¹ The most significant exception is Mouze, L., Chasse à l'homme et faux-semblants dans le Sophiste de Platon (Paris, 2020), 171–8Google Scholar. Mouze argues that the frame, including the Glaucus episode, underscores the divinity of the philosopher as opposed to the mere humanity of the sophist in order to communicate a straightforward ethical lesson to the reader about the relative value of each. Similarly, S. Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful: Plato's Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman (Chicago, 1984), 2.167 suggests that the Glaucus reference simply emphasizes that the sophist is not divine. I will argue that the reference to family ties serves instead to complicate the relationship between philosopher and sophist, and to bring the reader's attention to the similarities that allow for misidentification in the first place. Iber, C., Platon: Sophistes (Frankfurt, 2007), 460Google Scholar and Notomi, N., The Unity of Plato's Sophist: Between the Sophist and the Philosopher (Cambridge, 1999), 296CrossRefGoogle Scholar n. 44 suggest that the Glaucus reference is an example of ring composition but do not discuss the reference otherwise.

² Frede, M., ‘The literary form of the Sophist’, in C. Gill and M.M. McCabe (edd.), Form and Argument in Late Plato (Oxford, 1996), 135–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar does not discuss the frame or the references to Homer but does arrive at a similar conclusion about how the dialogue is designed to avoid mere arguments by authority.

³ Translations are my own, based on the most recent Oxford Classical Texts volume.

⁴ The quoted formula appears again at Il. 20.241. This time it comes in the mouth of Aeneas when he is challenging Achilles. I will focus on the first instance given its stronger parallels with the themes of misidentification and of guest-friendship or ξενία. That said, Tyler Jordan suggests to me that Plato may be playing with the polysemy of the line being deployed in contexts both of friendship and of animosity, perhaps highlighting the different reactions we see between Achilles and Diomedes. In Section V I suggest that these Homeric references are designed to shift under their own weight and complicate a more straightforward reading of the text.

⁵ γένος is also used in the Iliad, including at 6.209, just two lines before the line that Plato quotes.

⁶ T. Jordan, ‘The gift in the Iliad’ (MA Thesis, Western University, 2020) points out how the Glaucus episode is importantly different from other scenes of gift exchange. Chapter 3 offers an in-depth discussion of the episode as well as a helpful summary of recent interpretations.

⁷ Esses, D., ‘Philosophic appearance and sophistic essence in Plato's Sophist: a new reading of the definitions’, AncPhil 39 (2019), 295–317Google Scholar.

⁸ It may be that sophists in the Platonic sense can be seen as philosophers in a contemporary sense; thus G. Striker, ‘Methods of sophistry’, in G. Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge, 1996), 3–21. Similarly, it may be that the contemporary ‘sophist’ label should be applied equally to Socrates, as in A. Laks and G.W. Most (edd.), Early Greek Philosophy, vol. VIII (Cambridge, MA, 2016). Still, there is a distinct Platonic sense of ‘sophist’ and ‘philosopher’ at issue in the dialogue in which the two should not be so easily identified, otherwise it would be difficult to make sense of misidentifying one for the other.

⁹ Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge also fits with Diotima's famous point from the Symposium that one can only be a true lover of wisdom if they do not yet have it and are aware of its absence (204a1–b7). The final division of the Sophist suggests that this is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for being a philosopher since a sophist can recognize their ignorance but desire to appear wise above actually being wise. For more on Socrates, Plato, and contemporaneous conceptions of philosophy see Moore, C., Calling Philosophers Names: On the Origin of a Discipline (Princeton, 2020), especially ch. 6 and 8CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Peterson, S., Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato (Cambridge, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Since these divisions are meant to be exhaustive, the category ‘divine production of images’ will be broad, encompassing any production that is not of an original nor the product of a human being. Some of these images, e.g. reflections on smooth surfaces, will depend on the way that different objects interact with each other (266c1–4). It may not be a coincidence that the divine realm of the philosopher and surfaces that cause reflections are both described as ‘bright’ or ‘clear’ (λαμπρός, 254a9, 266c2). Socrates’ appearance of wisdom is not an original, because Socrates is not in fact wise. Because Socrates, unlike the sophist, does not intend to appear wise, it is not the product of human production in any straightforward sense either.

¹¹ In addition to the outer framing and the final division of the sophist, the contrast is also found at 254a4–b1, where the location of the philosopher, as opposed to that of the sophist, is called ‘divine’.

¹² The final distinction in the fifth division leaves us with those who engage in this kind of conversation for pleasure on the one hand and for profit on the other. The latter are sophists, the former are engaged in a sort of ‘prattle’, ἀδολεσχία, which is associated with Socrates both in Plato and in Greek comedy (cf. Tht. 195b10, Phdr. 269e4–270d8, Plt. 299b6–8, Prm. 135d5, Phd. 70b10–c3; Eupolis fr. 386 K.–A.; Procl. In Prm. 1.656–8).

¹³ This division has received much attention for its similarities to Socratic practice. Zaks, N., ‘Éristique et refutation socratique dans le Sophiste de Platon’, in S. Delcomminette and G. Lachance (edd.), L’Éristique : Définitions, caractérisations, historicité (Brussels, 2021), 267–88Google Scholar argues that the sixth division describes true Socratic refutation as opposed to the merely apparent refutations of the sophist highlighted elsewhere in the dialogue.

¹⁴ Plato has Socrates make the same point at Cra. 390c10–11. In the Republic Socrates actually uses the superlative ‘most knowledgeably’. This claim is consistent with there being other skills that enable one to ask and answer questions knowledgeably, just not as knowledgeably as the dialectician. See also Meno 75c4–d7.

¹⁵ Plato portrays Protagoras as competent at question and answer in addition to long speeches (Prt. 329b1–5, 334e4–336d5, 338e6–339e1; cf. Diogenes Laertius’ claim that Protagoras introduced ‘the Socratic form of arguments’ at 9.53 = D15 Laks-Most). Plato suggests that Gorgias boasted of being able to answer any question put to him at Meno 70b5–c3 and Grg. 447b9–449c8. He has Hippias make a similar boast in the Hippias Minor (363c7–d4, 373a9–c5; cf. Prt. 315c5–7, Hp. mai. 287a8–b3). Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, on the other hand, are portrayed as claiming to be able to refute an answerer no matter what (Euthyd. 275b7–e6, 276d1–e7). They are also portrayed as able to give answers so as to avoid being refuted (cf. 294d1–7) though not with complete success in their discussion with Socrates (e.g. 287b6–d6, 295b4–e3). The dialogue does also give hints that locate Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ skill as a kind of private battle in words (272a8, 305d5–7) employing the same language used to describe ἀντιλογική in the Sophist (225a9–b12).

¹⁶ Like the Sophist, this passage at the end of Republic Book 2 goes on to address the nature of false statements and false thoughts more broadly, though in this case they relate to the activity of the gods rather than the activity of sophists.