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The Strength of a Weak Organization: The Communist Youth League as a Path to Power in Post-Mao China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2019

Jérôme Doyon Open the ORCID record for Jérôme Doyon [Opens in a new window]
Jérôme Doyon*
Affiliation:
School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford. Email: jerome.doyon@area.ox.ac.uk.
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Abstract

How can a weak organization be a path to power? The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) lacks autonomy and coherence yet it is seen as the cradle for one of the main factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To understand this tension, I provide a novel account of the role played by the CYL in the recruitment of leading cadres since the 1980s. Against explanations based on factional struggles, I argue that the rise of CYL-affiliated cadres is a by-product of the organization's weakness. As the Party appoints CYL heads, CCP leaders, at various levels and at different points in time, have used the League to accelerate the promotion of their protégés. For years, there has been little incentive for Party bosses to dismantle this promotion path. However, in his bid to consolidate his power, Xi Jinping has weakened this channel so that it may not be used by potential rivals.

摘要

摘要

一个薄弱的政治机构怎样成为主要的选拔途径？尽管中国共产主义青年团缺乏自治权与一致性，它还是被视为中国共产党内部主要派系之一。为了解释这个矛盾现象，我对共青团自1980年代开始在干部选拔中的角色提供了一个新的见解。与派系斗争解释不同，我认为共青团干部势力上升是共青团本身组织薄弱造成的。在指派共青团领导时，各地的共产党领导人以此为契机提挈自己的人马。正因为这样的安排，以往的共产党领导人没什么激励使这一上升通道解体。但是，考虑到这一通道会被潜在竞争者利用，习近平掌权后削弱了这一通道。

Keywords

Chinese Communist Partyelite renewalCommunist Youth Leaguepolitical mobilityfactions中共共青团派系政治精英干部选拔
Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 243 , September 2020 , pp. 780 - 800
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Copyright
Copyright © SOAS University of London 2019

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