1. The Incident has spawned countless works of scholarship over the intervening 60 years, mostly by researchers in the People's Republic, in Taiwan, or in Hong Kong. The most comprehensive work in English is Tien-wei, Wu's The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1976)Google Scholar. Another valuable source is Bertram, James E.'s eye-witness account, First Act in China, the Story of the Sian Mutiny (New York: Viking, 1938)Google Scholar. Coble, Parks N.'s Facing Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar puts the Incident in the context of China's growing mood of national defiance. Just as this article was going to press, a Mainland Chinese historian published a survey of scholarship on the Xi'an incident in the Soviet Union/Russia, the U.S., Europe, Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong which summarizes the main trends in each region and introduces the most representative works. See Zhuhong, Zhang, “Guowai he Tai-Gang guanyu Xian shibian yanjiu de tedian he qushi” (“Some characteristics of and trends among overseas, Taiwan and Hong Kong research on the Xi'an Incident”) Beijing dangshi y anjin (Beijing Research on Party History), No. 2 (1998), pp. 31–35.Google Scholar

2. Eastman, Lloyd E., “Fascism in China: the blue shirts,” The China Quarterly, No. 49 (1972), pp. 1–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Eastman, Lloyd E., The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Youwei, Xu, “Guanyu ‘Lanyishe’ de jidian bianxi,” (“Some approaches to the Lanyishe”), Dangan yu lishi (Archives and History), No. 5 (1989), pp. 71–73Google Scholar. See also Eastman, 's own comments, in Eastman, Lloyd E., “The rise and fall of the ‘Blue Shirts’: a review article,” Republican China, Vol. 13, No. 1 (11 1987), p. 30.Google Scholar

4. The reactions to Eastman's earlier work are discussed in Youwei, Xu, “Hai neiwai dui Lixingshe de yanjiu” (“Domestic and overseas research on the Lixingshe”), Minguo chunqiu (Annals of the Republic), No. 5 (1996), pp. 51–53.Google Scholar

5. See Chang, Maria Hsia, “‘Fascism’ and modern China,” The China Quarterly, No. 79 (09 1979), pp. 553–567CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chang, Maria Hsia, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985)Google Scholar; and Eastman, Lloyd E., “Fascism and modern China: a rejoinder,” The China Quarterly, No. 80 (12 1979), pp. 838–842CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For more recent treatments of fascism in China, see Wakeman, Frederic Jr., “A revisionist view of the Nanjing decade: Confucian fascism,” The China Quarterly, No. 150 (06 1997), pp. 136–173Google Scholar, and Youwei, Xu, “Fascism,” in Kewen, Wang (ed.), Modern China: An Encyclopedia of History, Culture and Nationalism (New York and London: Garland, 1998), pp. 113–14.Google Scholar

6. Yuanzhong, Deng, Sanmin zhuyi Lixingshe shi (A History of the Three People's Principles Earnest Action Society) (Taipei: Shixian chubanshe, 1984).Google Scholar

Although Deng's book was not published until 1984, his research had begun as early as 1972 in response to a request from his father that he should put the record straight concerning the Lixingshe and scotch the many unsavoury rumours that it had spawned. (Interview, April 1995, Shanghai.) He was the ideal person for the job, both as Deng Wenyi's son, which eased his access to many veterans of the organization and their personal archives, and because of the rigorous academic training in history (resulting in a doctorate) that he had received in the U.S., a combination which earned him the blessing of Chiang Kai-shek. The late Eastman, Lloyd E. described Deng's work as “one of the most objective studies of the Nationalist period to have been published in Taiwan” (“Rise and fall,” p. 25)Google Scholar, and Taiwan historians also praised its role in lifting the veil that had hitherto made the Lixingshe so mysterious. For a mainland historian's view, see Youwei, Xu's two articles: “Deng Yuanzhong jiqi ‘Sanmin zhuyi Lixingshe shi’” (“Deng Yuanzhong and his ‘History of the Three People's Principles Earnest Action Society’”), Shuchuang (Window on Books) No. 1 (1993), pp. 84–85Google Scholar; and “Sanshi niandai Zhongguo zhengzhi de feifan toushi – Deng Yuanzhong jiaoshou jiqi Lixingshe shi yanjiu” (“An unusual insight into Chinese politics in the 1930s – Professor Deng Yuanzhong and his research on the history of the Lixingshe”) Dangshi xinxi bao (Party History Bulletin), 1 01 1994, p. 4.Google Scholar

