¹ For introductory clinical discussions of the causation of mental illness see Fish, F., Fish's Outline of Psychiatry for Students and Practitioners (Bristol, 1978), pp. 2–4Google Scholar; Willis, J., Lecture Notes on Psychiatry (Oxford, 1989), pp. 24ffGoogle Scholar.; and Kleinmuntz, B., Essentials of Abnormal Psychology (New York, 1974), pp. 97ffGoogle Scholar. (esp. 122–3) and 125ff. (esp. 151).

² The potential psychological richness of the poets' original material, and its explorative analysis of human motivation, is suggested by the extensive use of the Greek myths by psychoanalysts, especially of the Freudian school.

³ The limited number of surviving plays, and especially the fact that the two tragedians worked at close quarters and clearly had an influence on each other, as well as problems with dating Sophokles' plays, are all a hindrance in deciding which playwright was the first to introduce a new idea.

⁴ In epic, madness seems, on a first impression, non-existent. This misleading impression is derived from the fact that there is no suggestion, or explicit mention of madness as a serious mental derangement. Another important consideration that would explain this uncertainty that surrounds madness in Homer is language. The Homeric language used to describe mental processes differs significantly from that of tragedy, since no differentiation is made between organs of thinking and organs of feeling and emotion. Nevertheless, the folly in certain acts of the warriors is noted (Homer, , Il. 19.87ff., 6.232–6)Google Scholar, while strange, unusual, or wild activity is frequently remarked upon, and the gods are always thought its agents [Od. 23.11–14; cf. 9.410f., 14.178f.].

⁵ See below, on Aischylos' presentation of Orestes' situation in Choephoroi and Eumenides.

⁶ Conflict, perhaps the most prominent root of madness, is a very important, if implicit, element in the Homeric tales. For a discussion of this, see Simon, B., Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece (Ithaca and London, 1978), pp. 66ffGoogle Scholar. In tragedy there seems to be continuity not only in the development of certain Homeric words into terms denoting madness, but also of this notion lurking in epic that conflict results in madness. Although the chorus in Aias believe in the traditional explanation of a divinity causing madness (cf. Soph, . Ai. 172ffGoogle Scholar., esp. 185), in Tekmessa's descriptions Aias' madness is revealed as his own reaction to his situation, emerging from inside him. Athena is presented merely as the external trigger, while Sophokles' psychological insight into Aias' inner world in conflict with his external circumstances points to the real reasons for his insanity.

⁷ Knox, B. M. W., ‘The Ajax of Sophokles’, HSCP 65 (1961), 1–39, p. 5Google Scholar.

⁸ For a more thorough discussion of this, see my chapter on the presentation of madness in Bacchai: ‘A Testcase’, in The Presentation of Emotions in Euripidean Tragedy, Ph.D thesis (London University, 1991)Google Scholar.

⁹ The newly found concentration on ν⋯σος extends to cover not only the incident of Aias' raving attack (Soph, . Ai. 59, 66, 271, 274, 452)Google Scholar, but also his state after it (Soph, . Ai. 581f., 609, 425., 635)Google Scholar. Aias is not raving mad any more, but neither is he seen as cured. Madness, rather than a single incident, is now portrayed as a disease with stages.

¹⁰ Summarized evidence for this can be found in Willis (op. cit.) and Kleinmuntz (op. cit.) ai in my thesis (n. 8), pp. 12–14; 36–42, 53, 61.

¹¹ These physiological symptoms are predominant in the Hippokratic Writings. For example and a brief discussion, see pp. 52–4 of my thesis.

¹² Bond's insistence, however, that ‘it is nevertheless made up of genuine epileptic symptoms as well as the general tendency to argue that Euripides wanted in Herakles to draw the portra of an epileptic, is mistaken. For a discussion of this, see pp. 71–3 of my thesis.

¹³ Gregory, J. W., ‘Madness in the Herakles, Orestes and Bacchae: A Study in Euripidea Drama’, Ph.D unpubl. diss. (Harvard, 1974), ch. 2, p. 42Google Scholar.

