1. Institutionalization, or the lack of it, has been said to cause many problems in Chinese politics. See for instance Zhao, Suisheng, “The feeble political capacity of a strong one-party regime – an institutional approach toward the formulation and implementation of economic policy in post-Mao mainland China,” 2 parts, Issues and Studies, Vol. 26, Nos. 1–2, pp. 47–40, 35–74Google Scholar; Tsou, Tang, “The Tiananmen tragedy: the state-society relationship, choices, and mechanisms in historical perspective,” in Womack, Brantly (ed.), Contemporary Chinese Politics in Political Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 265–327Google Scholar; Lieberthal, Kenneth and Lampton, David (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision-Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Oksenberg, Michael, “The American study of modern China: toward the twenty-first century,” in Shambaugh, David (ed.), American Studies of Contemporary China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 315–343Google Scholar; Fewsmith, Joseph, Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994)Google Scholar; and Jia, Hao and Lin, Zhimin (eds.), Changing Central—Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).Google Scholar

2. For a sample of works see de Bary, Wm Theodore and Weiming, Tu (eds.), Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)Google Scholar; Hansen, Chad, “Punishment and dignity in China,” in Munro, Ronald J. (ed.), Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values (Ann Arbor: The Center for Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1985), pp. 359–383Google Scholar; Brugger, Bill and Reglar, Stephen, Politics, Economy and Society in Contemporary China (London: Macmillan, 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, ch. 5; Epstein, Edward J., “Law and legitimation in post-Mao China,” in Potter, Pitman B. (ed.), Domestic Law Reforms in Post-Mao China (Armonk, NY: ME. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 19–55Google Scholar; Lo, Carlos Wing-hung, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995)Google Scholar; Nathan, Andrew J., “Sources of Chinese rights thinking,” in Edwards, R. Randle, Henkin, Louis and Nathan, Andrew J., Human Rights in Contemporary China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 125–164Google Scholar; de Bary, Wm Theodore, “Chinese despotism and the Confucian ideal: a seventeenth-century view,” in Fairbank, John K. (ed.), Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 163–203Google Scholar; and Liu, Yongping, Origins of Chinese Law: Penal and Administrative Law in its Early Development (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1998).Google Scholar

3. For a recent treatment see De Bary, and Weiming, Tu, Confucianism and Human Rights.Google Scholar

4. Ibid. pp. 24–25.

5. This is postulated in Li, Linda Chelan, Centre and Provinces: China, 1978–1993. Power as Non-zero-sum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).Google Scholar

6. The impression that the Guangdong leadership was very keen on the rule of law “project” was confirmed by a law professor in Beijing's China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), who had been amongst the CASS legal experts invited to give law lectures to provincial leaders. Interviews conducted in Beijing, September 1996.

7. See for instance Baum, Richard, “Modernization and legal reform in post-Mao China: the rebirth of socialist legality,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 1986), pp. 69–103CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brugger, and Reglar, , Politics, Economy and Society, p. 177.Google Scholar

8. Hansen, , “Punishment and dignity,” p. 374.Google Scholar

9. Ibid. p. 367; Nathan, , “Sources of Chinese rights thinking”, pp. 127, 137–40.Google Scholar

10. The term “rule of law” appeared more often in academic papers, and was often used in contrast with the “rule of men.” For an example of the interchangeable use of various expressions, see Buxun, Li, “Shixing yifa zhiguo, jianshe shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia”Google Scholar (“Practise the ‘ruling according to the law’ policy, build a socialist country with the rule of law”), Chinese Legal Science, No. 2 (04 1996), pp. 14–27.Google Scholar For debates about the meanings of various terms, and whether one or the other term should be adopted, see, for example, Shihuan, Wu, “Lun yifa jinshang yu yifa zhiguo de zhengtixing” (‘The integral relations between doing business according to law and ruling according to law’), Guangdong Legal Science, No. 2 (04 1993), pp. 4–8Google Scholar; Daohui, Guo, “Zhiguo fanglüe de genben zhuanbian” (“A fundamental change of the approach to governance”), in Hailin, Liu, Buyun, Li and Lin, Li (eds.), Yifa zhiguo jianshe shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia (The Rule of Law: Building a Socialist, Rule-based Country) Beijing: zhongguo fazhi chubanshe, 1996), pp. 109–120.Google Scholar

