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Inscrutability and Its Discontents

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 June 2020

Laura Schroeter  and
François Schroeter
Laura Schroeter*
Affiliation:
University of Melbourne, Philosophy Discipline, Melbourne, Australia
François Schroeter*
Affiliation:
University of Melbourne, Philosophy Discipline, Melbourne, Australia
*
Email: laura.schroeter@unimelb.edu.au; fschro@unimelb.edu.au
Email: laura.schroeter@unimelb.edu.au; fschro@unimelb.edu.au
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Abstract

Our main focus in this paper is Herman Cappelen’s claim, defended in Fixing Language, that reference is radically inscrutable. We argue that Cappelen’s inscrutability thesis should be rejected. We also highlight how rejecting inscrutability undermines Cappelen’s most radical conclusions about conceptual engineering. In addition, we raise a worry about his positive account of topic continuity through inquiry and debate.

Keywords

Cappelensemantic externalismmetasemanticsconceptual engineering
Type
Author meets critics
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 5 , July 2020 , pp. 566 - 579
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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