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The Compensation of Wrongful Pregnancy in Québec Civil Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

Louise Langevin
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, Laval University

Abstract

The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the right to reproductive autonomy for women based on the right to liberty protected by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, it is a woman's choice whether to have children. It follows, therefore, that in the case of a violation of her reproductive autonomy, a woman has a right to compensation. It is in light of these principles that I analyze the wrongful pregnancy cases in Québec civil law. From a feminist analytical framework, I posit that Québec courts have effectively denied women the right to reproductive autonomy by awarding compensation for the cost of child-rearing only in cases where a difficult economic situation is evidenced by the parents. In so doing, the courts have not only refused to fully compensate women for the injuries caused to them, but they continue to reproduce the dominant pronatalist ideology in reproductive matters. This judicial reaction to cases of wrongful pregnancy is another example of the gendered dimension of law.

Résumé

La Cour suprême du Canada a reconnu le droit à l'autonomie de reproduction des femmes, fondé sur le droit à la liberté protégé par l'article 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. Les femmes peuvent donc décider d'avoir des enfants ou de ne pas en avoir. Et en cas d'atteinte illicite à son droit à l'autonomie de reproduction, une femme a droit à réparation. C'est à la lumière de ces principes que nous analysons la problématique de la «grossesse préjudice» en droit civil québécois. À partir d'un cadre théorique féministe, nous désirons démontrer que la position des tribunaux québécois sur cette question nie le droit à l'autonomie de reproduction des femmes, en accordant une compensation pour les frais d'entretien de l'enfant seulement en cas de situation économique difficile des parents. En fait, les tribunaux refusent de reconnaître un préjudice causé aux femmes et ils reproduisent l'idéologie pronataliste du groupe dominant en matière de procréation. Bref, la réponse des tribunaux à la problématique de la «grossesse préjudice» constitue un autre exemple du caractère genre du droit.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 1999

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References

1. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule В to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982, C 11 [hereinafter Canadian Charter].

2. Many expressions are used in this area: wrongful birth, wrongful pregnancy, wrongful conception. I use the expression “wrongful pregnancy” to describe the action for damages, instituted by a woman or a man, for failed sterilization or failed abortion and the birth of an unplanned healthy, or unhealthy, child.

3. By a feminist analytical framework, I mean the approach that denounces women's oppression by law and that deconstructs the traditional juridical concepts and reconstructs them, taking into account women's experiences. See Réaume, Denise G., “What's Distinctive About Feminist Analysis of Law? A Conceptual Analysis of Women's Exclusion from Law” (1996) 2 Legal Theory 265.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler]. Chief Justice Dickson, with whom Justice Lamer concurs, and Justice Beetz, with whom Justice Estey concurs, and Justice Wilson write reasons for the majority. Justice Mclntyre, with whom Justice La Forest concurs, dissidents. Many scholars have commentated upon this major decision. See, for example, Gavigan, Shelley A. M., “Morgentaler and Beyond: Abortion, Reproduction and the Courts” in Brodie, Janine, Gavigan, Shelley A. M. & Jenson, Jane, eds., The Politics of Abortion (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992) 117.Google Scholar On the historical background of abortion in Canada, see Mollie Dunsmuir, “Abortion: Constitutional and Legal Developments”, Current Issue Review, No 89–10E, Canada, Library of Parliament, Research Branch, Law and Government Division, 1993.

5. Bill C-43, which recriminalized abortion, was rejected by the Canadian Senate on 31 January 1991. Subsequently, the Conservative government of the time decided not to legislate in that area.

6. No hospitals or clinics do abortions in Prince Edward Island. See Sarick, Lila, “Women Face Varying Rules on Abortion”, The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (29 January 1998) A4.Google Scholar

7. Supra note 4.

8. Supra note 4 at 173.

9. Supra note 4 at 179.

10. On this topic, see Overall, Christine, “Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Reproductive Rights in Canada” in Backhouse, Constance & Flaherty, David H., eds., Challenging Times, the Women's Movement in Canada and the United States (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992) 240.Google Scholar Does this right also include the right to have access to medical treatments against infertility? See Philippas v. Kraft General Foods Canada inc., [1997] J.T.D.P.Q. No 8 (Q.L.). In this case of the Québec Human Rights Tribunal, the employer refused to reimburse, under the private health insurance plan, the employee for the costs of the treatments against infertility she underwent. She argued that her liberty of religion and her right to reproductive autonomy were violated. The judge refused to recognize a right to reproductive autonomy under the Québec Charter or that her freedom of religion was violated. See Ryan, Maura A., “The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist Critique” (1990) Hastings Center Report 6.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

