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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Austin's lecture on this topic contributes little to the problem of freedom of the will, and so in my discussion of his ideas I shall stop short of the difficult part of that problem. His most important positive suggestion is that hypotheticals should be divided into two classes, conditionals and pseudo-conditionals. He claims that neglect of this distinction has been the cause of mistakes in certain forms of the dispositional analysis of the statement that an agent could have acted otherwise, and he then goes on to criticise all forms of that analysis using arguments which do not depend on the difference between the two kinds of hypothetical.
This discussion will be in two parts. In the first I shall take up Austin's distinction between conditionals and pseudos and criticise it and develop it at length, because it seems to me to be the most important thing in his lecture. Since I shall not have space for comment on fortuitous errors made by defenders of the dispositional analysis of the claim that an agent could have acted otherwise, I shall concentrate on the essential features of that analysis.
1 “An Empirical Disproof of Determinism” in Freedom and Determinism ed. Lehrer, K. Random House, 1966.Google Scholar
2 Philosophical Papers, Oxford, 1961, p. 157. All references to Austin's British Academy lecture “Ifs and Cans” (1956) will be to this reprint in Philosophical Papers.
3 Loc. cit. p. 157.
4 Chisholm, R. emphasises this possibility in a different context in Review of ‘Philosophical Papers’, Mind 1964Google Scholar, part of which is reprinted in Free Will and Determinism, ed. 8. Berofsky, Harper & Row, 1966.
5 M. R. Ayers discusses examples of this kind in The Refutation of Determinism, Methuen, 1968, Ch. V. Though my treatment of them differs from his, I agree with his idea that Austin's concept of a pseudo ought somehow to be applicable to this kind of example too.
6 This point was made by Richard Malpas in discussion.
7 Norman Dahl pointed out in discussion the importance of this difference between verbs of action in the investigation of the logic of pseudos.
8 Loc. cit.
9 As far as I know, this suggestion about pseudos in which “can” is the main verb was first made by Locke, Don in “ifs and Cans Revisited”, Philosophy 1962CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. M. R. Ayers, loc. cit. p. 101.
10 See Grice, Paul: “The Causal Theory of Perception”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. VoL XXXV, 1961, pp. 126–132 for an early sketch of his theory.Google Scholar
11 See Part II for the discussion of Keith Lehrer's view that it might have this meaning.
12 M. R. Ayers argues that our choice between the two interpretations follows the line dividing the subject's intrinsic properties from its extrinsic properties (loc. cit. Ch. V). But context also seems to exert an influence, and even, in some cases, to help us to answer the question, which properties of the subject should be treated as basic.
13 This sentence means that he had the capacity, and that if he had also had the opportunity nothing would have prevented him from taking the trick. But it could convey this message in either of two ways. Nowell-Smith suggests one of them in “Ifs and Cans” (Theoria 1960, reprinted in Berfosky, loc. cit. See pp. 325-6): he takes the main verb to mean “nothing would have prevented him”, and then the hypothetical is inevitably interpreted as a conditional. However, if it is not contradictory to treat “nothing prevented him” (i.e. ‘all-in could’) as an operator with a subordinate conditional in its scope—and I suppose that it is not contradictory—it would be possible to interpret the main verb as “nothing prevented him”, and the rest of the sentence as a subordinate conditional, “from, if he had been leading, taking the trick”. The sentence would then be a pseudo. (This treatment depends, of course, on the validity of the theory of subordinate conditionals.) Austin interprets the sentence as a pseudo, but in a more natural way than this, because he takes the main verb to mean “he had the capacity” (loc. cit. pp. 177-B). All these interpretations are viable, but Austin's needs some refinement, because he needs to explain the implication of the complementary phrase “have taken”.
14 Austin, loc. cit. p. 168 footnote 2.
15 See G. Anscombe Intention, Blackwell, 1957, passim, and Kenny, A. Action, Emotion and Will, Kegan Paul, 1961Google Scholar, Ch. XI.
16 See R. Chisholm, loc. cit., p. 343.
17 Loc. cit. p. 160. He calls them “loose-jointed”.
18 Loc. cit. p. 160.
19 This explanation is adopted by Honore, A. M. in “Can and Can't”, Mind 1964CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and by Thalberg, I. in “Austin on Ability” in Symposium on J. L. Austin, ed. Fann, K. T. Routledge, 1969.Google Scholar
20 This difficulty was pointed out by Paul Grice in discussion.
21 A simpler theory would be preferable, if it fitted all the facts. But I cannot think of one.
22 This general thesis runs up against some difficult cases, which will be discussed in Part II.
