1. This view, widespread already at the time of the Crimean War and sedulously propagated by Austria's opponents in Russia, Prussia, Germany, the West, and among Rumanian nationalists, is generally adopted in the older Austrian literature (Heinrich Friedjung, Viktor Bibl, Josef Redlich, Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Richard Charmatz), can be found in most of the studies of scholars from other countries (A. O. Meyer, Kurt Borries, Franz Eckhart, R. W. Seton-Watson, E. V. Tarlé and others), and seems universal and taken for granted in the Rumanian literature, both bourgeois and Communist. Some studies (e.g., those of G. H. Henderson and Charles W. Hallberg) pass over the issue or downgrade its importance as a motive for Austrian policy. No one, to my knowledge, however, has raised the question of whether the “aggressive” or “acquisitive” Austrian aims were in reality aggressive at all.

2. Friedjung, Heinrich, Der Krimkrieg und die österreichische Politik (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1907), pp. 108–10, 183–87;Google ScholarBoicu, L., “Incercӑri Franceze de Pӑtrundere în Economia Moldovei in Epoca Razboiului Crimeii şi a Unirii (1853–1859),” Studii privind Unirea Principatelor (Bucharest, 1960), pp. 176–77;Google ScholarBerindei, Dan, ed., Rapoartele Consulatului Austriei din laşi (1856–1859) (Bucharest, 1959), pp. x–xiv. Some authors, acknowledging the absence of any evidence that Austria toward the end of the war was trying for any overt political control of the Principalities, emphasize her alleged plans for economic domination as an alternative to the political control which was denied her by Western and Turk resistance.Google ScholarRiker, T. W., The Making of Roumania (London, 1931), pp. 27–28, 30–32;Google ScholarBoicu, L., “Les Principautés roumaines dans les projets de Karl von Bruck et Lorenz von Stein pour la constitution de la ‘Mitteleuropa’ a l'époque de la guerre de Crimée,” Revue Roumaine d'Histoire, VI (1967), 236–42, 252–55.Google Scholar

3. This particular point deserves attention as a good example of what can happen when historians copy each other without critical checking and analysis of their sources. This alleged statement of Buol's is reported by Count Beust, then Minister-President of Saxony, in his memoirs, Aus Drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten (Stuttgart, 1887), I, 200.Google Scholar It was picked up by Pierre de la Gorce Hisroire du Second Empire (4th ed., 7 vols., Paris, 1912), I, 157,Google Scholar and cited in twisted form (i.e., as a direct quotation rather than an indirect citation) by Friedjung, Krimkrieg, p. 183. Through Friedjung it passed into the common domain and has been cited repeatedly, often in garbled form, right down to the present day, some more recent examples being Seton-Watson, R. W., A History of the Roumanians (Cambridge, 1929), p. 32;Google ScholarHallberg, Charles W., Franz Joseph and Napolen III, 1852–1864 (New York, 1955), p. 105;Google Scholar and Berindei, Rapoartele, p. xiv. Now to judge the value of Beust's testimony, one must consider the following: (I) He was writing, confessedly from memory, about a conversation which had occurred more than thirty years before. (2) He was one of Buol's worst enemies, considered by Buol the most Russian minister in Germany—and therefore the last man in whom Buol would genuinely confide. (3) Beust's memoirs are notoriously unreliable and tendentious, and nowhere more so than at this section, where Beust was trying to prove that Buol's policy had been all wrong and his own right (cf. Fuchs, W. P., Die deutschen Mittelstaaten und die Bundesreform, 1853–1860 [Berlin, 1934], p. 28 and n. 18). (4) Beust does not even say that Buol said directly, “We have the Principalities in our pocket”. Beust's words are, “Nach dem einen Ausspruch hatte Oesterreich die Donau-Fürstenthümer bereits in der Tasche.…” In other words, Buol allegedly said something which Beust took to mean that Buol allegedly said something which Beust took to mean that Buol believed that Austraia had the Principalities already in her pocket. The only conclusion one can reach is that Beust's testimony is of only slight worth in establishing what Buol may actually have said on this occasion, and for establishing what Buol really thought and felt, of no value whatsoever.Google Scholar

