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On the Speculative Nature of Our Self Conception: A Reply to Some Criticisms
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Extract
I must begin by thanking the editors for offering me the opportunity to respond to two of the other papers in this collection: ‘A Materialist's Misgivings about Eliminative Materialism,’ by Jeff Foss; and ‘Sensation, Theory, and Meaning,’ by Bonnie Thurston and Sam Coval. In some earlier publications I have defended eliminative materialism at some length (1981, 1984), and in others I have argued that the semantics of common observation terms is exhausted by their inferential or conceptual role, to the exclusion of any purely phenomenological component (1975, 1979). Foss criticizes the first thesis; Thurston and Coval, the second. I propose to defend both.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 11: New Essays in Philosophy of Mind Series II , 1985 , pp. 157 - 173
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Authors 1985