1 Lorimer, James, The Real World of City Politics (Toronto: James. Lewis and Samuel. 1970), 37Google Scholar.

2 Rae, Douglas, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (Rev. ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 3Google Scholar.

3 Schattschneider, E. E., The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 71Google Scholar.

4 On this whole question, note the author's “Adapting Urban Institutions: The Reform of Winnipeg, 1971,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's University, 1977, 25–46Google Scholar.

5 For a more complete picture of the Winnipeg reforms consult Meyer Brownstone, Feldman, L. D., Hefferon, D. C. and Plunkett, T. J., Politics and the Process of Reform of Urban Government: The Winnipeg Experience (Ottawa: Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, mimeo, 1971)Google Scholar.

6 Qualter, T. H., The Election Process in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), xiiGoogle Scholar.

7 Note also the general discussion of electoral law by D. Rae, The Political Consequences, especially chapter II. 13–46.

8 Note Rowat, D. C., Your Local Government: The Intelligent Canadian's Guide to Local Government (Toronto: Macmillan, 1955)Google Scholar, “The Ships of Local Government.” 26–29, and “The People Who Sail Them,” 41–47.

9 Crawford, K. G., Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), 83–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Ibid., 84.

11 Ibid., 86.

12 Ibid., 84–85.

13 Western Canadian cities, for instance, initially adopted the Ontario practice of local wards. From 1906 until 1920, Winnipeg elected two aldermen from each of seven wards; the original charters of Calgary (1893) and Edmonton (1904) specified three aldermen from each of three wards and two from four respectively; Saskatoon from 1906 until 1920 and Vancouver from 1886 until 1936 both employed small wards. The move away from the ward system in all these cities was advocated as a device to prevent ‘sectional’ (that is, labour) interests having guaranteed representation, generally by local parties of the type “formed by business men fearful of socialist, communist and other extremist elements.…” Note Joyce, J. G. and Hossé, H. A.. Civic Parties in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, 1970), 17Google Scholar.

14 Crawford uses the terms ‘at-large’ and ‘general’ synonymously. The expression ‘quasi-general’ may apply to those communities whose election systems, while technically divided into wards, are so constructed that the wards represent in themselves miniature at-large contests. Edmonton, since the reintroduction of its ward system in 1968, would constitute a prime example. Note the reasons for this in this author's “Edmonton Politics: Business as Usual,” Canadian Forum, 52 (1972), 8–9Google Scholar.

15 Hardwick, W. G., Vancouver (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan, 1974), 30Google Scholar.

16 Even two of the more important recent American textbooks (which in the usual case may be assumed to be composites of the significant literature) turn a blind eye to the politics of electoral adjustment. Thus note Stedman, Murray, Urban Politics (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers. 1972), 68–74Google Scholar, and Winter, W. O., The Urban Polity (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1969), 249–62Google Scholar.

17 For example, note Lorimer, James, A Citizen's Guide to City Politics (Toronto: James, Lewis and Samuel, 1972), 110–14Google Scholar.

18 Lineberry, R. L. and Sharkansky, Ira, Urban Politics and Public Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 88–92Google Scholar.

19 Banfield, E.C. and Wilson, J. Q., City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1966), 92Google Scholar.

20 Easton, Robert and Tennant, Paul, “Vancouver Civic Party Leadership: Backgrounds, Attitudes and Non-Civic Party Affiliations,” in Masson, J. K. and Anderson, J. D. (eds.), Emerging Party Politics in Urban Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), 118Google Scholar.

21 Lorimer, The Real World, 37–52.

22 This is discussed by Powers, Ned, “Ward System Bill Becomes a Hot Potato,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 28, 1973Google Scholar.

23 Note, on this point, the discussion by Hough, J. F., “Voters' Turnout and the Responsiveness of Local Government: The Case of Toronto, 1969,” in Fox, Paul (ed.), Politics: Canada (3rd ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 295–96Google Scholar.

24 McNaught, Kenneth, A Prophet in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), 99–153Google Scholar, and Masters, D. C., The Winnipeg General Strike (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950)Google Scholar. See also Robin, M., Radical Politics and Canadian Labour (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1968), 180–87Google Scholar and 203–06.

25 McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, 99.

26 Artibise, A. F. J., Winnipeg: A Social History of Urban Growth, 1874–1914 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975), 27Google Scholar.

27 McKillop, A. B., “Citizen and Socialist: The Ethos of Political Winnipeg, 1919–1935,” unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1970, 60Google Scholar.

