Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T04:54:03.380Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The idea of the self in the evolution of Hume’s account of the passions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jane McIntyre
Jane McIntyre*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Cleveland State University, 2121 Euclid Ave, Cleveland, OH44115, USA
*
*Email: jane.mcintyre@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Terence Penelhum has written extensively about the role of the idea of the self in Hume's account of the emotional and moral life of persons. Penelhum fails to notice, however, a change that takes place in the way that the idea of the self functions in Hume's account of the passions as that account evolved after the Treatise. This paper charts part of that evolution, and reflects on its significance for Hume's moral psychology.

Keywords

selfpassionscharactersympathysentiment of humanity
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 42 , Issue S1: Hume in Alberta: Selected Papers from the 2012 Hume Conference in Calgary , February 2012 , pp. 171 - 182
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

McIntyre, Jane L. 2005. “Hume's ‘New and Extraordinary’ Account of the Passions.” In The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise, edited by Saul, Traiger 199–215. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Google Scholar