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Actions, Products, and Truth-Bearers: A Critique of Twardowskian Accounts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2019

Silver Bronzo Open the ORCID record for Silver Bronzo [Opens in a new window]
Silver Bronzo*
Affiliation:
National Research University Higher School of Economics, School of Philosophy, Moscow, Russian Federation
*
Email: silver.bronzo@gmail.com
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Abstract

Friederike Moltmann has recently proposed an account of truth-bearers that draws on Kazimierz Twardowski’s action/product distinction. Her account is meant to provide a third way between the dominant view of primary truth-bearers as mind-independent entities and the recently revived construal of them as mental or linguistic acts. This paper argues that there is no room for Twardowskian accounts because they are based on a notion of “nonenduring product” that defies comprehension, and no need for them because the linguistic data that Twardowskians take to refute the act-theoretic approach can, in fact, be handled by that approach.

Keywords

Propositionstruth-bearersaction/product distinctionmental actsspeech actstruthTwardowskiMoltmann
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , April 2020 , pp. 297 - 312
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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