¹ A/RES/3201 (S-VI), May 9, 1974.

² A/RES/3202 (S-VI), May 16, 1975.

³ A/RES/3281 (XXIX), January 15, 1975.

⁴ On the legal significance of the distinction between adoption by an international organization or international legal conference by formal recorded vote and adoption without vote and informal consensus generally, see Jenks, , “Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simplified Majorities and Consensus as Modes of Decision in International Law,” in Cambridge Essays in International Law: Essays in Honour of Lord McNair 488 (1965)Google Scholar; Lacharrière, , “Consensus et Nations Unies,” [1968] Annuaire Français de Droit International 9;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Bastid, , “Observations sur la pratique du consensus,” 1 Multitudo Legum lus Unum: Festschrift für Wilhelm Wengler 11 (Tittel, ed., 1973)Google Scholar; Wengler, , “Rechtsvertrag, Konsensus und Absichtserklärung im Völkerrecht,” 31 Juristenzeitung 193 (1976).Google Scholar

For a legal realist type of approach to international lawmaking that emphasizes the fact of a state’s acceptance of a particular legal rule as being binding rather than the more traditional positivistic type of analysis of whether or not the claimed rule falls into any of the a priori categories of formal sources of international law, see the Dissenting Opinion by Judge Lachs in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/ Denmark: Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 229–30, 236. And see also the Advisory Opinion of the Court in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 16; Nuclear Tests case (Australia v, France), [1974] I.C.J. Rep. 253, 267–68. And see the author’s discussion, “International Law-Making and the Judicial Process: The World Court and the French Nuclear Tests Cases,” 3 Syracuse J. Int’l. L. & Com. 9, 39–41 (1975), Franck, , “Word Made Law: The Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Test Cases,” 69 Am. J. Int’l. L. 612, 614–15 (1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sur, “Les affaires des essais nucléaires devant la C.I.J.,” 79 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 972, 998–99 (1975).

⁵ It is no doubt historically correct to trace back the campaign for a new international economic order ultimately to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 14, 1962. Feuer, , “Réflexions sur la Charte des droits et devoirs économiques des Etats,” 79 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 273, 276 (1975).Google Scholar And see also Goldie, , “Some Dilemmas of an Internationalist in a World of State Egoism,” 2 Syracuse J. Int’l. L. & Com. 299, 301 (1974)Google Scholar; and see generally Schwarzenberger, , “The Principles and Standards of International Economic Law,” 1 Recueil des Cours 1 (1966).Google Scholar

⁶ The literature on the old bipolar model of world public order and the mutual interactions of the two blocs and their leaders is now legion; see variously Kulski, , Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (1959)Google Scholar; Hazard, , “Codifying Peaceful Coexistence,” 55 Am. J. Int’l. L. 109 (1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hazard, , “Coexistence Codification Reconsidered,” 57 Am. J. Int’l. L. 88 (1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McDougal, and Lasswell, , “The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order,” 53 Am. J. Int’l. L. 1 (1959)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McWhinney, , “Peaceful Coexistence” and Soviet-Western International Law (1964)Google Scholar; McWhinney, , “Soviet and Western International Law and the Cold War in the Era of Bipolarity,” 1 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 40 (1963)Google Scholar; and, more recently, McWhinney, , “From Bipolarity to Polypolarity: The International Law of the Post-Détente Era,” 1 Multitude Le gum lus Unum: Festschrift für Wilhelm Wengler 289 (Tittel, ed., 1973).Google Scholar

⁷ The intellectual roots of the “new” international law go back to the innovatory Chilean jurist and one-time judge of the World Court, Alvarez, , Le droit international nouveau dans ses rapports avec la vie actuelle des peuples (1959).Google Scholar Long before it was embraced by the third world majority in the United Nations, however, the concept was much canvassed in Soviet and Soviet bloc international law doctrine: see, for example, the debate in 1963 between the celebrated Soviet jurist, Tunkin, and the then Legal Adviser to the British Foreign Office, Sir Francis Vallat, cited in the author’s Conflit idéologique et ordre public mondial 116 (1970). And see also Movchan, , Kodifikatsii i progressivnoe razvitie mezhdunarodnogo prava (1974).Google Scholar