11. Author's interviews, Beijing, September 1996.

12. Marsh, Norman S., “The rule of law as a supra-national concept,” in Guest, A. G. (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 229–230.Google Scholar

13. For a historical account of the development of theories of legal evolution see Stein, Peter, Legal Evolution: The Story of An Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.Google Scholar For a discussion of the Chinese case, see Benewick, Robert, “Towards a developmental theory of constitutionalism: the Chinese case,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 442–461.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. The other six strategies are: establishing the socialist market framework in various policy aspects; diversifying export markets and expanding the open-door policy; restructuring industries to improve economic efficiency; planning intra-provincial regional development to ensure balanced development; developing education and training to improve the quality of workforce; and cultivating a healthy social and cultural environment. See Fei, Xie, “Wei Guangdong 20 nian jiben shixian xiandaihua er fendou” (“Struggling to achieve modernization within 20 years in Guangdong”), in Fei, Xie, Guangdong gaige kaifang tansuo (Probing in Reform and Opening Up in Guangdong) (Beijing: Central Party School Press, 1995), pp. 11–20.Google Scholar

15. See Renmin zhi sheng. No. 6 (06 1995), pp. 30–31.Google Scholar Author's interviews, Guangzhou, June 1996.

16. Guangdong nianjian 1997, p. 126.Google Scholar

17. Interviews with legal scholars in Guangzhou, June 1996.

18. See Nanfang ribao, 27 08 1994, p. 1.Google Scholar The “Law enforcement responsibility system handbook” was edited jointly by Guangdong Provincial People's Congress Standing Committee, Guangdong Provincial Law Bureau, and the Guangdong Provincial Legal Education Office, and published in May 1994. The handbook covers 448 national and provincial legislations enacted between 1979 and March 1994.

19. For a discussion of this appraisal system and its implementation in various cities in Guangdong, see Guangdong People's Congress System Research Association (ed.), Xin lu (The New Road) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Higher Education Press, 1996).Google Scholar

20. ibid. pp. 10, 27.

21. Author's interviews, Guangzhou, June 1996. Five elected officials were removed from their positions after the appraisal, including one county public security bureau chief. Several hundred non-elected officials were removed from their positions as an indirect effect of the legislative scrutiny on their elected superiors. According to a law professor of the CASS, there was no similar appraisal system in place in the National People's Congress as of 1996, where cadre management was still viewed as the exclusive privilege of the CCP. Author's interviews in Beijing, September 1996.

22. Economic legislation enacted during the 1980s was still very much overshadowed by the pre-existing planned economy, as seen from the requirements of the development of the market economy in the mid-1990s. Author's interviews with a CASS law professor, September 1996.

23. Author's interviews, Guangzhou, June 1996. For the adjustment of pace since 1995, see Fazhi (The Legal System), No. 1 (1996), p. 5.Google Scholar

24. See Deng's speech of 13 December 1978, given to the closing ceremony of the Central Working Conference convened in preparation for the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress which followed immediately, printed in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975–1982 (Beijing: People's Press, 1983), p. 136.Google Scholar

25. Author's interviews, Beijing, September 1996.

26. Author's interviews, Guangzhou, June 1996.

27. Ibid.

28. See Baoluo, Peng, “Guanyu yifa zhisheng (shi) de lilun yu shijian de sikao” (“Theory and practice of the ‘rule of law’ at a provincial/municipal level: some thoughts”), in Guangdong Legal Society (ed.), Shehuiihuyi shichang jingji yu yifa zhisheng lunwenji (Essays on the Socialist Market Economy and the “Rule of Law” in Guangdong) (Guangzhou: Facheng chubanshe, 1996), p. 8.Google Scholar

29. Author's interviews, Guangzhou, June 1996. A law professor at Beijing pointed out that this “bottom-up” phenomenon was in fact orchestrated from the top. Each level of government was practically pushing the next lower level to implement the “rule of law” policy, in the name of experimentation and gathering experience, thus delaying if not avoiding the impact of the policy on itself. Author's interview, Beijing, January 1998.