7. Guoxun, Gan et al. , Lanyishe, fuxingshe, lixingshe (The Blue Shin Society, The Revive China Society, and the Earnest Action Society) (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1984)Google Scholar. Another important contribution was the Japanese scholar Imai Shun's article on the Lixingshe ideologist Liu Jianqun: see Shun, Imai, “Kōnichi nashonarizumu to ‘ranisha’-teki ideorogī – Ryū Kengun cho, ‘Fuxing Zhongguo geming zhi lu’ ni tsuite no ichi kōsatsu” (“Anti-Japanese nationalism and ‘Blue Shirt’ ideology – an examination of Liu Jianqun's ‘The Road to Reviving the Chinese Revolution’”) Chūgoku kenkyū (China Research), No. 134 (04 1982), pp. 33–51.Google Scholar

8. Eastman, , “Rise and fall”;Google ScholarEastman, Lloyd E., “Appendix to the paperback edition: formation of the Blue Shirts,”Google Scholar in Eastman, , Abortive Revolution (1990 edition), pp. 375–381Google Scholar. Over the intervening years, Eastman's work has continued to be highly regarded in Western academic circles. See, for example, Wakeman, , “A revisionist view”.Google Scholar

9. According to Yuanzhong, Deng, the voluminous Lixingshe archives were either destroyed or transported to Taiwan shortly before the Nationalists' flight in 1949Google Scholar. While some of the latter are held in official government archives, many others remain in private hands (such as the large collection of Liu Jianqun's materials still in the keeping of Liu's widow). Neither were opened to Deng, despite the official blessing for his endeavour. (Interview, Shanghai, , 04 1995Google Scholar.) Deng's account of the late Liu Jianqun's records was confirmed by Professor Hu Chunhui of the Department of History, National Chengchi University (Taiwan). (Interview, Shanghai, , 09 1996Google Scholar.) Other sources have suggested that the Lixingshe archives are stored under guard in at least two special buildings. That there remain items of great sensitivity goes without saying, but until they are opened to public scrutiny we can only speculate on what they might contain.

Research on the mainland, meanwhile, has paid little attention to the Lixingshe. Some archive materials on the relationship between Zhang Xueliang and the Communist Party were recently unearthed by a Beijing historian, but were deemed too sensitive and denied publication. They have since been issued by a Taiwan publishing house: see Kuisong, Yang, Xian shibian xintan – Zhang Xueliang yu zhonggong guanxi zhi yanjiu (A New Exploration of the Xi'an Incident – Research on the Relationship Between Zhang Xueliang and the Chinese Communist Party) (Taipei: Dadong tushu gongsi, 1995)Google Scholar. According to some sources, the Second Archive on Chinese History (Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan) in Nanjing has a collection of documents concerning the Lixingshe-related organization, Fuxingshe (see below), but these too have yet to be made public.

10. See Wakeman, , “A revisionist view,” pp. 138 ff.Google Scholar

11. On the formation and internal structure of the Lixingshe, see Eastman, , “Rise and fall,” pp. 26–34Google Scholar; Chang, , Chinese Blue Shirt Society, pp. 4–5Google Scholar; Wakeman, , “A revisionist view,” pp. 138–156.Google Scholar

12. For details, see Eastman, , “Rise and fall,” pp. 31–33Google Scholar; Zidao, Yu and Youwei, Xu, “Lixingshe shulun” (“A case study of the Lixingshe”), Jindaishi yanjiu (Research on Modern Chinese History), No. 6 (1989), pp. 217–236, 202Google Scholar; Youwei, Xu, “Lixmgshe no Nihonkan kenkyū” (“The Lixingshe's view of Japan”), Chūgoku kenkyū geppō (China Research Monthly), No. 586 (12 1996), pp. 30–39Google Scholar, tr. Kodaira Kuniaki. In English, see also Youwei, Xu, “Blue Shirts (Lixingshe),”Google Scholar in Kewen, Wang, Modern China, pp. 29–30.Google Scholar

In principle, the Lixingshe advocated an armed anti-Japan policy. While this would seem to contradict Chiang Kai-shek's policy of tackling domestic problems first, it seems that Chiang allowed them to adhere to this stand on condition of following his orders for the time being. He was too wily a politician to try to force these young men into abandoning their convictions; nevertheless, there were several occasions when he had to caution them for going too far. The relationship is dealt with in the two Chinese articles cited above.

