* This paper constitutes Part 1 of a two-part article, the second instalment of which will be published in the next issue of The China Quarterly.

1. That is, “small” in relation to the whole of China. But it is as well to remember that Kiangsu in the early 1950s contained a total population of around 45 millions and had a surface area of more than 100,000 sq. km.

2. For a discussion of some non-economic aspects of land reform, see Shillinglaw, G., “Land reform and peasant mobilization in Southern China, 1947–1950,” in Lehmann, D. (ed.), Agrarian Reform and Agrarian Reformism (London: Faber & Faber, 1974).Google Scholar

3. In a paper to be published by the Contemporary China Institute, S.O.A.S., “Land tenure in pre-revolutionary China: Kiangsu province in the 1920s and 1930s.” This survey contains an analysis of many important features of Kiangsu's rural socio-economy before 1949: for example, the nature of landlordism in the province; tenancy systems (including the phenomenon of “permanent” tenancy and the division of land between sub-soil and surface owners); levels of rent; security of tenure and other exploitative aspects. There is also a brief discussion of some of the economic implications of tenancy.

4. That is, Kiangsu north and south of the Yangtze. This is not just an arbitrary division, for after 1949 Kiangsu was administered as two separate units: the North Kiangsu and South Kiangsu administrative regions. Not until November 1952 was the province re-united. For this reason, each region is considered separately in this article.

5. Hsing-cheng-yüan nung-ts’un fu-hsing wei-yüan-hui (The Commission for Rural Rehabilitation of the Executive Yüan), Chiang-su-sheng nung-ts’un tiao-ch’a (A Rural Survey of Kiangsu Province) (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1934), pp. 94–99, 124–34, 170–85 and 207–20. The four hsien were P’ei (Hsü-chou special district), Yen-ch’eng (Yen-ch’eng s.d.), Ch’i-tung (Nan-t’ung s.d.) and Ch’ang-shu (Soochow s.d.).Google Scholar

6. Ibid. pp. 207–20.

7. Kuang-tan, P’an and Wei-t’ien, Ch’üan, Su-nan t’u-ti kai-ko fang-wen chi (Investigations into Land Reform in South Kiangsu) (Peking: San-lien, 1952), p. 2.Google Scholar

8. Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Industry, China Industrial Handbooks: Kiangsu (Shanghai, 1933), pp. 31–33.Google Scholar

9. In general, the rate of profit on renting out land (expressed as a percentage of capital invested) was low in China. According to a survey of more than a hundred farms in Anhwei in 1923, the rate of return was as low as 2’5%: Buck, J. L., Economic and Social Survey of 102 Farms Near Wuhu, Anhwei, China (December 1923),Google Scholar cited by Chung-li, Chang, The Income of the Chinese Gentry (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962).Google Scholar In Kiangsu an investigation made by Chang Hsin-i in 1930 (“Some materials on the tenancy problem in China,” T’ung-chi yüeh-pao (Statistical Monthly), Vol. 2, No. 6 (June 1930), pp. 31–32) indicated that cash rent as a proportion of land value in the province ranged from 8·1 to 10–4% for dry-crop land and from 8·1 to 8·7% for paddy land. When costs of rent collection, possible spoilage, the effects of poor harvests and tax payments are taken into account, it is clear that net profit must have been considerably less. But investment in commercial and industrial enterprises offered higher returns as well as a degree of security that did not attach to income from land. Such factors may have reduced the relative attractions of landlordism in South Kiangsu.Google Scholar

10. See Ohkawa, K. and Rosovsky, H., “The role of agriculture in modern Japanese economic development,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 9, Part 2 (October 1960), pp. 43–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11. Landlords did sometimes provide seeds, fertilizer and other items of working capital, but such help was reflected in the payment of a higher rent.

