¹ The most recent Canadian example of this literature is Swinton, Katherine E., The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism (Toronto: Carswell, 1990), 8Google Scholar. Most general theories of judicial review are not without serious problems. See Tushnet, Mark, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; or Bakan, Joel, “Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy in Canadian Constitutional Thought,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 27 (1989), 123–93.Google Scholar

² Wheare, Kenneth C., Federal Government (4th ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 60–61Google Scholar. He writes that federal high courts “have exhibited a considerable impartiality in the exercise of their function as interpreters of the division of powers.” See also Duchacek, Ivo D., Comparative Federalism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 258.Google Scholar

³ Hogg, Peter W., “Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased in Constitutional Cases?” Canadian Bar Review 57 (1979), 721–39.Google Scholar

⁴ Stevenson, Garth, ed., Federalism in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989), 16Google Scholar; and Stevenson, Garth, Unfulfilled Union (Toronto: Gage, 1989), 66Google Scholar. The 1979 article by Peter Hogg (“Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased”) is reprinted in Stevenson's Federalism in Canada.

⁵ This theory of judicial review is also found in most general works on Canadian politics that consider federalism and the Supreme Court. Swinton, , The Supreme Court, 2 and 15Google Scholar; Brooks, Stephen, Public Policy in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989), 157Google Scholar; Russell, Peter H. et al. , Federalism and the Charter (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), 9Google Scholar; Russell, Peter H., The Judiciary in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987), 355Google Scholar; Gibbins, Roger, Conflict and Unity (Toronto: Methuen, 1985), 239Google Scholar; Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd ed.; Toronto: Carswell, 1985), 171Google Scholar; Russell, Peter H., “The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations,” Canadian Public Policy 11 (1985), 162–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mackay, A. Wayne and Bauman, Richard W., “The Supreme Court of Canada,” in Beckton, C. F. and Mackay, A. W., eds., The Courts and the Charter (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 76–77Google Scholar; Snell, James G. and Vaughan, Frederick, The Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 247Google Scholar; and Bernard, André, La Politique au Canada et au Québec (2nd ed.; Montréal: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1980), 381Google Scholar. Most works refer to Hogg, “Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased” and L'Écuyer, Gilbert, La Cour suprême du Canada et le partage des compétences 1949–1978 (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, 1978)Google Scholar. This reference to L'Écuyer's study is, however, spurious, since his conclusions are far more ambivalent than Hogg, Russell, Stevenson and others would lead us to believe. Indeed, he argues that the Supreme Court is centralist when compared to the previous jurisprudence of the Privy Council, but that this new development is justified by what L'Écuyer considers to be the centralist nature of the British North America Act itself. Thus, from a political science standpoint, L'Écuyer's study supports the centralist theory of the Supreme Court's impact on Canadian federalism. See also Chaput, Roger, “La Cour suprême et le partage des pouvoirs,” Revue générale de droit 12 (1981), 35–82.Google Scholar

⁶ This question is more fully discussed in Bzdera, André, “L'analyse politique de la Cour suprême du Canada, perspectives québécoises,” Canadian Journal of Law and Society (forthcoming)Google Scholar. Peter Hogg's 1979 article (“Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased”) is described as “une démonstration selon laquelle l'interprétation retenue par la Cour suprême est, sinon la meilleure, alors plausible dans les limites de la science juridique normative. Puisque toute interprétation peut se justifier d'une manière ou d'une autre, poser la question ainsi, c'est y répondre.”

⁷ See the sources cited in Vaughan, Frederick, “Critics of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: The New Orthodoxy and an Alternative Explanation,” this Journal 19 (1986), 495–520Google Scholar; and in Cairns, Alan C., “The Judicial Committee and Its Critics,” this Journal 4 (1971), 301–45Google Scholar. Although the Privy Council gave rise to two divergent lines of judicial precedent (centralist and provincialist), it nevertheless consistently defended the principle of a federal division of legislative powers between two autonomous levels of government.