13. Eastman, , “Rise and fall,” pp. 31–32Google Scholar. On Dai Li, see Youwei, Xu, “Dai Li,”Google Scholar in Kewen, Wang, Modern China, pp. 81–82.Google Scholar

14. This paper does no more than set out the bare gist of the role played at Xi'an by the Lixingshe. For a more detailed treatment, see Youwei, Xu, “Lixingshe yu Xian shibian” (“The Lixingshe and the Xi'an Incident”), a paper presented to the 14th International Association of Historians of Asia Conference (Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, 20–24 05 1996).Google Scholar

15. Baohang, Yan, “Liuwang guannei dongbei minzhong de kangri futu douzheng” (“The struggle of the Northeastern refugees in China Proper against Japan and to regain their homeland”), in Quanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (eds.), Wenshi ziliao xuanji (Compendium of Materials on Literature and History) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1986), Vol. 6, pp. 98–104Google Scholar; Jianqun, Liu, Yinhe yiwang (Memories at Yinhe) (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1966), pp. 234–37.Google Scholar

16. For details, see Detian, Ying, Zhang Xueliang yu Xian shibian (Zhang Xueliang and the Xian Incident) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), p. 71Google Scholar; and Youwei, Xu, “The Lixingshe and the Xi'an Incident,” pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

17. Jiazhao, Pan et al. (eds.), Jiang Jieshi tegong midang ji qita (Chiang Kai-shek's Secret Archives on Spy Activities and Other Matters) (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1993), p. 166.Google Scholar

18. Yunnan, Li, Xian shibian shimo zhi yanjiu (A Comprehensive Study of the Xi'an Incident) (Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1982), p. 255Google Scholar; Xiaoyi, Qin (ed.), Xian shibian shiliao (Historical Materials on the Xi'an Incident) (Taipei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe, 1983), Vol. 1, p.55.Google Scholar

19. Mingjiu, Sun, “Xian shibian” zhenxiang – Zhang Xueliang jiangjun weidui yingzhang Sun Mingjiu zishu (The Real Nature of the “Xi'an Incident” – the Personal Account by the Captain of General Zhang Xueliang's Bodyguard, Sun Mingjiu) (Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1993), p. 180Google Scholar; Xiong, Liang, Dai Li zhuan (A Biography of Dai Li) (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1985), p. 93.Google Scholar

20. Smedley, Agnes, Zhongguo de zhange (Battle Hymn of China) (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1986), pp. 149–150: tr. Feng, Jiang.Google Scholar

Xi'an became the Mecca of anti-Japan activity after the arrival there of the Northeastern Army attracted student refugees from Beijing. The students were not the only refugees, however: the Lixingshe itself, which had been primarily responsible for harassing them, was also forced under the terms of the June 1935 so-called “He-Umezu Agreement” to leave Beijing and relocate to Xi'an, where it promptly resumed its persecution.

21. Daogang, Yan, “Wo zai Xian shibianzhong de jingli” (“My experiences in the midst of the Xi'an Incident”), in Fuzhang, Wu (ed.), Xian shibian qinli ji (Personal Accounts of the Xi'an Incident) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1986), p. 197.Google Scholar

22. Daisheng, Sun, “Cong Shanghai dao Xian” (“From Shanghai to Xi'an”), in Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo (eds.), Xian shibian ziliao (Materials on the Xi'an Incident) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2nd series, 1981), pp. 125–26.Google Scholar

