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Identity and Necessary Similarity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Raja Bahlul
Raja Bahlul*
Affiliation:
Indiana University-Purdue University, at Indianapolis, IndianapolisIN 46202, USA
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Extract

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PH), commonly attributed to Leibniz, has given rise to much discussion and debate. Thus philosophers have argued over how it should be formulated, whether it is (necessarily) true, and what, if any, metaphysical consequences it has.

It is not my intention to add to these discussions here, having done so elsewhere. Rather, I intend to introduce and defend a closely related principle which I shall, for want of a better name, refer to as The Principle of the Identity of Necessary Similarity’ (PINS).

In section II, I briefly recapitulate some of the distinctions and other relevant points which are customarily made in connection with (PH). This is all too familiar material, but it is necessary in order to provide a general framework of concepts in terms of which we can discuss (PINS) in an intelligible fashion.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , December 1992 , pp. 531 - 546
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1992

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References

1 Bahlul, R. ‘Ockham’s Razor and the Identity of Indiscernibles,’ Philosophy Research Archives 14 (1988-89) 405-14CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2nd ed., Loemker, L.E. ed. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1969), 308Google Scholar

3 Adams refers to all such properties, simple and complex, as ‘suchnesses.’ See Adams, R. ‘Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,’ Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), 8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 See, for example, Armstrong, D.M. Nominalism and Realism, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978), 94Google Scholar; and Loux, M. Substance and Attribute (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1978), 133.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 See, for example, Cortes, A. ‘Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles: A False Principle,’ Philosophy of Science 43 (1976) 491-505CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and French, S. ‘Why the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is not Contingently True Either,’ Synthese 78 (1989) 141-66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Dummett, M. Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth 1973)Google Scholar

7 Van Fraassen, B. Introduction to the Philosophy of Space and Time (New York: Random House 1970)Google Scholar

8 Hacking, I. ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles,’ Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975) 249-56CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 McTaggart, J. The Nature of Existence, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1921), 101Google Scholar

10 This is the classical example used by Max Black to argue for the idea that (PII) is not a necessarily true principle. See Black, M. ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles,’ Mind 61 (1952) 152-63.Google Scholar

11 Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1980), 3Google Scholar

12 Hughes, G.E. and Cresswell, M.J. An Introduction to Modal Logic (London: Methuen 1968), 190Google Scholar

13 This is known as ‘Brouwer’s axiom.’ See Hughes & Cresswell, 57, where this axiom is briefly explained.

14 Thus Kripke says that necessary identity is a ‘self-evident [thesis] of philosophical logic independent of natural language’ (4).

15 I would like to thank my former teacher, Prof. Romane Clark, and anonymous referees of this journal for many helpful comments and suggestions.