⁸ Alternatively, it can be argued that such “theories” are merely ideological constructs and that their authors have never intended that their writings be considered scientific. Such theories are often presented without any substantive discussion of alternative theoretical frameworks.

⁹ Consider the Canadian debate on this issue: Kyer, Clifford Ian, “Has History a Role to Play in Constitutional Adjudication: Some Preliminary Considerations,” Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 14 (1981), 135–57Google Scholar; Vipond, Robert C., “1787 and 1867: The Federal Principle and Canadian Confederation Reconsidered,” this Journal 22 (1989), 3–25Google Scholar; and Vaughan, Frederick, “The Use of History in Canadian Constitutional Adjudication,” Dalhousie Law Journal 12 (1989), 59–84.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Dogan, Mattei and Pelassy, Dominique, How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics (2nd ed.; Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1990), 8.Google Scholar

¹¹ Several notable comparative judicial studies of federal high courts have been undertaken, but they are of limited use for political analysis. Recent studies include: Lenaerts, Koenraad, Le juge et la constitution aux États-Unis d'Amérique et dans l'ordre juridique européen (Brussels: Bruylant, 1988)Google Scholar; McWhinney, Edward, Supreme Courts and Judicial Law-Making (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986)Google Scholar; Antieau, Chester J., States' Rights under Federal Constitutions (New York: Oceana Publications, 1984)Google Scholar; Bellet, Pierre and Tune, André, eds., La Cour judiciaire suprême, un enquête comparative (Paris: Economica, 1978)Google Scholar; Bothe, Michael, Die Kompetenzstruktur des modernen Bundesstaates in rechtsvergleichender Sicht (Berlin: Springer, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and McWhinney, E. and Pescatore, P., eds., Federalism and Supreme Courts and the integration of Legal Systems (Heule: UGA, 1973).Google Scholar

¹² Shapiro, Martin, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 20Google Scholar. A similar insight was put forward 60 years ago by Mouskhelichvili: “[la cour suprême fédérale] tâche de renforcer le pouvoir central et d'augmenter sa compétence” (Mouskhelichvili, M., La théorie juridique de l'État fédéral [Paris: Pedone, 1931], 137).Google Scholar

¹³ For a discussion of methodology and political perspectives useful for the study of federal high courts, see notably Jessup, Dwight W., Reaction and Accommodation: The United States Supreme Court and Political Conflict 1809–1835 (New York: Garland, 1987)Google Scholar; Hanson, Roger A. and Chapper, Joy A., A Framework for Studying the Controversy Concerning the Federal Courts and Federalism (Washington: USPO, 1986)Google Scholar; Easterbrook, Frank H., “Ways of Criticizing the Court,” Harvard Law Review 95 (1982) 802–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shapiro, Courts; and Wasby, Stephen L., The Impact of the United States Supreme Court (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1970)Google Scholar. See also Orban, Edmond, ed., Fédéralisme et cours suprêmes (Brussels: Bruylant, 1991), 11–33Google Scholar, for an interesting attempt to combine elements of both legal and political analysis of federal high courts.

¹⁴ Before the (post-Civil War) Reconstruction period, the Supreme Court had never invalidated an important federal law, but the Court had claimed the right to do so as early as 1803 in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)Google Scholar and had attempted to do so in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857). Kutler, Stanley I., Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ Schreiber, Harry N., “Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the American System,” Law and Society Review 14 (1980), 663–722CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Scheiber, Harry N., “American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,” Toledo Law Review 9 (1978), 619–80.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Knox v. Lee [The Legal Tender Cases], 79 U.S. 457 (1871).Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Dam, Kenneth, “The Legal Tender Cases,” The Supreme Court Review (1981), 367–412Google Scholar. After two new judicial nominations by President Grant, Hepburn v. Griswold of 1870 was reversed by The Legal Tender Cases of 1871. The power to create legal tender paper currency was withheld from both levels of government by the Constitution, and this understanding dominated nineteenth-century America. The use of “gold clauses” in private contracts from 1871 until forbidden by a more powerful federal government in 1933 (see Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 [1935]Google Scholar) underscores this historical interpretation of monetary power in the United States.