23. Gao Chongmin, “Xian shibian zatan” (“Miscellaneous remarks on the Xi'an Incident”) in ibid. p. 19.

Conflicts, both verbal and physical, between Northeastern Army and 17th Route Army officers and men had been frequent in the beginning, arising both from cultural and economic differences between the two and from resentment by Yang's soldiers toward the “usurpers.” To disguise their plans, Zhang and Yang allowed these conflicts to continue among the ordinary soldiers even while they and their officers cemented their alliance. See Bochun, Shen, Xian shibian jishi (A Record of the Xi'an Incident) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1979), pp. 85–86, 106–107Google Scholar; Zhengmin, Yang, “Huiyi Xian shibianqian de jijian shi” (“Recollections of a few things before the Xi'an Incident”) in Zhonggong dongbeijun dangshizu (eds.), Zhonggong dongbeijun dixiadang gongzuo huiyi (Memories of the Communist Party's Underground Cells' Work within the Northeastern Army) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1995), p. 145.Google Scholar

24. Yanfo, Zhang, “Kangzhan qianhou juntong tewu zai xibei de huodong” (“The activities of the Jun Tong bureau in the Northwest before and after the anti-Japanese war”), in Quanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (eds.), Wenshi ziliao xuanji (Selection of Materials on Literature and History) No. 64 (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1986), p. 88.Google Scholar

25. Snow, Edgar, Xixing manji (Red Star Over China) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1979) p. 363, tr. Leshan, Dong.Google Scholar

For almost a year, beginning in late 1935, KMT and CCP negotiating teams headed by Chen Lifu and Zhou Enlai, respectively, had been conducting prolonged secret talks on the terms of an anti-Japan alliance. It was the failure of these negotiations to produce a mutually acceptable compromise which triggered Chiang's visit to Xi'an to initiate a renewed offensive against the Communists. See the Japanese researcher Kazutaka, Kikuchi's recent interview with Chen Lifu, 95-yesr-old KMT elder: “Chen Lifu shi he no intabyū: Sanminshugi seinendan, ‘C. C. kei’ no koshō, oyobi Nihonjin he no teigen” (“An interview with Chen Lifu: the Three People's Principles Youth Corps, the term ‘C. C. Clique,’ and some proposals for the Japanese People”), Chūgoku kenkyū geppō (China Research Monthly), No. 592 (06 1997), pp. 28–43, especially pp. 34, 42–43Google Scholar. On the negotiations, see also Kuisong, Yang, Shiqude jihui? – zhanshi Guo-Gong tanpan shilu (A Lost Chance? – A Factual Record of Wartime KMT-CCP Negotiations) (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1992), especially pp. 4–26Google Scholar. Supplementary information may also be found in another interview with Chen Lifu: see Masayasu, Hosaka, “Kokumintō chōrō (Chen Lifu) ga kataru Chūgokujin no kokoro wo shiranai ‘Taiwan dokuritsi ron’” (“KMT Elder (Chen Lifu) discusses how the ‘Taiwan Independence’ advocates are ignorant of the Chinese spirit”)Google Scholar, Chūō Kōron (Central Forum), (08 1996).Google Scholar

26. Bochun, Shen, A Record of the Xi'an Incident, pp. 123–24.Google Scholar

27. Kuoqing, Zeng, “Xian shibian huiyi” (“Recalling the Xi'an Incident”)Google Scholar, in Fuzhang, Wu, Personal Accounts, p. 209.Google Scholar

28. Zanyu, Xiao, “Tan Xian shibian” (“Chatting about the Xian Incident”), in Jilu, Huang et al. , Ziqiang fendou qishinian (Seventy Years of Struggle for Self-Strengthening) (Taipei: Zhonghua ribao, 1981), pp. 147–49Google Scholar; Zanyu, Xiao, Xiao Zanyu xiansheng fangwen jilu (Record of Some Visits with Mr. Xiao Zanyu) (Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1992), pp. 43–45.Google Scholar

29. Bertram, James M., Zhongguo de diyimu – Xian shibian (First Act in China, the Story of the Sian Mutiny)Google Scholar (Xi, 'an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1989), p. 129Google Scholar, tr. Niu Yulin; Jiazhao, Pan et al. , Chiang Kai-shek's Secret Archives, p. 77.Google Scholar

30. Yeli, Ji, “Zai dongbeijun qibing batuan gongzuo de huiyi pianduan” (“Fragmentary recollections of underground Party work among the 8^th cavalry regiment of the Northeastern Army”)Google Scholar, in Zhonggong dongbeijun dangshizu (eds.) Memories of the Communist Party's Underground Cells' Work, pp. 493–95.Google Scholar