30. See Shenzhen Party Committee (ed.), Deng Xiaoping yu Shenzhen (Deng Xiaoping and Shenzhen) (Shenzhen: Haitian chubanshe, 1992), p. 10.Google Scholar

31. The report is printed in Qiushi, No. 21 (1992), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

32. See Nanfang ribao, 29 03 1993, p. 1Google Scholar, and Yangcheng wanbao, 3 07 1993, p.1.Google Scholar

33. Guangdong People's Congress (ed.), The Course of Guangdong People's Congress, 1954–1994 (Guangzhou: Guangdong People's Congress, 1994), p. 82.Google Scholar

34. Ibid. The influence of central policy, and especially the impact of Qiao Shi's comment of the “experimental field” in April 1993, was also acknowledged by authors' interviews conducted in Guangzhou, June 1996. According to a respondent working in the legal stream, Qiao Shi's remarks served to remove the worry among Guangdong's leaders that local legislation should only supplement existing national laws and regulations. Instead, Guangdong was now sanctioned not only to experiment in reform policies, but also in laws before national legislation was in place.

35. See Li, , Cenire and ProvincesGoogle Scholar; and Li, Linda Chelan, “Central-provincial relations: beyond compliance analysis,” in Cheng, Joseph (ed.), China Review 1998 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998), pp. 157–185.Google ScholarPubMed

36. This is not to suggest that provinces are able to “create” ambiguity on their own despite very clear instructions from the central government. Provincial success in blurring central policy will substantially depend on their ability to obtain central government co-operation, which allows them a larger space of autonomy. This does not however imply that provincial discretion applies entirely to decisions or non-decisions made at the centre. The process is one of interactive influences rather than zero-sum trade-off between the centre and the provinces. See Li, , Centre and ProvincesGoogle Scholar, for a full exposition of this position.

37. Author's interviews, Guangzhou, December 1993.

38. For more discussion see Li, , Centre and ProvincesGoogle Scholar, ch. 8, and Li, Linda Chelan, “Towards a non-zero-sum interactive framework of spatial politics: the case of centre-province in contemporary China,” Political Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 (03 1997), pp. 49–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39. Ibid. ch. 5.

40. Author's interviews, Guangzhou, June 1996. One example of “central policy, provincial bills” the respondent gave was the “combat the crimes” policy. Central pressure required provinces to tighten up law enforcement. The cost of this was, however, shouldered entirely by provinces. Many local governments were facing a much higher bill to pay for prison expenditures, for instance.

41. This is reflected in the following table:

Sources:

Table extracted from Li, Centre and Provinces, and calculated from Dangdai Zhongguo congshu bianji bu (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo de Guangdong (Guangdong in Contemporary China) Vol. 1 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991), pp. 686–87Google Scholar; and Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, A Record of Insights of Opening and Reform in Guangdong, p. 59.Google Scholar

42. Author's interviews, Guangzhou, June 1996. According to the respondent, despite various difficulties with the new fiscal system, in particular with reference to the time lag between the transferal of central fiscal grants and the requirement of local expenditure, one notable result of the new system was that the centre had ceased asking for additional contributions from Guangdong. Unlike previously when substantial “extra-contractual” remittances were required on top of remittances under the formal contractual system, by and large the fiscal relationship between Guangdong and the centre since 1994 had been conducted within the confines of the new system. One major lingering problem was that there had been no major improvement in the delineation in expenditure responsibilities between the centre and provinces, despite repeated complaints from the province. For the major content of the tax-sharing system of 1994 and its major principles, see State Council Notice No. 85, 1993, printed in Caizheng No. 2 (1994), pp. 18–20.Google Scholar See also Li, , “Central-provincial relations: beyond compliance analysis.”Google Scholar

