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Assertion and transparent self-knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Eric Marcus  and
John Schwenkler
Eric Marcus*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Auburn University, Birmingham, AL, USA
John Schwenkler
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
*
Eric Marcus marcuea@auburn.eduPhilosophy Department, Auburn University
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Abstract

We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one asserts is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm ‘Assert that p only if you believe that p’. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one's own doxastic states. It is, as we put it, transparent rather than empirical self-knowledge.

Keywords

AssertionBeliefSelf-KnowledgeTransparency
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 7 , November 2019 , pp. 873 - 889
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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