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Congress and the Cold War: U.S.-China Policy, 1955

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Philip J. Briggs
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Extract

Perhaps no other foreign policy area brought forth the emotional anti communism characteristic of the 1950s as did American relations with the People's Republic of China. The so–called “ loss of China ”issue beginning in 1949, for which the Republicans primarily blamed the Democrats, severely strained the bipartisan approach towards foreign policy. In addition, four years before he died in 1951, Republican foreign policy leader Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg excluded China policy from the area of bipartisan agreement, while his party's loyalty to the defeated Nationalists remained strong. Senator Joseph McCarthy's“communists–in– government” charges during the Korean War, when American forces were engaged in combat with the People's Liberation Army, further exacerbated relations between the Republican and Democratic parties, and between the legislative and executive branches of government. Ominously, the possibility of a preventive strike on the China mainland also became the focus of serious consideration and possible implementation during the Formosa Strait confrontation of 1954–55.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 85 , March 1981 , pp. 80 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1981

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References

1. For the development of bipartisanship and an example of its usage see my “Congress and collective security: the resolutions of 1943, World Affairs, Vol. 132, No. 4 (1970), pp. 332–44,Google Scholar and “Senator Vandenberg, bipartisanship and the origin of United Nations Article 51,” Mid America: An Historical Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1978), pp. 1963–69.Google Scholar For a critical analysis of bipartisanship during the first Eisenhower term see Reichard, Gary W., “Divisions and dissent: democrats and foreign policy, 1952–1956,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 1 (1978), pp. 51–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. For a review article reassessing Eisenhower's leadership see Santis, Victor De, “Eisenhower Revisionism,” Review of Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1976), pp. 190–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar An example of new documentation becoming available is U.S., Congress, Senate, Executive Sessions Of The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. 3, 84th Congress, 1st sess. (1955), made public April 1978. Hereafter referred to as Executive Sessions.Google Scholar

3. For Truman's views see Miller, Merle's Plain Speaking an Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1974), especially p. 304.Google Scholar

4. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Authorizing the President to Employ the Armed Forces of the United States for Protecting the Security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related Positions and Territories of that Area, Senate Report, 13, 84th Congress, 1st sess. (1955), p. 3. Hereafter referred to asAuthorizing the President

5. For incisive views of the Dulles personality and political style see Hoopes, Townsend, “God and John Foster Dulles,” Foreign Policy, No. 13 (Winter 1973–1974), pp. 154–77;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and his The Devil and John Foster Dulles: The Diplomacy of the Eisenhower Era (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973).Google Scholar

6. Author's interview with presidential assistant Sherman Adams in Hanover, New Hampshire, 14 November 1967.

7. Ibid..

8. Representative Charles H. Halleck, recorded interview, the John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey.

9. Author's interview with Adams.

10. Ibid..

11. Eisenhower, State of the Union Message, 2 February 1953, Vital Speeches Of The Day, Vol. 19, No. 9 (1953), pp. 258–64.Google Scholar

12. See Clubb, 's Twentieth Century China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 341.Google Scholar For an excellent early analysis of the Formosa problem see his “Formosa and the offshore islands in American policy, 1950–1955,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 74, No.4 (1959), pp. 517–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, recorded interview, Dulles Papers.

14. For a pertinent study on Senator McCarthy see Griffith, Robert, The Politics of Fear: Joseph McCarthy and the Senate (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970).Google Scholar

15. Dulles fired John Patton Davies on 5 November 1954. See Chapt. 10 in Kahn, E. J. Jr, The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York: The Viking Press, 1975).Google Scholar

16. Remarks from address before American Bar Association, San Francisco, California, 16 September 1952, Dulles Papers.

17. Senator Sparkman has recalled that Dulles “…coordinated and cooperated quite well with Congress,” recorded interview, Dulles Papers.

18. Lyndon Johnson was for instance, supportive of the Administration's bipartisan approach. See New York Times, 15 December 1954, p. 1.

19. Author's interview with Adams. George was entitled by seniority to the chairmanship of either the Finance or Foreign Relations Committee.

