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Forgiveness1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

H. J. N. Horsbrugh
H. J. N. Horsbrugh*
Affiliation:
University of Victoria
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Extract

There appear to be a number of general things which can be said about forgiveness. If these are left sufficiently vague they seem to be applicable to all the situations in which the term is used.

First, there can be no question of forgiveness unless an injury has been inflicted on somebody by a moral agent. There must be something to forgive; and the injury that is to be forgiven must be one for which a moral agent can be held responsible. One cannot forgive a rock for falling on one's foot or a cougar for attacking one's child—even though a child might kick the rock and a father might shoot the cougar.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , December 1974 , pp. 269 - 282
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1974

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Footnotes

1

The first section of this paper owes a great deal to Professor Downie'sR. S. article, “Forgiveness,” The Philosophical Quarterly (1965).

References

2 This requires to be slightly amended to cover all the situations connected with self-forgiveness. See Section IV.

3 I am not even prepared to concede that ‘I forgive you’ is sometimes used performatively since the uttering of these words never of itself constitutes forgiveness. If they are accompanied by a decision to forgive and by a spontaneous reversal of feeling such as often disposes of a quarrel between old friends I should agree that someone has been forgiven. But this would be true even if the words remained unuttered.

4 I do not intend to argue for this position. But I think it follows from my view of forgiveness-unless one chooses to deny that one ought to have an attitude of good-will towards all other moral agents.

5 If it is objected that God, as an infinite being, is not subject to injury, I must point out that I am simply considering what is implied by the orthodox Christian doctrine of a forgiving Heavenly Father. Hence, there is no need for me to meet this objection-although, in fact, I think it can be met.