43. For an official statement on the connection between the rule of law and market economy, see for instance Fei, Xie, “Jiaqiang fazhi jianshe, jianchi yifa zhisheng”Google Scholar (“Strengthening the legal system, carrying through the rule of law in Guangdong”), in Fei, Xie, Probing in Reform and Opening Up in Guangdong, p. 370.Google Scholar For an elaboration of the connection see Puihuang, Peng and Xianying, Yin, “Shilun fazhan shichang jingji bixu jiaqiang fazhi jianshe”Google Scholar (“Developing the market economy necessarily requires the strengthening of the legal system: a preliminary analysis”) in Guangdong Legal Society, Essays on the Socialist Market Economy and the “Rule of Law” in Guangdong, pp. 141–46.Google Scholar

44. The awareness among Guangdong officials and scholars of the importance of maintaining the image of the reform pacesetter is clearly shown in articles such as Shihuan, Wu, Ying, Lu et al. , “Shuli Guangdong ‘quanguo huochetou’ de fazhi xingxiang”Google Scholar (“Establish Guangdong's image as the national spearhead of the rule of law”), in Guangdong Legal Society, Essays on the Socialist Market Economy and theGoogle Scholar “Rule of Law” in Guangdong, pp. 69–75.Google Scholar

45. The Guangdong government organized a series of seminars and conferences with officials and scholars to devise new strategies for continuous growth and development since 1993. A succinct description of Guangdong's concern in the new phase of competition and development is given in Zhu Senlin's speech to a conference of this kind in September 1994. See Senlin, Zhu, “Zhengzhuang xin youshi, jiasu xiandaihua” (“Create new edges, speed up the modernization”), in Guangdong Yearbook Editorial Board (ed.), Jianli Guangdongfazhan xin youshi yanjiu chengguo huibian (A Compendium of Studies on Establishing Guangdong's New Edge in its Development) (Guangdong: Guangdong Yearbook Press, 1995), pp. 35–43.Google Scholar

46. This perceived threat from Shanghai was evident in a paper on the comparative edges of Shanghai and Guangdong, written by an official in the Research Office, Guangdong government. See Qingyong, Huang, “Cong Shanghai de jueqi kan Guangdong de zai fazhan”Google Scholar (“The lesson of the reinvigoration of Shanghai on the further development of Guangdong”), in ibid. pp. 443–451.

47. Ruo, Lin, “Yizhua gaige, erzhua fazhi”Google Scholar (“One method is reform, the other is the strengthening of the law”), reprinted in ibid. p. 85. This article was first released in Guangdong Economy, No. 6 (1993).Google Scholar

48. There is a need to recognize the possibility of provincial leaders concurring and disagreeing with central policy out of their independently formed beliefs and rational thinking, and not to treat choices of behaviour by provincial leaders entirely in terms of compliance or non-compliance with central policies. Provincial choices are likely to be a combination of the two. See Li, , “Central-provincial relations: beyond compliance analysis.”Google Scholar

49. See Hutchinson, Allan C. and Monahan, Patrick (eds.), The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), especially pp. 97–123 and 1–16.Google Scholar There has been a long debate as to whether the concept and the institution of the “rule of law” should be defined in a more substantive or more procedural, and thus narrower, sense. The former position sees many liberal notions connected with democracy and popular sovereignty as part of the institution of the “rule of law,” whilst the latter will confine rule of law largely to predictability of law and thus sees its existence theoretically compatible with the absence of democracy. See for instance Marsh, “The rule of law as a supra-national concept,” for the former position and Raz, Joseph, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, ch. 11, for the latter.