¹⁸ For example, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)Google Scholar or Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).Google Scholar

¹⁹ United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)Google Scholar, and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)Google Scholar. See Corwin, Edward S., “The Passing of Dual Federalism,” Virginia Law Review 36 (1950), 1–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Fellman, David, “Federalism: Ten Years of the Supreme Court, 1937–1947,” American Political Science Review 41 (1947), 1142–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁰ The only exception to this rule, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)Google Scholar, was subsequently ignored by the Court and finally overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).Google Scholar

²¹ Benson, P. R., The Supreme Court and the Commerce Clause 1937–1970 (Cambridge: Dunellen, 1970).Google Scholar

²² See Kaden, Lewis B., “Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role,” Columbia Law Review 79 (1979), 847–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Herman Pritchett succinctly sums up this modern use of Marshall's opinions, especially his opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland of 1819. “The battle of strict construction was fought and lost in McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819” (The American Constitution [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977], 536Google Scholar). See also Berger, Raoul, Government by Judiciary (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 373–79.Google Scholar

²⁴ Gunther, Gerald, ed., John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).Google Scholar

²⁵ Orban, Edmond, “Droits de la personne et processus de centralisation: rôle de la Cour suprême des États-Unis,” this Journal 20 (1987), 711–29.Google Scholar

²⁶ On the incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, see Berger, , Government by Judiciary, 143–56.Google Scholar

²⁷ As Martin Shapiro aptly points out, “almost all the scholarly treatments of the modern Supreme Court have been produced either by active proponents of and participants in the New Deal or by its intellectual and political allies and successors” (Shapiro, Martin, “The Constitution and Economic Rights,” in Harmon, M. Judd, ed., Essays on the Constitution of the United States [New York: Kennikat, 1978], 74).Google Scholar

²⁸ See, for example, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Reflections on Garcia and Its Implications for Federalism (Washington: USPO, 1986)Google Scholar. The judges of the minority in the Garcia case have, however, vowed to overrule this decision at first opportunity.

²⁹ It should perhaps be noted that the Privy Council's Canadian jurisprudence is largely congruent with the centralist hypothesis of courts of final appeal (in this case, of an Imperial Court), since the Privy Council's jurisprudence generally favoured the maintenance of the Empire (a weak Canadian federal government and the conservation of colonial appellate jurisdiction). See, for instance, Verney, Douglas V., Three Civilizations, Two Cultures, One State (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), 149–71, 278–92.Google Scholar

³⁰ For comments on the federal decision to abolish appeals to London, see Russell, Peter, “The Political Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in Its First Century,” Canadian Bar Review 53 (1975), 586–87Google Scholar; and Morin, Jacques-Yvan, “Le Québec et l'arbitrage constitutionnel: de Charybde en Scylla,” Canadian Bar Review 45 (1967), 614Google Scholar. On the history of the Supreme Court of Canada, see Snell, and Vaughan, , The Supreme Court of Canada.Google Scholar

³¹ MacGuigan, Mark R., “Precedent and Policy in the Supreme Court,” Canadian Bar Review 45 (1967), 627–65Google Scholar. Only well after the British House of Lords announced in 1966 its willingness to overrule precedents did the Supreme Court of Canada clearly overrule a Privy Council precedent (in 1978).

³² Earlier periods of Supreme Court history are not, however, devoid of interest (nor centralist tendencies). From 1875 to about 1890, the Supreme Court decided a few cases before the Privy Council had begun to develop its interpretation of Canadian constitutional law. The 1949–1965 period is also of interest. Consider the following centralist/nationalist decisions: Severn v. The Queen, [1878] 2 S.C.R. 70; Johannesson, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292; or Saumur v. Québec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299.

