar; Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. IV, p. 364 Google Scholar; Jellicoe, , The Crisis of the Naval War, pp. 102–5Google Scholar; infra, pp. 20-1.
73 Ibid., p. 106.
74 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, p. 234 Google Scholar; Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. IV, p. 364 Google Scholar; Churchill, , Thoughts and Adventures, p. 134 Google Scholar; George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, pp. 1143, 1173–5.Google Scholar
75 Ibid., vol. III, pp. 1150-1.
76 Colvin, , The Life of Lord Carson, vol. III, p. 229.Google Scholar
77 Ibid., vol. III, p. 252.
78 Colonel (now Lord) Hankey's part in securing the convoys was very great indeed; for he supplied the Cabinet Ministers with most of their ammunition and continually pressed for the adoption of the convoy system. See Lord Riddell's War Diary (London, 1933), p. 351 Google Scholar; Churchill, , Thoughts and Adventures, p. 131.Google Scholar
79 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. V, pp. 10–15 Google Scholar; George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 1151–4.Google Scholar Material for this memorandum was apparently obtained in part from junior officers of the Admiralty staff ( Churchill, , Thoughts and Adventures, p. 134).Google Scholar
80 Jellicoe, , The Submarine Peril, p. 112.Google Scholar
81 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1155.Google Scholar
82 Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 1145, 1157-8. Mr. Lloyd George states that the meeting was held without notifying the Shipping Controller, and suggests that these captains were to some degree, at least, a picked and not a representative group, and that Admiral Jellicoe probably overstressed the difficulties of sailing in convoy. There is apparently little confirmation elsewhere of these two latter suggestions; indeed, Admiral Sims states that all the merchant masters that had any contact with the naval officers were openly hostile to convoys ( Sims, W. S., The Victory at Sea, London, 1920, p. 90).Google Scholar But Admiral Jellicoe does suggest that ships in a convoy “should be handled in a manner that approached the handling of battleships in a squadron” ( Jellicoe, , The Crisis of the Naval War, pp. 105–6).Google Scholar
83 Jellicoe, , The Crisis of the Naval War, pp. 109–10, 119–21Google Scholar; Jellicoe, , The Submarine Peril, p. 123 Google Scholar; Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, pp. 382–3Google Scholar; ibid., vol. V, pp. 15, 27-9; Fayle, , Seaborne Trade, vol. III, pp. 99–100, 149 Google Scholar; George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, pp. 1155–8.Google Scholar
84 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, pp. 370–1.Google Scholar
85 Ibid., vol. V, p. 15.
86 Earl Jellicoe later denied that Admiral Beatty's comments constituted an approval of a general convoy system, and stated that they applied only to the Scandinavian trade ( Jellicoe, , The Submarine Peril, p. 104n).Google Scholar This is not the interpretation of the Official History nor of Mr. Lloyd George (see George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1158 Google Scholar; Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, pp. 382–3).Google Scholar
87 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, p. 383; vol. V, pp. 15-16.Google Scholar
88 Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 382-3.
89 Sims, , The Victory at Sea, p. 7.Google Scholar Admiral Jellicoe later denied that he had told Admiral Sims that there was absolutely no solution for the submarine problem. “What I did say was that the counter measures being devised could not be immediately successful as time was required for their production” (The Submarine Peril, pp. 70–1).Google Scholar Admiral Sims, however, had recorded two things: Jellicoe's exact words, and the general impression he had made on his hearer. Admiral Jellicoe repudiated the first; but his denial scarcely affects the truth of the second, which was no less important. Moreover, Admiral Sims' account is confirmed by a letter from General Robertson to Sir Douglas Haig, dated April 28: “The situation at sea is very serious indeed. It has never been so bad as at present, and Jellicoe almost daily announces it to be hopeless” ( Cooper, Duff, Haig, Toronto, 1926, vol. II, p. 101 Google Scholar; cf. also p. 123).
90 See, for example, the confusing statement of SirCarson, Edward to the House of Commons, British House of Commons Debates, 02 21, 1917, pp. 1361–3.Google Scholar
91 Churchill, , Thoughts and Adventures, pp. 134–5Google Scholar; George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, pp. 1156–7Google Scholar; Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. V, p. 18.Google Scholar
92 Tayle, , Seaborne Trade, vol. III, pp. 128–9.Google Scholar
93 Ibid., vol. III, p. 91.
94 Salter, , Allied Shipping Control, pp. 122, 125.Google Scholar
95 Fayle, , Seaborne Trade, vol. III, p. 92.Google Scholar
96 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, p. 385.Google Scholar
97 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, pp. 1148–9.Google Scholar
98 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, p. 379.Google Scholar
99 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 380.
100 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1160.Google Scholar
101 Ibid., vol. III, pp. 1161-2; Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. V, p. 17.Google Scholar
102 The Official History notes with more than a tinge of scepticism that the First Sea Lord “has added later that on April 23 [ocean convoy] was ‘very nearly’ put forward ‘as it was obviously close to a settlement’“ (ibid.).
