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The conclusion of practical reasoning: the shadow between idea and act

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sarah K. Paul
Sarah K. Paul*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706, USA
*
*Email: skpaul@wisc.edu
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Abstract

There is a puzzle about how to understand the conclusion of a successful instance of practical reasoning. Do the considerations adduced in reasoning rationalize the particular doing of an action, as Aristotle is sometimes interpreted as claiming? Or does reasoning conclude in the formation of an attitude – an intention, say – that has an action-type as its content? This paper attempts to clarify what is at stake in that debate and defends the latter view against some of its critics.

Keywords

practical reasoningintentionaction
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 3 , 2013 , pp. 287 - 302
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2013

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