11. Morgentaler, supra note 4 at 172.

12. See, for example, Suite v. Cooke, [1995] R.J.Q. 2765 (Qué. CA.); Kealey et al. v. Berezowski et al. (1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 708 (Gen. Div. Ont.) [hereinafter Berezowski]; R. H. v. Hunter, [1996] O.J. No 4477 (Gen. Div. Ont.).

13. R.S.Q., C. C-12 [hereinafter Québec Charter].

14. Supra note 4.

15. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530, rev'ing [1989] R.J.Q. 1980 (Qué. S.C.), [1989] R.J.Q. 1735 (Qué. C.A.) [hereinafter Daigle]. Among the commentaries published on this decision, see Greschner, Donna, “Abortion and Democracy for Women: A Critique of Tremblay v. Daigle” (1990) 35 McGill L.J. 633.Google Scholar

16. However, if the child is born alive, he may sue his mother for damages suffered while he was a foetus. See Dobson (Litigation guardian of) v. Dobson, [1997] A.N.B. No 232 (N.B.C.A.). In this case, the damages were suffered in a car accident. Permission to appeal granted by the Supreme Court of Canada, No 26152 (20 November 1997).

17. [1997] A.C.S. No 96 (Q.L.).

18. (1996), 138 D.L.R. (4th) 238 (Man. Q.B.).

19. (1996), 138 D.L.R. (4th) 254 (Man.C.A.).

20. Supra, note 15.

21. See Des Rosiers, Nathalie, “La Responsabilité de la mère pour le préjudice causé par son enfant” (1995) 36 C. de D. 61Google Scholar; Ministère de la Justice, Rapport du groupe de travail fédéral-provincial-territorial des procureurs généraux sur l'égalité des sexes dans le système de justice au Canada, ministre de la Justice, avril 1992, p. 52. See also Parti pris contre les femmes dans le droit positif (Saskatchewan-Ile du Prince Edouard), document d'information, (April 1992 at 29 ff.; Cooper-Stephenson, Ken, “Past Inequities and Future Promise: Judicial Neutrality in Charter Constitutional Tort Claims” in Martin, Sheilah L. & Mahoney, Kathleen E., eds., Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 226Google Scholar; Cassels, Jamie, “Damages for Lost Earnings Capacity: Women and Children Last!” (1992) 71 Can. Bar. Rev. 445Google Scholar; Ellen Picard, “Women and Medical Malpractice” in Martin & Mahoney, eds., ibid. 248; Gibson, Elaine, “Identifying Gender Bias in Personal Injury Compensation” in Broekman, Joan & Chunn, Dorothy, eds., Investigating Gender Bias, Law, Courts, and the Legal Profession (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1993) 87.Google Scholar For American studies on this topic, see Bender, Leslie, “An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship” (1993) 78 Cornell L. Rev. 575Google Scholar; “A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort” (1988) 38 J. of Legal Educ. 3; “Changing the Values in Tort Law” (1990) 25 Tulsa L. Rev. 759; Finley, Lucinda M., “A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course” (1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 41Google Scholar; Scales, Ann C., “Feminists in the Field of Time” (1990) 42 Rorida L. Rev. 95.Google Scholar

22. Cooke v. Suite, [1995] R.J.Q. 2765 (Qué. CA.) [hereinafter Cooke].

23. [1993] R.J.Q. 514 [hereinafter Suite]. The Québec Superior Court has already rendered judgments on this question: Cataford v. Moreau, [1978] C.S. 933 [hereinafter Cataford]; Desforges v. Dessureault, C.S., 700–05–000291–876, July 20 1992; Engstrom v. Courteau, [1986] R.J.Q. 3048 (Qué. S.C.); Faucher-Grenier v. Laurence, [1987] R.J.Q. 1109 (Qué. S.C.) [hereinafter Faucher].