¹⁴ See below in the concluding section, on literal description of the manifestations of madne and detailed emotional portrayal of the mad characters.

¹⁵ ταραχ⋯ is often associated withΦρ⋯νες [cf. Pind. Od. 7.30/Aisch. Ch. 1056].

¹⁶ See, for instance, Epidemics iii, case 4.

¹⁷ Definition and description from Willis (op. cit.), pp. 4, 34–5.

¹⁸ Orestes' paranoid condition is emphasized by the play's noticeable shifts from health to disease, sanity to madness, reality to delusion. For a more detailed discussion of this, see Zeitlin, F., ‘The Closet of Masks: Role-playing and Myth-making in the Orestes of Euripides’, Ramus 9, no. 1 (1980), 51–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The fact that drama is by its very nature episodical and selective emphasizes even more that Orestes only episodically reaches a degree of abnormality that amounts to certifiable insanity – which is one of the characteristics in modern psychological definitions of a paranoid psychopath. Willis (op. cit.), pp. 6, 47; Fish (op. cit.), pp. 69, 71, 138–9.

¹⁹ The unusual and dramatically effective scene with Iris and Lyssa dispels any doubts as to whether it was Hera's revengeful hate that wished and caused it. Hera's hostility is briefly introduced in the prologue (20), and acknowledged by everybody towards the end of the play (Eur, . Her. 1189, 1253, 1263–8, 1303–10, 1311f., 1393)Google Scholar.

²⁰ This very important theme of ν⋯σος is introduced from early on, in the first lines of Elektra's prologue. Although, as Elektra herself is aware, such attitudes and crimes as she is describing are all part of human nature ⋯νθρώπου ς⋯σις), this long line of criminal ancestors seems to imply a tendency for repetition of criminal behaviour. Fuqua, C. in ‘The World of Myth in Euripides' Orestes’, Traditio 34 (1978), 1–28Google Scholar comments: ‘the sickness motif which is to prove so important for evaluating Orestes' conduct for the remainder of the play is introduced in terms of its mythological archetype. It should be noted that at the same time Elektra parallels these various sequences of events from different generations, she also expresses doubts about their propriety, 4–5, 14, 17, 26–7. In this way the ambiguity of the present situation is seen as having its analogues in the past’ (p. 9). Also, the chorus refer to Orestes' matricide as ν⋯σος (831–3), and his frantic attempts to justify his crime τ⋯ δ' κακουργεȋν) they call κακοΦρ⋯νων ⋯νδρ⋯ν παρ⋯νοια (823f.).

²¹ C. W. Willink in his commentary (ad loc.) believes that ‘It is more important to appreciate the paradoxical use of language and interplay of themes than to ask whether Or. is “truly remorseful” in the sense “repentant”.’ While appreciating the splendid use of language and the ingenious interplay of themes is undoubtedly important, it seems to me equally so that we address the question of whether Orestes is experiencing guilt or not. In fact, it seems to me that this very ingenuity and complexity of language are there for a purpose. When Euripides, as Willink says, ‘indulges in sophistical word-play (σ⋯νεσις … σ⋯νοιδα, implying συνε⋯δησις)’, he must be, indeed, counting on the ‘echo of the sophistical view that συνε⋯δησις may be πολ⋯μιον τῷ συνειδ⋯τι (Antiph. 5.93)’. I believe that Euripides intended the question of the presence of guilt in Orestes to be asked, and in fact he gives us several clues as to the answer. Willink himself goes on to remark: ‘he does not use the vb μεταγινώσκειν or related words (cf. S. Phil. 1270); and even in his “saner” moments (as 280–300) we feel that he would do the same thing again, given the appropriate ⋯λπ⋯ς. His apologia to Tyndareus is notably “unrepentant”.’

²⁴ The same is true of Aias in Sophokles' play. In both plays the suggestion that the protagonists are mad even when not in the midst of a mad attack, that they have no way out of madness, is very strong. Aias' delusion has a recovery (305–11). But the doubt expressed by the chorus (337f.) introduces the idea that Aias is not back to health and complete sanity (344 ⋯ν⋯ρ Φρονεȋν ἒοικεν). He is ἒμΦρων (306, cf. 259), but this does not necessarily mean he is in his right mind. His attack is of specified duration and dies down, but the same cannot be said for his disease in general.

