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Life and Death in the Demiansk Pocket: The 123rd Infantry Division in Combat and Occupation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 August 2008
Extract
During the past two decades, focus on the German-Soviet war has shifted from a nearly exclusive fascination with field marshals and their battles—“chaps and maps”—to one more concerned with the social aspects of the war. Issues of resistance and collaboration, German occupation policies and everyday life under Nazi rule, and the Soviet Union's recovery from the catastrophe of 1941 and its subsequent unprecedented mobilization during the latter stages of the war now constitute the main emphases of research. Many of these new lines of investigation revolve around the implementation and results of the German Vernichtungskrieg, the war of annihilation carried out by the Wehrmacht, SS, and myriad other German agencies against the Soviet state and population. As the army was the largest and most powerful German institution operating in the Soviet Union, it has recently attracted the most attention and generated the most controversy. Historians have reached a rough consensus concerning the German High Command's complicity in implementing the Vernichtungskrieg; here, the set of orders commonly referred to in the literature as the “criminal orders” illustrate the army's means of achieving Hitler's goals. More recently, scholars have begun to investigate the army's responsibility for starving millions of Soviet civilians. While some dissenting voices have been heard, it is clear that the German High Command willingly and even enthusiastically participated in the war of annihilation.
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References
1 This was made abundantly clear by the traveling exhibition “Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941–1944” put on by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research in the late 1990s. On the literal firestorm caused by the exhibition, see Hamburg Institut für Sozialforschung, ed., Besucher einer Ausstellung (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1998)Google Scholar; Thiele, Hans-Günther, ed., Die Wehrmachtsausstellung. Dokumentation einer Kontroverse (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1997)Google Scholar, as well as the citations given in Bartov, Omer, “The Wehrmacht Exhibition Controversy: The Politics of Evidence,” in Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century, ed. Bartov, Omer, Grossman, Atina, and Nolan, Mary (New York: The New Press, 2002), 270–71, n. 1–4.Google Scholar
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13 Oberkommando des Heeres Chef H Rüst und BdE AHA Ia (I) Nr. 2891/40 g.k. 2.10.1940 Betr.: Aufstellung von Divisionen 11. Welle; Anlage 2 zu AHA Ia (I) Nr. 2891/40 g.kdos. Abgaben des Feldheeres an Personaleinheiten für Aufstellung der Divisionen 11. Welle, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (hereafter BA-MA), RH 26–123/172; Tessin, Georg, Verbände und Truppen der Deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS 1939–1945, vol. 6, Die Landstreitkräfte 71–130 (Onasbrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1972), 298–9Google Scholar.
14 Only one document concerning the number of prior servicemen can be found for the division. It states that 7,907 men had served in the field army before entering the 123rd ID. Since the division had 17,817 soldiers in the spring of 1941, it seems that the one-third to one-half approximation is likely. See 123 ID Abt Ib–Az. Aufst., 16.10.1940, BA-MA RH 26–123/3; Transportmeldungen Nr. 823/41 geh., 6.3.41, BA-MA RH 26–123/4.
15 The only divisional file located that deals with the regional composition of the division dates from December 1, 1941. It states that nearly sixty percent of the division indeed hailed from Military District III. Since the division had already suffered heavy casualties and received very few replacements by this point, it is reasonable to conclude that the percentage was even higher at the outbreak of war; see Landmannschaftliche Zusammensetzung 123 ID, Stand 1.12.41, BA-MA RH 26–123/161.
16 The two companies are the 1/415th Infantry Regiment and the 1/416th Infantry Regiment; for the composition of the 1/415th, see Erkennungsmarken Nachweise der 1./IR 415 (ehem. 9. Inf. Regt. 9) and the monthly reports entitled 1. Kompanie Infanterie-Regiment 415 Erkennungsmarkenverzeichnis/Veränderungsmeldung from October 12, 1940, to July 12, 1941, Deutsche Dienststelle (hereafter WASt), 80744; and for the 1/416th, see 1. Kompanie Inf. Rgt.416 (Bisher 9./IR 67) Erkennungsmarkenverzeichnis Veränderungsmeldung from January 3, 1941, to July 8, 1941, WASt, 80763.
17 “Weisung Nr. 21 Fall Barbarossa,” printed in Hubatsch, Walther, ed., Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939–1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1962), 84–8Google Scholar.
18 See the vociferous complaints of Army Group North's Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, in his diary; von Leeb, Wilhelm Ritter, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen, ed. Georg, Meyer (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), July 17, 1941, 298; August 2, 1941; August 3, 1941, 316–17Google Scholar.
19 Kriegstagebuch 123rd ID (hereafter KTB), 2.8.41, BA-MA RH 26–123/9; Fernspruch 19.7, 01.40 an 416 Infanterie-Regiment, BA-MA RH 26–126/15.