24. Kealey et al., supra note 12. In this case, the court admits the principle of compensation for the rearing costs of a child born because of medical malpratice. But in this particular case, the court refuses to compensate the parents for such damages, because they can financially afford to have another child. The judge awards $40, 000 to the parents for their personal damages. It is interesting to note that the judge cites with approval Québec jurisprudence on the topic, such as Suite v. Cooke, supra note 23. It is one of the rare Québec civil law cases that is used by a Canadian common law court. Even if the common law system is based on judge-made decisions and the legal principles of the civil law system are to be found in the Civil Code, it is interesting to note that the two systems refer to public order rules to either compensate or to refuse to compensate. Other Canadian courts have awarded compensation for the rearing costs of the child: Fredette v. Wiebe (1986), 73 C.C.L.T. 106 (B.C.S.C); Cherry v. Borsman (1991), 5 C.C.L.T. (2d) 243 (B.C.S.C). Some others have refused: Doiron v. Orr (1978), 86 D.L.R. (3d) 719 (Ont. H.C.J.) [hereinafter Doiron]; Bickenbach, J. E., “Damages for Wrongful Conception: Doiron v. Orr” (1980) 18 U.W.O.L.Rev. 493.Google Scholar See also Cryderman v. Ringrose, [1978] 3 W.W.R. 481 (Alta.CA.); Colp v. Ringrose, [1979] 3 L.M.Q. 72 (Alta. T. D.); Keats v. Pearce (1984), 48 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 103 (Nfld S.C). One decision grappled with the question of the right of the father to be compensated for the costs of raising a child born because of a failed abortion: Freeman v. Sutter, [1996] 4 W.W.R. 78 (Man. CA.), rev'ing [1995] 8 W.W.R. 511 (Man.Q.B.). For an award of compensation for the rearing costs of two children born handicapped because of a diagnostic error, see R.H. v. Hunter, supra note 12.

25. Section 5, Québec Charter, supra note 13.

26. Supra note 4.

27. Cataford, supra note 23.

28. Ibid.

29. The first American decision to apply this rule is Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). For an analysis of the case law on this matter, see Scheid, John H., “Benefits vs. Burdens: The Limitation of Damages in Wrongful Birth” (19841985) 23 J. Fam. L. 57.Google Scholar

30. Suite, supra note 23 at 526.

31. Ibid.

32. She obtained $500 for medical costs, costs incurred to visit the doctor and maternity clothing. The smallness of this amount may be explained by the absence of evidence. She was also awarded $8, 000 for loss of salary while on maternity leave; $5, 000 for loss of enjoyment of life, pain while giving birth and moral and psychological pain caused by the birth of a fourth child.

33. Cooke, supra note 22 at 2781 [translation].

34. Ibid. at. 2782.

35. Ibid. at 2768 [translation].

36. Supra note 4.

37. Ibid.

38. Cooke, supra note 22 at 2768 [translation].

39. In the Ontario case of Berezowski, supra note 12 at 740, the judge would have applied the rule of the minimization of the damage if the parents had chosen the sterilization for economic reasons. In fact, the judge says that Mrs. Kealey had decided not to undergo an abortion and that it was her decision to keep the child.

40. Supra note 4.

41. Ibid.

42. On the limitation role of the causal link, see International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. XI, Torts, part I, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) at 66. no 105.

43. Cooke, supra note 22 at 2742 [translation].

44. Gauthier, Anne H., “Des enfants, mais à quel prix?” in Dénatalité, des solutions, Colloque international sur les politiques familiales organisé par le Conseil des affaires sociales avec la collaboration du Secrétariat à la famille et du Bureau de la statistique du Québec (Québec: Publications du Québec, 1988) at 125.Google Scholar

45. This is the average cost of a child in 1992 dollars. See Duchesne, V., “Élever un enfant: une entreprise coûteuseLe Soleil (7 January 1996) B1.Google Scholar It may cost up to $150,000 to rear a child up to the age of 18, according to the Ministry of Agriculture of Manitoba, taking the average price of goods and the day care costs in Winnipeg in 1992. See L'Institut Vanier de la Famille, Profil des familles canadiennes, Ottawa, 1994.Google Scholar According to the economist Anne Gauthier, “the higher the standard of living of the family, the more expensive it costs to rear a child. However, the economic burden of a first child is heavier on low revenue families. On the 18 years that the child is dependant upon his parents, he represents the costs of six years of revenue for low revenue families, compared to four for families with a higher revenue. In fact, a family puts between 20% and 25% of its revenue towards the upbringing of a first child. This is an average, because the cost depends on the age of the child. The cost is lower when the child is younger and multiplied by 3 when the child is 16–17 years old.” Ibid. at 128 [translation]. On the evaluation of the costs and avantages of a child for his parents, see Bruce, C., “Measure of Damages for the Wrongful Death of a Child” (1987), 66 Can. Bar Rev. 344.Google Scholar

