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A Pledge Unredeemed: The Housing Crisis in Weimar Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Dan P. Silverman
Dan P. Silverman
Affiliation:
Pennsylvania State University
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Extract

If every German had had his own home,” wrote the National Socialist Karl Fiehler in 1932, “the revolution of 1918 would not have been possible.” Typical of the Nazi tendency toward exaggeration, Fiehler's assertion nevertheless recognized the role of housing in a stable society. Article 155 of the Weimar constitution of August 11, 1919, promised suitable housing for every German, but that promise remained unfulfilled. The Weimar regime, in fact, left many promises unfulfilled, and the collapse of the republic might be attributed to a lack of effectiveness in solving basic social and economic problems. Existing studies of the Weimar republic provide inadequate treatment of the problem-solving process employed to attack specific problems such as the housing shortage. Students of Weimar Germany have been fascinated with the beginning and the end of the republic, paying little attention to the relatively stable years from 1924 to 1929. Examination of the German housing problem will not explain why the republic fell. Historians have already supplied a rich variety of “explanations” for the fall of the republic: the burden of Versailles, reparations, inflation, depression, constitutional deficiencies, political fragmentation, and unhealthy compromises between the republic and the military, labor and management, and federal and state governments. Not everyone has been convinced. The German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf criticizes “explanations that do not explain, statements that do not state anything.” Perhaps, as Michael Stürmer suggests, it is time to go beyond the origins and collapse of the Weimar republic. The historical significance of the Weimar republic lies in how it functioned as well as how it fell.

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Articles
Information
Central European History , Volume 3 , Issue 1-2 , March 1970 , pp. 112 - 139
Copyright
Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1970

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References

1. Fiehler, Karl, Nationalsozialistische Gemeindepolitik (“Nationalsozialistische Bibliothek,” No. 10, Munich, 1932), p. 50.Google Scholar

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16. The most detailed use of population statistics to “prove” that there was no permanent housing shortage is found in Nawratzki, Curt, Bevölkerungsaufbau, Wohnungspolitik, und Wirtschaft (Berlin, 1931).Google Scholar See also comments by Luppe, Hermann in Soziale Praxis, XII (1932), 1321–25Google Scholar, and Kuczynski, Jürgen in Germany, Sozialisierungs-Kommission, Verhandlungen der Sozialisierungs-Kommission über die Neuregelung des Wohnungswesens (Berlin, 1921), II, 73.Google Scholar While Kuczynski, like Luppe and Nawratzki, felt that Germany's rate of population growth was declining, he believed the existing housing shortage demanded immediate attention.

17. Not all members of Germany's socialization commission agreed that there was a housing shortage. Hermann Luppe argued in 1921 that “everyone is being housed somewhere,” but Jürgen Kuczynski noted that people living in railway cars were not exactly being “housed.” Kuczynski interpreted Luppe as maintaining that “so long as we pack them in like herring, we'll have no housing shortage.” See Germany, Sozialisierungs-Kommission, Verhandungen, II, 12, 17.

18. Reflecting the regional nature of the housing shortage, rural areas objected to paying taxes to finance urban housing projects.

19. Seldte, Franz, Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich, 1933–1938 (Munich and Berlin, 1939), pp. 172–75.Google Scholar Seldte attributed the Nazis' lack of progress on the housing problem to the prior demands of rearmament and the four-year plan.

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22. Ibid., pp. 20–27.

23. State, local, federal governments made available an estimated 3.2 milliard marks for housing construction subsidies in 1921, but with rising inflation, no one had any idea how many units that amount of funding would pay for. See Kommission, Sozialisierungs-, Verhandlungen, II, 301–302.Google Scholar

24. Bresciani-Turroni, Costantino, The Economics of Inflation: A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany, 1914–1923 (New York, 1937), p. 319Google Scholar, argues that any profits from inflation had already been nullified by rent controls. Although Turroni's study has long been considered a standard work on the German inflation, many of his basic assumptions, particularly that of the destruction of the German middle class through inflation, have been challenged in Karsten Laursen and Pedersen, Jørgen, The German Inflation, 1918–1923 (“Skrifter Fra Aarhus Universitets Økonomiske Institut,” No. 18, Amsterdam, 1964).Google Scholar

25. While critics of the housing program held government interference responsible for the collapse of the private housing industry, it would seem that the collapse of the private housing industry necessitated government action. The basic problem was the high interest rate on first mortgages, generally around 10 per cent, which made privately built housing unrentable. The housing program sought to provide low-cost mortgage money.