20 Lt. Klaus W., 418 Infantry Regiment, 17.7.41, Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte (hereafter BfZ), Sammlung Sterz.
21 XXVII AK KTB, 13.7.41, BA-MA RH 24–28/14.
22 Divisions-Führer 123 Inf. Division Nr. 1054/41 geh. Betr.: Manneszucht, 6. September 1941, BA-MA RH 26–123/19. The following discussion is based on this document.
23 II AK KTB, 21.9.41, BA-MA RH 24–2/80. The 415th Infantry Regiment reported that its “men look like corpses;” 17.35 Uhr Von IR 415, 23. September 1941, BA-MA RH 26–123/32.
24 II AK KTB, 1.12.41, 10.12.41, BA-MA RH 24–2/80; Leeb, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen, Dec. 1, 1941, 399–400.
25 These figures are arrived at through the use of the personnel reports for the two companies from October 1940 through December 1941. For the 1/415th, see the monthly reports entitled Erkennungsmarken Nachweise der 1./IR 415 (ehem. 9. Inf. Regt. 9), 1. Kompanie Infanterie-Regiment 415 Erkennungsmarkenverzeichnis/Veränderungsmeldung from October 12, 1940, to December 11, 1941, WASt, 80744; and for the 1/416th, see 1. Kompanie Inf.Rgt.416 (Bisher 9./IR 67) Erkennungsmarkenverzeichnis/Veränderungsmeldung from January 3, 1941, to December 22, 1941, WASt, 80763.
26 Fernschreiben an Armee-Oberkommando 16, 21.11.41, BA-MA RH 26–123/22.
27 II AK KTB, 20.11.41, 21.11.41, 4.12.41, 11.12.41, BA-MA RH 24–2/80.
28 One soldier reported that the “primary task of the soldiers now consisted of building shelters for the winter”; Lt. Klaus W., Inf. Rgt. 418, 18.11.41, BfZ, Sammlung Sterz.
29 KTB, Band II, Überblick 16.12.41–5.1.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/46. The original war diary for this time period was destroyed by enemy fire.
30 Generalkommando II. Armeekorps, Abteilung Qu/Ia 461/43 g.Kdos, Betr.: Bandeneinwirkung an Armee-Oberkommando 16, 15. Mai 1943, BA-MA RH 24–2/210. Gerlach argues that “that there certainly cannot be at any time talk of a ‘partisan struggle’ without partisans,” as by mid-August 1941 there were 12,000 partisans active in Belarus and by the end of the year, the number had ballooned to 30,000; see Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 861. For the counterargument, see Heer, Hannes, “The Logic of the War of Extermination: The Wehrmacht and the Anti-Partisan War,” in War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II 1941–1944, ed. Hannes, Heer and Klaus, Naumann (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 92–126Google Scholar.
31 AK II KTB, 16.12.41, BA-MA RH 24–2/107.
32 Generalkommando II. Armeekorps, Abteilung Qu/Ia 461/43 g. Kdos, Betr.: Bandeneinwirkung an Armee-Oberkommando 16, 15. Mai 1943, BA-MA RH 24–2/210.
33 Already on January 6, the division noted that “there are far too many indicators for a large-scale enemy offensive not to occur”; KTB, 6.1.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/46. Leeb also wrote that “all signs point to an enemy attack on the 123rd ID very soon, perhaps tomorrow”; Leeb, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen, January 8, 1942, 431; KTB, Überblick von 16.12.41–5.1.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/46. On the actual breakthrough, see KTB, 10.1.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/46.
34 Leeb, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen, January 10, 1942, 432; Halder, Franz, Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939–1942, ed. Hans-Adolf, Jacobson (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962–64), vol. III, January 12, 1942, 381–82Google Scholar. This fear, of course, was predicated on Hitler's notorious “No Step Back” order given following the onset of the Soviet counteroffensive in mid-December 1941. In regard to Army Group North, while permitting the withdrawal behind the Volkhov River for units that had participated in the abortive Tichvin offensive, Hitler categorically stated, “other retrograde movements can only be carried out when an acute danger threatens the entire front”; Schramm, Percy, ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 1940–1941 (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, no date)Google Scholar, Band V, Teilband 2, Op. Abt. (IM), Nr.1725/41 g.Kdos.Chefs., 16. Dezember 1941, 1083. On the defense of the strong-points, see KTB, 15.1.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/46.
35 Bericht des Kommandeurs des verst. IR 416 über den Verlauf des Rückmarsches vom 11.-26.1.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/87.