4. This distinction is not primarily a juridical or legal one, even though standard authorities distinguish between “real” or “international” protectorates, e.g., that of Great Britian over the Ionian Isles, 1815–1864, and colonial protectorates. Cf. Académie Diplomatique Internationale, Dictionnaire Diplomatique (Paris, n.d.), II, 500–501;Google ScholarDigest of International Law, prepared under the direction of Marjorie A. Whiteman (Washington, D. C., 1963), I, 431–33;Google ScholarBrierly, J. K., The Law of Nations (6th ed., New York, 1963), pp. 133–34.Google Scholar The protectorate Russia exercised over the Principalities, and which Austria proposed to take over with European sanction, was clearly of the former variety. Since the Principalities were not sovereign territories to begin with, but under the Porte's suzerainty, the ties were not sovereign territories to begin with, but under the Porte's suzerainty, the Russian protectorate (which the Russians sometimes insisted was not really a protectorate but only a guarantee)consisted from the legal standpoint in a share of the Porte's suzerain rights over them. But the main point about all such protectorates is that while they all involve some dependent relationship between protected and protector states, this varies widely in practice; a protectorate tends to consist of what the protecting power in fact does with it. The intent of the protecting power, in other words, is important, and can be decisive. Obviously, any protectorate can become the basis for gradual absorption of the protected territory—witness the Russian protectorates in the Trans—Caucasus. Russia might well eventually have annexed the Principalities had she not been stopped. But not all protectorates have ended in annexation by the protecting power—witness the cases of the Ionian Isles, Serbia, or the de facto protectorate exercised by France and England over Greece, especially during the Crimean War. And the very fact that Buol wanted European sanction and control of the protectorate shows that he did not intend it to lead to annexation—just as, analogously, Glandstone's willingness to have European control of Egyptian finances under the British occupation of Egypt shows that he was not aiming at permanent control of Egypt.

5. Writing privately to Baron Lebseltern, chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg, Aug. 5, 1853, Buol, after denouncing Russia's policy as “unjustifiable and diametrically opposed to our interests,” and protesting Russia's efforts to enlist Austria in a holy war for a cause not her own, continued: “The moment will no doubt come when Austria and Russia will have great interests to pursue in the East and when we will be able to do this without running afoul of one another and in mutual support of each other. The only thing which appears to me dangerous is to want to precipitate that moment. We will see Turk domination collapse one day, but it is a question of waiting for the force of events to bring this event about, and above all not appearing to provoke it at such an inopportune time.” Haus-, Hof-und Staatsarchiv (henceforth HHStA), Politisches Archiv (PA) x, 37.

6. Drouyn to Baron Bourqueney, envoy at Vienna, Paris, July 5 and 6, Nos. 49–50, Archive du Ministère des Affaires Etrangeres (henceforth AMAE), Correspondance Politique, Autriche 451; Eugene de Guichen, La Guerre de Crimée, 1854–1856 (Paris, 1936), pp. 58–59;Google Scholar British ambassador Lord Cowley to Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon, Paris private, July 6, 1853, Clarendon deposit c. 6, Bodleian Library, Oxford (henceforth Clardep.).

7. Austrian ambassador Baron Hübner to Buol, Paris, Oct. 22, 1853, No. 159A Reserved, HHStA, PA IX, 42. Hübner remarked that this was not the first such French offer, but the clearest.

8. Drouyn to Bourquency, Nov. 7, 1853, No. 83, AMAE, Autriche 452; Bourqueney to Drouyn, Dec. 1, 1853, No. 123, ibid.

9. Bourqueney to Drouyn, Dec. 16, 1853, No. 130, ibid.

10. Duke Ernest II of Saxe-Coburg, who often invited and undertook English and French commissions in Germany in his eagerness to play a role in great-power politics, repeatedly urged the acquisition of the Principalities on Vienna, but could get nowhere with Francis Joseph. The strongest response was Alexander Bach's remark that Austria must emerge finally with the same protectorate Russia had had, Ernest, , Aus meinem Leben (Berlin, 1888–1889), II, 186;Google ScholarRedlich, Joseph, Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria (New York, 1929), pp. 158–59.Google Scholar Napoleon also went behind the backs of Hübner and Buol to convey directly to Francis Joseph his proposal for giving Austria a protectorate over the Principalities, direct control of the mouths of the Danube, and a guarantee of the whole Austrian Empire, in exchange for a war alliance. Alois Debraux, director of the chancery of the Austrian General Consulate at Paris, to Baron Kübeck, President of the Reichsrat, February 27, 1854, HHStA, Kabinettsarchiv, Geheimakten 3; Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, Der Freiherr von Hübner 1811–1892 (Innsbruck, 1933), p. 117. There is no sign that this approach had more success than those made through regular channels.Google Scholar

11. Ernest II, Aus meinem Laben, II, 139, 141; Cowley to Clarendon, private, Aug. 22, 1853, Clar. dep. c. 6; Palmerston to Clarendon, Aug. 31, 1854, Clar. dep. c. 15; Russell to Clarendon, Oct. 30, 1854, ibid.