31. Zanyu, Xiao, “Chatting about the Xi'an Incident,” p. 150Google Scholar; Zanyu, Xiao, Record of Some Visits, p. 46.Google Scholar

32. Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily) (Xi'an), 14 12 1936.Google Scholar

33. Kuoqing, Zeng, “Recalling the Xi'an Incident,” p. 210Google Scholar. Chen Gongbo has confirmed that Zeng's actions were taken of his own volition, not under duress. See Gongbo, Chen, Kuxiaolu (1925 nian zhi 1936 nian) (Records of Pain and Laughter, 1925–1936) (Beijing: Xiandai shiliao biankanshe, 1981), pp. 252–53.Google Scholar

34. Ibid. pp 210–11.

35. Xibei wenhua ribao (Northwest Culture Daily) (Xi'an), 19 12 1936.Google Scholar

36. See Youwei, Xu, “The Lixingshe's view of Japan”.Google Scholar

37. Wenyi, Deng, Maoxian fannanji (A Record of Braving Great Difficulties) (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1973), Vol. 2, pp. 88–90Google Scholar; Yuanzhong, Deng, A History of the Three People's Principles Earnest Action Society, pp. 568–90Google Scholar; Eastman, , “Rise and fall,” p. 31.Google Scholar

Deng Wenyi never explained how he was able to come by the news when all the Lixingshe's transmitters in Xi'an had been seized. The Fuxingshe was the lowest level of the Lixingshe's organization, much less elitist than its parent body, and had upwards of 100,000 members.

38. Demonstrating the Lixingshe's lack of concrete information about what had actually transpired in Xi'an, among the names on the list were those of one operative who had been executed by Yang Hucheng in the early hours of the Incident and another who had escaped the city but whose whereabouts were unknown. The apparent haste with which the list had been drawn up (presumably the Lixingshe wanted to prove its spurs) was also indicated by the fact that four names were repeated at least twice and another was miswritten. In an interview, Deng Yuanzhong explained that there had been no documents that would have allowed every name on the list to be checked, but that probably at least 95% were genuinely members of the Lixingshe.

39. Other people evidently thought so too. Though a conspiracy was probably never on the cards, Deng's actions coincided precisely with those of Chiang Kai-shek's rivals in the government, who argued disingenuously that too much concern for his life could actually deepen the crisis. Chiang's subsequent fury, fuelled by hints from Deng's rivals within the Lixingshe, such as Dai Li, that Deng and He Zhonghan were conspiring with He Yingqin to seize power, was thus understandable. See Eastman, , “Rise and fall,” pp. 37–38.Google Scholar

40. Wenyi, Deng, Braving Great Difficulties, pp. 90–91Google Scholar; Yuanzhong, Deng, A History of the Three People's Principles Earnest Action Society, pp. 572–580.Google Scholar

41. Jiazhao, Pan et al. (eds.), Kang Ze yu Jiang Jieshi fuzi (Kong Ze's Relationship to Chiang Kai-shek and his Son) (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1994), p. 25Google Scholar; Shenbao (Shanghai), 17 12 1936.Google Scholar

It seems likely that these were the instinctive reactions of military men rather than forewarnings of a plot to unseat Chiang Kai-shek. Recent research has downplayed the earlier view of He Yingqin as a rival to Chiang's supremacy. See Zongren, Xiong, He Yingqin de huanhai chenfu (Floating and Sinking in the Official Seas – the Career of He Yingqin) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1994).Google Scholar

42. Jiazhao, Pan et al. , Kang Ze's Relationship to Chiang Kai-shek, pp. 75, 77Google Scholar; Eastman, , Abortive Revolution, pp. 70 ff.Google Scholar

The Special Movement Corps, although under the direct command of the Military Affairs Commission, was actually directed by Lixingshe officers. Its primary role was political indoctrination and it had proved its effectiveness earlier in the Jiangxi campaigns against the communists.