36 KTB, 15.1.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/46; Artillerie-Regiment 123, Abteilung Ia, Betr.: Gefechtsbericht, 21.2.42. The subordinate units of the 123rd ID suffered tremendous casualties due to frostbite. The Veterinary Company, forced into a combat role, reported 108 cases of frostbite (in comparison to thirty casualties) during a two-week period, while the Reconnaissance Section reported 160 cases of frostbite in addition to a further 169 sick soldiers. For the Veterinary Company, see Abschnitt Schroeder, Abteilung IIa, 29.1.1942; on the Reconnaissance Section, see Aufklärungs-Abt. 123, Gefechtsbericht für die Zeit vom 8.1. bis 30.1.1942. Both reports are in BA-MA RH 26–123/85.
37 For Hitler's order, see Korpsbefehl, 13. Januar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/50; on the division's order, see 123 ID Kommandeur, Erfahrungen der Abwehrkämpfe, 14. Januar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/48.
38 AK II KTB, 17.1.42, BA-MA RH 24–2/107. Klink places the crisis in Army Group North within the context of the much more desperate situation facing Army Group Center. Both Hitler and Halder felt that the withdrawal of II Corps would unhinge the entire northern flank of Army Group Center; see Klink, Ernst, “The Conduct of Operations,” in Germany and the Second World War, ed. Boog, et al. , vol. IV, 738Google Scholar. Leeb and Hitler had a contentious discussion on January 13. Leeb, utterly disgusted at Hitler's obstinate refusal to countenance the withdrawal of II Corps, submitted his resignation on January 15, with Eighteenth Army's commander, Georg von Küchler, taking control of the Army Group North on January 18; see Leeb, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen, January 13, 1942, January 15, 1942, January 18, 1942, 433–440. On the meeting between Hitler and Leeb, see also Halder, , Kriegstagebuch, vol. III, January 13, 1942, 383Google Scholar.
39 AK II KTB, 19.1.42, 21.1.42, BA-MA RH 24–2/107.
40 10.30 Uhr an II A.K., BA-MA RH 26–123/50.
41 Divisionsarzt 123 Infanterie Division, Betr.: Gesundheitsbericht, 31. Januar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/50. The doctor for the II/415th Infantry Regiment noted that “the general health of the troops has considerably worsened recently … the soldiers make a completely weakened and malnourished impression”; Bataillonsarzt II./Infanterie-Rgt. 415, 6.2.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/83.
42 Infanterie-Regiment 415, Abteilung Ia, Betr.: Gefechtsbericht für die Zeit vom 8.-30.1.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/86; for an analysis of the SS-Totenkopf division's condition in the pocket, see Sydnor, Charles W. Jr., Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death's Head Division, 1933–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 2nd ed., 230–31Google Scholar.
43 See 1. Kompanie Infanterie-Regiment 415 Erkennungsmarkenverzeichnis/Veränderungsmeldung from February 1, 1942, WASt, 80744.
44 II./Infanterie-Regiment 415 Abt. Ia/IVb 6.2.42 Betr.: Beanspruchung der Truppe, BA-MA RH 26–123/85.
45 KTB, 7.2.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/46. That this was a very shaky stabilization was made clear by the division's daily report to II Corps on February 9 when it stated that “the manning of the position has become so thin, that the line is no longer a HKL [main combat line] but rather a security line”; Tagesmeldung 9. Februar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/203.
46 Halder, , Kriegstagebuch, vol. III, February 10, 1942, 397Google Scholar. As early as mid-January, one combat group operating under the 123rd ID's command had more than 200 men from the veterinary company and 67 men from the medic company in the front line; Kämpfstärke und Waffenbesetzung der Gruppe Schröder, no date, BA-MA 26–123/48.
47 IVa, Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 1.2.-28.2.42, 1.4.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/226.
48 Ibid., 10.2.42. The Corps' war diarist recorded that “the Corps cannot survive with this type of supply.”
49 Tätigkeitsbericht der Abteilung IIa vom 16.2.42–15.3.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/163.
50 18.2.42, 18.3.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/46.
51 Tagesmeldung 5. Februar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/52.
52 Gruppe Rauch, no date [presumably February 20, 1942, or February 21, 1942] in BA-MA RH 26–123/88.
53 Veterinärkompanie 123, Betr.: Zustandbericht der Vet. Kp.123, 27. Februar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/203.
54 Kommandierende General des II Armeekorps, Qu. Nr. 80/42 geh., 18.1.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/219.
55 One example of these scorched-earth tactics is found in the directive to retreat from the Molvotitsy Hedgehog position in which “all buildings [are] to be destroyed”; Gruppe Rauch, Abt. Ia/Az Iva, Nr. 139/42 geh., 17. März 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/53.
56 Gruppe Rauch Abt. Ia/Az. Iva, Nr. 151/42 geh., Gruppenbefehl für den Ausbau der Polastellung, 6. März 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/53.
57 Generalkommando II Armeekorps, Abt. Ia, Nr. 803/42 geh., Korpsbefehl Nr. 119, 29. März 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/55; Glantz, David, The Battle for Leningrad (Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 2003), 185Google Scholar.