26. During 1925, the city of Berlin provided 10 million marks of its own funds to finance 3651 housing units; this was in addition to 60 million marks in rent tax revenues which financed 10,050 units. See Torinus, , Wohnungspolitik der Nachkriegszeit, p. 105;Google ScholarRücker, Emil, Die Wohnungsbaufinanzierung nach der Stabilisierung der Währung unter be-sonderer Berücksichtigung Gross-Berlins (Halle, 1929), pp. 32–33.Google Scholar

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28. Ibid., p. 52; Ausschuss zur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen der Deustschen Wirtschaft, Der deutsche Wohnungsbau. Verhandlungen und Berichte des Unterausschusses für Gewerbe, Industrie, Handel und Handwerk (III. Unterausschuss), (Berlin, 1931), p. 216Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as III. Unterausschuss, Verhandlungen.

29. The population of Wandsbeck, near Hamburg, grew from 27,966 in 1900 to 45,190 in 1932. The city borrowed to pay for housing, schools, streets, sewers, and transportation, until by 1931 the city was paying 1.6 million marks annually to cover the interest and principle on loans. Wandsbeck, it seemed, would have to get out of the housing business. See Dieter, Bernd, Die Wohn- und Siedelwirtschaft in der Stadt Wandsbeck (Hamburg, 1934), pp. 143–45.Google Scholar

30. In 1912, it was estimated that about 8 per cent of the Westphalia-Rhine population lived in dwellings erected by employers. See Britain, Great, Ministry of Health, The Housing Problem in Germany, p. 26;Google ScholarFrey, Otto, Die industrielle Arbeiterwohnungsfrage und ihre Lösung (Grünstadt, 1939), pp. 18–20.Google Scholar Walther Rathenau counseled against requiring industry to build housing, arguing that it would discourage construction of new plants. Companies desiring to expand would simply purchase an existing plant from another company, which would not carry the obligation to construct new housing. See Sozialisierungs-Kommission, Verhandlungen, II, 222.

31. Reserving such a large portion of public funds for the public utility construction societies may have been somewhat unjust, since some of those funds apparently were never used, while private builders were turned away because of a “shortage” of funds. See III. Unterausschuss, Verhandlungen, p. 88.

32. Ibid., pp. 87–88; Britain, Great, Ministry of Health, The Housing Problem in Germany, pp. 18–21;Google ScholarNoak, Hellmuth, Siedeln—aber richtig (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 8–9;Google ScholarBrögelmann, Wilhelm, Wohnungsmarkt-Prognose? Eine Untersuchung über Lage und Aussichten am Wohnungsmarkt (Endingen, 1932), p. 18.Google Scholar

33. Weiss, , Die Sozialisierung des Wohnungswesens, p. 87.Google Scholar

34. Exemption from rent control was a rather illusory advantage, since public utility societies would have become noncompetitive had they raised rents above the “legal” level. It would also have been difficult for them to claim public utility status had they charged more than private owners of controlled dwellings.

35. Sozialisierungs-Kommission, Verhandlungen, I, 155. In a presidential decree of Dec. 1, 1930, the government provided a clearer definition of “public utility,” and limited public utility construction utility construction to small apartments which were not profitable for private builders. See Soziale Praxis, XL (1931), 314–15.