28 Ibid., 51. See also Robin, Radical Politics, 203–04.

29 Harris, Nigel, Beliefs in Society: The Problem of Ideology (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), 99Google Scholar.

30 This kind of local party has been fairly typical of the response of western Canada's commercial elites to organized labour's own municipal electoral initiatives. Note Joyce and Hossé, Civic Parries in Canada, 17–18.

31 Harris, The Problem of Ideology, 99.

32 Stinson, Lloyd, Political Warriors: Recollections of a Social Democrat (Winnipeg: Queenston House, 1975), 300Google Scholar.

33 Masters provides a list of the prospective financial backers of the League which is composed exclusively of the largest financial institutions, and the professional societies, of Winnipeg (The Winnipeg General Strike, 64). Of the composition of the original committee, McNaught quotes ‘liberal lawyer’ J. W. Wilton: “I sized up the personnel. There was not a returned soldier there. Newspaper editors, bankers, manufacturers and capitalists abounded” (A Prophet in Politics, 106).

34 For much of this historical record note McKillop, “Citizen and Socialist,” 64ff. See also Barber, Paul, “Class Conflict in Winnipeg Civic Politics: The Role of the Citizens' and Civic Election Organizations,” mimeo., University of Manitoba, 1970Google Scholar.

35 Stinson, Political Warriors, 253.

36 Note Lorimer, A Citizen's Guide, 105. For press coverage of the founding convention and policy ‘positions’ of the new nonpartisan party note also the Winnipeg Free Press, September 11, 1971, 5Google Scholar, and September 13, 1971, 3, 15.

37 Prior to the 1973 provincial election the chairman of the ICEC, William Palk, attempted, with the “Group for Good Government,” to replicate the municipal success of his party in keeping the NDP from power. By endorsing particular Liberal or Conservative candidates the “Group” hoped to “rid Manitoba of socialism” (Winnipeg Free Press, March 5, 1973Google Scholar, and May 1, 1973). Mr. Palk was unsuccessful.

38 Stinson, Political Warriors, 338.

39 Artibise, Winnipeg, 47–48.

40 For a discussion of the system and Winnipeg, see Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, 148–50, and the comments about proportional representation in Canada's western provinces by Qualter, The Election Process, 130–42. A summary of the qualifications of municipal electors for this period is found in the Royal Commission on the Municipal Finances and Administration of the City of Winnipeg, Report (Winnipeg: King's Printer, 1939), 15ffGoogle Scholar. See also the short statement in the souvenir brochure of the city's Jubilee (1874–1924), Winnipeg—Know Our City (Civic Social and Athletic Association, 1924), 21–22Google Scholar.

41 Artibise, Winnipeg, 58.

42 “The Three-Ward System Adopted,” Manitoba Free Press (Winnipeg), March 17, 1920Google Scholar.

43 Manitoba Free Press (Winnipeg), March 16, 1920Google Scholar.

44 At the regular meeting of the Trades Council the night following the council meeting, “Ald. Robinson … stated that he knew absolutely nothing of the proposed change until its introduction on the night it was endorsed. Such a change, he said, should have been brought befor [sic] the legislative committee for proper consideration” (Manitoba Free Press [Winnipeg], March 17, 1920)Google Scholar.

45 Ibid., March 16, 1920.

46 Ibid.

47 City of Winnipeg, Minutes of the Council (March 15, 1920), 205–08Google Scholar. The defection of Wiginton was essentially irrelevant to the outcome of the vote since Mayor Gray would have voted, as he had in the past, with the Citizens' group in the event of a tie.

48 Manitoba Free Press (Winnipeg), March 17, 1920Google Scholar. ‘Just representation’ had been something of a problem in Manitoba. For example, Lionel Orlikow notes that in 1914 F. J. Dixon's “personal vote of 9200 was greater than the total of 8900 of the cabinet of seven men.” Note his “The Reform Movement in Manitoba, 1910–1915,” in Swainson, Donald (ed.), Historical Essays on the Prairie Provinces (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), 226CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

49 Although extending the vote to British subjects was approved by referendum November 22, 1940, it was only with the election of November 27, 1942, that the reform became operable. Note the City of Winnipeg, Municipal Manual: 1971 (Winnipeg, 1971), 24Google Scholar. It is important to note that John Queen was the city's mayor for this wartime period (1938–1942) of franchise reform, although it did not ensure his reelection. See also Stinson, Political Warriors, 249–53.