12. Feb. 26, 1854, No. 22, AMAE, Autriche 453.

13. HHStA, PA XL, 48.

14. E.g., von Srbik, H., Deutsche Einheit: Idee und Wirklichkeit vom Heiligen Reich bis Königgrätz (Munich, 1936–1942), II, 226, 229–31.Google Scholar

15. Buol's Vortrag of Mar. 21, 1854, HHStA, PA XI, 48.

16. Grünne to Buol, Jan. 8 and II, 1854; Buol to Grünne, Mar. 1, 1854, HHStA, PA XL, 79.

17. Buol to Hübner, 05 4, 1854, HHStA, PA IX, 48; British ambassador at Vienna Lord Westmorland to Clarendon, May 4 and 5, 1854, Nos. 169 and 170, Public Record Office (henceforth PRO), FO 7/433. The occupation convention was concluded with Turkey on June 14.

18. Buol to Lieutenant Field Marshal Count Coronini, June 30, 1854, Kriegsarchiv, Vienna (henceforth KA), Serbisch-Banater Armee-Corps 1854/326; Buol to Quartermaster General Baron Hess, July 22 and Aug. 17, 1854, HHStA, PA XL, 78; Buol to Hübner, Aug. 15, 1854, HHStA, PA IX, 48.

19. KA, Feldakten III and IV Armee-Obercommando/1854/9.

20. June 22, 1854, No. 69, AMAE, Autriche 45

21. Ibid., Drouyn to Bourqueney, May 31, 1854, No. 64. ibid.

22. Briefly, these were (1) that the casus belli for Austria be a Russian refusal to evacuate the Principalities; (2) that the Allied armies cooperate with Austria on the Danube; and (3) that after expulsion of Russia from the Principalities, the Allies be willing to negotiate for peace on definite, moderate terms (the Four Points). The Russian evacuation eliminated the first condition, while the Western powers were not willing to grant Austria the other two. See Buol's Vortrag, of July 30, 1854, HHStA, PA XL, 48.

23. Buol to Hübner, July 2, 1854, No. 3, HHStA, PA IX, 48

24. Occasionally an English leader came to advocate an Austrian occupation as intrinsically desirable for political and military reasons, even if it did not lead to Austrian entrance into the war. Lord Aberdeen, the Prime Minister, frequently urged this (e.g., Aberdeen to Clarendon, June 20, 1854, British Museum [BM], Add. Mss. 43189). But Aberdeen was notoriously Austrophile and had by this time lost all influence on foreign policy. More significantly, Sir Charles, Wood, then President of the Board of Control and later First Lord of the Admiralty, recommended this course in long memoranda to Clarendon and Russell in May 1854, even telling Russell “that her permanent occupation of them would be an advantage to us all”. To Clarendon, May 8, Clar. dep. c. 14, and to Russell, May 9. PRO 30/22, IID. Even Russell, normally strongly Austrophobe, was sufficiently encourged by Austria's pro-Western stance to tell Clarendon on June 5 that the best way to meet the Russian land threat to Turkey lay “in placing Austria or the 5/4 [sic] Powers in the position [in the Principalities] which Russia alone has hitherto held”. Clar. dep. c. 15. These were scattered voices, however. The British public and parliament were solidly anti-Austrian, and those with the decisive voice in policy—Palmerston, Clarendon, Russell, and Stratford de Redcliffe, Ambassador at Constantinople—persistently identified Austria with Russia and wished to oust her from the Principalities, unless these provinces could be used to ease Austria out of Italy.