58 Private Ernst A., Infantry Regiment 272, 26.3.42, BfZ, Sammlung Sterz.
59 Gruppe Rauch, Ib, Besondere Anordnung für die Versorgung für den 27.3.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/217.
60 IVa, Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 1.-31.3.42, 6.4.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/226.
61 Fernschreiben von 123 Infanterie Division an II A.K., Betr.: Einsatz der Btle., BA-MA RH 26–123/56.
62 Gruppe Rauch Abt. Ia/Az.IVa Nr. 1009/42 geh., An Generalkommando II. Armeekorps, 19. September 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/58.
63 Zustandbericht 123 ID (o. IR 416, 4./- u.8/IR 418 und kleins Spliterrgruplen [sic]) 10.6.1942 Nr. 320/42 geh.; Zustandbericht 123 ID 1.10.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/230.
64 123 ID Abt Ia/Az. VII Nr. 1879/43 g.Kdos. 4. Juli 1943 Betr.: Kampfwert, BA-MA RH 26–123/123.
65 1. Kompanie Infanterie-Regiment 415 Erkennungsmarkenverzeichnis/Veränderungsmeldung, dated 12.7.1941 to 12.5.42, WASt, 80744; 1. Kompanie Inf. Rgt. 416 1. Bataillon Erkennungsmarkenverzeichnis Veränderungsmeldung, 8.7.1941 to 8. Mai 1942, WASt, 80763.
66 1. Kompanie Infanterie-Regiment 415 Erkennungsmarken-Verzeichnis (Veränderungsanzeige), 12.6.1942 through 15.1.1943, WASt, 80744; 1/416 Veränderung zur Erkennungsmarkenliste der Dienststelle 10324B, 18.5.42 through 21.1.43, WASt, 80763.
67 Van Creveld, Martin, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945 (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1982), 45Google Scholar; Rass, Christoph, “Menschenmaterial.” Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront. Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision 1939–1945 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2003), 107, 405Google Scholar.
68 While division command unit maintained control over the majority of its units (with the important exceptions of the infantry and artillery battalions), it also found itself commanding the following units: the 12th ID's reconnaissance unit, the 960th Landschützen Battalion, the 89th Infantry Regiment, Pioneer Battalion 671, Wachbataillon 707, a company of the 12th ID's anti-tank section, pieces of the 526th Artillery Abteilung, the 619th Motorcycle Battalion, and parts of 27th Infantry Regiment; see Kräfteverteilung 16. Januar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/224.
69 Rass, “Das Sozialprofil von Kampfverbänden,” 680–682; here 681.
70 Bartov, Hitler's Army, passim.
71 Halder, , Kriegstagebuch, vol. III, February 22, 1942, 405Google Scholar.
72 Generalkommando II Armeekorps, Ia Nr.53/42 geh., Korpsbefehl Nr. 89, 11. Januar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/50. It should be noted that the use of scorched earth by the 123rd ID in January and February 1942 was merely the application of tactics previously used by the Soviets during their retreat in late 1941. According to the war diary of the 123rd ID, the Russians burned down a total of five villages on November 23 and December 4; see the war diary's entries for November 23, 1941, and December 4, 1941. II Corps believed that the Red Army “apparently just wanted to burn down buildings to deprive German troops of shelter”; see II AK KTB, 5.12.41, BA-MA RH 24–2/80.
73 12. Januar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/48.
74 Gefechtsbericht über die Zeit vom 8.-30.1.1942, I/415; III Bataillon Infanterie-Regiment 415, Bericht über die Ereignisse bei IR 415 (ohne II./415) seit dem 11.1.42, 2.II.42. See also Bericht über den Einsatz der 2./Ar 123 vom 8.1.1942 bis 12.1.1042, BA-MA RH 26–123/85.
75 Gruppe Rauch, Abt. Ia/Az. IVa, Div. Befehl Nr. 121, 18. Januar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/50. The repeated orders to burn all of these dwellings leads one to believe that the soldiers refrained from destroying every shelter in the area. Whether this was done out of humanitarian motives or resulted from oversight is open to speculation.
76 Gruppe Rauch, Abt. Ia/Az.IVa, Befehl für die Verteidigung der Nachschubstraße, 30. Januar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/50. Emphasis in original.
77 123 Infanterie-Division, Abt. Ia/Straßenkommandant, Betr.: Walinkis-Filzstiefel, 19.1.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/50. Emphasis in original. The division recorded that it was able to procure thirty-four pairs of boots in this “action”; see Filzstiefelaktion, 19.1.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/48.
78 Gruppe Rauch, Ib, Besondere Anordnungen für die Versorgung für den 19.1.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/217. Panje horses were horses native to the U.S.S.R. that the Germans found to be better suited to the climate and terrain of the Soviet Union than German horses.