50 In simplest terms plural voting results from the practice of permitting property owners to vote in each ward in which their property is located. Therefore, reducing the number of wards naturally reduces plural voting.

51 See Manitoba Free Press (Winnipeg), March 16, 1920Google Scholar. For the elections that fall. Ward One would have 20,466 electors. Ward Two would have 21,070 and Ward Three 18,728.

52 At the extreme, Artibise notes that in the earlier election of 1910, when there were 72 polling stations, ex-mayor Andrews was registered at 66 and a Mr. D. E. Sprague at 60 (Winnipeg, 40).

53 On occasions when working-class turnout would be atypically low (that is, in those elections without a mayoralty contest), the proportion of the Citizens' vote would swell, the labour vote being swamped by the larger turnout rate of the middle-class across the large-scale constituency.

54 Introduced to the legislature by resolution on February 12, 1960, Bill 62. “An Act to Establish the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg,” moved quickly through its legislative phases to passage on March 21, 1960.

55 The Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission in itself constitutes an interesting case of the differing roles set for royal commission investigations by a parliamentary administration. See Mitchell, D. G., “Royal Commissions as Executive Instruments,” unpublished B.A. (Honours) thesis. University of Alberta, 1973Google Scholar. Although reluctant, the provincial Liberal administration responded to repeated requests by the area's municipalities to appoint (and fund) an inquiry in 1955. Among the five commissioners were included the mayors of Winnipeg and the area's two largest suburban cities, St. James and St. Boniface. All of the commissioners had been selected from a list of nominees submitted by the municipalities. See Greater Winnipeg investigating Commission, Report and Recommendations (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer. 1959). 19Google Scholar.

56 Local Government Boundaries Commission, Provisional Plan for Local Government Units in the Greater Winnipeg Area (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1970), 69–70Google Scholar. This scheme would have seen one municipal representative for each area's 50,000 population, plus ten directly elected members, at least six of whom would have directly represented city of Winnipeg constituencies.

57 It is important to observe that the Act also specified that each electoral division was to encompass a portion of at least two area municipalities. Note Manitoba, , Debates and Proceedings, February 17, 1960, 665Google Scholar.

58 On this point note the comments of the leader of the Opposition (former Premier D. L. Campbell who had struck the Investigating Commission) in Manitoba, , Debates and Proceedings, February 24, 1960, 881–84Google Scholar and March 21, 1960, 1801.

59 Ibid., February 25, 1960, 906–10.

60 For example, for the four years immediately prior to Unicity the metro council was comprised of three New Democrats and seven Liberals and Conservatives. All were to stand as candidates in 1971, but only the four nominated as official ICEC candidates were to win seats on the new council.

61 Brownstone, et al., Politics and the Process of Reform, 23.

62 Burdeney, Bill, “Party Politics and Regional Government,” in Axworthy, Lloyd (ed.), The Future City (Winnipeg: Institute for Urban Studies, 1971), 34Google Scholar.

63 Province of Manitoba, Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1970), 11Google Scholar.

64 Personal interview with Hon. Cherniak, Saul, August 25, 1971Google Scholar.

65 Province of Manitoba, Proposals, 13.

66 So, to some extent, Tom Axworthy's quip has substance: “their very existence was at stake and hell hath no fury like a politician about to lose his job.” See his “Winnipeg Unicity,” in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Look to the North: Canadian Regional Experience (Washington, D.C.: 1974), 106Google Scholar.

67 Johnston, J. Frank, Manitoba, , Debates and Proceedings, June 9, 1971, 1656Google Scholar.

68 L. R. Sherman, ibid., June 10, 1971, 1688.

69 Steve Patrick, Liberal MLA for Assiniboia, ibid., June 7, 1971, 1569.

70 The NDP municipal convention had resolved that its policies would be binding upon its candidates. The ICEC convention (150 delegates meeting in a suburban curling club) unanimously resolved that its policies were not binding but merely “guides to good administration” (Winnipeg Free Press, September 13, 1971)Google Scholar.

71 As indicated, the table is adapted from the Local Government Boundaries Commission. It is, incidentally, a direct replica of work done by the Investigating Commission a decade earlier, which had generated a similar uncritical appraisal of representation by associating such with the ratio of elected officials to citizens. Note tables and discussion, Report and Recommendations (1959), 99–101Google Scholar.

72 City of West Kildonan, Submission of the City of West Kildonan to the Municipal Affairs Committee Concerning Bill 36, ‘The City of Winnipeg,’ July 14, 1971, 28–29Google Scholar.

