Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-4rdpn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-05T07:23:00.429Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Reactive attitudes and personal relationships

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Per-Erik Milam*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

Abstract

Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim (a) that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others’ attitudes and actions regarding her, and (b) that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I dispute both claims and argue that this objection exaggerates the role of the reactive attitudes and underestimates the importance of non-reactive moral emotions.

Type
Distinguished Lecture
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. 1923. On Old Age. On Friendship. On Divination.. Translated by Falconer, W. A.. Cambridge: Harvard UP.Google Scholar
Dressler, Joshua. 2006. “Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections.” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 3: 457472.Google Scholar
Fehr, Beverley. 2004. “Intimacy Expectations in Same-Sex Friendships: A Prototype Interaction-Pattern Model.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86(2): 265284.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Grayling, A. C. 2013. Friendship. New Haven, CT: Yale UP.Google Scholar
Hall, Jeffrey A. 2011. “Sex Differences in Friendship Expectations: A Meta-Analysis.” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 28(6): 723747.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, Immanuel. 1997. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Gregor, Mary. New York, NY: Cambridge UP.Google Scholar
Nichols, Shaun. 2007. “After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive Attitudes.” Philosophical Perspectives 21(1): 405428.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nichols, Shaun. 2015. Bound. New York: Oxford UP.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pereboom, Derk. 2001. Living without Free Will. New York: Cambridge UP.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pereboom, Derk. 2009. “Free Will, Love, and Anger.” Ideas y Valores 58: 169189.Google Scholar
Pereboom, Derk. 2014. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford: Oxford UP.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russell, Paul. 1992. “Strawson’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility.” Ethics 102(2): 287302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shabo, Seth. 2012a. “Incompatibilism and Personal Relationships: Another Look at Strawson’s Objective Attitude.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(1): 131147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shabo, Seth. 2012b. “Where Love and Resentment Meet: Strawson’s Intrapersonal Defense of Compatibilism.” Philosophical Review 121(1): 95124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sommers, Tamler. 2007. “The Objective Attitude.” The Philosophical Quarterly 57(228): 321341.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1962) 1982. “Freedom and Resentment.” In Free Will, edited by Watson, Gary, 5980. New York: Oxford UP.Google Scholar
Strawson, P. F. 1985. Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. London: Methuen and.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wallace, R. Jay. 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard UP.Google Scholar
Wolf, Susan. 1981. “The Importance of Free Will.” Mind 359: 386405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zarbatany, Lynne, Conley, Ryanne, and Pepper, Susan. 2004. “Personality and Gender Differences in Friendship Needs and Experiences in Preadolescence and Young Adulthood.” International Journal of Behavioral Development 28(4): 299310.CrossRefGoogle Scholar