43. Wenyi, Deng, “Xian shibian yu Zhongguo mingyun” (xia) (“The Xi'an Incident and the fate of China” part 2), Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Literature), Vol. 32, No. 3 (1978), pp. 90–91Google Scholar; Wenyi, Deng, “Xian shibian guanxi Zhongguo mingyun – Lixingshe yingjiu Jiang weiyuanzhang” (“The impact of the Xi'an Incident on China's fate – the Lixingshe's rescue of Chairman Chiang”), Dongfang zazhi (Eastern Miscellany), New Series, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1987), pp. 67–68.Google Scholar

44. Jiacai, Qiao, Tiexue jingzhong zhuan – Dai Li de gushi (A Biography of Iron, Blood and Pure Spirit – the Story of Dai Li) (Taipei: Zhongwai tushu chubanshe, 1985), p. 102.Google Scholar

45. Jiacai, Qiao, Dai Lijiangjun he lade tongzhi – kangri qingbaozhan (General Dai Li and his Comrades – the Intelligence War against Japan) (Taipei: Zhongwai tushu chubanshe, 1979), Vol. 1, p. 171Google Scholar; Qiang, Wen et al. , “Fuxingshe zai Xian shibian zhong fencheng hezhan liangpai” (“The division of the Revive China Society into peace and war factions during the Xi'an Incident”)Google Scholar, in Fuzhang, Wu, Personal Accounts, p. 283Google Scholar; Yuanzhong, Deng, A History of the Three People's Principles Earnest Action Society, pp. 325–27Google Scholar; Eastman, , “Rise and fall,” p. 36.Google Scholar

46. Zengkai, Guo, “Yige lishi wenti de jiaodai” (“Discussing a certain historical problem”), in xueshe, Cuncui (ed.), Wei dierci Guo-Gong hezuo puping daolu de – Xian shibian yu Zhang Xueliang (Preparing the Way for the Second Period of Nationalist-Communist Co-operation – the Xi'an Incident and Zhang Xueliang) (Hong Kong: Dadong tushu gongsi, 1978), pp. 216–17, 224.Google Scholar

47. Yuanzhong, Deng, A History of the Three People's Principles Earnest Action Society, pp. 604–05.Google Scholar

48. Songfu, Fan, “Xian shibian huiyilu” (“Recollections of the Xi'an Incident”), Dang'an yu shixue (Archives and History), No. 2 (1996), pp. 55–56.Google Scholar

49. See the representative's own account of the affair: Xizhong, Liu, “Han Fuju yu Zhang Xueliang de jiehe ji Han zai Xian shibian shiqi de huodong” (“The alliance between Han Fuju and Zhang Xueliang and Han's activities during the Xi'an Incident”)Google Scholar, in Kuitang, Zhang, Wanji jiuwang de shishi – Xian shibian (An Epic of Resolving a Crisis to Save the Nation – the Xi'an Incident) (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1994), p. 232.Google Scholar

50. Yuanzhong, Deng, A History of the Three People's Principles Earnest Action Society, pp. 590–91.Google Scholar

51. Jianqun, Liu, Memories at Yinhe, pp. 248–49.Google Scholar

52. Qiang, Wen et al. , “The division of the Revive China Society,” p. 283.Google Scholar

53. Bingfan, Gong, “Shiqi lujun Shen, Tang liangtuan pan-Yang tou-Jiang jingguo” (“The story of how the Shen and Tang units of the 17^th Route Army rebelled against Yang [Hucheng] and surrendered to Chiang [Kai-shek]”)Google Scholar in Fuzhang, Wu, Personal Accounts, p. 560.Google Scholar

54. Guojun, Yao, “Guan Linzheng bu zai Shaan-Gan zuji hongjun huiyi” (“Regarding the way Guan Linzheng's units obstructed the Red Army in Shaanxi and Gansu”)Google Scholar, in Gansusheng junqu dangshi ziliao zhengji bangongshi (eds.), Sanjun da huishi (The Great Union of Three Armies)Google Scholar (Lanzhou, , Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1987), Vol. 2, pp. 918–19Google Scholar; Tan Yizhi, “Wei ershiwushi zai Gansu zuji hongjun he ‘shuangshier’ shibianhou Guan Linzheng yu Hu Zongnan” (“About the puppet 25^th division's obstruction of the Red Army in Gansu, and about Guan Linzheng and Hu Zongnan after the ‘Double 12^th Incident”) in ibid., p. 924.