25. Clarendon to Westmorland, July 7, 1854, PRO, FO 7/429; Colloredo to Buol, July 8, 1854, No. 75C, HHStA, PA VIII, 39.

26. For one example of dozens of expressions of this fear, see Buol to Hübner, July 14, 1854, No. 3, HHSA, PS IX, 48.

27. Same to same, private, July 29, 1854, ibid.

28. Prokesch to Buol, Frankfurt, February 26, 1854, private; May 29, No. 60B Confidential; Aug. 7, private; and Nov.1, No. 118 Confidential, all in HHStA, PA II, 35 (the letter of Aug. 7 is published in von Prokesch, Anton, ed., Aus den Briefen des Grafen Prokesch von Osten, 1849–1855 [Vienna, 1896], pp. 384–85).Google Scholar

29. As does, for example, Friedjung (Krimkrieg, pp. 108–109). Borries, Kurt, Preussen im Krimkrieg 1853–1856 (Stuttgart, 1930), pp. 163–64, recognizes Buol's greater caution and clearer recognition of the dangers involved, but maintains nonetheless that Buol was after the same gains as Prokesch and Hübner, only on the cheap.Google Scholar

30. On Hüber's relations with Buol, see Engel-Janosi, Hüber, pp. 105–107. The British ambassador at Paris, Lord Cowley, reported many instances of Hüber's condemnation of Buol's policy. On November 30, 1853, for example, he wrote Clarendon that Hübner had called Buol unfit for his position, and declared that Austria should long ago have told Russia that crossing the Pruth meant war with Austria. Clar. dep. c. 7. As for Prokesch, he regarded Buol as the worst possibe choice for foreign minister at Schwarzenberg's death in 1852 (Hoffman, Joachim, Die Berliner Mission des Grafen Prokesch-Osten [Berlin, 1959], pp. 96–97),Google Scholar and despite Buol's loyal support of him both at Berlin and Frankfurt, Prokesch never really gained confidence in him Cf. Prokesch, Briefe, p. 446.

31. Earlier in the crisis Prokesch had been as ardent a proponent of cementing the Holy Alliance and solving the Eastern Question at Russia's side as he later became of the Western alliance; Prokesch to Buol, Frankfurt, June 10, 1853, Prokesch, Briefe, pp. 317–19; same to same, private, June 18 and July 12, HHStA, PA II, 26.

32. Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, II, 226, 229–30, 247–50; Tarlé, E. V., Krymskaia Voina (Moscow, 1950), I, 292, 503;Google Scholar II, 293. Friedjung (Krimkrieg, p. 109) and Borries (Preussen im Krimkrieg, pp. 164–66) point out that Bruck and Hess also had expansionist aims, but differed with Buol on means—which is much more correct.

33. See my article, “Bruck versus Buol: The Conflict over Austrian Eastern Policy,1853–1855,” Journal of Modern History, XI, No. 2 (06 1968), 193–217.Google Scholar

34. Hess to Buol, Iaşi, Oct. 7, 1854, HHStA, PA XL, 78.

35. Ibid.; memorandum by Hess, “Militärische-Politische Bemerkungen,” May 12, 1855 HHStA, PA XL, 321; Vortrag by Hess, Jan. 22, 1856, HHStA, PA XII, 259.

36. Hess to Buol, Iaşi, Oct. 7, 1854, HHStA, PA XL, 78.

37. Beer, Adolf, Die orientalische Politik Österreichs seit 1774 (Prague, 1883), pp. 517–18.Google Scholar

38. Ibid., pp. 570–72.

39. Two memoranda from Augustin, July 1855, HHStA, PA XII, 57. Augustin, it must be noted, had a reputation for excessive zeal and lack of prudence which even his good friends could not gainsay. See Coronini to Hess, Iaşi, Jan. 12, 1855, KA, Feldakten III and IV AOK, 321.

40. On the Austrian occupation in general, see Nistor, I., “Ocupaţia austriacӑ in Principate (1854–1857) dupa rapoartele lui Coronini,” Academia Româna, Menioriile Sectiunii Istorice, Ser. III, tom. XX, mem. 7 (1938),Google Scholar and Graf von Wimpffen, Alfons, Erinnerungen aus der Walachei während der Besetzung dutch die österreichischen Truppen in den Jahren 1854–1856 (Vienna, 1878).Google Scholar On the specific issues named, see my article “Bruck versus Buol,” cited above, and also: Francis Joseph to Buol, Schönbrunn, Sept. 5, 1854, KA, Feldakten III and IV AOK 1854/9 Buol to Eduard Bach, civil commissioner for the Principalities, Aug. 22 and Sept. 14, 1854, HHStA, PA XII, 54; Buol to Ştirbei, Vienna, Jan. 22, 1855, in answer to Ştirbei to Buol, Bucharest, Jan. 4, ibid., 57; Clarenclon to Westmorland, No. 341, Oct. 24, 1854, PRO, FO 7/430, and to Stratford, private, Oct. 30, 1854, PRO, FO 352/37/1/2.