³³ Reference re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights, [1967] S.C.R. 792, and Reference re Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86. Brassard, Jacques, ed., Le territoire québécois (Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1970)Google Scholar; Head, Ivan L., “The Canadian Offshore Minerals Reference,” University of Toronto Law Journal 18 (1968), 131–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tremblay, Guy, “The Supreme Court of Canada: Final Arbiter of Political Disputes,” in Lajoie, A. and Bernier, I., eds., The Supreme Court of Canada as an Instrument of Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for Supply and Services Canada, 1986), 179–209Google Scholar; and McWhinney, Edward, Québec and the Constitution 1960–1978 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 20, 43.Google Scholar

³⁴ Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981]Google Scholar 1 S.C.R. 753. See generally McWhinney, Edward, Canada and the Constitution 1979–1982 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Russell, Peter et al. , The Court and the Constitution (Kingston: Institute for Intergovernmental Relations, 1982)Google Scholar; and Banting, Keith and Simeon, Richard, eds., And No One Cheered (Toronto: Methuen, 1983).Google Scholar

³⁵ Most critical academic commentary provides support to the view that the primary political objective of the federal government was not the better protection of human rights in Canada, but rather was an expedient for imposing a language policy on Quebec, and more generally for promoting “national” social and economic values often at odds with those of Quebec Society. Furthermore, the Charter as finally enacted in 1982 has had a centralizing effect on Canadian federalism. As F. L. Morton writes, “The Supreme Court's Charter decisions are beginning to impose uniform national standards in policy areas that previously reflected regional diversity” (“The Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom,” this Journal 20 [1987], 44Google Scholar). See also Knopff, Rainer and Morton, F. L., “Nation-Building and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” in Cairns, A. and Williams, C., eds., Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for Supply and Services Canada, 1985), 133–82Google Scholar; and Mandel, Michael, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall and Thompson, 1989).Google Scholar

³⁶ Reference re Objection to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793.Google Scholar

³⁷ Gérard Bergeron writes that this decision completely ignores “une large constitutionnalité à fondement conventionnel dans la tradition même du constitutionnalisme britannique” (Bergeron, Gérard, Pratique de l'État du Québec [Montréal: Québec-Amérique, 1984], 247Google Scholar). Similar comments were made by several prominent Canadian academics.

³⁸ R. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988]Google Scholar 1 S.C.R. 401 (“provincial inability test” leads to federal competence, over environmental protection); and General Motors of Canada v. City National Leasing, [1989]Google Scholar 1 S.C.R. 641 (general regulation of trade doctrine).

³⁹ One prominent Canadian constitutionalist contends, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada is remarkedly balanced in its approach to federalism conflicts (Russell, , “The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations”Google Scholar). His analysis shares the flaws of most Canadian analyses of the Supreme Court's impact on the federal division of powers by severely underestimating the centripetal effect of Supreme Court decisions concerning economic regulation and the constitutional amending procedure.

⁴⁰ Tremblay, Guy, “Un fédéralisme de plus en plus centralisateur,” Le Devoir, December 19, 1990Google Scholar; Brun, Henri and Tremblay, Guy, Droit constitutionnel (2nd ed.; Montréal: Yvon Biais, 1990), chap. 6Google Scholar; and Brassard, Jacques, La Cour suprême et la constitution (Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1968), 204, 243–44.Google Scholar

⁴¹ “Preliminary rulings” can be requested by lower court judges (that is, by judges of all national courts) on questions of Community law (Lasok, Dominik, “The Community Legal Order and Its Relation to the Legal Order of the Member States,” in Lasok, D. and Soldatos, P., eds., Les Communautés européennes en fonctionnement [Brussels: Bruylant, 1981]Google Scholar; and Weiler, Joseph, “The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism,” Yearbook of European Law 1 [1981], 273–80).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴² Usher, John, European Community Law and National Law: The Irreversible Transfer? (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981).Google Scholar