79 KTB Qu., 12.2.42, 13.2.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/200. A report from the supply company indicated twenty-five head of cattle were seized; Stab Dinafü 123, 15. Februar 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/203.
80 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 1.2.-28.2.42, IVa, 1.4.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/226.
81 KTB Qu., 22.1.42, 12.2.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/200.
82 Ibid., 14.2.42, 15.2.42, 16.2.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/200.
83 On the 12th ID and its condition during the fighting, see Bartov, The Eastern Front, 25.
84 Chrezvychainaia Gosudarstvennaia Komissiia po Ustanovleniiu i Rassledovaniiu Prestuplenii Nemetsko-Fashistskikh Zakhvatchikov na Territorii Sovetskogo Soyuza, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, RG 22–002M, Reel 18, 1745. Oldenburg notes similar, though much larger-scale programs undertaken by the 11th Army during the spring of 1942 that produced comparable results; see his Ideologie und militärisches Kalkül, 90–2.
85 This chronology follows that of the Eleventh Army in the Crimea and Seventeenth Army in the Donets Basin fairly closely; see ibid., 68–77; 228–232.
86 Halder, , Kriegstagebuch, vol. III, February 13, 1942, 399Google Scholar.
87 Ibid., 21.3.1942, 417.
88 Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction, 224–225.
89 On the effects of the Russian thaw, see KTB II AK, 10.4.42, 17.4.42; on the link-up between II Corps and the rescue force, see KTB, 22.4.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/46.
90 Generalkommando II Armeekorps, Abt. Ia Nr. 1422/42 geh., Korpsbefehl Nr. 124, 19.5.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/57. Emphasis in original. Five days after the encirclement was broken, II Corps issued an order stating that the troops were to “maintain defensive positions”; Generalkommando II. Armeekorps, Nr. 1177/42 geh., Korpsbefehl Nr. 120, 27.4.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/56.
91 See the six-page instructional pamphlet concerning fortifications: Gruppe Rauch, Abt. Ia/Az. Iva, Nr. 314/42 geh., Betr.: Ausbau der Pola-Stellung, 28. April 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/56.
92 Wegner, Bernd, “The War against the Soviet Union 1942–1943,” in Germany and the Second World War, ed. Boog, Horst et al. , volume VI, The Global War: Widening of the Conflict and the Shift of the Initiative 1941–1943 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 1205.Google Scholar
93 Anlage 2 zu Gruppe Rauch, Abt. Ia/Az.Ive 1 Nr. 1965/42 geh. vom 18.12.42, Anzahl verlegter Minen, Stand vom 17.12.1942; 123 ID Abt. Ia/Az.IVe 1 an Generalkommando II AK, 3. September 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/106.
94 II Corps complained that it had suffered more than 4,000 casualties during the month of June despite the lack of any major combat. From July 1 through July 10, II Corps suffered an additional 1,136 casualties; see KTB II AK 1.7.41, 12.7.42, BA-MA RH 24–2/379.
95 Generalkommando II Armeekorps, Abt. Ia, Nr. 1253/42 geh., Zusatz zum Korpsbefehl Nr. 123, 6. Mai 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/56.
96 KTB, 4.5.42, 7.5.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/46; Pionier Bataillon 123 Abt. Ia/M, Betr.: Riegelstellung “M,” 31. Juli 1942.
97 Gruppe Rauch, Abt. Ia/Az. Iva, 1. Mai 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/56.
98 Abschnitt Koßmala, Abt. Ia, Betr.: Kampfunterstände, 29.6.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/65. The I/418 reported that while thirty-three dugouts were finished, twelve of them were flooded.
99 Fernspruch Nr. 17, Gruppe Rauch Ia an Gen Kdo II AK, Betr.: Einsatz russischer Zivilkräfte zum Straßenbau, 11.10.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/96.
100 The opening of the land bridge connecting the pocket to the Sixteenth Army allowed for rations to be raised; KTB AK II, 3.5.42, BA-MA RH 24–2/108; IVa, Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 1.-31.5.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/226. Air supply also picked up considerably by early March with the goal of 300 tons of supplies exceeded for the first time on March 4. Subsequent daily deliveries reached a total of 544 tons; KTB AK II, 4.3.42, 7.3.42, 18.3.42, 23.3.42, BA-MA RH 24–2/108.
101 Lt. Klaus W., Inf. Rgt. 418, 31.7.42, BfZ, Sammlung Sterz.
102 Abschnitt Noack Abteilung Ib, Betr.: Flüchtlinge in Gl.-Demidovo, 30.4.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/204.