12. A concomitant of the increase in absentee landlordism in South Kiangsu was the development of institutions known as “landlord bursaries” (tsu-chari). These were designed to facilitate the exploitation and management of land and were operated by agents working on behalf of landlords. See Muramatsu, Yuji, “A documentary study of Chinese landlordism in the late Ch’ing and the early Republican Kiangnan,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. XXIX, Part 3 (1966), pp. 566–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13. The expected direct relationship between soil fertility (quality of land) and rent level does not emerge from available data. Rather there was a tendency for an inverse relationship to exist in Kiangsu: in other words, the burden of rent was heaviest for those least able to bear it. For specific evidence see Yu-i, Chang, Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh shih-tzu-liao (Source Materials on Modern Chinese Agricultural History) (Peking: San-lien, 1957), Vol. 3, p. 247.Google Scholar Also Po-ta, Ch’en, A Study of Land Rent in Pre-Liberation China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), Chap. 3.Google Scholar

14. T’ien-tzu, Wang, “The rural economy of Pei-hsia in Wusih,” Nung-hang yüeh-k’an (Monthly Journal of the Farmers’ Bank of China), Vol. 2, No. 11 (November 1935), pp. 15–31.Google Scholar

15. Hsiu-ch’ing, Liu, “Ch’i-tung tsu-tien wen-t’i yü fu-chih tzu-keng-nung yüntung” (“The problem of tenancy in Ch’i-tung and the movement to create owner-cultivators”), Ti-cheng yüeh-k’an (Land Administration Monthly), Vol. 5, Nos. 2 and 3 (March 1937), pp. 321–46.Google Scholar

16. Every one of the owner-cultivator households spent something on hired labour, house repairs and purchases of tools and fertilizers. The proportion carrying out expenditure on animal husbandry was lower at 66–67%. See ibid.

17. Consideration of other factors such as lack of security of tenure in Kiangsu and landlords’ use of exploitative devices other than rent would reinforce this conclusion.

18. Buck’s data show that there was well under one draft animal unit per farm in his Kiangsu samplè. See Buck, J. L., Land Utilization in China (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937), Statistical Volume, Table 5, p. 131. The supply situation of farm tools was equally serious: most farms probably had a traditional plough and one or two simple tools, but larger and more specialized equipment was often shared.Google Scholar

19. Although the institution of tenancy enabled many landless peasants to obtain a living from the land, the most frequent size of operational holding remained very small. Moreover, most farms were heavily fragmented.

20. See, for example, “Chiang-su I-hsing ti nung-ts’un ching-chi yü kung-ch’an-tang pao-tung ti chen-hsiang “ (“ The rural economy of I-hsing and the Communist Party movement”), Ts’un-chih (Rural Administration), Vol. 2, Nos. 11 and 12, pp. 40–46.Google Scholar

21. See Liu, “The problem of tenancy.”

22. For an account of CCP activities in Kiangsu during the Sino-Japanese War, see Johnson, Chalmers A., Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), especially Chap. 5.Google Scholar

23. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 the CCP modified its agrarian policies in the interest of ostensible national unity against Japan. The compromise policy which emerged was the “double reduction”: the reduction of rents by 25% and of interest payments on loans (to 1·0 or 1·5% a month).

24. “Su-pei t’u-ti kuan-hsi ti chin-hsi” (“Land relations in North Kiangsu now and in the past”), Su-pei jih-pao (North Kiangsu Daily) (Su-pei) (Yang-chou), 30 June 1951, p. 4. 25.Google Scholar

25. Ibid.

26. Because of the difficulties of unified organization in wartime conditions, North Kiangsu was divided into two sub-units, Central and North Kiangsu. The dividing line was the Hwai River.

27. A good account of some of the stratagems resorted to by landlords is given by Lu Feng in his Jen-min fan-shen chi (The People Throw Off their Feudal Yoke) (Yangtze Publishing House, 1947).

28. Nung-min chiu-kuo hui (abbreviated to Nung-chiu hui) and Ch’a-tsu t’uan.

29. After the end of the Sino-Japanese War peasants began to move spontaneously beyond rent reduction to actual confiscation of landlords’property. In May 1946, under the pressure of events, the Central Committee of the CCP gave its formal approval to these confiscatory actions against landlords, though adding a qualification that moderation should be shown to those having industrial and commercial interests and to the rich peasants. But the last six months of 1946 and much of 1947 was a period when many peasants and cadres ignored the directives issued by the Party and when, as Liu Shao-ch’i later confessed, “…most of the deviations in the implementation of agrarian reform were committed…and the interests of part of the middle peasants were encroached upon, industry and commerce in the rural areas wete partly impaired and indiscriminate beatings and killings occurred…”: see Liu Shao-ch’i, “On the Agrarian Reform Law,” a report made at the Second Session of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking, 14 June 1950, and translated in full in The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China and Other Relevant Documents (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, December 1950).Google Scholar

30. Keng-che yu ch’i-t’ien. The original phrase was Sun Yat-sen’s, but it was subsequently adopted by the CCP and incorporated into its agrarian programme.