46. One can imagine the evaluation problems that lie ahead: in addition to the evaluation of the rearing costs of the child, which might include education fees up to the university level, we can add the problems in determining the value of the domestic tasks of the mother, her loss of revenue in case of maternity leave, the loss of career opportunities, the use of statistics on salaries based on sex, and so on.

47. See, for example, Donaldson, Russell G., “Recoverability of Cost of Raising Normal, Healthy Child Born as Result of Physician's Negligence or Breach of Contract or Warranty” (1991) 89 ALR 4th 632.Google Scholar

48. Cooke, supra note 22 at 2782 [translation].

49. In those cases, the couples could be awarded damages for the pain and suffering during the pregnancy.

50. Supra note 4 at 171. “I would conclude, therefore, that the right to liberty contained in s. 7 guarantees to every individual a degree of personal autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting their private lives.” See Boivin, Michelle, “Les acquis du féminisme en droit: reconceptualisation de la représentation des femmes et de leur place dans la société canadienne” (1995) 36 C. de D. 27 at 50 ff.Google Scholar

51. Supra note 4 at 171–72.

52. See the opinion of Justice Viens, [1989] R.J.Q. 1980 (Qué. S.C.), and the ones of Justices Bernier, Nichols and LeBel, [1989] R.J.Q. 1735 (Qué. C.A.).

53. [Translation] Cass. civ.lre, 25 June 1991, Bull. civ. 1, no 213; D.1991.566, Annot. Philippe Le Tourneau. For an example of an action instituted following the failure of a tubai ligation, see Madame M … v. Hospices civils de Colmar, Trib. Admin. Strasbourg, 21 April 1994, (1994), 6 Revue du droit public 1837.

54. See Jourdain, P., “Obligations et contrats spéciaux” (1991) 90 R. tri. dr. civ. 753–56.Google Scholar

55. Doiron, supra note 24 at 723.

56. On the manifestations of pronatalism at the beginning of the 60s, see Hollingworth, Leta S., “Social Devices for Impelling Women to Bear and Rear Children” in Peck, Ellen & Senderowitz, Judith, eds., Pronatalism, The Myth of Mom & Apple Pie (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1974) 19Google Scholar; Judith Blake, “Coercive Pronatalism and American Population Policy” in Peck & Senderowitz, dir., ibid. 29.

57. According to a study by the United Nations Fund for the population, there are 45 million abortions in the world every year. France-Presse, Agence, “Six Milliards de Terriens en l'an 2000Le Devoir (29 May 1997) A7.Google Scholar

58. In a survey done by La Gazette des femmes in September 1996, the women interviewed answered that the family was the second most important element in their lives after love. See Conseil du Statut de la femme, La Gazette des femmes (Québec: September-October 1996) 12.

59. Berezowski, supra note 12.

60. Suite, supra note 23 at 1110 [translation].

61. Firestone, Shulamith, The Dialetic of Sex (New York: Bantam, 1971).Google Scholar

62. See Descarries, Francine, “Maternité et technologie de la reproduction humaine: une réalité éclatée” in Sortir la maternité du laboratoire, Actes du forum international sur les nouvelles technologies de reproduction (Montréal: Conseil du statut de la femme, 1987) 60.Google Scholar

63. Faucher, supra note 23.

64. Supra note 12.

65. “In short, the love, companionship, affection and joy which a child brings is thought to so outweigh the burdens that we shudder at the thought that the law could be so foolish as to regard this as a compensable” Ibid. at 12, 732.

66. Ibid. at 732.

67. Suite, supra note 23.

68. Ibid. at 526.

69. Supra note 12.

70. Ibid. at 733.

71. See Gimenez, Martha E., “Feminism, Pronatalism and Motherhood” in Trebilcot, Joyce, eds., Mothering Essays in Feminist Theory (New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984) 287.Google Scholar

72. Supra note 22.

73. Supra note 12.

74. Coote, supra note 22 at 2781.