103 KTB Qu., 25.4.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/201.
104 Ibid., 30.4.42.
105 Ibid. The remainder of this discussion is based on this entry unless otherwise noted.
106 The idea of forcing civilians across the line into Soviet-controlled territory was one that first surfaced in discussions concerning the fate of Leningrad's civilians. The idea was finally put into practice on a horrifyingly large scale by the Ninth Army in March 1944. On Leningrad, see Ganzenmüller, Jörg, Das belagerte Leningrad, 1941–1944. Die Stadt in den Strategien von Angreifern und Verteidigern (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005), 37–38Google Scholar. On the Ninth Army's actions, see Rass, Menschenmaterial, 386–402.
107 KTB Qu., 1.5.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/201.
108 Gruppe Rauch, Abt. Ib, Nr. 194/42 geh., Betr.: Ernährung der Zivilbevölkerung, 2. Mai 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/205. The following discussion is based on this document unless otherwise noted.
109 Similar motives guided the policy of the Seventeenth Army as fear of unrest in its rear area led its commander, Colonel-General Hermann Hoth, to announce that “assisting [civilians] with food lay in the interests of the Wehrmacht and is an issue of extraordinary importance for the Army.” The Seventeenth Army also began supplying civilians with food from its own stocks; see Oldenburg, Ideologie und militärisches Kalkül, 238.
110 123 Inf. Division, Ib/Wi., Betrifft.: Heuaufbringung im Div.-Bereich, 25. Juni 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/206. One officer estimated that “thousands” of prisoners of war were used to gather the harvest; Lt. Klaus W., Inf. Rgt. 418, 31.7.42, BfZ, Sammlung Sterz.
111 123 Inf. Division, Ib/Wi. Betr.: Heuaufbringung im Div.-Bereich. 16. Juni 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/206. A cynic, however, might ask how many of such animals were still in the possession of civilians following the experiences of the winter fighting.
112 123 Inf. Division, Ib/Wi., Betr.: Roggenernte, 12. August 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/208.
113 Armeeoberkommando 16 O.Qu/Qu.2, Verordnung zur Regelung des Arbeiteinsatzes, 18.7.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/220.
114 123 ID Ib 6.11.42, Besondere Anordnungen für die Versorgung zum Div.-Befehl Nr. 171, BA-MA RH 26–123/218.
115 Generalkommando II AK, Korpstagesbefehl, 26.9.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/97.
116 Oldenburg, Ideologie und militärisches Kalkül, 316. See his further discussions of this issue on 117–119, 245.
117 Armee-Oberkommando 16 Abt.: Ic/A.O. Nr. 463/42 geh. 20. Juni 1942 Betr.: Lagebericht Abwehr, BA-MA RH 26–123/220.
118 Such opposition to the regime's goals also took place at much higher levels of the military hierarchy. The resistance of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, commander-in-chief of the Eleventh Army, to the plans to evacuate some 700,000 inhabitants of the Crimea to allow for the “Germanization” of the area has been convincingly interpreted by Oldenburg as a triumph of strategy over ideology. See Oldenburg, Ideologie und militärisches Kalkül, 132.
119 Generalkommando II Armeekorps, Qu. Nr. 987/42 geh., Besondere Anordnung für die Versorgung des II AK, Nr. 214, 23.8.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/220. The remainder of this section is based on this document unless otherwise noted.
120 Emphasis in original.
121 For overviews of this problem, see Kroener, Bernhard, “The Manpower Resources of the Third Reich in the Area of Conflict between Wehrmacht, Bureaucracy, and War Economy,” in Germany and the Second World War, ed. Kroener, Bernhard et al. vol. V/1, Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 787–1100Google Scholar, esp. 996–1096; Herbert, Ulrich, Hitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 27–137.Google Scholar
122 Herbert, Ulrich, “Zwangsarbeit in Deutschland. Sowjetische Zivilarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene 1941–1945,” in Erobern und Vernichten. Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941–1945, ed. Rürup, Reinhard and Jahn, Peter (Berlin: Argon, 1991), 106–130Google Scholar; here, 110–113; Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 137–171, provides an excellent account of the decision-making process that resulted in the employment of Soviet laborers in the Reich.
123 Becker, Peter W., “Fritz Sauckel: Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor,” in The Nazi Elite, ed. Smelser, Ronald and Zitelmann, Rainer (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 194–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
124 Müller, Rolf-Dieter, “Menschenjagd. Die Rekrutierung von Zwangsarbeitern in der besetzten Sowjetunion,” in Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941–1944, ed. Heer, Hannes and Naumann, Klaus (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), 92–103Google Scholar; here, 94.
125 On the Wehrmacht's view, see ibid.; on the total numbers involved, see Herbert, “Zwangsarbeit in Deutschland,” 107.
126 Gruppe Rauch, Ib, Betrifft: Anwerbung und Abschub russischer Arbeiter für das Reich, 26. Mai.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/205.
