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Prospects for a New Sino-Japanese Relationship

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Extract

After 22 years of cold war confrontation, the People's Republic of China and Japan finally established diplomatic relations under the impact of the Sino-American détente. In bilateral terms, the rapprochement had the immediate effect of removing certain artificial political and financial barriers that had impeded the normalization of relations. It also promoted the normal interchange of visits and goods between the two countries. The two-way trade in 1973 reached the $2,000 million mark, or nearly double the volume for the previous year. In conformity with the provisions of the Sino-Japanese joint statement of 29 September 1972, the two governments concluded an undersea cable accord, a memorandum for the increase of resident news correspondents in each country from five to 11, a three-year official trade agreement granting each party most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to tariffs, customs clearance and other matters relating to bilateral trade, and an aviation agreement. Pending the conclusion of a fishery agreement, a navigation accord and a treaty of peace and friendship, the two countries seem to have entered into a more normal relationship that may eventually benefit both.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1974

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References

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