31. “Land relations in North Kiangsu.” The Chinese phrase is i-shou na chiang, i-shou na suan-p’an.

32. Ibid. See also “T’u-ti kai-ko shih-shih pan-fa“ (“Methods of implementing land reform”), Hsin-hua jih-pao (New China Daily) (Hsin-hud) (Nanking), 27 November 1950, p. 1, which describes these areas as where “…and was distributed during the war of liberation, but was subsequently snatched back by landlords and rich peasants.”Google Scholar

33. Feng, Kao (vice-chairman of the Land Reform Committee of the People's Administration of North Kiangsu), “Su-pei-ch’ü i-nien-lai t’u-ti kai-ko yün-tung ti pao-kao” (“Report on land reform work in North Kiangsu during the past year”), Su-pei, 28 December 1951, p. 1.Google Scholar

34. The directives considered in this section, together with their dates of publication and/or promulgation, are as follows. Central Government: Agrarian Reform Law, 30 June 1950 (promulgated). East China Military Administration: Provisions for Rent Reduction in the Newly Liberated Regions of East China, 6 February 1950 (promulgated), 27 April 1950 (published); Directive on Preparatory Work for Land Reform, 21 March 1950 (published); On Agricultural Production Policies in the Land Reform Areas This Autumn and Winter, 18 September 1950 (published); Methods of Implementing Land Reform in East China, 26 November 1950 (published); and On Completing Land Reform Ahead of Time, 5 December 1950 (promulgated).

35. The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China and Other Relevant Documents, pp. 1–16.Google Scholar

36. In practical terms there seems to have been no difference between these terms: confiscation applied to land belonging to landlords and requisition to that of rich peasants.

37. Agrarian Reform Law, p. 4.

38. For a more extended analysis of the provisions of the Agrarian Reform Law, see Wong, John, Land Reform in the People's Republic of China (New York: Praeger, 1973), Chap. 3.Google Scholar

39. Agrarian Reform Law, pp. 17–58.

40. The ECMA was set up on 27 January 1950 in Shanghai. It exercised jurisdictio over the three provinces of Shantung, Chekiang and Fukien; the four administrative districts of North and South Anhwei and North and South Kiangsu; and two municipalities, Shanghai and Nanking.

41. By this time rent reduction had been incorporated into the “Common Programme” as an essential pre-condition of the implementation of land reform; in the newly liberated regions. The text of the regulations can be found in “Hsin-ch’ü nung-ts’un mieh-tsu t’iao-li,” Su-nan jih-pao (South Kiangsu Daily) (Su-nan) (Wusih), 29 April 1950, p. 1.Google Scholar

42. ibid.

43. A speech made on the same day that the East China regulations were passed reinforced this point by emphasizing that questions involving rent deposits, unpaid hired labourers, the maintenance of tenant security were to be deliberately shelved until land reform “ proper” was implemented. See “Kuan-yü Hua-tung hsin chieh-fang ch’ü nung-ts’un mieh-tsu t’iao-li ti shuo-ming” (“ Explanation of rent reduction regulations in the villages of the newly liberated areas of East China”), Hsin Soo-chou pao (New Soochow Daily), 28 April 1950, p. 1. The moderate tone of these documents was echoed in a central directive issued on 18 February 1950, On Land Reform and Public Grain Acquisition in the Newly Liberated Areas.Google Scholar

44. Directive by the East China Military Administrative Committee on Preparatory Work for Land Reform, in Hua-tung ch’ü ts’ai-cheng ching-chi fa-ling hui-pien (Economic and Financial Regulations for the East China Region) (Shanghai: East China People's Publishing House, 1951), Vol. 2, pp. 1972–976.Google Scholar