127 KTB Qu., 3.6.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/201; Gruppe Rauch, Ib/IV Wi., Betr.: Anwerbung und Abschub russischer Arbeiter für das Reich, 6. Juni 1942; 123 Inf. Division, Ib/Wi., Betr.: Anwerbung und Abschub russ. Arbeiter für das Reich, 16.6.42; Abteilung Ib, 23.6.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/205. The focus of recruitment subtly shifted in November 1942 when the division looked for “Russian women fifteen to thirty-five, healthy, no foreign/alien types, to go to Germany as household servants.” Again, this was designed as a voluntary program; 123 Inf. Division, Abt. IV/Wi, 18.11.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/211. For a further discussion of this particular program, see Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 187–189.
128 As early as May 5, II Corps contacted the Sixteenth Army and argued the “necessity of evacuating the civilian population out of the pocket” due to the difficulties in feeding the population of the front areas and the destroyed villages who “crowded together in the middle of the pocket”; KTB AK II, 18.5.42, BA-MA RH 24–2-108.
129 Generalkommando II. Armeekorps, Qu./IV Wi., Betr.: Abschub und Ernährung russischer Zivilbevölkerung, 9.6.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/206.
130 See the entries in the Quartermaster's war diary for 9.8.42, 11.8.42, 18.8.42, 22.8.42, 4.10.42, 4.11.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/201; Fernspruch 8.6.42, Betr.: Abschub russischer Arbeiter in das Reich, Fernspruch 16.6.42, II AK Qu, an alle Divisionen; Fernspruch, 21.7.42, an Ib, BA-MA RH 26–123/214; Fernspruch 123 ID, 16.11.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/216.
131 Ibid., 21.7.42; 1.8.42; 22.12.42. In October, the division requested the further evacuation of approximately 1,750 people as the “harvest yields would suffice for the civilian population until the end of the year.” This food could last longer for those working for the Germans if the unproductive were deported; Gruppe Rauch, Ib/Ia, Betr.: Evakuierung der Zivilbevölkerung, 23. Oktober 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/102.
132 123 Inf. Division, Abt. Ic, Betr.: Überwachung der Zivilbevölkerung, 28.9.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/209.
133 KTB Qu., 9.8.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/201.
134 Tätigkeitsbericht Ic mit Anlagen 21.6–10.11.42, 14.8.42, BA-MA RH 26–123/155; Tätigkeitsbericht der 123 Inf. Division, Abt. Ic, für die Zeit vom 21–30. November 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/156.
135 Lt. Klaus W., Inf. Rgt. 418, 31.7.42, BfZ, Sammlung Sterz.
136 123. Inf. Division, Abt. Ic, Betr.: Überwachung der Zivilbevölkerung, 6.10.1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/98.
137 123 Inf. Division, Kommandeur, 24. November 1942, BA-MA RH 26–123/211.
138 Generalkommando II. Armeekorps, Abteilung Ia, Tagesbefehl, 24. Januar 1943, BA-MA RH 26–123/166; 126 Infanterie Division, Tagesmeldung an Gruppe Laux, 28.11.42, BA-MA RH 26–126/65.
139 KTB, 28.12.41, BA-MA RH 26–123/46.
140 Ibid., 18.12.42.
141 Wegner, “The War against the Soviet Union 1942–1943,” 1205.
142 Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando, Band V, Teilband I, 1. Januar 1943, 10.
143 KTB, 3.1.43, BA-MA RH 26–123/117.
144 Ibid., 8.1.43.
145 Küchler made this exact point; see Wegner, “The War against the Soviet Union 1942–1943,” 1205, n. 129.
146 On Hitler's view, see the comments of Helmuth Greiner, the OKW war diarist, and General Walther Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Operations for the OKW, in Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando, Band V, Teilband I, 30. Januar 1943, 86.
147 Ibid., 31. Januar 1943, 86. The plan called for phased withdrawals beginning with formations located in the easternmost section of the pocket. It envisaged the manning of six lines before all units were able to withdraw to the western bank of the Lovat River. See Haupt, Werner, Heeresgruppe Nord (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1967), 149–154Google Scholar.
148 Generalkommando II. Armeekorps, Abteilung Ia, Nr. 117/43 g.Kdos, Betr.: Entrümpelungsaktion, 2. Febr. 1943, BA-MA RH 26–123/118.
149 Generalkommando II. Armeekorps, Abt. Ia, Nr. 192/43 g.Kdos, Betr.: Unternehmen “Ziethen,” 13. Febr. 1943, BA-MA RH 26–123/118. Regimental commanders in the 123rd ID learned of the evacuation during a meeting at divisional headquarters on February 8; KTB, 8.2.43, BA-M RH 26–123/118.
150 123 Inf. Division, Abt. Ia/Az. Iva E. Nr. 477/43 g.Kdos, Divisionsbefehl Nr. 1 für die Durchführung des Unternehmens “Ziethen,” BA-MA RH 26–123/118.