36. Schaaf, Hans, Die Entwicklungstendenzen der gemeinnützigen Bauvereinigungen in Deutschland in der Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit (Münster, 1926), pp. 44–51.Google Scholar

37. Torinus, , Wohnungspolitik der Nachkriegszeit, pp. 73–74.Google Scholar

38. III. Unterausschuss, Verhandlungen, p. 53. Labor minister Heinrich Brauns agreed that foreign capital should play only a minor role on the German housing market. See the “Denkschrift über die Wohnungsnot und ihre Bekämpfung,” Dec. 14, 1927, in Verhandlungen des Reichstags, III. Wahlperiode 1924/27, Anlagen, Bd. 420, Drucksache 3777.

39. For the acrimonious debate between the minister for economic affairs Julius Curtius, who favored the use of foreign credit on the housing market, and the president of the Reichsbank Hjalmar Schacht, who opposed them, see III. Unterausschuss, Verhandlungen, p. 53, and Timm, Helga, Die deutsche Sozialpolitik und der Bruch der Grossen Koalition im März 1930 (“Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien,” No. I, Düsseldorf, 1952), pp. 78, 152.Google Scholar

40. The Chapman project is described in Rücker, Wohnungsbaufinanzierung nach der Stabilisierung, pp. 46–49.

41. III. Unterausschuss, Verhandlungen, p. 53; “Denkschrift über die Wohnungsnot und ihre Bekämpfung,” pp. 23, 27.

42. Compensation disputes were to be settled in local courts. See Reichsarbeitsministerium, Reichsarbeitsblatt, N.F., Jg. II (1931), II, 318–20; Schröder, Hans, Die Beseitigung von Wohnmisständen. Ein städtebauliches Erfordernis der Volksgesundheit (Charlottenburg, 1936), pp. 56–57.Google Scholar

43. Soziale Praxis, XL (1931), 827–28, and XLI (1932), 117;Google ScholarReichsarbeitsblatt, N.F., Jg. II (1931), II, 319–20.Google Scholar

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46. Schröder, , Die Beseitigung von Wohnmisständen, pp. 79–80.Google Scholar

47. See the recommendations of labor minister Adam Stegerwald, Apr. 14, 1932, in Reichsarbeitsblatt, N.F., Jg. 12 (1932), I, 70.

48. Ibid., pp. 157–58.

49. Ibid., p. 193.

50. For a discussion of the sociological effects of partitioning see Soziale Praxis, XL (1931), 704–706.

51. See, for example, the opinion of the administrative advisor Böhmer, Rudolf in Soziale Praxis, XXXIX (1930), 676–77.Google Scholar

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53. The continuing attempt to solve two problems with a single program may have contributed to the failure to solve either problem.

54. The cities generally donated marginal land for outskirts settlements; settlers could raise good crops only with the liberal use of high-quality fertilizer, which most could not afford. See Soziale Praxis, XLI (1932), 1050; Baumann, Adolf, Städtebaulich-wirtschaftliche Fragen der Erwerblosen-Stadtrandsiedlung (Brandenburg a.d. Havel, 1933), pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

55. Ibid., p. 33.

56. Soziale Praxis, XL (1931), 1644, and XLI (1932), 1051; Reichsarbeitsblatt, N.F., Jg. 12 (1932), I, 10–13.

57. Soziale Praxis, XLI (1932), 1539.

58. Reichsarbeitsblatt, N.F., Jg. II (1931), I, 174.

59. Fey, Walter, Leistungen und Aufgaben im deutschen Wohnungs- und Siedlungsbau (“Sonderhefte des Instituts für Konjunkturforschung,” No. 42, Berlin, 1936), p. 33.Google Scholar

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62. Soziale Praxis, XXXIX (1930), 958–59; Lederle, Rose, Kleinstwohnungen aus öffentlichen Mitteln? (Munich, 1932), pp. 11–12.Google Scholar

63. Soziale Praxis, XXXIX (1930), 882; Reichsarbeitsblatt, N.F., Jg. 10 (1930), I, 146.

64. The government laid down strict specifications to reduce costs. For example, buildings constructed under the supplementary program were to have no bath or shower facilities; the Commissar suggested instead a hand basin with running cold water. He claimed the type of people who rented low-cost dwelling units generally did not use bath facilities. See Reichsarbeitsblatt, N.F., Jg. 10 (1930), II, 464–67, and II (1931), II, 224–25.