103 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1162.Google Scholar
104 Ibid.
105 Churchill, , Thoughts and Adventures, p. 136 Google Scholar; Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. V, p. 19.Google Scholar
106 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1162.Google Scholar
107 Churchill, , Thoughts and Adventures, p. 136.Google Scholar
108 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. V, pp. 19–20.Google Scholar
109 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, pp. 1163–4.Google Scholar A memorandum, written by Admiral Jellicoe on April 27 at the moment he approved the convoy system, gives no indication that he expected any great amelioration or significant change in the shipping situation as a result of the new policy. See Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. V, pp. 21–5.Google Scholar
110 Admiral Jellicoe in later years added this postcript to his story: “It has frequently been erroneously stated that the Admiralty decision in this matter was the result of pressure brought to bear on the Admiralty from the War Cabinet and civilian quarters. Possibly this idea has arisen from the proceedings of the War Cabinet on April 25, but it is quite incorrect. The views of experienced naval officers on a technical question involving the gravest responsibility could not possibly be affected by outside opinion, however high the quarter from which that opinion emanated” (The Submarine Peril, pp. 130-1). Great and strange, indeed, are the coincidences in this capricious world!
111 Fayle, , Seaborne Trade, vol. III, pp. 137, 187–8, 465.Google Scholar
112 Ibid., vol. III, pp. 133-7.
113 Ibid., vol. III, p. 133.
114 Ibid., vol. III, pp. 132-6; infra, pp. 36-7.
115 Ibid., vol. III, pp. 132-4.
116 Supra, p. 18.
117 Supra, p. 23.
118 Colvin, , The Life of Lord Carson, vol. III, pp. 251–64.Google Scholar
119 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1170.Google Scholar
120 Ibid., vol. III, pp. 1170-80.
121 Sims, , The Victory at Sea, pp. 219–20.Google Scholar
122 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, pp. 1177–80.Google Scholar
123 Ibid., vol. III, p. 1180.
124 Aikin, Charles, “The British Bureaucracy and the Origins of Parliamentary Policy” (American Political Science Review, vol. XXXIII, 02, 1939, p. 39).Google Scholar
125 Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, p. 157.Google Scholar
126 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 133-6; George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 171–3, 180–8.Google Scholar
127 Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, p. 147.Google Scholar
128 Churchill, , Great Contemporaries, pp. 253–6.Google Scholar
129 Cf. Dawson, , “Winston S. Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911-15,” pp. 325–9.Google Scholar
130 Sir Henry Wilson's diary will furnish innumerable illustrations; the pages are as smug and outspoken as they are revealing ( SirCallwell, C. E., Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, London, 1927).Google Scholar
131 The emergence of so extreme an iconoclast and individualist as Lord Fisher as head of the navy is not without its significance.
132 Churchill, , Thoughts and Adventures, pp. 130–1.Google Scholar
133 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1169.Google Scholar
134 Ibid., vol. III, pp. 1170-1.
135 Ibid., vol. III, p. 1171.
136 Ibid., vol. III, p. 1172. For early examples, see Edwards, J. H., David Lloyd George (New York, 1929), vol. I, pp. 290–1, 304–5.Google Scholar
137 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 150–61, 199–212 Google Scholar; vol. II, pp. 550-7; vol. Ill, pp. 1173-4. Cf. supra, p. 18n.
138 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. IV, p. 382.Google Scholar Admiral Sims later stated he had believed in convoys from the beginning (The Victory at Sea, p. 93).
139 ln the dispute over convoys the Ministers knew what they wanted to do, and they pressed their case against official opposition with whatever expert assistance they could muster. Mr. Lloyd George did the same thing later in the war when he asked the opinion of Lord French and Sir Henry Wilson in order to strengthen his argument against Sir Douglas Haig and Sir William Robertson ( George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. IV, London, 1934, p. 2367).Google Scholar The more difficult situation, which is not discussed here, is where the experts are evenly divided on a question, and the Minister must somehow decide between them.
140 Jellicoe, , The Submarine Peril, p. 36n.Google Scholar; Colvin, . The Life of Lord Carson, vol. III, p. 262.Google Scholar
141 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1172.Google Scholar
142 Supra, p. 22.
143 Newbolt, , Naval Operations, vol. V, p. 10.Google Scholar
144 American help undoubtedly enabled a much more extensive convoy system to be established. There seems, however, to be no doubt but that a very large part of the sailings could have been protected by the British forces without any American assistance of any kind. In the elaborate convoy service that was eventually set up the United States Navy apparently furnished over twenty-five per cent of the escorting ships. See Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. IV, p. 367 Google Scholar, and Sims, , The Victory at Sea, pp. 94–5.Google Scholar
145 Cf. Mr. Balfour's statement of this point ( Dugdale, , Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, pp. 237–8).Google Scholar
146 Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. III, pp. 113–14.Google Scholar Cf. ibid., vol. I, pp. 482-3; vol. II, pp. 118-19, 313-14.
147 The Times (London) 10 3, 1939.Google Scholar
148 Admiral Jellicoe, for example, quotes with approval Admiral Sims as saying: “We must keep in mind that at no time until the Armistice was signed was any escort force strong enough to ensure entire safety” ( Jellicoe, , The Submarine Peril, p. 116).Google Scholar How generous a margin “entire safety” would demand, would appear to be a difficult if not insoluble problem.
149 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1166.Google Scholar
150 Ibid., vol. III, p. 1167.
151 The quotation is not from Lord Jellicoe, but from the Official History, ( Fayle, , Seaborne Trade, vol. III, p. 132).Google Scholar
152 Ibid., vol. III, p. 137.
153 The destroyer force had been built up to this figure by the early spring of 1917 “although, of course, it fell far short of requirements in earlier months” ( Jellicoe, , The Crisis of the Naval War, p. 114).Google Scholar
154 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, pp. 1167–8.Google Scholar
155 It broke up, however, over a difference of opinion between the First Lord and the First Sea Lord (cf. Dawson, , “Winston S. Churchill at the Admiralty,” pp. 344–56).Google Scholar
156 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. III, p. 1169.Google Scholar