73 Ibid., 29. Emphasis in the original.

74 See “Synopsis of Comments at Meetings of Metro Municipal Councils Between October 3 and November 26, 1969,” Local Government Boundaries Commission, Internal File #4703, n.d.

75 Interview with Mr. Cherniak. Note also the statement in support of at-large elections by C. J. Rogers, spokesman for the Winnipeg Downtown Business Association, Tribune (Winnipeg), January 26, 1971Google Scholar.

76 The other members of the commission were the retired clerk of the Legislative Assembly and the retired president of the University of Manitoba. Note the Report of the Greater Winnipeg Electoral Boundaries Review Commission, 1971 (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, April 15, 1971)Google Scholar. The Commission was provided restrictive terms of reference exactly paralleling the government's Proposals, and a working period from accepting these to presentation of final report of 21 days. The government also maintained a close liaison through the person of Cherniak's special assistant, Mrs. E. Gallagher, who “was instrumental in researching and drafting the report” (Brownstone, et al., Politics and the Process of Reform, 72).

77 Cherniak, Manitoba, Debates and Proceedings, June 3, 1971Google Scholar, 1466.

78 On the particular matter of change in the system of representation consider also Axworthy, Lloyd and Cassidy, Jim, Unicity: The Transition (Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, 1974), 195–206Google Scholar.

79 For example, see the Winnipeg Free Press, September 18, 1971. On the city council of Winnipeg, however, its predecessors had normally caucused prior to important meetings. For the period 1960–64 the CEC maintained a majority of 11–7 over opposition councillors, from 1965 to 1971 a majority of 10–8. Nonetheless the majority on all six standing committees of council from 1961 to 1971 was from the CEC-GWEC caucus. Of the 60 annual committee chairmanships available for this period, the CEC-GWEC caucus retained 53.

80 Winnipeg Free Press, October 5, 1971Google Scholar.

81 Stinson, Political Warriors, 300–09.

82 Winnipeg Free Press, September 29, 1971, 1Google Scholar.

83 Winnipeg Free Press, October 7, 1971, 3Google Scholar.

84 Personal interview with Wally Johannson, MLA (NDP caucus chairman and campaign manager for veteran Alderman Magnus Eliason, who was defeated in 1971), August 26, 1975.

85 The election also produced, at 60.7 per cent, the highest voter turnout since civic records were maintained (1920) (Winnipeg Free Press, October 24, 1974)Google Scholar.

86 The previously suburban wards returned 26 ICEC, three like-thinking Independents, and no NDP councillors.

87 Smallwood, Frank, Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 287–88Google Scholar. “[H]alf the newly-elected GLC Labour councillors formerly served as members of the LCC, including all key committee chairmen and leaders. … Hence, the elections had the practical effect of expanding substantially the geographical jurisdiction of the former LCC while leaving its former leadership patterns virtually intact” (287).

88 Dahl, Robert, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 230Google Scholar.

89 Prewitt, Kenneth, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 31–49Google Scholar.

90 Downes, B. T., “Municipal Social Rank and the Characteristics of Local Political Leaders,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 22 (1968), 514–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

91 Sharpe, L. J., “Elected Representatives in Local Government,” British Journal of Sociology 13 (1962), 201CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92 See, for example, Easton and Tennant, “Vancouver Civic Party Leadership,” 112–13.

93 For a discussion of the federal and provincial candidate data see this author's “Adapting Urban Institutions,” 140–55.

94 Banfield and Wilson have observed, for example, that in Boston the change from wards to at-large elections in 1949 had effectively eliminated ethnic minority representatives from the council (City'Politics, 94–96).

95 Vancouver's 10 aldermen are elected at large. Toronto elects 2 in each of 11 large block wards and in Edmonton 3 are elected in each of 4 quasi-at-large strip wards.

96 The (Spearman) rho test between NDP support and census areas ranked by highest average income is-.881. For a discussion of variables and method note this author's “Adapting Urban Institutions,” 100–02, 259–64.

97 In reviewing the operations of the first Unicity council, provincial bureaucrats did observe one tendency, that being to “spend [tax] money for personal credit, hence log-rolling and the budget sky-rockets”—more so than with the previous Metro regime. Personal interviews with senior officials, Department of Urban Affairs.

98 Note, for example, the developments relating to the emergence of a new reform movement during the 1974 civic campaign in The Editors, “Reform Politics in Winnipeg: Opening Things Up,” City Magazine 1 (1975), 28–36Google Scholar.