45. “Chieh-fang i-lai ti Su-nan nung-min yiin-tung kai-k’uang” (“ The peasant movement in South Kiangsu since Liberation”), Su-nan, 8 February 1950, p. 2.Google Scholar

46. “Su-pei ti tsai-ch’ing yü chiu-tsai kung-tso” (“The situation in North Kiangsu and relief work”), Hsin Soo-chou pao, 23 April 1950, p. 4. Also “ Su-pei i-nien-lai cheng-fu kung-tso pao-kao” (“ Report of government work in North Kiangsu in the past year ”), Su-pei, 29 October 1950, states that the natural disasters were the worst in many decades. Famine conditions were said to have lasted for more than 10 months and to have affected four million peasants. (One chin is approximately 0·5 kg.)

47. At provincial, special district and hsien levels.

48. On Agricultural Production Policies in the Land Reform Areas This Autumn and Winter (published 18 September 1950). See Ts’ai-cheng ching-chi fa-ling hui-pien, Vol. 2, p. 2000.Google Scholar

49. This was to be achieved in the areas where land reform was to be implemented through the following principles: (1) cultivation of autumn and winter crops should continue on the principle of “he who reaps, tills”; (2) crops could be divided between the original cultivator and the new landowner by the agreement of both parties according to the norms laid down in the rent reduction regulations; (3) the new landowner could reimburse the original cultivator for the total cost of cultivation and fertilizer application carried out before the land was reallocated.

50. Ts’ai-cheng ching-chi fa-ling hui-pien, Vol. 2, pp. 1976–996.Google Scholar

51. For example, Article 15 of the East China Rent Reduction regulations stated: “Protect industry and trade, including those industrial and commercial enterprises engaged in by landlords and old-style rich peasants.”

52. For an exposition of this policy, see Liu Shao-ch’i's report” On the Agrarian Reform Law,” pp. 71–75.

53. Agrarian Reform Law, p. 3.

54. Ibid.

55. Ts’ai-cheng ching-chi fa-ling hui-pien, Vol. 2, pp. 1976–996.Google Scholar

56. On Completing Land Reform Ahead of Time, in ibid. pp. 1996–998.

57. North Anhwei had been particularly hard-hit by flooding.

58. “Land reform in East China to be accelerated,” Shanghai News, 16 December 1950, translated in Survey of the China Mainland Press (Hong Kong), No. 35 (21 December 1950), pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

59. China entered the Korean War in October 1950.

60. Ts’ai-cheng ching-chi fa-ling hui-pien, Vol. 2.

61. Ibid.

62. In order to bring these “lawless landlords” under control, the ECMA had in October promulgated its Provisional Regulations for Controlling Lawless Landlords in East China.

63. An interesting phenomenon of this period was the large amount of space in newspapers and other publications devoted to refuting the proposition that “there is no feudalism in Kiangnan” (Chiang-nan wu feng-chien). Special treatment of the large numbers of landlords with industrial and commercial interests seems to have given rise to the belief that rural conditions in Kiangnan were somehow different from those elsewhere in China-that landlordism was in fact less feudal and more progressive. The implications of such an argument were far-reaching, for they suggested that land reform might take place more peacefully and with less emphasis on class struggle.

64. Some indication of the effect upon land reform of the “new line” can be seen from a report which appeared in March 1951. It stated that the original plan was that an area of East China containing an agricultural population of 47 millions should complete land reform during the winter and spring of 1950–51. Yet by March 1951 land reform had been fully implemented in an area containing 66 million peasants (40% more than the original target). If the “old-liberated” areas were also included, the figure rose to 100 millions. See Jui-lung, Liu, “Kuan yü Hua-tung t’u-ti kai-ko kung-tso ti pao-kao” (“Report on land reform work in East China”), Hsin-hua, 21 March 1951, p. 2Google Scholar

65. “Su-pei t’u-ti kai-ko chi-pen wan-ch’eng” (“Land reform has basically been completed in North Kiangsu”), Su-pei, 31 May 1951, p. 1.Google Scholar

66. In “The newly liberated areas of North Kiangsu are vigorously creating the conditions for land reform” (ibid. 19 October 1951, p. 1) it was stated that by the end of August 1950, 512 hsiang (76% of the total in this area) had established “peasant organizations” (nung-hui tsu-chih).

