^{page 40 note 1} I take the general sense of λбγοι here to be somewhat similar to that, e.g., in Parmenides 135d, where Socrates is praised for his zeal in ‘argument and enquiry’, or ‘speculation’–ή ὁρμή έπι τούς λбγους.

^{page 41 note 1} On the supposed ironical use of the phrase see Burnet, ,Phaedo, note on 99c. AlsoGoogle ScholarGoodrich, H. J., Class. Rev, XVII p. 381 and XVIII P. 5, especially p. 382. I am returning to the point later in this section.Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 2} Perhaps I should refer to Burnet's remark on ioid, that ‘Socrates first considers the σνμβαίνοντα to see whether they involve any contradiction or absurdity;. if they do, the hypothesis is ipso facto destroyed’. Later in the same note Burnet compares the method with that of ‘experimental science’. See also Goodrich, , Class. Rev. XVIII pp. 9Google Scholar and 10. But surely all this is beside the point. Socrates makes no reference to any external check (‘absurdity’), and if ‘contradiction’ refers to (internal) inconsistency in the consequential series, it would seem to destroy the consequences rather than the hypothesis. The treatment of hypotheses quoted by editors from Parmenidcs 135 sq. has quite a different purpose; there the question at issue is the truth or falsity of the hypotheses, and the method (the ‘γνμνασία’) recommended by Parmenides is solely directed to the testing of them. Here it is not the theory or hypothesis (of ideas) which is to be tested, but particular conclusions to be drawn from it.

^{page 41 note 3} I can see nothing better than Burnet's explanation of Ӗχοιτο here (ioid 3), as to ‘fasten on’ or ‘stick to’ the hypothesis, though the usage is rather difficult in view of the preceding έχбμενος.

^{page 42 note 1} As Goodrich brings out in his precise and careful analysis of the passage, the reference to Anaxagoras and the hope which he inspired is parenthetical in form; yet the name δεῦτερος πλοῦς and the depreciation by Socrates of his own method spring from thoughts recorded in this parenthesis. In 99a 4 the parenthesis closes and the argument returns to where it was at 97b. Consequently the paragraph which follows in 99d and e is not intended to explain the inferiority of Socrates’ method (its ‘δευτερóγης’), although the vein of irony which had already led him before the parenthesis to speak of himself asὰϕυής in physics still persists, and now induces him to describe his own work as‘a flight from the facts’, whereas the real main reason for depreciating it is not that stated in the present paragraph (99d and e), i.e., its indirectness of approach, but that stated in the previous paragraph (99c), i.e., its failure to demonstrate the reasonableness of things. It is possible, however, that Plato was influenced by this further consideration and that its indirectness is an additional reason for depreciating the δεӖτερος πλοῦς; if so, he must have, formed a clearer conception in his mind of the nature of the πρѿτος πλοῦς than is stated in the text.

^{page 43 note 1} It has also, I think, given rise to comparisons of this passage with Republic VI which endow the λбγοι with a sort of intermediate status as metaphysical entities somewhere on the scale of being between γιγνбμενα and είδη. But it scarcely seems likely that if Plato had had anything like this in his mind he would not have taken it further, nor that he would have left this intermediate status to be inferred from the use of an illustration about the applicability of which he has himself expressed reservations. There is nothing else in the passage which supports any such interpretation.

^{page 45 note 1} The moral effect of philosophy does not concern us here.

^{page 46 note 1} When Plato presents dialectic in 511b as τὰς ύποθέσεις ποιούμενος ούκ ὰρχὰς τῷ бντι ύποθέσεις, the firm distinction between ύποθέσεις and ὰρχαι should, it seems to me, if an excursus may be permitted, remove the difficulty usually found in the description of dialectic as ὰναιροῦσα τὰς ύποθέσεις in 533c. ὰναιρεῖν, meaning ‘do away with’, ‘annul’, ‘abolish’, etc., does not seem an inappropriate word to use of the dialectical treatment of hypotheses, seeing that it is its main task to substitute ὰρχαι for them. The dialectician takes over these hypotheses, conscious that they are only hypotheses, and then proceeds to do away with them step by step. When he reaches an ὰρχέ he no longer needs hypotheses at all. This doesn't mean that he has done away with the theorems that the mathematician accepted (e.g., γωνιѿν τριττὰ είδη) any more than to annul a law enforcing an observance necessarily annuls the observance itself, It means that he is engaged in getting rid of hypotheses from his own mind. He starts with them, but by the time that he has reached an ὰρχέ he has them in his mind no longer; in the interval, therefore, he must have ‘done away with ‘or ‘got rid of’ them, and so the word ὰναιροῦσα may be taken in its usual sense and should really present no difficulty. Whether in fact Plato thinks that any of the three theorems mentioned in 510c requires alteration, he simply hasn't told us; he does indicate (e.g. 5IId) that they require support.