41. Of particular interest here are Buol's successful fight to keep the military authorities in the Principalities from assuming authority to try and to punish foreign subjects accused of inciting Austrian soldiers to desertion; his refusal to intervene to influence the choice the hospodars would make for agents to be sent to the Vienna Conferences in the spring of 1855; and his general and persistent counsel to both military and civilian representatives in the Principalities on the necessity of respect for Turk rights and cooperation with Allied consuls there. Note, Buol to AOK, Dec. 29, 1854, HHStA, PA XL, 78; protocol of conference, Jan. 9, ibid., 49; Buol to Hess, Apr. 12 and 21, 1855, ad 48 and ad 58, KA, Feldakten III and IV AOK 1855, 322/IV; Austrian Consul General Mihanovich to Buol, No. 5, Jan. 16, 1855, and Buol to Mihanovich, Jan. 25 and Feb. 14, 1855, HHStA, PA XXXVIII, 109; Austrian Consul General Testa to Buol, cipher telegram, Apr. 16, 1855, and Buol to Testa, Apr. 18, ibid., 110.

42. Steinitz, Eduard, ed., Erinnerungen an Franz Joseph I (Berlin, 1930), pp. 46–47;Google Scholar protocol of conference, Vienna, Feb. 11, 1856, HHStA, PA XII, 219/VII; Baron Werner (Austrian Undersecretary of State, substituting for Buol) to Prokesch, Wos. 21 and 23, Feb. 25, 1856, ibid., 200.

43. Steinitz, Erinnerungen, loc. cit.

44. See, for instance, his explanation of the desired Austrian protectorate as given to the special Prussian envoy Edwin von Manteuffel in December 1854: a joint European guarantee of the Principalities, “mit konimissarischen Auftrag an Österreich, die Aufrechterhaltung der gegeben Rechte zu überwachen.” Quoted in Borries, Krimkrieg, p. 261.

45. One finds Francis Joseph stressing this point from the very beginning of the Eastern crisis, in the Leiningen mission of January 1853, down to the end in the Peace of Paris. Beer, Orientalische Politik, pp. 436–37; protocol of ministerial conference, Vienna, Jan. 11, 1853, HHStA, Ministerrats-Protokolle 15/1; protocol of conference of Feb. 11, 1856, cited above, n. 41.

46. For example, see Joseph, Francis to Hess, Sept. 1854, No. 3666, and Count Grünne to Hess, Oct. 29, 1854, No. 4012, KA, Militär-Kanzlei 1854; Hess to Coronini, Czernowitz, Oct. 10, 1854, No. 55, with Francis Joseph to Hess, Schönbrunn, Oct. 3, 1854, No. 55A and Beilage (no date or title), No. 55B KA, Feldakten, Serbisch-Banater AK, 327/X.Google Scholar

47. Brassier to Minister-President Otto von Manteuffel, Vienna, Nov. 6, 1854, Preussens Auswärtige Politik, 1850–1858, ed. Poschinger, Heinrich V. (Berlin, 1902), II, 546–49.Google Scholar

48. See, for example, his long memoir (entitled “Votum”) addressed to the Emperor for consideration at the crucial ministerial conferences of Nov. 15 and 17, 1854. Verwaltungsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Bach, 18.

49. See Gallagher, John and Robinson, Ronald, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” Economic History Review, 2nd series, VI (1953), 1–15,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and the reply by Oliver McDonagh, “The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade,” ibid., XVI (1962), 489–501. I am not arguing, to be sure, that England wanted to make the Principalities or Turkey her colonies in any formal sense. But it is, I think, clear that Palmerston, Stratford, and others envisioned British-led reform and British supremacy of influence in both areas, and saw free trade as one of the main instruments for achieving this end; and I would heartily agree with McDonagh that other free traders like Cobden and Bright opposed precisely this imperialist element in the foreign policy of Palmerston—particularly at the time of the Crimean War.

50. May 18, 1855, Preussens Auswärtige Politik, II, 124–25.