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Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

Brian Flemming*
Affiliation:
Of the Bar of Nova Scotia, Halifax
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Abstract

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Type
Notes and Comments
Copyright
Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 1964

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References

1 [1963] I.C.J. Rep. 15 (Judgment of December 2, 1963).

2 Ibid., 98.

3 Hereafter referred to simply as “Cameroun.” This is the French spelling of the word used throughout the Pleadings. For some unexplained reason, the Court anglicized the word to “Cameroon.”

4 Supra note 1, at 38.

5 [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 319, 422–436.

6 United Kingdom Counter-Memorial, Vol. II (Annexes), 7. (At the time of writing the Pleadings in this case had not been bound in book form, so documents had to be referred to individually.)

7 The plebiscite was held on February 11, 1961, and the voting was 233,571 in favour of union with Cameroun, 97,741 in favour of union with Nigeria. The plebiscite was held pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1352 (XIV) of October 16, 1959.

8 This plebiscite was held pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1473 (XIV) of December 12, 1959, and the voting was 146,296 in favour of union with Nigeria, 97,659 in favour of union with Cameroun. In a previous plebiscite held in 1959 pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1350 (XIII) of March 13, 1959, the inhabitants of the Northern Cameroons voted to decide their future in a plebiscite to be held at a later date; the 1961 plebiscite was necessary as a result of the 1959 one.

9 See General Assembly Resolutions 224(III), 326(IV), 443(V), 563(VI), 649(VII), 742(VIII),and 1473(XIV).

10 General Assembly Resolution 224(III), adopted November 18, 1948: “[The Trusteeship Council may] request, whenever appropriate, an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice as to whether such [administrative] unions are within the scope of and compatible with the … Charter and … the Trusteeship Agreements. …”

11 Supra note 1, at 22.

12 Article 19 is as follows: “If any dispute whatever should arise between the Administering Authority and another Member of the United Nations relating to the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation or other means, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, provided for in Chapter XIV of the United Nations Charter.” For the text, see supra note 1, at 25.

13 Rosenne, , The International Court of Justice 307 (1957).Google Scholar See also Hudson, , The Permanent Court of International Justice 1930-1943, at 414–17 (1943),Google Scholar for a discussion of the interpretation of “dispute” by the P.C.I.J. The present Court discussed the nature of “dispute” more fully in the South West Africa Cases, supra note 5, at 328.

14 Supra note 1, at 27.

15 Ibid., 133.

16 Ibid., 166.

17 Ibid., 108.

18 Ibid., 109.

19 Ibid., 110. 20

20 Ibid., 65.

21 Ibid., 96 (italics added). See the joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice in the South West Africa Cases, supra note 5, at 465.

22 The text of Article 32(a) is as follows: “When a case is brought before the Court by means of an application, the application must, as laid down in Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute, indicate the party making it, the party against whom the claim is brought and the subject of the dispute. It must also, as far as possible, specify the provision on which the applicant founds the jurisdiction of the Court, state the precise nature of the claim and give a succinct statement of the facts and grounds on which the claim is based….”

22a The present Court strongly affirmed this rule in the Temple of Preah Vihear (Preliminary Objections) Case [1961] I.C.J. Rep. 31 and again impliedly endorsed it in its latest judgment in the Barcelona Traction (Preliminary Objections) Case [1964] I.C.J. Rep. where the problem of “discontinuance” was discussed at length.

23 For an analysis of the problem of “fast filing” and the rule in the Nottebohm case, see Waldock, , “Decline of the Optional Clause,” 32 Brit. Yb. Int’l. L. 244 (1955–56).Google Scholar

24 Nottebohm Case (Preliminary Objection), [1953] I.C.J. Rep in, 122.

25 Supra note 1, at 29 (italics added).

26 P.C.I.J., Ser. D, No. 2, at 397.

27 Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Cmd. No. 6531 (1944).

28 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, 71–72.

29 Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 22, at 15 (1929).

30 Ibid.; P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 46 at 162; Haya de la Torre Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 71.

31 Supra note 1, at 33 (italics added).

32 Ibid. This raises the question: what if Cameroun had sought to defer the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement pending disposal of this case by applying for interim measures of protection under Article 41 of the Statute. It is the writer’s view that the Court would have refused to grant these since one of the parties to that agreement, the United Nations, was not a party to the action. Even if these interim measures were granted, it is problematic whether the U.N. would have had to comply with them: see Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court 110–113 (rev. ed. 1958).

33 Supra note 1, at 33.

34 Ibid., 37.

35 See Lauterpacht, op cit. supra note 32, at 850. Also see Jenks, , The Prospects of International Adjudication 171 (1964).Google Scholar

36 Supra note 1, at 98–99.

37 In the American sense of the term meaning “without object” or “pointless.”

38 Ibid., 37.

39 Ibid., 151.

40 Borchard, , Declaratory Judgments 15 and passim (2d ed., 1941).Google Scholar The Court had access to this book and was obviously strongly influenced by it.

41 Zamir, , The Declaratory Judgment 42 (1962).Google Scholar

42 In French, “patrimoine juridique.”

43 Supra note ι, at 172.

44 Ibid., 102.

45 Ibid., 39–40. Judge Koretsky relied on Judge Spender’s Separate Opinion and Judge Lauterpacht’s Dissenting Opinion in the Interhandel Case (Pre-liminary Objections), [1959] I.G.J. Rep. 6, at 54 and 95 respectively.

46 Supra note i, at 103.

47 Ibid., 103. See also Fitzmaurice, , “Hersch Lauterpacht, The Scholar as Judge —Part II,” (1962) 38 Brit. Yb. Int’l L. 1.Google Scholar

48 Supra note 1, at 103.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., 105.

51 Jenks, op. cit. supra note 35, at 134–35.

52 Ibid., chapter 2, passim.

53 Judges Jessup, Badawi, Bustamente, and Beb a Don.

54 Judges Spender, Koo, Fitzmaurice, and Morelli.

55 See Judge Fitzmaurice’s interesting comments on this point in his Separate Opinion, supra note 1, at 127–130.