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Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 November 2019

Jonathan Mitchell*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Manchester, United Kingdom

Abstract

This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions—specifically their normative dimension—while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences.

Type
Article
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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