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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
I want to attempt to analyze a forgotten area in the philosophy of emotions, the relations between physiological changes and the emotions. I want to do this:
(1) by first of all briefly setting out some distinctions necessary to the understanding of the position I will be arguing for,
(2) then by trying to elucidate what exactly is to be understood by the term ‘physiological change’ in the context of an emotion,
(3) by showing that particular physiological changes are not part of the concept of any particular emotion and are only linked causally to the cognitive-appetitive part of an occurrent emotional state (the description of which part, forms the concept of that particular emotion),
(4) by showing, however, that the notion of a physiological change is part of the concept of an emotional state,
(5) and, finally, by drawing out some consequences of this analysis.
* I would like to thank Professors Terence Penelhum and les Holborow for their help in developing the main points of this article.
1 Though I differ on a number of points from Pitcher, I should acknowledge my indebtedness, as regards the matter of occurrent and dispositional uses of emotion terms, to a section of his article ‘Emotion’ in Mind Vol. 74, July 1965, pp. 331–332.Google Scholar
2 For reasons which it would be too difficult to set out briefly in this article, I make use of a distinction between an evaluation (a rational rating) and an appraisal (an arational rating) in the cognitive aspects of emotions. Some emotions seem to include an evaluation, others an appraisal.
3 Though I make the above distinction (between material and intensional object) in a way that differs from Miss Anscombe's, all the stimulus came from a section of her article ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’ in Analytical Philosophy 2nd Series, edit. Butler, R. J. (Oxford, Blackwells, 1965), pp. 158ff.Google Scholar
4 Cf. for example, Alston, ‘Emotion and Feeling’ Encyclopedia of Philosophy edit. Edwards, P. Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1967; Vol. 2, pp. 481ff.Google Scholar
5 Op. cit. in the Psychiatric Quarterly Vol. 41, 1967, p. 488.
6 For example:
Ryle, –The Concept of Mind Hutchinson, London, 1949Google Scholar; Ch. IV, sections (2) and (5); and ‘Feelings’ in The Philos. Quarterly April 1951;
Kenny, —Action,Emotion and Will London, Routledge & Kegal Paul, 1963Google Scholar, Ch. III; Pitcher, in ‘Emotion’ Mind Vol. 74, 1965Google Scholar; Alston, in ‘Emotion and Feeling’ Encyclop.of Philos. edit. Edwards, Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1967. Vol. 2.Google Scholar
7 For example, Arnold, Magda in Emotion and PersonalityVol. I, New York, Columbia University Press and Cassell & Co., 1960, p. 179Google Scholar; Kenny, Anthony also appears to hold this view in Action, Emotion and Will London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, p. 98.Google Scholar
8 Psychological Review Vol. 69, Sept. 1962, p. 379.
9 Ibid., p. 397.
10 ‘A Systematic Classification of the Phenomenology of Emotions’, pp. 488–489.
11 Op. cit., p. 485-Regarding this argument, I would like to suggest that one sense of ‘startled reaction’ (reacting with alarm at something apprehended and evaluated) is more akin to an emotion than to a stomach upset.
12 Op. cit., pp. 395–396.
13 From ‘Contribution à l'étude de l'action émotive de l'adrénaline’, Revue Française d'Endocrinogie, No.2, 1924, pp. 301–325.
14 Op. cit., pp. 395–396.
15 Op. cit., p. 105.
16 Op. cit., pp. 382 and 396.
17 Op. cit., p. 38.
18 Ibid., p. 39.
19 For a fully argued version of this claim, the reader should consult Ryle–The Concept of Mind Ch. IV, pp. 83ff., and Kenny–Action, Emotion and Will Ch. Ill., pp. 52ff.
20 For example, Bruce Aune in ‘Feelings, Moods and Introspection’ Mind April 1963, p. 198.
21 In ‘Seeing and Hearing Emotions’ Analysis Vol. 26, 1965–1966, Moreland Perkins puts forward literary examples which shows that we speak of seeing emotions but not why we do so.