⁴³ Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos, [1963]Google Scholar 2 C.M.L.R. 105, and Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, [1964]Google Scholar 3 C.M.L.R. 425. See Bebr, Gerhard, Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Colin, Jean-Pierre, Le gouvernement des juges dans les Communautés européennes (Paris: LGDJ, 1966).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Plender, Richard, “The Interpretation of Community Acts by Reference to the Intentions of the Authors,” Yearbook on European Law 2 (1982), 57–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Waelbroeck, Michel, “Le rôle de la Cour de Justice dans la mise en oeuvre du traité CÉE,” in Les effets des décisions de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes dans les États membres (Brussels: UGA, 1983), 183–216Google Scholar; and Weiler, Joseph, “Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?” in Tsoukalis, L., ed., The European Community (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 39–56.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office, [1975]Google Scholar 1 C.M.L.R. 1.

⁴⁶ See Stein, Eric, “Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution,” American Journal of International Law 75 (1981), 21–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This decision was subsequently ignored by two national high courts, the Conseil d'État in 1978 and the Bundesfinanzhof in 1981 —a most dramatic development in any legal system (Issac, Guy, “Les effets de la Cour de justice en France,” in Les effets des décisions de la Cour de justice).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (ERTA), [1971]Google Scholar 10 C.M.L.R. 335, and Case 6/76 Kramer, [1976]Google Scholar 18 C.M.L.R. 440. Louis, Jean-Victor, “Le droit communautaire comme facteur d'integration dans les relations extérieures des Communautés européennes,” Études internationales 9 (1978), 43–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kovar, Robert, “La contribution de la Cour de justice au développement de la condition internationale de la Communauté européenne,” Cahiers de droit européen 14 (1978), 527–73.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Case 11/7 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970]Google Scholar 9 C.M.L.R. 294. Warner, J. P., “The Relationship Between European Community Law and the National Law of Member States,” Law Quarterly Review 93 (1977), 349–66Google Scholar; Rideau, Joël, “Le rôle de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes: techniques de protection,” Revue internationale du droit comparé 33 (1981), 583–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lanier, E. R., “Solange, Farewell: The Federal German Constitutional Court and the Recognition of the Court of Justice of the European Communities as Lawful Judge,” Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 11 (1988), 1–30.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Weiler, , “Community, Member States and European Integration,” 52.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Stein, , “Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution”Google Scholar; Sasse, Christoph and Yourow, Howard, “The Growth of Legislative Power of the European Communities,” in Sandalow, T. and Stein, E., eds., Courts and Free Markets (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 96–126Google Scholar; Cappelletti, Mauro et al. , eds., Integration Through Law, Vol. 1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lenaerts, , Le juge et la constitution, 646Google Scholar; and Waelbroeck, , “Le rôle de la Cour de Justice dans la mise en oeuvre du traité CÉE,” 215.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Rasmussen, Hjalte, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 377.Google Scholar

⁵² Weiler, Joseph, “The Court of Justice on Trial,” Common Market Law Review 24 (1987), 555Google Scholar. Weiler observes that “in virtually all books about the Court published to date, the underlying ethos is one of praise and admiration.”

⁵³ Vandersanden, George and Engler, B., “Considérations juridiques relatives à l'élaboration d'une théorie de l'intégration européenne,”Google Scholar in Lasok, and Soldatos, , eds., Les Communautés européennes, 530Google Scholar (translation is mine).

