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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
‘When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. … Consciousness … is inseparable from thinking, and essential to it. …’
John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (II, 27)
‘Psycho-analysis … cannot accept the identity of the conscious and the mental. It defines what is mental as processes such as feeling, thinking and … willing. … ’
Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis (Lecture 1 ).
In this paper I shall provide a novel version of a traditional epistemic criterion for distinguishing mental entities from nonmental ones, and defend it from likely sorts of objections. By the phrase ‘criterion of the mental’ I mean a set of conditions which is necessary and sufficient for an entity's being mental (or psychological).
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