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Richmond Campbell Self-Love And Self-Respect: A Philosophical Study of Egoism (Ottawa: Canadian Library of Philosophy 1979). Pp. 335.

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Richmond Campbell Self-Love And Self-Respect: A Philosophical Study of Egoism (Ottawa: Canadian Library of Philosophy 1979). Pp. 335.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

George R. Carlson
George R. Carlson*
Affiliation:
University of the Witwatersrand
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Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , December 1982 , pp. 781 - 795
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

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References

1 Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1956) 289-303. Surprisingly, there is no reference in the text to this article.

2 ‘The Devil Is Not A Fool: Egoism Re-Visited,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 12 (1975) 327. This interesting piece is a reply to my own ‘Ethical Egoism Reconsidered,' American Philosophical Quarterly, 10 (1973) 25-33.

3 ‘In Defense of Egoism,’ in Gauthier, D.P. ed., Morality And Rational Self-Interest, (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall 1971) 64–87Google Scholar

4 cf. Gauthier, D.P. ‘The Impossibility of Rational Egoism,’ The Journal of Philosophy, 71 (1974) 442 and 456.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This watershed piece on the internal incoherence of egoism is ignored by Campbell.

5 Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1903). 70-1

6 Gauthier, 442

7 cf. my own ‘Plans, Expectations, And Act-Utilitarian Distrust.’ Philosophical Studies, 36 (1979) 295-300

8 Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2 (1972-73) 249-54

9 Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 5 (1975) 340-4. I have criticized some aspects of this important piece in my own ‘Weak Universal Egoism As A Non-Ethical Theory,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 8 (1978) 498-509.

10 Ibid., 340

11 Edward Regis, Jr., ‘What Is Ethical Egoism?', Ethics, 91 (1980) 59

12 cf. Dwyer, William ‘Criticisms of Egoism,’ Personalist, 56 (1975) 219Google Scholar

13 The following discussion parallels, but is different in important respects from, that contained in my ‘Beliefs, Wants, and Ethical Egoism; Philosophia, 9 (1979) 9-20.

14 Few authors have detailed, so well, the reasons why ‘gratification of desire’ may be irrational, as does Campbell (e.g. when it thwarts personal well-being and growth). As such, want satisfaction cannot, itself, serve as a viable standard of practical reason, and is subject to various tests of rationality, one of which is explored in the remainder.

15 Paton, H.J. The Moral Law (London: Hutchinson University library 1948), 67·8Google Scholar

16 Kalin, ‘Two Kinds of Moral Reasoning, etc.,’ 342Google Scholar and elsewhere

17 The allusion here to a desire to act rationally, as the other part of the source of A's pro-attitude, is needed to explain why A's belief, about what it is rational for any X to do, should become, for A, a motivating or exciting reason.

18 Hegel's Philosophy of Right, transl. by Knox, T.M. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1942) 89–90Google Scholar

19 cf. my own Wants And Rationality,’ Philosophical Papers, 10 (1981) 51-65