⁵⁴ Philip, Christian, La Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1983), 125Google Scholar (translation is mine). See also Rasmussen, Hjalte, “The United States Supreme Court's Power under Attack: A Study with European Analogies,” in Les effets des décisions de la Cour de justice, 301.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Rasmussen, Hjalte, “Between Self-Restraint and Activism,” European Law Review 13 (1988), 38Google Scholar; and Bettati, Mario, “Le ‘law-making power’ de la Cour,” Pouvoirs 48 (1989), 58, 69–70Google Scholar. See also Bzdera, André, “The Court of Justice of the European Community and the Politics of Institutional Reform,” West European Politics 15 (1992), 122–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁶ Labouz, Marie-Françoise, Le système communautaire européen (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1986), 162–63Google Scholar; and Weiler, , “The Court of Justice on Trial,” 583, n. 30.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Cavin, Pierre, “Le Tribunal fédéral suisse,” in Bellet and Tune, eds., La Cour judiciaire suprême, 345–62Google Scholar; Roussy, Jean, Le contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois fédérales aux Etats-Unis et en Suisse (Lausanne: Thonney-Dupraz, 1969)Google Scholar; and Morrison, Fred L., “The Swiss Federal Court,” in Grossman, J. B. and Tannenhaus, J., eds., Frontiers of Judicial Research (New York: John Wiley, 1969), 133–62.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Delpérée, Francis, ed., La Cour d'arbitrage: Actualités et perspectives (Brussels: Bruylant, 1988).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Rodotà, Carla, La Corte costituzionale: Come E Chi Garantisce il Piene Rispetto della Nostra Costituzione (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1986), 89–94Google Scholar; and Sandulli, Aldo M., “La Cour constitutionnelle italienne et sa jurisprudence,” in McWhinney and Pescatore, eds., Federalism and Supreme Courts, 97.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Douin, Claude-Sophie, Le fédéralisme autrichien (Paris: LGDJ, 1977), 46–52Google Scholar; and Favoreu, Louis, Les cours constitutionnelles (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1986), 33–51.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship, (1920)Google Scholar, 28 C.L.R. 129.

⁶² For instance, the Uniform Tax Case, (1942)Google Scholar, 65 C.L.R. 373. For an overview of constitutional development of federalism in Australia, see Galligan, Brian, Politics of the High Court (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Coper, Michael, Encounters with the Australian Constitution (North Ryde: CCH Australia, 1987)Google Scholar; and Sawer, Geoffrey, Australian Federalism in the Courts (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967).Google Scholar

⁶³ Commonwealth v. Tasmania, (1983)Google Scholar, 57 A.L.J.R. 450. See particularly Coper, Michael, ed., The Franklin Dam Case (Sydney: Butterworths, 1983)Google Scholar; and Sornarajah, M., ed., The South West Dam Dispute: The Legal and Political Issues (Hobart: University of Tasmania, 1983).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Fernseh, [1961]Google Scholar 12 BVerfGE 205, and Reichskonkordat, [1957]Google Scholar BVerfGE 309.

⁶⁵ Financial Subsidies Case, [1975]Google Scholar 39 BVerfGE 96. See Kisker, Gunter, “The West German Federal Constitutional Court as Guardian of the Federal System,” Publius 19 (1989), 35–52Google Scholar; Kommers, Donald P., The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989)Google Scholar, chap. 3; Orban, Edmond, “La Cour constitutionnelle fédérale et l'autonomie des Länder en République fédérale d'Allemagne,” Revue juridique Thémis 22 (1988), 37–60Google Scholar; Blair, Philip M., Federalism and Judicial Review in West Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ In Canada, the Patriation Reference of 1981 allowed the federal government to adopt unilaterally a charter of rights applicable to the provinces; in the United States, judicial “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment applied the federal Bill to the States; and in the European Community, the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case of 1970 announced the Court's intention to protect rights (in areas of Community competence) with reference to several international conventions and to the common judicial traditions of the Member States.

⁶⁷ Orban, Edmond, La dynamique de la centralisation dans l'État fédéral: un processus irréversible? (Montréal: Québec-Amérique, 1984).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See, for example, Petter, Andrew, “Federalism and the Myth of the Federal Spending Power,” Canadian Bar Review 68 (1989), 448–79Google Scholar; Kaden, , “Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty”Google Scholar; or Sandalow, Terrance, “The Expansion of Federal Legislative Authority,” in Sandalow and Stein, eds., Courts and Free Markets, 78–84.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Choper, Jesse H., Judicial Review and the National Political Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Monahan, Patrick J., “At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism,” University of Toronto Law Journal 34 (1984), 47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Coper, Michael, “The Role of the Courts in the Preservation of Federalism,” Australian Law Journal 63 (1989), 473.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Nowak, John E., “Judicial Review and the National Political Process,” California Law Review 8 (1980), 1231.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Most general comments in this section refer to the American, Canadian and European examples, unless otherwise stated.