50. Here “rule of law” is understood more in the narrower, procedural, sense.

51. Author's interviews, Beijing, September 1996.

52. This is information given by the Chief Procurator of the Guangdong Senior Level Procuratorate, as reported in Ming pao, 5 02 1996, p. C1.Google Scholar

53. The poorest 5% of urban population in Guangdong earned almost 10% less in 1997 than in 1996 (an average of 3,241 yuan against 3,570 yuan), whilst the poorest 5% nationally earned 2.5% less (2,186 yuan against 2,243 yuan). The richest 10% in Guangdong earned 8% more in 1997 than in 1996, whilst nationally the increase was 11%. In relative terms, the gap between the richest 10% and lowest 5% has enlarged from 4.7 times (Guangdong) and 4.1 times (national) in 1996 to 5.6 times and 4.7 times respectively in 1997. Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, 1997, p. 229Google Scholar; China Statistical Yearbook, 1997, pp. 296–97.Google Scholar

54. Oslon, James M., Herman, C. Peter and Zanna, Mark P. (eds.), Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison: The Ontario Symposium, Vol. 4 (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), p. 2.Google Scholar This observation was first made by the classical study on American soldiers by Stouffer, S. A., Suchman, E. A., DeVinney, L. C., Star, S. A. and William, R. M. Jr., The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).Google Scholar

55. See for instance Martin, Joanne, “The tolerance of justice,”Google Scholar in Oslon, et al. , Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison, pp. 217–242.Google Scholar

56. An illustration is in Deng Xiaoping's remarks during his Southern Tour in spring 1992. The major thrust of his messages was to encourage new initiatives to seek higher economic growth, especially from the more developed areas in the south and along the coast. Notwithstanding the primary concern for growth rather than equality, Deng apparently felt obliged to also include a reference to the longer-term aim of achieving equalitarianism in wealth in the nation. See Shenzhen Party Committee, Deng Xiaoping and Shenzhen: Spring, 1992, p. 5.Google Scholar

57. The increasing occurrence of corruption cases among officials who were previously well-known for their dedication to work and revolutionary spirit reflected the magnitude of the pressure. See for instance a report in Apple Daily (Hong Kong), 30 06 1996, p. A13.Google Scholar

58. See Yangcheng wanbao 31 10 1993, p. 1.Google Scholar

59. See Jiaqi, Mo, “Guanyu jianli wanshan fanfubai fazhi jizhi de gouxiang”Google Scholar (“Some thoughts on establishing and improving the anti-corruption legal mechanism”), in Guangdong Legal Society, Essays on the Socialist Market Economy and the “Rule of Law” in Guangdong, p. 114.Google Scholar

60. For a semi-official statement of the background of the adoption of the rule of law policy in Guangdong, coming from within the provincial leadership, see Hong, Zeng, “Yifa zhisheng shi lishi fazhan de yaojiu he biran”Google Scholar (“Practising the ‘rule of law’ in Guangdong is the logical requirement of historical development”), in Guangdong Legal Society, Essays on the Socialist Market Economy and the “Rule of Law” in Guangdong, pp. 3–7.Google Scholar Zeng was a member of the Guangdong People's Congress Standing Committee and the former director of the Guangdong Justice Bureau.

61. Author's interview, Guanghou, June 1996.

62. The status of local legislation in the national legislative system has been a major topic of contention within China. For examples of such discussion see Wangsheng, Zhou, “Lun Zhongguo difang lifa de diwei” (“The status of local legislation in China”), Zhengzhi yu falü, No. 5 (10 1994), pp. 8–11Google Scholar, and Guancheng, Shen, “Dui difang lifaquan de zai renshi” (“A reappraisal of local legislation”), Chinese Legal Science, No. 1 (02 1996), pp. 17–22.Google Scholar There are two approaches in arguing for the legitimacy of local legislation in a unified legal hierarchy: the “legislation by experience” argument and the “advanced legislation” argument. Forchanges in attitudes regarding these two approaches in Guangdong, , see Fazhi, No. I (1996), pp. 4–6.Google Scholar