²⁸ There, the repressed feelings will be set free when Dionysos drives Pentheus out of his Φρονοȋν (cf. Eur, . Ba. 853Google Scholar, and ἒκστησον Φρεν⋯ν (850)). As he is at 851 Φρον⋯ν εὖ, Pentheus will never accept his repressed emotions and admit his repressed fantasies. Once in ⋯λαΦρ⋯ν λ⋯σσαν he loses the defensive control. For further discussion of this see my thesis, pp. 118–20.

²⁴ ‘A good medical term for the emotional upset that can bring on disease.’ Smith, W. D., ‘Disease in the Orestes’, Hermes 95 (1967), 291–307, p. 297Google Scholar.

²⁵ V. A. Rodgers comments: ‘It is I think this internal awareness expressed in the word synesis, rather than the strange use of the word itself, which puzzles Menelaos. Or.'s affliction has been attributed earlier in the play both by others and by himself to the θε⋯ς, 37–8.… But in reply to Men.'s question he refers not primarily to these externalised agents of madness, but to synesis, an inner consciousness. This concept Men. fails to grasp since, as his question to Or. implies, he understands his plight in terms of something external destroying him. This is why he is much happier when Or. talks of λ⋯πη … since this can be understood as a form of nosos which, because it is caused from without, can be cured…’ ‘Σ⋯νεσις and the Expression of Conscience’, GRBS 10 (1969), 241–54, p. 254Google Scholar.

²⁶ Rodgers (op. cit.) also seems to agree that Orestes experiences no conscious feeling of guilt. ‘Orestes is in obvious distress, and describes his condition as λ⋯πη. But can one, even so, talk justifiably, in Orestes' case, of a guilty conscience in any sense? The adjective he uses to describe his deed is δειν⋯ς, a word which appears to bear no moral connotations at all, being used of things which are extraordinary or monstrous. What he is conscious of is the full horror of the deed, a feeling which need have nothing to do with awareness of culpability or with moral guilt’ (p. 250).

²⁷ Smith (op. cit.) believes that what is meant by σ⋯νεσις is ‘the conscious knowledge of evil action, which may destroy moral sensibility rather than bring healing remorse’. He also points out that σ⋯νεσις–ν⋯σος is an oxymoron. ‘The terms are opposed in medical writings as in common speech, and synesis is what delirium destroys’ (p. 297).

²⁸ Willink's commentary (ad loc.): ‘it throws a revealing light on Orestes’ readiness to commit crimes of violence, given the appropriate ⋯λπ⋯ς …’.

²⁹ A notable example is Euripides' presentation of ἒρως in Hippolytos and Medea, where traditional notions relating to the external nature of eros are juxtaposed with the characters' own interpretation for their situation, for which they assume personal responsibility. For quotes and discussion, see p. 143 of my thesis.

³⁰ For an illustration of this, see pp. 143–4 of my thesis.

³¹ The split, after Homer, of emotion from intellect (see below, n. 46), creates a threat of vulnerability to the intellectual self aspiring at αὐτ⋯ρκεια. A detached and negative attitude towards emotions results from this and perseveres to modern day. It does not consist, however, only of resentment and contempt for this obstacle to self-control and possession. Its strongest characteristic is fear. The self-conscious observation of the emotional process results in a growing awareness that the responsibility for emotions lies with the individual, and not an external agency. While the person always feels the victim of whatever it is that happens to him, the observation of his experience gradually makes him realize that the ‘to’ is no longer indicative of something coming from outside, caused externally. Emotion is now π⋯θος, still expressive of the passivity but not a god's ἃτη or the work of a daimon.

³² I am following Willink here in his suggestion that: ‘257–9 would be better in the sequence 258–9–7: 255–6 have left it open whether Or. is “seeing” or merely “fearing to see” the Furies; El. attempts to calm him by denying his visions, and Or. counters with “Yes (I do see them) for (…) here they come galloping near me”.’ The suggestion that lines ‘260–7 would be better in the sequence 260–1–4–5–2–3–6–7’ is also highly plausible.