20. Senator Hubert Humphrey, recorded interview, The Herbert H. Lehman Papers, Columbia University, School of International Affairs, New York city.

21. Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, pp. 263–64.

22. See Donovan, Robert J., Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 300.Google Scholar

23. Eden, Anthony, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 342.Google Scholar

24. See Morse, Wayne's speech in Congressional Record, Vol. 101 (1955), p. 747,Google ScholarEisenhower, 's Mandate For Change, 1953–1956 (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 554–55, and Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, pp. 265–66.Google Scholar

25. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p. 342.

26. New York Times, 16 November 1954, p. 1.

27. U.S. Congress, Senate, Message From The President Of The United States Transmitting A Mutual Defense Treaty Between The United States of America And The Republic Of China, Senate Document, Executive A, 84th Congress, 1st sess. (1954), p. 1.

28. For complete text of the treaty and supplementary notes see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Collective Defense Treaties, Committee Print, 90th Congress, 1st sess. (1967), pp. 101–104.

29. New York Times, 19 January 1955, p. 3.

30. Ibid..

31. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 558.

32. Authorizing the President, pp. 5–6.

33. Transcript of background news conference, 24 January 1955, Dulles Papers.

34. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 550.

35. See remarks by Senator John Sparkman in Preface to Executive Sessions, pp. 4–5.

36. Hearings on Senate Joint Report, 28, Ibid.. 24 January 1955, pp. 68, 84 and 92.

37. Ibid.. 25 January 1955, p. 216.

38. Ibid.. p. 182.

39. Senator Wayne Morse, Recorded Interview, Lehman Papers, pp. 13–14.

40. New York Times, 25 January 1955, p. 3.

41. Senate Report, 55, complete text, Executive Sessions, pp. 770–71.

42. Senate Joint Report, 28, Formosa Resolution, complete text, Ibid.. pp. 756–57.

43. Author's interview with Adams.

44. Recorded Interview, Lehman Papers, p. 9.

45. Ibid.. p. 10.

46. Congressional Record, Vol. 101 (1955), pp. 738–47.Google Scholar

47. New York Times, 27 January 1955, pp. 1,2.

48. Ibid..

49. Ibid.. 28 January 1955, p. 2. However, with respect to Radford, Sherman Adams later claimed that he was not “trigger–happy” and that any such concern would have originated from “a lack of communication between Eisenhower and his Admirals which is not a reasonable assumption to make.” Author's interview.

50. Congressional Record, Vol. 101 (1955), pp. 820–21.Google Scholar

51. New York Herald Tribune, 20 January 1955, p. 1.

52. Ibid..

53. Complete text of speech in reprint from Congressional Record, 28 January 1955, Lehman Papers.

54. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pp. 559–60.

55. Ibid.. pp. 560–61.

56. United Nations Document, S/3354,28 January 1955.

57. Ibid.. S/3355, 30 January 1955.

58. Ibid.. S/3356, 31 January 1955.

59. Ibid.. S/3358, 3 February 1955.

60. New York Times, 8 February 1955, pp. 1, 5.

61. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Defense Treaty With The Republic Of China, Senate Executive Report, 2, 84th Congress, 1st sess. (1955), pp. 1–7.

62. For remarks by Senators George and Morse see New York Times, 9 February 1955, pp. 1,14. For Senator Lehman's description of the treaty see letters to constituents, 22 and 26 March 1955, Lehman Papers.

63. Congressional Record, Vol. 101 (1955), p. 1398.Google Scholar

64. New York Times, 10 February 1955, p. 14. Democratic standard-bearer Adlai Stevenson strongly supported Lehman–s efforts. He sent the Senator a “Bravo! ” for his opposition speech on the treaty and also remarked, “I pray that our misgivings will not be realized and this document won't embarrass us for years to come.” See postcard, 26 February 1955, Lehman Papers.

65. The Nixon Administration disclaimed the Formosa Resolution on 12 March 1970, and it was terminated by Act of Congress on 26 October 1974. The Carter Administration terminated the Mutual Defence Treaty effective 1 January 1980, over unsuccessful congressional opposition to his unilateral termination of a treaty.

66. Eisenhower,Mandate For Change, p. 563.