67. “Land reform has basically been completed in North Kiangsu.”

68. “Lao-ch’ü chieh-shu t’u-kai kung-tso ta-pu wan-ch’eng, hsin-ch’ü t’u-ti kai-ko yün-tung chin-chang chin-hsing” (“Land reform work is mostly completed in the old areas. In the new areas the land reform movement is moving ahead as a matter of urgency”), ibid. 10 December 1950, p. 2.

69. Accounts of the sabotage activities of the “lawless landlords” can be found in Su-pei during early November: see, for example,“Pu-fa ti-chu p’o-huai t’u-ti kai-ko” (“Lawless landlords are sabotaging land reform”), ibid. 1 November 1950, p. 2.

70. “Land reform work is mostly completed in the old areas.”

71. Su-pei hsing-cheng-ch’ü t’u-ti kai-ko ch’ü-t’i shih-shih pan-fa (Specific Methods for Implementing Land Reform in the Administrative Region of North Kiangsu), Su-pei, 18 December 1950, p. 1.Google Scholar

72. And presumably rich peasants too.

73. Specific Methods for Implementing Land Reform, Article 3 (i).

74. “Transfer or disposal after the liberation of the locality by sale, mortgage, gift or any other means, of any land which should be confiscated or requisitioned…shall be declared null and void. Such land should be included in the land to be redistributed. But if peasants who bought such land or took mortgages on such land will thereby suffer any considerable loss, measures should be worked out for proper compensation.” Agrarian Reform Law, pp. 3–4.

75. An obvious explanation would be that the rules governing the implementation of land reform were passed some time in advance of their official publication - as had been the case with the rent reduction regulations (see above, note 34).

76. Kao Feng, “Report on land reform work in North Kiangsu.”

77. “Land reform has basically been completed in North Kiangsu.”

78. Ibid.

79. “Pu-fa ti-chu fan-kung fu-p’i” (“Counterattacks and resurgence of lawless landlords”), Su-pei, 16 August 1951.

80. “Push ahead with the work of regulating the land,” ibid. 14 May 1951, p. 2.

81. See “The peasant movement in South Kiangsu since Liberation.”

82. But not without difficulty: see ibid, where it was reported that during the autumn levy, landlords transferred property and wealth and concealed and divided their land in an effort to escape their obligations.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid. It is worth mentioning that talk of cadres’ shortcomings was not pure fantasy, as witness the criticism of “formalism,” “close-door sectarianism” and other erroneous tendencies.

85. “Kuan-yü Su-nan hsing-cheng-ch’ü kung-tso ch’ing-k’uang ti pao-kao” (“Report on the work situation in the administrative region of South Kiangsu”) (ibid. 6 February 1950, p. 1) emphasized the uniqueness of South Kiangsu's economy.

86. Kuan-yü t’u-ti kai-ko chun-pai kung-tso ti chih-shih (Directive on Preparations for Land Reform), ibid. 23 March 1951, p. I.

87. “Mu-ch’ien Su-nan sheng-ch’an chiu-tsai ti ch’ing-shih ho jen-wu” (“The current situation and the tasks of production relief in South Kiangsu”), ibid. 11 April 1950, p. 1. 88. Ibid.

89. “I-chiu-wu-ling nien chang-pan-nien ti Su-nan hsing-cheng kung-tso” (“Administrative work in South Kiangsu in the first half of 1950”), ibid. 28 July 1950, p. 1.

90. This is not to suggest that all the former difficulties had been overcome-in particular, landlord opposition continued on a wide scale. See “Pu-fa ti-chu p’o-huai t’u-kai fa-ling” (“Lawless landlords break the Land Reform Law”), ibid. 21 August 1950, p. 1, and “Chen-chiang chuan-ch’ii pu-fa ti-chu p’o-huai sheng-ch’an p’o-huai t’u-kai” (“Lawless landlords in Chinkiang special district are undermining production and sabotaging land reform”), ibid. 22 September 1950, p. 1. The landlord problem in South Kiangsu was more intractable than in the north because of the large numbers that owned industrial and commercial enterprises.