³³ There is indeed a possibility that it was Aischylos who developed the Erinyes into the very goddesses of madness. See O'Brien-Moore, A., Madness in Ancient Literature (Weimar, 1924), pp. 75–82Google Scholar.

³⁴ Orestes is influenced by both his sister (Eur, . Or. 211–315, 1018–50Google Scholar; also 615–21) as well as Pylades, (Or. 1069–1224)Google Scholar.

³⁵ This is an excellent illustration of the results of the reluctance/incapability to face up to responsibility for one's own emotions and emotional motivation. See n. 31 above.

³⁶ ‘The silence of a mute actor, is worth drawing attention to if the dramatic reason for it overshadows the technical one. But unless something previously unnoticed is happening at Or. 1591–2, the opposite situation obtains: there is only a technical reason for Pylades' silence, all the more reason, one would think, for letting it pass unnoticed.’ Nisetich, F. J., ‘The Silencing of Pyiades’, AJP 107 (1986), 46–54, p. 49Google Scholar n. 14.

³⁷ δ⋯ξαιμι stresses the ironical ambiguity. See Zeitlin (op. cit.), esp. pp. 51ff. and 70ff.

³⁸ Simon (op. cit.), p. 124.

³⁹ Barlow, S. A., ‘Sophokles’ Ajax and Euripides', Herakles', Ramus 10 no. 2 (1981), 112–28, p. 119Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Note the acceptance of his tears (Her. 1353–7).

⁴¹ Theseus, (Her. 1240ffGoogle Scholar., cf. especially 1249: νουθετεȋς), asks his friend to have patience and acceptance and not yield to θυμ⋯ς (Her. 1246). What is also remarkable is the difference of attitudes regarding pollution in the two plays. While Pylades is indeed prepared to ignore it for the sake of his friendship with Orestes (cf. Or. 793f.), Theseus himself believes that Φιλ⋯α itself is capable of overpowering the transmission of such pollution: οὐδε⋯ς ⋯λ⋯στωρ τοîς Φ⋯λοις ⋯κ τ⋯ν Φ⋯λων (Her. 1234).

⁴² For a discussion of Euripides' presentation of inexpressibility, see pp. 126–7 and esp. 257–60 of my thesis.

⁴³ Summarized evidence in the introduction to my thesis, pp. 8–11.

⁴⁴ Another example of Euripides' re-evaluation of madness is the case of Kassandra in Troiades, discussed in my thesis, pp. 58–61.

⁴⁵ Obvious, for instance, in: Herakles, in the hero's acceptance of emotion as an essential part of his nature and its portrayal as a kind of therapy for his madness; in Alkestis, in the presentation of the heroine's emotional motivation and admirable composure, which strips away any negativism against emotion as uncontrollable and disastrous; also, in the same play, Euripides' presentation of love (Φιλ⋯α) as a mutual rewarding and constructive feeling. His portrayals of perversions of emotional relationships are also detectable instances of reevaluation. For examples and discussion, see p. 246 of my thesis.

⁴⁶ In Homer there is no separate mental and emotional functioning. Thought is one with feeling, which is accompanied with the urge to act (cf. Il. 24.197ff.). O n the contrary, for us, as well as for the classical Athenian, emotion remains motivating, bu t intellect an d emotion are separated. Understanding a n emotion is seen as a function independent from the actual experience of the feeling.

⁴⁷ Examples other than in Orestes could include the presentation of Phaidra's passion in Hippolytos; Bacchai, where the downfall of Pentheus is either through his own ⋯μαρτ⋯αι or through the will of Dionysos; or even Medea, where several layers of motivation produce different nuances for both Jason's an d Medea's actions.

⁴⁸ Classical Greek's realization of emotion as internal π⋯θος offers no help towards understanding the inexplicability or managing the uncontrollability of emotions. Man's fear of his emotions emerges as he becomes increasingly aware of his responsibility for something he can barely control.