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Ethical intuitionism and the linguistic analogy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Philipp Schwind Open the ORCID record for Philipp Schwind [Opens in a new window]
Philipp Schwind*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Centre for Ethics of the University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
*
Email: philipp.schwind@philos.uzh.ch
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Abstract

It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral theory should reflect the convictions of mature moral agents. Hence, intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-considered moral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists offer an empirically adequate account of our moral obligations. I do this by applying recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on the idea of a universal moral grammar to a number of claims implicit in W. D. Ross’s normative theory. I argue that the results at least partly vindicate intuitionism.

Keywords

Ethical intuitionismW. D. RosslinguisticsJohn Rawlsmoral psychology
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , 2018 , pp. 292 - 311
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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