91. “Ch’iu-shou hou shih-hsing t’u-ti kai-ko” (“Implement land reform after the autumn harvest”), ibid. 7 August 1950, p. 1.

92. “Chüeh-i tung-yüan Su-nan ch’üan-t’i nung-min chin-tung ming-ch’un wanch’eng T’u-ti kai-ko” (“Decision to mobilize all the peasants of South Kiangsu to complete land reform this winter and next spring”), ibid. 7 September 1950, p. 1.

93. Ch’en P’i-hsien was the secretary of the Party Committee of the CCP (South Kiangsu branch). Ou-yang Hui-lin was a member of the ECMA Land Reform Committee. The text of Ou-yang's report can be found in ibid. 3 September 1950, p. 1.

94. The supposed relationship between tenancy and rural poverty was not always understood by the peasants. Some contemporary reports even suggest that they were taken in by landlords‘protestations that they (the peasants) owed their very existence to the landlords’ generosity in renting out land.

95. See especially “Ko-ti tai-piao k’ung-su ti-chu chieh-chi po-hsüeh tsui-o chieh-lu pu-fa ti-chu p’o-huai t’u-ti kai-ko tsui-hsing” (“Representatives from all areas accuse the landlord class of exploitation and unmask the criminal activities of lawless landlords against land reform”), ibid. 5 September 1950, p. 1.

96. “On mobilizing the peasant masses to complete land reform in South Kiangsu this winter and next spring,” Su-nan, 3 September 1950, p. 1. The resolution was in many ways a simple endorsement of Ou-yang Hui-lin's speech calling for an acceleration of land reform.

97. “Su-nan ti-i-chieh nung-min tai-piao ta-hui t’ung-kuo ti ssu-hsiang chüeh-i” (“The four decisions taken by the South Kiangsu first peasant representative conference”), ibid. 7 September 1950, p. 1.

98. See also the second resolution passed at the conference “Kuan-yü chin-hou nung-min hsüeh-hui kung-tso ti chüeh-i” (“On the future work of the Peasant Associations”). ibid.

99. “Pa Su-nan nung-tai ta-hui ti ching-shen kuan-ch’e tao nung-min ch’ünchung-chung ch’ü!” (“Thoroughly inculcate the spirit of the South Kiangsu conference of peasant representatives into the peasant masses!”), ibid.

100. Su-nan ke-chieh jen-min tai-piao hui-i shou-ch’u erh-tz’u ch’üan-hui.

101. See, for example, the bitter attack by Chang Yün-hsi in “Ko-chieh taipiao tsai ta-hui-shang ti fa-yen ” (“Speeches by various representatives at the conference”), Su-nan, 14 September 1950, p. 2; also the speech of Chiao K’angshen, ibid.

102. Even in September 1950, the question of protecting trade and industry continued to concern some of the conference delegates. P’ing Hsiao-chung, a representative of trade and industry, spoke of the important inter-relationship between agriculture and industry and trade. Agriculture, he said, provided both the raw materials and market for the industrial sector, but only through industrialization could the problem of rural poverty be solved. The Agrarian Reform Law's emphasis on the need to protect industry and trade reflected the importance of this relationship and was quite in accordance with the objective situation. See ibid.

103. See also the attack by Ch’en Yün-ke on those people who took the attitude that peasant demands were wrong and who sided with the landlords (ibid.). Also that of Huang Li-yeh who called on the conference to take the standpoint of the peasants, not the landlords (“Speeches by various representatives at the conference,” ibid. 15 September 1950, p. 6).

104. “Speeches by various representatives,” ibid. 14 September 1950, p. 2.

105. “Speeches by various representatives,” ibid. 15 September 1950, p. 5. At this conference Ou-yang represented the South Kiangsu Peasant Associations.

106. ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. “Su-nan t’u-ti kai-ko yün-tung chi-chiang chu-pu chan-k’ai” (“The future stages of development of the land reform movement in South Kiangsu ”), ibid. 4 November 1950, p. 1.