Accounts vary as to whether or not Guan himself was a member of the Lixingshe. According to Tan Yizhi, Guan personally insisted that he was not a member (Yizhi, Tan, “Wo yu Guan Linzheng jiangjun de jiaowang” (“My dealings with General Guan Linzheng”), in Quanguo zhengxie Shaanxisheng Huxian wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui (eds.), Guan Linzheng jiangjun (General Guan Linzheng) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1989), p. 15Google Scholar. Deng Yuanzhong, however, asserted in an interview that Guan was a member. Given that all Central Government Army commanders in positions of influence were appointed from among the military membership of the Lixingshe, Deng's version seems the more believable.

55. Zuolin, Xiao, “Xian shibian shi Fuxingshe Henan fenshe de huodong” (“The activities of the Henan branch of the Revive China Society during the Xi'an Incident”)Google Scholar, in Fuzhang, Wu, Personal Accounts, pp. 286–290.Google Scholar

56. Ming, Shi, “Zhuiyi Xian shibian shi de Lanzhou” (“Recollections of Lanzhou during the Xi'an Incident”), Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Literature), Vol.41, No. 6 (1982), pp. 57–59.Google Scholar

57. Tianfang, Cheng, Shi-De huiyilu (Memoirs of an Embassy to Germany) (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1967), pp. 147–48, 151Google Scholar; Gong'anbu dang'anguan (ed.), Zai Jiang Jieshi shenbian banian – daicongshi gaoji muliao Tang Zong riji (Eight Years at the Side of Chiang Kai-shek – The Diary of High-Level Aide-de-camp Tang Zong) (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1991), pp. 53–54.Google Scholar

58. Guoxun, Gan, The Blue Shirt Society, the Revive China Society, and the Earnest Action Society, p. 95.Google Scholar

59. Xinwenbao (Shanghai), 28 12 1936.Google Scholar

60. Zhang Xueliang did not participate in these talks. He was finally placed under Chiang's personal custody and was to remain a prisoner for some 60 years, outliving both Chiang and Dai Li. Yang Hucheng, whose troops remained in Xi'an, remained free for several months, then, once they had been dispersed, was sent off on a forced trip to Europe. On his return following the outbreak of war he was arrested by Dai Li in Nanchang, imprisoned, and finally executed on the eve of Chiang's flight to Taiwan in 1949.

61. Xiaoyi, Qin (ed.), Xi'an shibian shiliao (Historical Materials on the Xi'an Incident) (Taipei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe, 1983), Vol. 2, pp. 131–32, 172.Google Scholar

62. Guofangbu bqingbaoju (eds.), Dai Yunong [Dai Li] xiansheng quanji (Complete Works of Mr. Dai Yunong [Dai Li]) (Taipei: Guofangbu qingbaoju, 1979), Vol. 2, pp. 48–49Google Scholar; Zhongguo dier lishi danganguan (eds.), Xian shibian dang'an shiliao xuanbian (Selection of Archive Materials on the Xi'an Incident) (Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe, 1986), p. 143.Google Scholar

63. Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan, Archive Materials on the Xi'an Incident, pp. 169–171, 197, 207Google Scholar; Xilian, Song, Yingquan jiangjun – Song Xilian zishu (A Hired Thug as General – the Personal Account of Song Xilian) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1986), p. 111.Google Scholar

64. Bertram, , First Act in China, pp. 289, 294, 304.Google Scholar

65. Zhaolin, Zhang, “Huiyi Xian shibian qianhou zai Xian de xinwen xuanquan gongzuo” (“Recollections of newspaper propaganda work in Xi'an before and after the Xi'an Incident”)Google Scholar, in Zhonggong Dongbeijun dangshizu (eds.), Memories of the Communist Party's Underground Cells’ Work, pp. 182–85.Google Scholar

66. Zanyu, Xiao, Record of Some Visits, p. 47.Google Scholar

67. Jianqun, Liu, Memories at Yinhe, p. 240.Google Scholar

68. Qiantu (Shanghai), Vol.5, No. 1 (16 01 1937), p. 185Google Scholar; Youwen, Jian, Xibei congjun ji (Diary of an Army-Man in Northwest China) (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1982), p. 204.Google Scholar

69. Yuanzhong, Deng, A History of the Three People's Principles Earnest Action Society, pp. 624–26.Google Scholar