⁸ This important historical difference in the origins of the two movements is reaffirmed in Kardelj, , “The Historical Roots of Non-Alignment,” 15 Socialist Thought and Practice 3 (1975)Google Scholar; Hudes, , “Towards a New International Economic Order,” 2 Yale Studies in World Public Order 88, 95 (1975).Google Scholar

⁹ Gosovic, and Ruggie, , “On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly,” 30 International Organisation 309, 311, 316 (1976)Google Scholar; Hudes, supra note 8, at 99.

¹⁰ Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, A/RES/2625 (XXV), October 24, 1970. Compare Rosen-stock, , “The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey,” 65 Am. J. Int’l. L. 713 (1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sinclair, , “Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States,” in Essays on International Law in Honour of Krishna Rao 107 (Nawaz, ed., 1975)Google Scholar; Frowein, , “Der Beitrag der internationalen Organisationen zur Entwicklung des Völkerrechts,” 36 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 147, 156–8 (1976).Google Scholar

¹¹ Voting NO on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3381 (XXIX), January 15, 1975, were Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the United States; abstaining were Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, and Spain; there were, as noted, 120 affirmative votes.

¹² See, in this regard, Vignes, , “Organisation et règlement intérieur de la IIIe Conférence sur le droit de la mer,” 91 Revue du Droit Public 337 (1975)Google Scholar; Vignes, , “Will the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea Work According to the Consensus Rule?,” 69 Am. J. Int’l. L. 119 (1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McWhinney, , “The Codifying Conference as an Instrument of International Law-making: From the ‘Old’ Law of the Sea to the ‘New’,” 3 Syracuse J. Int’l. L. & Com. 301 (1975).Google Scholar And see also United Nations, Rules of Procedure for the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Rule 39 (Required Majority) and Appendix (Declaration incorporating the “Gentleman’s Agreement”), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/30/Rev. 1, at 9 and 17; reproduced in 13 Int’l. Leg. Mat. 1199, 1205, 1209 (1974).

¹³ Feuer, supra note 5, at 273, 303; Dupuy, , Mélanges Rousseau 75–87 (1974)Google Scholar; Hudes, supra note 8, at 114; Gosovic and Ruggie, supra note 9, at 309, 322.

¹⁴ See, for example, the reservations expressly entered by the United States, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2229, May 1, 1974, at 41; by West Germany, ibid., 51; by France, ibid., 73; by Japan, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2230, May 2, 1974, at 17; by the United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2231, May 2, 1974, at 12; reproduced in 13 Int’l. Leg. Mat. 744 (1974).

¹⁵ “… On s’est alors livré à des exercices véritablement acrobatiques pour rapprocher, fondre, synthétiser tout ce qui pouvait l’être et pour faire entrer dans la Charte, sans souci trop grand de logique ou de réalisme, tout ce que l’on voulait qu’il y entrât. On ne s’étonnera donc pas que la Charte ressemble si fort à l’habit d’Arlequin, et qu’on y rencontre un déséquilibre, une imprécision, un désordre, une hétérogénéité qui en altèrent quelque peu la cohérence et l’élégance.” Feuer, supra note 5, at 237, 285; and see generally Tomuschat, “Die Charta der wirtschafdichen Rechte und Pflichten der Staaten, Zur Gestaltungskraft von Deklarationen der UN-Generalversammlung,” 36 Zaö RV 444 (1976).

¹⁶ “Au-delà de ces malfaçons, le document présente un défaut plus grave, qui est d’être ambigu. Et même doublement ambigu. … Derrière une formulation abstraite et générale se cachent des interprétations qui varient d’un Etat à l’autre et dont les discussions à l’Assemblée générale apportent un écho éloquent. Si bien qu’on ne peut rien dire de la Charte qui ne soit susceptible d’être contesté par l’une quelconque des Parties. La tâche de l’interprète ne s’en trouvera pas facilitée.” Feuer, ibid., 285.