65. The Kassel housing office reported that between 1926 and 1928, 63 per cent of those seeking housing wanted small (one to three-room) apartments, but only 23 per cent of the new housing constructed in the city during those years was of that type. While only 8 per cent wanted dwellings of over four rooms, 34 per cent of the construction consisted of units over four rooms. See Rücker, , Die Wohnungsbaufinanzierung nach der Stabilisierung, pp. 180–81.Google Scholar

66. Reichsarbeitsblatt, N.F., Jg. II (1931), II, 197, 224–25.

67. Lederle, , Kleinstwohnungen aus öffentlichen Mitteln?, p. 60 (Anhang).Google Scholar

68. Ibid., Introduction. The III. Unterausschuss concluded Germany would have to construct minimum existence dwellings regardless of the social consequences. A minority report disputed that contention. See III. Unterausschuss, Verhandlungen, pp. 33–34.

69. Sozialisierungs-Kommission, Verhandlungen, I, 11–12; II, 286.

70. Contractors gave conflicting testimony before the III. Unterausschuss. One claimed that it was impossible to squeeze out more than 5 per cent of the construction cost without making serious cuts in quality; a further 5 per cent cost reduction, he testified, would result in a 40 per cent decrease in quality. Another contractor, however, claimed that the use of new materials and reduction in construction time could lower costs by as much as 15 per cent per square meter. See III. Unterausschuss, Verhandlungen, pp. 554–60.

71. Ibid., pp. 587–88.

72. The Weimar constitution itself provided only half-hearted support for socialization. See Holborn, Hajo, A History of Modern Germany, 1840–1945 (New York, 1969), p. 556Google Scholar. Most plans for socialization of housing faltered on the question of exactly what was to be socialized. Would it involve socialization of land ownership, or simply the housing constructed on the land, or the construction industry itself, the mortgage-lending institutions, or simply the management of apartment buildings?

73. One expert estimated that long-range planning based on a guaranteed level of government funding could save up to 20 per cent in construction costs. See III. Unterausschuss, Verhandlungen, pp. 579–80.

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76. While Walter Bierbrauer suggested a 1 to 2 ratio, the noted economist Karl Pribram suggested a differential of about 40 per cent of the prewar rent level. See Bierbrauer, , Die Einwirkungen des Krieges und der Nachkriegszeit auf die Wohnbautätigkeit, p. 66Google Scholar, and Pribram, Karl, “Die volkswirtschaftlichen Probleme der deutschen Wohnungswirtschaft,” in Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Vol. 177 (1930), 267–68.Google Scholar

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79. Figures released by the federal statistical office in 1930 indicated that a skilled worker spending one-fourth of his income on rent could afford a monthly rental of 56.56 marks, while an unskilled worker could afford only 43.81 marks rent per month. See Pribram, , in Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Vol. 177 (1930), 261–63.Google Scholar

80. Rent increases would not necessarily have to be met by corresponding wage increases. One source estimated that a 30 per cent rent increase could be absorbed by a 4 per cent wage increase. See Gut, Der Wohnungsbau in Deutschland nach dem Weltkriege, p. 110.

81. For an excellent discussion of social conservative doctrine, see Lebovics, Herman, Social Conservatism and the Middle Classes in Germany, 1914–1933 (Princeton, 1969).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

82. Anker, , Die Wohnungszwangswirtschaft, p. 50.Google Scholar

83. Horst Sanmann, among others, has argued that Brüning's deflationary policy was “objectively wrong.” His policies not only failed to halt the depression, but actually contributed to the down-turn of the business cycle. See Sanmann, Horst, “Deutsche Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik in der Ära Brüning,” Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik, Jg. 10 (Tübingen, 1965), 139–40.Google Scholar