109. Su-nan t’u-ti kai-ko shih-shih pan-fa (Methods of Implementing Land Reform in South Kiangsu), promulgated by the Office of the People's Administration of South Kiangsu, in ibid. 28 November 1950, p. 1.

110. ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Specific provisions included the following: all landlord houses in cities and villages used directly for industrial and commercial activities (including those which had been rented out prior to the publication of the Agrarian Reform Law) were to be untouched. Confiscation of surplus buildings belonging to landlords could only take place after discussion at the ch’ü (“district”) level and after permission had been given to the hsien authorities, etc. See ibid. Articles 3, 4 and 5.

113. Ibid.

114. The peculiar device whereby land was symbolically divided between the “surface right” (t’ien-mien ch’üan) and the “bottom right” (t’ien-ti ch’üan) was the origin of a particular form of tenancy in South Kiangsu mistakenly called “permanent tenancy.” The owner of the bottom right was the title holder to the land and, as such, it was his name that was registered with the government and he who paid the land taxes. Although he was not allowed to cultivate the land (that privilege belonged to the owner of the surface right alone) he was permitted to collect rent from the cultivator of the soil. In other words, the holder of the bottom right was the landlord and the holder of the surface right, the tenant. The landlord could sell his bottom right (his claim on rent) but this in no way affected the right of the tenant to continue cultivating the soil. For his part, the tenant could farm the land himself, employ hired labour to do so or sub-lease the land to a third party and so simultaneously become landlord and tenant. The importance of this device is indicated by the fact that it existed in an area of South Kiangsu containing 10 million peasants (about 40% of the total agricultural population). However, distribution was not general and it was found in only 12 out of 25 hsien. It was most common in the east, occurred to a more limited extent in central South Kiangsu and was not found at all in the west. For further consideration of this phenomenon, see P’an and Ch’üan, Su-nan t’u-ti kai-ko fang-wen chi, Chap. 3. Also Hsiao-t’ung, Fei, Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1939), Chap. XI, pp. 181–91, is of special interest.Google Scholar

115. Agrarian Reform Law, p. 5.

116. Methods of Implementing Land Reform in South Kiangsu.

117. “Su-nan t’u-ti kai-ko kung-tso ti pao-kao” (“Report on land reform work in South Kiangsu”), made at the First Plenum of the Second Session of the South Kiangsu Conference of People's Representatives, Su-nan, 1 January 1952, pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

118. “Su-nan-ch’ü t’u-kai chi-pen wan-ch’eng ” (“Land reform basically completed in South Kiangsu ”), Hsin-hua, 21 March 1951, p. 2.Google Scholar

119. “Hua-tung t’u-kai yün-tung ch’üan-mien chan-k’ai ” (“The land reform movement is advancing on a broad front throughout East China ”), Su-nan, 12 December 1950, p. 1.Google Scholar

120. “Su-nan t’u-kai ch’üan-mien chan-k’ai” (“Land reform in South Kiangsu is advancing on a broad front”), ibid. 23 December 1950, p. 1.

121. This was the shuo-li tou-cheng.

122. “Su-nan t’u-ti kai-ko kung-tso ch’ing-k’uang” (“The situation regarding land reform work in South Kiangsu”), Su-nan, 18 April 1951, p. 2.Google Scholar

123. Hsin-hua, 21 March 1951.

124. Statistics showed that 520 landlord households had escaped from villages in Wusih hsien and 391 in I-hsing hsien. See “P’i-p’ing lang-fei t’u-kai kuo-shih hsien-hsiang” (“Criticism of the wastage of the fruits of land reform”), Su-nan, 18 February 1951, p. 1.Google Scholar

125. Grain was distributed to the poor peasants for production purposes (for seed).

126. “Report on land reform work in South Kiangsu.”

127. “San-pa-san-ko hsiang wan-ch’eng fa t’u-ti-cheng” (“Three hundred and eighty three hsiang have completed the work of issuing title deeds”), Su-nan, 13 August 1951, p. 1.Google Scholar

128. In the preceding pages the land reform has been considered in the general contexts of North and South Kiangsu. A slight qualification to these accounts is that land reform in the large city suburbs of South Kiangsu followed a slightly different chronology from that outlined above.