¹⁷ Charter of Economie Rights and Duties of States (U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX), January 15, 1975), Chapter II, Economic Rights and Duties of States:

Article 1. Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.

Article 2. 1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.

2. Each State has the right:

• (a)

  (a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and priorities....

• (b)

  (b) To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within its national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities comply with its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its economic and social policies....

• (c)

  (c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent....

¹⁸ Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States:

Article 33. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.

And see also additional Charter provisions:

Article 16(2). No State has the right to promote or encourage investments that may constitute an obstacle to the liberation of a territory occupied by force.

Article 18. … In the conduct of international economic relations the developed countries should endeavour to avoid measures having a negative effect on the development of the national economies of the developing countries, as promoted by generalised tariff preferences and other generally agreed differential measures in their favour.

¹⁹ Article 16. I. It is the right and duty of all States, individually and collectively, to eliminate colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, neocolonialism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation and domination, and the economic and social consequences thereof, as a prerequisite for development....

²⁰ Article 16(1) … States which practise such coercive policies [i.e. colonialism … ] are economically responsible to the countries, territories and peoples affected for the restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, the natural and all other resources of those countries, territories and peoples. It is the duty of all States to extend assistance to them....

²¹ Article 29. The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind....

²² Article 30. The protection, preservation and enhancement of the environment for the present and future generations is the responsibility of all States....

²³ Compare Loewenstein, , Political Power and the Governmental Process 147–49 (1957).Google Scholar

²⁴ The logically formal rationality of the “classical,” juridically-based system of world public order, now being challenged by the campaign for a new world economic order, was, of course, itself immediately preceded by a fundamentally economically-based system, the so-called Pax Britannica, which “rested on the combined might of the City of London and the British Navy. In the last resort needy governments and private entrepreneurs had to take their cue from the City of London on what would-be ’host’ countries expected of the borrowers.” Schwarzenberger, , “An Evolving Economic World Order,” 1 Rutgers-Camden Law Journal 243, 246 (1969).Google Scholar

²⁵ The third world strategy for ending white minority rule in Southern Africa runs the gamut from direct military involvement, as with the sending of Cuban troops to fight in Angola; indirect military involvement, through assistance to guerrilla operations, as in Rhodesia; and sophisticated juridically-based operations in official international arenas: as to this latter, see the author’s “Credentials of State Delegations to the U.N. General Assembly: A New Approach to Effectuation of Self-Determination for Southern Africa,” 3 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 19 (1976). And see generally Calogeropoulos-Stratis, , Le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes (1973)Google Scholar; Klein, , “Nationale BefreiungsKämpfe und Dekolonisierungspolitik der Vereinten Nationen: Zu einigen völkerrechtlichen Tendenzen,” 36 Zaö RV 618 (1976).Google Scholar

²⁶ Towards a New International Economic Order: Report by a Commonwealth Experts Group 49 (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1975); Hudes, supra note 8, at 88, 178.

²⁷ Kardelj, , “The Historical Roots of Non-Alignment,” 15 Socialist Thought and Practice 3, 44 (1975)Google Scholar; and see generally Rubinstein, and Ginsburgs, , Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective five (1971)Google Scholar; Frowein, supra note 10, at 161.

²⁸ Compare Castrén, , “What We Expect of International Law,” in Essays on International Law in Honour of Krishna Rao 42 (Nawaz, ed., 1975)Google Scholar; Tunkin, , “International Law: The Contemporary and Classic,” ibid., 48, at 55 et seq.Google Scholar; Petersmann, , “Die Dritte Ublt und das Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht. ‘Entwicklungsland’ als privilegierte Rechtsstatus,” 36 Zaö RV 492 (1976).Google Scholar