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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Some philosophers hold that there are nonmoral reasons that can be used to justify being moral and that these are “in a certain way” more fundamental than moral reasons. Presumably these reasons could also be given in some circumstances for not being moral, although this is not clear. Moral reasons, in this view, might be overriding “on the level of everyday life,” but not “at the most fundamental level.” I take this to mean that should there be a conflict between the moral “reasons of everyday life” and those that are “most fundamental” the former must give way, and I take it to mean that the “most fundamental” reasons support the everyday ones and that the latter would collapse without their support. I wish to argue, against this view, that the question “Why should I be moral?” is confused in that it requests a justification where none can be given without radically altering the logic of the discourse that is “supported.”
1 For example, Snare, Frank “Can a Moral Man Raise the Question,‘ Should I be Moral?’” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1975), pp. 499–507.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In a reply to this essay, Pritchard, Michael S. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1976),CrossRefGoogle Scholar argues that Snare has not shown a non-moral justification to be necessary. Neither of them investigates the possibility that justifying moral principles introduces an incoherence into moral discourse.
2 Cf. Melden, A.l. “Utility and Moral Reasoning,” in Ethics and Society, ed. DeGeorge, R.T. (New York, y), p. 180;Google Scholar and Wittgenstein, Ludwig On Certainty (Oxford, 1969), par. 496f.Google Scholar For an examination of the claim that morality requires God's existence and support and would rest on a mistake if there were no God, see Mayberry, T. “God and Moral Authority,” The Monist 54 (1970), pp. 106-23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 Morality is obviously not a game, but the game analogy is useful for bringing out certain of its aspects that have to do with teaching and learning and learning and understanding. For a discussion of the game analogy and other analogues of morality, see Mayberry, T. “Morality and Its Analogues,” Mind 80 (1971), pp. 365-78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 For a discussion of how this might be done see Mayberry, T. “Morality and justification,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 6 (1968), pp. 205-14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 496f.
6 Cf. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 82.
7 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 139.
8 The importance of exemplary individuals is also clear. Remember Stephen Spender's poem:
I think continually of those who were truly great.
Who, from the womb, remembered the soul's history
Who wore at their hearts the fire's center.
Born of the sun they travelled a short while towards the sun,
And left the vivid air signed with their honour.
9 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 110, 150, 204, 253, 559, 612.
10 The most direct appeal to self-interest is the appeal to force. If we despair of success with other appeals we may resort to this. For example, Malcolm X, despairing of appeals to moral principles that some civil rights groups directed to racists, said, “If he [the racist] only understands the language of a rifle, get a rifle. If he only understands the language of a rope, get a rope. But don't waste time talking the wrong language to a man if you really want to communicate with him.” Quoted in I.F. Stone, “The Pilgrimage of Malcolm X,” The New York Review of Books, November 11, 1965.
11 “Bahamian government spokesman, on the execution of an American who confessed to murder: ‘If we didn't hang people occasionally, the society would fall apart.’ ” The Toledo Blade, October 24, 1976.
12 By ‘non-existent’ I intend someone who, for example, believes the principle prohibiting harm to others has no application; by ‘limited’ someone who believes it applies only to a limited group.
13 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 200.
14 Melden, A.I. Rights and Right Conduct (Oxford, 1959), pp. 39ffGoogle Scholar.
15 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 230.
16 Ibid., p. 223.
17 Ibid ., p. 226.
18 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 25.
19 I wish to thank the Editors of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.