151 At roughly the same time as II Corps was turning the Demiansk pocket into a smoking pile of rubble, the Ninth Army was beginning to withdraw from the exposed Rzhev salient toward the Buffalo Position. Its commander, Colonel-General Walter Model, reminded his subordinates of “the importance of creating a zone of complete destruction in front of the Buffalo Position”; quoted in Rass, Menschenmaterial, 382. For a brief discussion of the scorched earth tactics employed here, see Rass's discussion, 381–82. Gerlach provides details of Army Group Center's withdrawal through Belarus; Kalkulierte Morde, 1102–4.
152 Müller, Norbert, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den zeitweilig besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion (1941–1944) (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1991), Document 157, 390.Google Scholar
153 Anlage 3 zu Gen.Kdo.II.A.K. Ia Nr. 192/43 g.Kdos. vom 13.2.1943, BA-MA RH 26–123/118; Bartov, The Eastern Front, 140.
154 Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 153–154.
155 126 Infanterie Division, Abt. Ia/Pi., 1.3.43, Richtlinien für die Zerstörungs- und Sperrung im Abschnitt der Division, BA-MA RH 26–126/89.
156 126 Infanterie Division, Abt. Ia, Nr. 255/43, geheim, Divisionsbefehl für das Ausweichen in die Lowatj-Brückenkopfstellung (Nr. 126), 25.2.43, BA-MA RH 26–126/75; 123 Infanterie Division, Abt. Ia/Az IVa/R Nr. 544/43 geh., 21. Februar 1943, BA-MA RH 26–123/240; Gruppe Höhne, Ia 320/43 geh., Gruppenbefehl für Absetzen von Linie “F” auf Linie “C,” 23.2.43, BA-MA RH 26–126/88; Gruppe Höhne Ia, 118/43 g.Kdos., Betr.: Unternehmen “Ziethen,” 19.2.43, BA-MA RH 26–126/89; KTB Qu., 22.2.43, BA-MA RH 26–123/233.
157 Fernschreiben 142, 16.2.43 von Chef des Generalstabes an 123 Infanterie Division, BA-MA RH 26–123/240; the II Corps quartermaster ordered the removal of all cattle both to secure the German supply and to deny them to the oncoming Soviets; KTB Qu., 16.2.43, BA-MA RH 26–123/233.
158 123 Infanterie Division, Ib, Nr. 278/43 geh., Befehl für das Zurückführen der Zivilbevölkerung in den Abstellraum der Division, 16.2.43, BA-MA RH 26–123/240. The following discussion is based on this document unless otherwise noted; see also KTB Qu., 12.2.43, 18.2.43, BA-MA RH 26–126/151.
159 Pioneer Btl. 126, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4, 1.1–30.6.1943, 20.2.43, BA-MA RH 46/416.
160 KTB Qu., 22.2.43, BA-MA RH 26–123/233. For a look at the 12th ID's activities during the withdrawal, see Bartov, The Eastern Front, 140.
161 KTB, 1. Vierteljahr 1943, 31.1.43, 28.2.43, RW 31/588.
162 Ibid., 31.1.43.
163 KTB des leitenden Wirtschaftskommandos Dno, 39, BA-MA RW 31/935.
164 KTB, 28.2.43, BA-MA RW 31/588.
165 Ibid., 11.3.43.
166 Ibid., 28.2.43.
167 KTB 1. Vierteljahr 1943, 146, 165, BA-MA RW 31/937.
168 For the number of evacuees from the Demiansk pocket, see Stabsbesprechung am 28.3.1943 in Sitzungssaal, BA-MA RW 31/588; on the number of civilians in the Army Group area, see KTB, 31.3.43, BA-MA RW 31/588. The phrase comes from the War Diary entry for March 30, 1943.
169 KTB des leitenden Wirtschaftskommandos Dno, 59, BA-MA RW 31/595.
170 KTB 3. Vierteljahr, Woche v.1.-10.7.43, BA-MA RW 31/939.
171 Lt. Klaus W., Inf. Rgt. 418, 31.7.1942, BfZ, Sammlung Sterz.
172 Hartmann, Christian, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherishe Wehrmacht? Überlegungen zur Struktur des deutschen Ostheeres 1941–1944,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 52 (2004): 1–75Google Scholar.
173 It is at this point that Hull's argument concerning the increasingly radicalized culture of the Prusso-German army becomes somewhat problematic. Instead of having its policies degenerate into a spiraling inferno of violence and brutality, the German army of the Second World War retained enough flexibility to reverse track and approach Russian civilians from a different perspective. One would be hard-pressed to argue that the Imperial Army functioned in a more radical manner than its successor. Hull, Absolute Destruction.