⁷² Friedrich, Carl J., Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1968)Google Scholar; Orban, , La dynamique de la centralisationGoogle Scholar; or Morin, Jacques-Yvan, Le fédéralisme: théorie et critique (Montréal: Université de Montréal, 1965).Google Scholar

⁷³ Shapiro, , Courts.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ On the United States Supreme Court's place within society, see Brigham, John, The Cult of the Court (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; and Kammen, Michael, A Machine that Would Go of Itself: the Constitution in American Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See Funston, Richard Y., “The Supreme Court and Critical Elections,” American Political Science Review 69 (1975), 791–811CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Dahl, Robert A., “Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,” Journal of Public Law 6 (1957), 279–95.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Rasmussen, , On Law and Policy, 355–56Google Scholar. France wished to add two new judges for each of the big Member States (France, Britain, Germany and Italy). Presently, judges representing Member States with only 16 per cent of Community population can gain majority control of the Court.

⁷⁷ Bzdera, André, “L'Accord du lac Meech et le nouveau mode de sélection des juges de la Cour suprême du Canada, une réforme chimérique?” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 4 (1989), 1–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁸ For example, Russell, , The Judiciary in Canada, 351.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Schmidhauser, John R., The Supreme Court (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 108–14Google Scholar; and Krislov, Samuel, The Supreme Court in the Political Process (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 55–56.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)Google Scholar, and 349 U.S. 294 (1955); and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)Google Scholar; and Hutchinson, Dennis, “Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision-making in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958,” Georgetown Law Journal 68 (1979), 1–96.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Sohier, Jérôme, “‘Vote secret’ ou ‘vote dissident’ (La pratique de la publication des opinions dissidentes au Tribunal constitutionnel fédéral allemand),” in Mélanges offerts à Raymond Vander Elst (Brussels: Éditions Nemesis, 1986), 755–68.Google Scholar

⁸² Russell, , The Judiciary in Canada, 351.Google Scholar

⁸³ Tribe, Laurence, “Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services,” Harvard Law Review 90 (1977), 1065–1104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁴ Wechsler, Herbert, “Political Safeguards of Federalism,” Columbia Law Review 54 (1954), 543–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Choper, , Judicial ReviewGoogle Scholar, chap. 4. This theory is now officially part of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)Google Scholar. Yet, as is well known, the modern American Senate is today at best a central legislative body where disproportionate political influence is granted to electors of regions of the United States that are politically organized into small States. They no longer represent the “States” as political entities.

⁸⁵ Particularly noteworthy are the writings of the two constitutionalists, Henri Brun and Guy Tremblay. The recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions General Motors and Crown Zellerbach are totally unacceptable to Brun and Tremblay, and indeed to most Québécois (Brun and Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel).

⁸⁶ Amlund, Curtis A., “The Theory and Practice of Federalism in the Governmental Organization of the Confederate States of America” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1959), 264–69Google Scholar. This centralist vision of judicial power is also found in the Anti-Federalist papers (letter of Brutus, January 31, 1788) (Storing, Herbert, The Complete Anti-Federalist [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981]).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁷ This expression comes from the title of a 1921 French study on the United States Supreme Court: Lambert, Édouard, Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation sociale aux États-Unis (Paris: Giard, 1921).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See also Vandycke, Robert, “Les droits de l'homme et leurs modes d'emploi: à propos de la charte constitutionnelle de 1982,” Sociologie et sociétés 18 (1986), 148–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar